My OperaA Word on the Palestinian Statehood Bid
Monday, September 12, 2011 7:52:07 AM
Hello,
If you don’t have much patience for the intricacies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this one is going to bore you. I’ll try to be short about it.
Palestine is, by some standards of international law, already a state: it has a functioning central (albeit unelected and illegitimate) government, it’s a member in regional organizations like the Arab League, and it has the capacity to enter into relations with other states. It is not a UN member state, but an "observer entity," one rank under the "permanent observer state" status of the Vatican. It doesn’t show up on any maps made in the US, except sometimes as “Occupied Palestinian Territories,” demarcated by dashed lines along the 1967 borders. And since Palestine is occupied, it lacks one basic mark of statehood, sovereignty: it cannot control its airspace or borders (meaning the West Bank and Gaza Strip are subject to nightly raids by the Israeli military or worse), it cannot issue visas, and it cannot take action to defend itself either legally or militarily. Perhaps that explains, but probably too succinctly, why the Palestinian statehood initiative is all the rage right now.
The bid is not a surprise to anyone. Palestinian PM Salaam Fayyad said in 2009 that his state-institution-building plan would be complete by September 2011 and President Obama explicitly stated his desire to see a Palestinian state emerge by the same month. To go further back to a more important date, UN Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan from 1947) calls for the creation of two states, one Jewish and one Palestinian. Israel declared independence on May 15, 1948. Palestine never did, for reasons either too obvious or too complex (depending on who’s reading this) to explain. The statehood bid is designed to create a Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967—that means the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—with East Jerusalem as its capital.
As it stands now, about 130 of 193 UN member states (including India and China and 13 others of the world’s 20 most populous countries) have confirmed they will vote for Palestinian statehood, with more expected to join the camp. The US has said it will veto the statehood bid in the Security Council in order to defend Israel. Other no votes likely include Germany, Italy, Canada, and the Marshall Islands. But it gets a lot more complicated than that.
Talking about Palestine in reference only to the 1967 territories is pretty silly, not least because the West Bank and Gaza comprise only 22% of what was once “historic Palestine” (that means current-day Israel). Talking about Palestinians is equally silly, because 70% of the people are refugees—they live in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank, Gaza, Kuwait, Chile, Argentina, etc. At 5 million people, they are the largest refugee community in the world. My landlord is a refugee, my falafel guy is a refugee, everyone’s a refugee. I hope that’s not a song lyric. This is one of the nicer places where the refugees (and I) live:
Since the only representation of all these displaced people—all of whom rightfully claim their UN-sanctioned right of return to their homes, which are now mostly bulldozed lots in Israel—rests with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), it is that organization that most accountably makes decisions (or should) on behalf of “Palestine.” There is major concern among Palestinians that the PLO will be replaced by a “State of Palestine” at the UN, to the disenfranchisement of five million people. Those who subscribe to this idea have justifiably little faith that those in the Palestinian leadership (Mahmoud Abbas and his ilk) will carry on the fight for refugee rights once a Palestinian state has been established. They remember finding out, thanks to the Palestine Papers, how few refugees Abbas actually wanted to resettle in their former homes when he was negotiating final status issues with the Israelis back in 2008. It was something like three percent. Cynics of the statehood bid see Abbas as something of a traitor to the Palestinian cause who will throw the refugees under the bus (to be fair, they’re pretty well-acquainted with the underside of the bus) as soon as a state is declared. They want to know exactly what is contained in the application for statehood, and to his discredit Abbas is not forthcoming. They fear, in the words of one very well-spoken Palestinian named Akram, that this is the worst mistake the Palestinian leadership has made since the 1994 Oslo Accords, which split up the West Bank and turned the PA into a subcontractor for Israel.
Here is Mustafa Barghouthi, one of the least-reviled (but still somewhat reviled) politicians of Palestine, seated on the far right explaining why he’s for the statehood bid:
If the statehood bid is a long-term strategy, it’s miserable for the above reason. But if it’s step one of a clever maneuver to isolate Israel, delegitimize the occupation, end settlement and enforce the right of return, then it’s brilliant—and as an outsider and optimist, I have to think that’s what Abbas is doing. It’s working on the first count, at least: Israeli leaders have done nothing to avert what Defense Minister Ehud Barak tastelessly called, two days after the Japanese tsunami, a diplomatic tsunami. The state seems to have no plan but to rely on the US veto in the Security Council, issue militant pronouncements about September, and flail for the best. Israelis rightly fear that Palestinian membership in the UN will lead to its signature on the Rome Statute, which in turn leads to the possibility of prosecution of numerous Israeli war crimes at the International Criminal Court. Netanyahu, Barak, and (former Israeli PM Ehud) Olmert are rumored to be named the defendants in prospective ICC cases.
The statehood bid is not just a good tactic because it raises the prospect of ICC prosecution for such things as Operation Cast Lead, the 2008-09 Gaza massacre in which 1,400 Palestinians were killed in less than a month. It also sets the 1967 borders as the legitimate borders of Palestine—which, in case you forgot, Israel forgot. There are currently about half a million illegal Jewish settlers inside the 1967 borders (aka the Green Line), all of whom would be occupying another UN member state after the vote. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, settling civilian populations in occupied territory is a war crime. There’s no doubt Palestinian representatives at the UN would pursue the case.
