Posts tagged with "hacker"
Sunday, 13. May 2007, 14:16:48
SECURITY, hacker
TTO - Một chuyên gia bảo mật người Ấn Độ cảnh báo cơ chế chống lừa đảo qua bàn phím ảo mới của ngân hàng Citibank có thể dễ dàng bị hacker “đập vỡ” và lấy đi những thông tin nhạy cảm của khách hàng.
Cơ chế bàn phím ảo của CitibankBàn phím ảo cho phép khách hàng nhập số thể và IPIN một cách an toàn hơn. Nhưng theo hacker Yash K.S, tin tặc có thể dễ dàng vượt qua cơ chế này để thu thập những thông tin nhạy cảm khi họ nhập vào.
Để qua được cơ chế này, hacker có thể sử dụng chức năng Win32 APIs để lấy các hình ảnh về tên sử dụng, mật khẩu, số thẻ tín dụng, số pin và bất kỳ thông tin gì khi người dùng nhập vào bàn phím ảo.
Thông tin chi tiết có thể
tham khảo tại đây.
M.PHI (Theo ZDNET)
Monday, 7. May 2007, 11:55:15
hacker, life
(Quantrimang) Cạnh tranh không lại với các website đối thủ, nhiều doanh nghiệp hợp pháp đã quyết định bỏ chỗ sáng, tìm chỗ... tối khi tìm đến cậy nhờ hacker.
Sự gia tăng đột biến của các vụ tấn công phá hoại nhằm vào các doanh nghiệp cụ thể trong thời gian qua cho phép người ta suy đoán rằng: bọn tội phạm mạng đang từ bỏ dần việc "nã rocket" tràn lan vào mạng Internet.
Một phần nguyên do được chỉ ra là vì hành động này tiềm ẩn nguy cơ cao, nhưng cũng có nhiều chuyên gia cho rằng, bọn chúng vì tiền mà chuyển sang "phá hoại có mục đích".
Hacker nào cũng phải có vũ khí, và thông thường nhất, vũ khí của chúng chính là mạng lưới các máy tính bị hijack (tấn công) - mà theo thuật ngữ vẫn gọi là botnet. Trước đây, Hacker thường sử dụng botnet để tiến hành các vụ tấn công Từ chối dịch vụ: hạ gục một site hoặc máy chủ nào đó bằng cách dội bom nó với một khối lượng dữ liệu khổng lồ.
Các site cờ bạc trực tuyến nằm trong số những nạn nhân đầu tiên: bọn tội phạm mạng đe dọa sẽ tấn công DDoS nếu như "nạn nhân" không chịu chi cho chúng một khoản tiền kha khá.
Nhưng theo hãng bảo mật Symantec, họ đã chứng kiến một sự "sụt giảm đáng kể" về số lượng các vụ tấn công tống tiền kiểu này trong thời gian qua.
"Tấn công tống tiền không còn mang lại nhiều lợi nhuận nữa, vì hạ gục một website thông qua DDoS vừa ầm ĩ, vừa mạo hiểm". Nhiều mạng botnet giờ đã chuyển sang phát tán thư rác - một nhiệm vụ vừa kiếm chác tốt hơn, lại vừa ít rủi ro hơn.
Đi theo tiếng gọi đồng tiền
Không đồng tình với nhận định này, ông Paul Sop, Giám đốc công nghệ của hãng Prolexic cho rằng chưa bao giờ, các vụ tấn công DDoS lại phổ biến như hiện nay.
"Sự sụt giảm mà Symantec ghi nhận chỉ diễn ra trong một khoảng thời gian ngắn, và nó là một sự dừng tay chiến lược của bọn tội phạm trong cuộc chạy đua vũ trang với các hãng bảo mật. Khi bọn chúng cảm thấy nguy hiểm, chúng lập tức thay đổi chiến thuật ngay".
Không có lý do gì để cho rằng tấn công DDoS không còn mang lại lợi nhuận nữa. Không doanh nghiệp nào muốn chấm dứt sự nghiệp của mình chỉ vì tiếc một khoản tiền đưa cho hacker cả. Nhưng một khi họ đã cam chịu lần đầu tiên, không có gì đảm bảo rằng hacker sẽ không "tái diễn" hành vi tống tiền ở những lần sau.
Mặt khác, hacker đang giảm bớt các vụ tấn công tống tiền không phải vì chúng e sợ rắc rối với pháp luật. Trái lại, chỉ vì chúng dành nhiều thời gian cho việc "đánh thuê" cho các doanh nghiệp mà thôi.
