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Welcome to Cold War II

World Geopolitical Analysis

STICKY POST

SCO v NATO Geopolitics



Ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, a new geopolitical power block has emerged. On June 14 2001, under the leadership of Russia and China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was formed. Ever since its creation this military and economic intergovernmental organisation has been steadily working to counterbalance the influence of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in Eurasia and beyond..

Welcome to Cold War II -- World Geopolitical Analysis.

This page was created for the purpose of graphically illustrating the geopolitical struggle that is currently occuring in our world. For simplicity, only five colours have been used to signify a country's geopolitical stance. NATO member countries and their close allies are shown as dark blue. Countries where NATO members have relatively significant political, military and/or economic influence are shown as blue. Countries which are neutral or where neither NATO nor SCO members have relatively significant influence are shown as purple. Countries where SCO member countries have relatively significant political, military and/or economic influence are shown as dark red. SCO member countries and their close allies are shown as red.

The following factors are being used in this analysis:

  • Military, political and economic organisations ie. SCO (wiki); CSTO (wiki); EurAsEC (wiki); CIS (wiki); CES (link); ALBA (wiki); NATO (wiki); GUAM (wiki); CDC (wiki); ANZUS (wiki); EU (wiki); EEA (wiki); NAFTA (wiki); CAFTA (wiki)
  • Other diplomatic relations ie. MNNA designations (wiki)
  • Recognition of Israel (link); Recognition of Taiwan (link); Recognition of Kosovo (link)
  • Wars and international disputes
  • Rhetoric of politicians ie. “Axis of evil” (wiki); "Outposts of Tyranny" (wiki); "State Sponsors of Terror" (link)
  • Presence of foreign troops and military bases ie. US Department of Defense Base Structure Report, Fiscal Year 2007 (link); US Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country June 30 2007 (link)
  • Geostrategic location
  • Energy politics and security
  • Recipients of military aid ie. US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) (link)
  • Targets of sanctions, arms embargoes ie. US Treasury Sanctions Programs (link), US Arms Embargoes (link); EU sanctions and arms embargoes (link)
  • Purchasers of weapons ie. US weapons exports (link); Russian weapons exports (link)
  • Degree of support for the US occupation of Iraq (wiki)
  • Degree of support for the US occupation of Haiti (link)
  • Degree of support for the US occupation of Afghanistan (wiki)
  • Historical position ie. during the Cold War



The highlighting of the text using the abovementioned colours is meant to suggest which faction's geopolitical interests are being represented/served. The factors are evaluated and weighted to arrive at the geopolitical stance of the country. Countries with insignificant territory and/or military budget are excluded from this analysis.


Country (military expenditure in $ millions as per CIA World Factbook): Factors.