All of this makes it much harder to Israel to continue the occupation—any half-sane politician would recognize the wisdom of swimming with the tsunami instead of sitting arms akimbo in a bunker. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu is not that politician. With September approaching, he authorized the distribution of tear gas, stun grenades, and attack dogs to the settlers in the West Bank, the same rabid ideologues who regularly vandalize Palestinian mosques (even IDF bases) and believe feverishly that the entirety of Israel is for Jews only, God said so. His intransigence about apologizing to Turkey for last year’s brutal raid on the Gaza-bound Mavi Marmara was compounded by his refusal to apologize to Egypt for the August cross-border raid that killed five Egyptian soldiers. If I was an Israeli, I would not feel safe with the unapologetic Netanyhau at the helm. At least one Israeli columnist rightly compared him to a drunk driver.
It’s clear to me, after only five days back, that this is not exactly the same Bethlehem I left. There aren’t major shifts visible yet—traffic flows freely, nobody’s cut off the water yet, the checkpoints are still functioning at full speed. I think the Israeli watchtower outside my window has its light on more often. I chatted with two shopkeepers, both of whom are pessimistic about September’s blow to Bethlehem’s crucial tourist industry. One of them mentioned war, the other one said probably not, just a lockdown of the West Bank. Other Palestinians speak much more vaguely about “troubles” or “difficulties” ahead, and I doubt they know much more specifics than I. Probably the most worrying comment I heard was during a statehood discussion at the Alternative Information Center, from some obnoxious wannabe Maoist (opposed to the statehood bid), who said the popular struggle could not discount the gun among its options. He was pretty widely glared at.
I’m out here working for whoever will take me (volunteering for PNN, minus the old boss), ostensibly stringing for the Christian Science Monitor but with no stories to speak of yet. My finances are unpredictable, to write a hilarious euphemism. I have a couple new friends and a couple old friends, but sociality takes a big backseat to what I want to call my serious mindset—specifically the infuriatingly thick moral-political lens that renders it impossible to make a cheese sandwich here and not consider the consequences. The roof is still a quiet place to relax, the hummus is still murderously good, and people still walk around in Jerusalem with huge loaded guns.
The wall has some new decoration:
I’m glad to be back, but more than that I’m ready to get to work. I’d like to update this blog more regularly as this second tour of Palestine goes on and I hope you keep up with me. Thank you for reading.
Best,
Brendan
If you don’t have much patience for the intricacies of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this one is going to bore you. I’ll try to be short about it.
Palestine is, by some standards of international law, already a state: it has a functioning central (albeit unelected and illegitimate) government, it’s a member in regional organizations like the Arab League, and it has the capacity to enter into relations with other states. It is not a UN member state, but an "observer entity," one rank under the "permanent observer state" status of the Vatican. It doesn’t show up on any maps made in the US, except sometimes as “Occupied Palestinian Territories,” demarcated by dashed lines along the 1967 borders. And since Palestine is occupied, it lacks one basic mark of statehood, sovereignty: it cannot control its airspace or borders (meaning the West Bank and Gaza Strip are subject to nightly raids by the Israeli military or worse), it cannot issue visas, and it cannot take action to defend itself either legally or militarily. Perhaps that explains, but probably too succinctly, why the Palestinian statehood initiative is all the rage right now.
The bid is not a surprise to anyone. Palestinian PM Salaam Fayyad said in 2009 that his state-institution-building plan would be complete by September 2011 and President Obama explicitly stated his desire to see a Palestinian state emerge by the same month. To go further back to a more important date, UN Resolution 181 (the Partition Plan from 1947) calls for the creation of two states, one Jewish and one Palestinian. Israel declared independence on May 15, 1948. Palestine never did, for reasons either too obvious or too complex (depending on who’s reading this) to explain. The statehood bid is designed to create a Palestinian state on the borders of June 4, 1967—that means the West Bank and the Gaza Strip—with East Jerusalem as its capital.
As it stands now, about 130 of 193 UN member states (including India and China and 13 others of the world’s 20 most populous countries) have confirmed they will vote for Palestinian statehood, with more expected to join the camp. The US has said it will veto the statehood bid in the Security Council in order to defend Israel. Other no votes likely include Germany, Italy, Canada, and the Marshall Islands. But it gets a lot more complicated than that.