"Chúng tôi đã phát hiện rất nhiều hành vi cạnh tranh không lành mạnh giữa các hãng. Nhiều doanh nghiệp đã thuê hacker tấn công website đối thủ".
Ông Sop cho biết hình thức tấn công DDoS đánh thuê kiểu này diễn ra nhiều ở châu Á - một khu vực mà Symantec vốn không hiện diện nhiều cho lắm.
"Tại châu Á, tấn công DDoS cực kỳ phổ biến. Điều thực sự đáng sợ là bạn có thể mua quyền truy cập vào một botnet với số tiền ít đến kinh ngạc và bạn có thể khiến đổi thủ của mình rớt mạng suốt một thời gian dài".
Prolexic cho biết họ đã phải mất tới 4 tháng để giúp một doanh nghiệp khách hàng chống lại các cuộc tấn công DDoS từ một băng đảng hacker được đối thủ thuê. "Quả là cách phá hoại đối thủ nhất cử lưỡng tiện".
Trọng Cầm
Theo BBC, VietNamNet
Saturday, 28. April 2007, 13:00:00
hacker
Gregg Keizer
April 27, 2007 (Computerworld) Dino Dai Zovi, the New York-based security researcher who took home $10,000 in a highly-publicized MacBook Pro hijack on April 20, has been at the center of a week's worth of controversy about the security of Apple Inc.'s operating system. In an e-mail interview with ComputerWorld, Dai Zovi talked about how finding vulnerabilities is like fishing, the chances that someone else will stumble on the still-unpatched bug, and what operating system -- Windows Vista or Mac OS X -- is the sturdiest when it comes to security.
-Friday, the vulnerability was first identified as within Safari, but by Monday, QuickTime was tagged . Why the confusion?
* I knew exactly where the vulnerability was when I wrote the exploit; that is part of the basic vulnerability research usually required to write a reliable exploit. I intentionally did not reveal where exactly the vulnerability was in order to prevent others from reverse engineering the vulnerability from those details. Initially, I was only revealing that the vulnerability affected Safari on Mac OS X, the target of the contest. However, now ZDI [3com TippingPoint's Zero Day Initiative] has been willing to publicly reveal that it affects many more system configurations, including all Java-enabled browsers on Mac OS X and Windows if QuickTime is installed.
- As you were working with the vulnerability and exploit, did you know that it would impact non-Mac OS X systems?
* I had suspected that it might affect other platforms running QuickTime, but I did not have time to look into it.
- You found the vulnerability and crafted an exploit within 9 or 10 hours. And you've said 'there was blood in the water.' Does that mean you had a head start -- in other words, prior research -- or was it all built from scratch?
* Is it really that easy to dig up a vulnerability? I had found other vulnerabilities in Mac OS X and even QuickTime in the past, so I had some familiarity with the code, but I only discovered this vulnerability that night. My quote that there was "blood in the water" referred to the fact that there were reports of other vulnerabilities in QuickTime, and even Java-related vulnerabilities in QuickTime over the last few years. In my experience, if a certain software package has had vulnerabilities in the past, it is more likely to contain other undiscovered vulnerabilities.
Halvar Flake and Dave Aitel, two prominent security researchers, use the fishing metaphor to explain vulnerability finding. Some days you go out and catch nothing, some days you catch something great. Sometimes you hear about some great fishing happening in a stream somewhere and there are lots of fish to catch until everyone else starts fishing there and the stream becomes overfished. In this case, I suspected that there would be good fishing in QuickTime and I got lucky and found something good in a short amount of time. This is far from the first time that I've gone fishing for vulnerabilities, however.
- After the positive ID of the vulnerability, there were some unconfirmed claims that your exploit had been snatched at CanSecWest. Although those reports have been discounted , what can you tell us about how you protect your findings?
* And what are the chances that someone will independently dig out the vulnerability based on the limited information made public? I do everything that I consider reasonable to protect my security research. I keep exploits in encrypted disk images that are only mounted when necessary on hardened systems that are not always powered on. I am very conservative in what details I share and with whom in order to tightly control knowledge of the vulnerabilities. I often give my exploits non-obvious code names so that I can refer to them over non-encrypted channels without revealing anything about them. [But] with the details that have been released so far, I believe that is a very real possibility that someone may be able to independently dig out the vulnerability, but it won't exactly be trivial and I hope that whoever does acts responsibly with it.
- With the ongoing 'Mac OS X is safe' vs. 'You're in denial' debate, what would you recommend to a Mac user as reasonable security precautions?