Afghanistan (123): Does not recognise Israel (link); Under US and NATO occupation since 2001 (wiki); US FMF recipient ($396,800,000 in 2005) (link); surrounded by SCO and SCO observer states (wiki); active partisan resistance (link); purchaser of US weapons (2005); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Albania (57): Acceding to NATO (link); potential EU candidate (link); US FMF recipient ($2,976,000 in 2005, $3,465,000 in 2006) (link); 70 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Algeria (3,000): Does not recognise Israel (link); Major purchaser of Russian weapons (rian.ru,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006)
Angola (2,000): Purchaser of Russian weapons (2000,2001,2002); US and China are the major oil purchasers and export partners (link); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Argentina (4,300): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); purchaser of US weapons (SIPRI,2000)
Armenia (135): CSTO (wiki); CIS (wiki); EurAsEC observer (wiki); Russian military presence (wiki); purchaser of Russian weapons (2004); military tensions with Azerbaijan (link 1,link 2); closed borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan (link); US FMF recipient ($7,936,000 in 2005, $3,960,000 in 2006) (link); 46 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Australia (17,840): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); 711 US military personnel stationed (link); ANZUS (wiki); free trade agreement with US (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); 1000 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 870 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Austria (1,497): Surrounded by NATO (wiki); EU (wiki); NATO countries are the main arms suppliers (SIPRI); purchaser of US weapons (2002); 4 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Azerbaijan (121): GUAM (wiki); CIS (wiki); military tensions with Armenia (link 1,link 2); hosts Russian early-warning radar at Gabala (link); Georgia/Turkey oil pipeline cooperation (link); US FMF recipient ($7,936,000 in 2005, $3,960,000 in 2006) (link); 3 of initial 136 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 20 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Bahrain (628): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); Does not recognise Israel (link); 1,389 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($18,847,000 in 2005, $15,593,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2005)
Bangladesh (1,010): Does not recognise Israel (link); US FMF recipient ($248,000 in 2005, $990,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2000,2002,2006)
Belarus (421): 'Union of Russia and Belarus' signatory (wiki); CSTO (wiki); EurAsEC (wiki); SCO observer applicant (wiki); CIS (wiki); CES (link); hosts Russian early-warning radar at Baranovichi (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (SIPRI,2000); “The Last Dictatorship in Europe” (link); "Outpost of Tyranny" (wiki); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link); leadership is under EU restrictions on admission and financial sanctions (link)
Belgium (3,999): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 1,367 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2005,2006); 381 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Belize (18): US FMF recipient ($698,000 in 2005, $198,000 in 2006) (link)
Benin (101): ACOTA participant (link)
Bhutan (8): No diplomatic relations with Israel (link); Surrounded by SCO and SCO observer states (link)
Bolivia (130): ALBA (wiki)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (234): Surrounded by NATO (wiki); potential EU candidate (link); US FMF recipient ($8,480,000 in 2005, $8,910,000 in 2006) (link); 207 US military personnel stationed (link); 37 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Botswana (326): ACOTA participant (link); US FMF recipient ($496,000 in 2005) (link)
Brazil (9,940): NATO countries are the main arms suppliers (SIPRI); purchaser of US weapons (2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (2005)
Brunei (291): Does not recognise Israel (link); For the years 1888-1984 was a British protectorate
Bulgaria (356): NATO (wiki); EU (wiki); US military presence (link); $15 billion gas pipeline project with Russia (link); US FMF recipient ($6,944,000 in 2005, $9,900,000 in 2006) (link); 155 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 100 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Burkina Faso (75): ACOTA participant (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2005)
Burma (Myanmar) (39): Ally of China and major purchaser of Chinese weapons (link); "Outpost of Tyranny" (wiki); purchaser of Russian weapons (2001,2002,2006); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link); EU sanctions and arms embargo (link)
Burundi (44):
Cambodia (112): US FMF recipient ($992,000 in 2005, and $990,000 in 2006) (link)
Cameroon (230): Cooperating with US in oil pipeline from Chad (link)
Canada (9,802): NATO (wiki); 143 US military personnel stationed (link); NAFTA (wiki); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); 127 troops stationed in Haiti (link); 2,500 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Central African Republic (16): French military presence (link); historically a French colony prior to 1960
Chad (69): Participant of the US Pan Sahel Initiative (link); Does not recognise Israel (link); cooperating with US in oil pipeline to Cameroon (link); French military presence (link)
Chile (3,910): Free trade with US (link); US FMF recipient ($495,000 in 2005, $592,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2003,2005,2006); 327 troops stationed in Haiti (link)