Talking about Palestine in reference only to the 1967 territories is pretty silly, not least because the West Bank and Gaza comprise only 22% of what was once “historic Palestine” (that means current-day Israel). Talking about Palestinians is equally silly, because 70% of the people are refugees—they live in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, the West Bank, Gaza, Kuwait, Chile, Argentina, etc. At 5 million people, they are the largest refugee community in the world. My landlord is a refugee, my falafel guy is a refugee, everyone’s a refugee. I hope that’s not a song lyric. This is one of the nicer places where the refugees (and I) live:
Since the only representation of all these displaced people—all of whom rightfully claim their UN-sanctioned right of return to their homes, which are now mostly bulldozed lots in Israel—rests with the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), it is that organization that most accountably makes decisions (or should) on behalf of “Palestine.” There is major concern among Palestinians that the PLO will be replaced by a “State of Palestine” at the UN, to the disenfranchisement of five million people. Those who subscribe to this idea have justifiably little faith that those in the Palestinian leadership (Mahmoud Abbas and his ilk) will carry on the fight for refugee rights once a Palestinian state has been established. They remember finding out, thanks to the Palestine Papers, how few refugees Abbas actually wanted to resettle in their former homes when he was negotiating final status issues with the Israelis back in 2008. It was something like three percent. Cynics of the statehood bid see Abbas as something of a traitor to the Palestinian cause who will throw the refugees under the bus (to be fair, they’re pretty well-acquainted with the underside of the bus) as soon as a state is declared. They want to know exactly what is contained in the application for statehood, and to his discredit Abbas is not forthcoming. They fear, in the words of one very well-spoken Palestinian named Akram, that this is the worst mistake the Palestinian leadership has made since the 1994 Oslo Accords, which split up the West Bank and turned the PA into a subcontractor for Israel.
Here is Mustafa Barghouthi, one of the least-reviled (but still somewhat reviled) politicians of Palestine, seated on the far right explaining why he’s for the statehood bid:
If the statehood bid is a long-term strategy, it’s miserable for the above reason. But if it’s step one of a clever maneuver to isolate Israel, delegitimize the occupation, end settlement and enforce the right of return, then it’s brilliant—and as an outsider and optimist, I have to think that’s what Abbas is doing. It’s working on the first count, at least: Israeli leaders have done nothing to avert what Defense Minister Ehud Barak tastelessly called, two days after the Japanese tsunami, a diplomatic tsunami. The state seems to have no plan but to rely on the US veto in the Security Council, issue militant pronouncements about September, and flail for the best. Israelis rightly fear that Palestinian membership in the UN will lead to its signature on the Rome Statute, which in turn leads to the possibility of prosecution of numerous Israeli war crimes at the International Criminal Court. Netanyahu, Barak, and (former Israeli PM Ehud) Olmert are rumored to be named the defendants in prospective ICC cases.
The statehood bid is not just a good tactic because it raises the prospect of ICC prosecution for such things as Operation Cast Lead, the 2008-09 Gaza massacre in which 1,400 Palestinians were killed in less than a month. It also sets the 1967 borders as the legitimate borders of Palestine—which, in case you forgot, Israel forgot. There are currently about half a million illegal Jewish settlers inside the 1967 borders (aka the Green Line), all of whom would be occupying another UN member state after the vote. Under the Fourth Geneva Convention, settling civilian populations in occupied territory is a war crime. There’s no doubt Palestinian representatives at the UN would pursue the case.
All of this makes it much harder to Israel to continue the occupation—any half-sane politician would recognize the wisdom of swimming with the tsunami instead of sitting arms akimbo in a bunker. Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu is not that politician. With September approaching, he authorized the distribution of tear gas, stun grenades, and attack dogs to the settlers in the West Bank, the same rabid ideologues who regularly vandalize Palestinian mosques (even IDF bases) and believe feverishly that the entirety of Israel is for Jews only, God said so. His intransigence about apologizing to Turkey for last year’s brutal raid on the Gaza-bound Mavi Marmara was compounded by his refusal to apologize to Egypt for the August cross-border raid that killed five Egyptian soldiers. If I was an Israeli, I would not feel safe with the unapologetic Netanyhau at the helm. At least one Israeli columnist rightly compared him to a drunk driver.
It’s clear to me, after only five days back, that this is not exactly the same Bethlehem I left. There aren’t major shifts visible yet—traffic flows freely, nobody’s cut off the water yet, the checkpoints are still functioning at full speed. I think the Israeli watchtower outside my window has its light on more often. I chatted with two shopkeepers, both of whom are pessimistic about September’s blow to Bethlehem’s crucial tourist industry. One of them mentioned war, the other one said probably not, just a lockdown of the West Bank. Other Palestinians speak much more vaguely about “troubles” or “difficulties” ahead, and I doubt they know much more specifics than I. Probably the most worrying comment I heard was during a statehood discussion at the Alternative Information Center, from some obnoxious wannabe Maoist (opposed to the statehood bid), who said the popular struggle could not discount the gun among its options. He was pretty widely glared at.
I’m out here working for whoever will take me (volunteering for PNN, minus the old boss), ostensibly stringing for the Christian Science Monitor but with no stories to speak of yet. My finances are unpredictable, to write a hilarious euphemism. I have a couple new friends and a couple old friends, but sociality takes a big backseat to what I want to call my serious mindset—specifically the infuriatingly thick moral-political lens that renders it impossible to make a cheese sandwich here and not consider the consequences. The roof is still a quiet place to relax, the hummus is still murderously good, and people still walk around in Jerusalem with huge loaded guns.
The wall has some new decoration:
I’m glad to be back, but more than that I’m ready to get to work. I’d like to update this blog more regularly as this second tour of Palestine goes on and I hope you keep up with me. Thank you for reading.
Best,
Brendan