* I recommend that Mac users make their primary user a non-admin account, use a separate keychain for important passwords, and store sensitive documents in a separate encrypted disk image. I think these are fairly straightforward steps that many users can take to better protect their sensitive information on their computer.
- As a researcher who works often in Mac OS X, what's your take on the amount of information that Apple releases when it patches vulnerabilities?
* I think that the amount of information that Apple releases with its patches is sufficient in the level of detail for a knowledgeable user to determine the criticality of the vulnerabilities. They do not, however, provide guidance on the level of criticality of the security update for less technical users. I do not think this is too much of an issue, though, as I believe that the vast majority of users should simply patch the security vulnerabilities as soon as possible regardless of their criticality.
- How important in this case was it that 3com TippingPoint stepped up with a $10,000 prize?
* Would you have bothered if the prize money had not been there? For me the challenge, especially with the time constraint, was the real draw. I also hoped that the live demonstration of a Mac OS X exploit would provide some much needed hard evidence in the recent Mac security debates.
- From your research on both platforms, is there a winner between Mac OS X 10.4 and Vista on security?
* I have found the code quality, at least in terms of security, to be much better overall in Vista than Mac OS X 10.4. It is obvious from observing affected components in security patches that Microsoft's Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) has resulted in fewer vulnerabilities in newly-written code. I hope that more software vendors follow their lead in developing proactive software security development methodologies.
- What are you spending most of your time on these days? Last October, for instance, there were news stories that mentioned you showed a VM rootkit to developers at Microsoft.
* I recently co-authored a book, The Art of Software Security Testing: Identifying Software Security Flaws, which was just published by Addison-Wesley Professional in December. Also since around that time, I have been managing information security for a financial firm in New York City. I do still spend some of my free time researching software vulnerabilities, VM hypervisor rootkits, and 802.11 wireless client security.
Wednesday, 4. April 2007, 23:11:21
hacker
Jaikumar Vijayan
April 04, 2007 (Computerworld) Like many just-launched e-commerce sites in the world, this unnamed Web site has a fairly functional, if somewhat rudimentary, home page. A list of options at top of the home page allows visitors to transact business in Russian or in English, offers an FAQ section, spells out the terms and conditions for software use and provides details on payment forms that are supported.
But contact details are, shall we say, sparse. That's because the merchandise being hawked on the site -- no we're not going to say what it is -- isn't exactly legitimate. The site offers malicious code that webmasters with criminal intent can use to infect visitors to their sites with a spyware Trojan horse.
In return for downloading the malware to their sites, Web site owners are promised at least €50 -- about $66 (U.S.) -- every Monday, with the potential for even more for "clean installs" of the malicious code on end user systems. "If your traffic is good, we will change rates for you and make payout with new rates," the site promises.
As organized gangs increasingly turn to cybercrime, sites like the one described are coming to represent the new face of malware development and distribution, according to security researchers. Unlike malicious code writers of the past who tended to distribute their code to a tight group of insiders or in underground newsgroups, the new breed is far more professional about how it hawks, plies and prices its wares, they said.
"We've been seeing a growth of highly organized managed exploit providers in non-extradition countries" over the past year or so, said Gunter Ollmann, director of security strategies at IBM's Internet Security Systems X-Force team. For subscriptions starting as low as $20 per month, such enterprises sell "fully managed exploit engines" that spyware distributors and spammers can use to infiltrate systems worldwide, he said.
The exploit code is usually encrypted and uses a range of morphing techniques to evade detection by security software. It is designed to use various vulnerabilities to try to infect a target system. And many exploit providers simply wait for Microsoft Corp.'s monthly patches, which they then reverse-engineer to develop new exploit code against the disclosed vulnerabilities, Ollmann said.
"All you've got to do is just subscribe to them on a monthly basis," Ollmann said. "The going rate is about $20."
One such site was discovered by Don Jackson, a security researcher at SecureWorks Inc., an Atlanta-based managed security service provider. While investigating a Trojan horse named Gozi recently, Jackson discovered that it was designed to steal data from encrypted Secure Sockets Layer streams and send it to a server in St. Petersburg, Russia. The Trojan horse took advantage of a vulnerability in the iFrame tags of Microsoft's Internet Explorer and had apparently been planted on several hosted Web sites, community forums, social networking sites and sites belonging to small businesses.
The server to which the stolen information was sent to held more than 10,000 records containing confidential information belonging to about 5,200 home users. It was maintained by a group called 76Service and contained server-side code for stealing data from systems -- as well as code for an administrator interface and a customer interface for data mining, Jackson said.