China (81,480): SCO (wiki); claims Taiwan as its "inalienable part" (wiki); major purchaser of Russian weapons (mosnews,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); US arms embargo (link); EU arms embargo (link)
Colombia (3,300): 124 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($99,200,000 in 2005, $89,100,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2001,2002,2004,2005); purchaser of Russian weapons (2006); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Congo, Republic of the (85): French colony prior to 1960
Congo, Democratic Republic of the (104): French military presence (link); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link)
Costa Rica (83): CAFTA (wiki); In 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Ivory Coast (180): French military presence (link); ACOTA participant (link); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link); EU arms embargo (link)
Croatia (620): Acceding to NATO (link); EU candidate (wiki); 180 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Cuba (694): ALBA (wiki); hostile relations with the US (wiki); No diplomatic relations with Israel (link); "Outpost of Tyranny" (wiki); "State Sponsor of Terror" (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (link); Unwelcomed 903 US military personnel stationed in Guantanamo (link); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link)
Cyprus (384): EU (wiki); Greek, Turkish, UK and UN military presence (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2001)
Czech Republic (2,170): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); US FMF recipient ($5,952,000 in 2005, $3,957,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2002); purchaser of Russian weapons (2003,2005,2006); 99 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 224 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Denmark (3,272): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 157 US military personnel stationed (including Greenland) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2001,2003,2004,2006); 55 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 665 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Djibouti (29): Does not recognise Israel (link); French military presence (link); 2,038 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($4,468,000 in 2005, $3,960,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2002)
Dominican Republic (180): CAFTA (wiki); US FMF recipient ($992,000 in 2005, $941,000 in 2006) (link); 302 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Ecuador (650): Potential ALBA member (link); 41 US military personnel stationed and 1 small airforce facility (link)
Egypt (2,440): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); Treaty of Peace with Israel (link); 288 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($1,289,600,000 in 2005, $1,287,000,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (1999)
El Salvador (162): CAFTA (wiki); US FMF recipient ($1,488,000 in 2005, $9,900,000 in 2006) (link); 280 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Equatorial Guinea (152): Traditionally a Spanish colony
Eritrea (220): Purchaser of Russian weapons (2001,2004); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Estonia (155): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); CDC (wiki); US FMF recipient ($4,960,000 in 2005, $4,451,000 in 2006) (link); 35 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 130 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Ethiopia (296): ACOTA participant (link); US FMF recipient ($7,050,000 in 2005, $1,980,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2000,2003,2004); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Finland (1,800): EU (wiki); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2002); 100 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
France (45,000): NATO (wiki); EU (wiki); 1,100 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Gabon (254): ACOTA participant (link); French military presence (link)
Georgia (23): US military presence (link); GUAM (wiki); CDC (wiki); CIS assosiate member (wiki); Azerbaijan/Turkey oil pipeline cooperation (link); military tensions with Russia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia territories (link); Georgian Pankisi Gorge is a possible safe haven for Chechen guerillas (link); "Beacon of Liberty" (link); US FMF recipient ($11,904,000 in 2005, $11,880,000 in 2006) (link); 2,000 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Germany (35,063): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 58,894 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2004); 3,600 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Ghana (84): ACOTA participant (link); US FMF recipient ($496,000 in 2005, $495,000 in 2006) (link)
Greece (5,890): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 354 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005); purchaser of Russian weapons (2001,2002); 170 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Guatemala (170): CAFTA (wiki)
Guinea (120): Does not recognise Israel (link); French colony prior to 1958
Guinea-Bissau (9): Colony of Portugal prior to 1974
Guyana (6): US FMF recipient ($99,000 in 2005, $99,000 in 2006) (link)
Haiti (26): Under US, Canadian and Chilean occupation (link); US FMF recipient ($297,000 in 2005, $988,000 in 2006) (link); active population dissent/rebellion (link)
Honduras (53): CAFTA (wiki); 412 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($1,492,000 in 2005, $891,000 in 2006) (link); 368 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Hungary (1,080): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); US FMF recipient ($5,951,000 in 2005, $2,474,000 in 2006) (link); 300 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 180 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)