The front end allowed subscribers to log in to individual accounts, view indexed data and get results from queries based on certain fields such as IP addresses and URLs. Each customer-generated query had a price associated with it, Jackson said. The currency unit used on the site was WMZ, a WebMoney unit roughly equivalent to the U.S. dollar, Jackson said. A customer query returning three passwords for a small retailer might cost 100 WMZ, while a query for 10 passwords for an international bank might fetch 2,500 WMZ or more. Customers could also choose how they wanted their search results delivered -- as compressed files in e-mails or via FTP.
The actual Gozi code itself appears to have been purchased by 76Service from a Russian hacking group called the HangUp Team. Such code typically costs about $1,000 to $2,000, depending on its sophistication, Jackson said. In addition to the original Trojan horse, the server also hosted two ready-to-deploy variants in a separate staging area. The malicious code included a downloader and a stored password stealer and appeared to be have been made to order for 76Service.
Often, groups such as the HangUp Team also offer a detection monitoring service with which they keep an eye on antivirus vendors to know exactly when signatures are available that can detect their malware. Customers who can afford the service are then told to start releasing variants to evade detection. And customers willing to pay for premium service can get hundreds of such ready-to-use variants bundled with their initial malware code purchase.
"When the first variant is detected by many [antivirus] vendors and data from new infections starts to slow, the person providing the executable code is to spot that and release a new variant," Jackson said.
The actual server hardware that the 76Service used was being managed by another entity called Russian Business Network (RBN), which provided Simple Network Management Protocol-based management and back-up services. "This ensured a level of service [comparable to] a hosting provider," Jackson said.
"We are not talking about kids doing it for kicks over the weekend anymore," said Yuval Ben-Itzhak, chief technology officer at Finjan Inc., a San Jose-based security vendor. "This is real cash, real money that's involved here."
A report released last June by Finjan had already noted a trend toward the commercialization of malicious code, Ben-Itzhak said. That report said that cybercriminals hold "vulnerability auctions" in which they sell information on freshly discovered software flaws to the highest bidder. Another trend spotted was the packaging of exploits into professional, off-the-shelf tool kits that can be used to create malicious Web sites. One such tool kit -- Web Attacker -- cost just $300 from a Russian Web site.
"Just like any other legitimate software company, the Russian Web site even solicited support and update service, and it provided detailed reporting capabilities that could outline the number of people infected per exploit and per operating system," the Finjan report noted. "The level of investment in this particular software indicates that there is substantial demand for such products."
Wednesday, 28. March 2007, 15:15:19
hacker, tools
A new Windows-friendly version of the Metasploit hacking tool has been released
Robert McMillan (IDG News Service) 28/03/2007 09:00:39
Developers have released a major update to the Metasploit security testing tool designed to run more smoothly on the Windows operating system.
Metasploit 3.0, released early Tuesday morning, has been rewritten in the Ruby programming language to make the software faster and less buggy for Windows users, who make up the great majority of the software's users according to Metasploit developer HD Moore.
"Ninety-eight percent of our entire user base runs on Windows and they were really poorly supported," Moore said. By rewriting the program, developers expect to attract new users who had previously been frustrated by the effort required to run Metasploit on Windows. "We're guessing that we'll probably get 20 to 30 percent more users just from our improved Windows support," he said.
Metasploit has been installed on more than 100,000 computers to date, Moore said. Within 12 hours of the 3.0 release, the new code had been downloaded by about 7,500 systems, despite a denial of service attack on the Metasploit.com Web site.
The new version of the hacking tool includes a jazzed up Web interface and much more modest resource requirements on Windows PCs. Metasploit 2.7, which was written in the Perl language, uses between 128M bytes and 256M bytes of memory. With version 3.0 that requirement has dropped to 32M bytes, Moore said.
With the rewrite, Metasploit now uses a modular architecture that will make it easy for developers to integrate new exploit code and testing tools into the software.
Previously the framework was focused on developing exploits, but with the 3.0 changes, the software can now be used to do new things like test networks for flaws and merge new hacking tools within the Metasploit framework, Moore said. "We're kind of the security tool amoeba at this point, where anytime anyone has an interesting security tool, we can go, 'Great, absorb.'"
Metasploit developers have also tightened up the licensing terms for their software, which had previously been offered under both the GNU General Public License and the
Artistic license, used by Perl.
Under the new Metasploit Framework License used by version 3.0, companies will no longer be able to sell the core Metasploit software, a practice that had been on the rise, according to Moore.
"We didn't want other companies reselling and repackaging it," he said. "We figured that people would be good community Samaritans and would contribute back to us ... but that wasn't happening."
Companies will be able to sell their own Metasploit modules, however, Moore said.
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