[ANALYSIS PART 2, PART 3]

STICKY POST

SCO v NATO Geopolitical Analysis, part 2

Iceland (0): EEA (wiki); NATO (wiki); insignificant US military presence (link); 2 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 9 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
India (19,040): SCO observer (wiki); major purchaser of Russian weapons (link,2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006), 70-80% of Indian armament is of Soviet/Russian origin (link); purchaser of NATO and Israeli weapons (SIPRI); ongoing military tensions with Pakistan over Kashmir (wiki); longstanding border dispute with China (link)
Indonesia (1,300): Does not recognise Israel (link); 30 US military personnel stationed and 1 small naval facility (link); US FMF recipient ($990,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2006); major purchaser of Russian weapons (link,2002,2003)
Iran (4,300): SCO observer (wiki); Does not recognise Israel (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (SIPRI,2003); mammoth energy contracts with China (link); nuclear energy contract with Russia (link); defense pact with Syria (link); hostile relations with Israel (wiki); hostile relations with the US (wiki); “Axis of Evil” (wiki); "Outpost of Tyranny" (wiki); "State Sponsor of Terror" (link); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link); partial EU sanctions (link)
Iraq (1,340): Does not recognise Israel (link); Under US and "Coalition of the Willing" occupation since 2003 (link); active partisan resistance (link); part of the “Axis of evil” (wiki) prior to US invasion; purchaser of US weapons (2006)
Ireland (700): EU (wiki); 5 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Israel (9,450): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); US FMF recipient ($2,202,240,000 in 2005, $2,257,200,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); hostile relations with Syria (wiki) and Iran (wiki)
Italy (28,183): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 10,216 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2006); 3,200 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 2,160 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Jamaica (31): US FMF recipient ($595,000 in 2005, $594,000 in 2006) (link)
Japan (44,310): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); 33,068 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2003,2004,2005,2006); 600 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Jordan (1,400): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); Treaty of Peace with Israel (wiki); US FMF recipient ($304,352,000 in 2005, $207,900,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004); purchaser of Russian weapons (link)
Kazakhstan (222): SCO (wiki); CSTO (wiki); EurAsEC (wiki); CIS (wiki); CES (link); hosts Russian early-warning radar at Balkhash (link); oil pipeline to China (link); Turkmenistan/Russia gas pipeline cooperation (link); 84% of oil and gas exports pass through Russia (link); US FMF recipient ($4,960,000 in 2005, $3,465,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2000,2004,2005,2006); 29 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Kenya (281): ACOTA participant (link); 31 US military personnel stationed and 2 small military facilities (link)
Korea, North (5,000): Hostile relations with the US (link); No diplomatic relations with Israel (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2000,2001); part of the “Axis of Evil” (wiki); "State Sponsor of Terror" (link); "Outpost of Tyranny" (wiki); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link); EU sanctions and arms embargo (link)
Korea, South (22,060): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); 27,114 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (2005); 933 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Kuwait (3,010): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); Does not recognise Israel (link); US military presence - related to "Operation Iraqi Freedom" - transit point for troops entering and leaving Iraq (link); launch-pad for the US invasion of Iraq; purchaser of US weapons (2003); purchaser of Russian weapons (2002); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Kyrgyzstan (19): SCO (wiki); CSTO (wiki); EurAsEC (wiki); CIS (wiki); Russian military presence (link); US military presence (link); US FMF recipient ($1,984,000 in 2005, $1,881,000 in 2006) (link)
Laos (11): Purchaser of Russian weapons (2005)
Latvia (87): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); CDC (wiki); GUAM observer (wiki); US FMF recipient ($4,960,000 in 2005, $5,940,000 in 2006) (link); 3 of initial 125 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 98 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Lebanon (541): Does not recognise Israel (link); Fought a 34 day war with Israel in 2006 (link); US FMF recipient ($3,713,000 in 2006) (link); in 2005 Syria withdrew all of its troops following the "Cedar Revolution" (wiki); purchaser of US weapons (2000)
Liberia (67): US FMF recipient ($2,976,000 in 2005, $1,980,000 in 2006) (link); US arms embargo (link)
Libya (1,300): Does not recognise Israel (link); "State Sponsor of Terror" as per US Department of State (link)
Lithuania (231): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); CDC (wiki); US FMF recipient ($5,456,000 in 2005, $4,455,000 in 2006) (link); 120 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 130 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Luxembourg (232): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 8 US military personnel stationed and 1 small army facility (Bettembourg site has been closed (link)) (link); 9 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Macedonia (200): Acceding to NATO (link); CDC (wiki); EU candidate (wiki); US FMF recipient ($5,208,000 in 2005, $3,960,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2006); 33 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 151 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Madagascar (329): French colony 1896-1960
Malawi (16): ACOTA participant (link)
Malaysia (1,690): Does not recognise Israel (link); NATO countries are the main arms suppliers (SIPRI); purchaser of US weapons (2002,2003,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (link)
Mali (106): Participant of the US Pan Sahel Initiative (link); ACOTA participant (link); Does not recognise Israel (link)
Mauritania (19): Participant of the US Pan Sahel Initiative (link)
Mexico (6,070): NAFTA (wiki); purchaser of US weapons (2001,2002)
Moldova (9): GUAM (wiki); CDC (wiki); CIS (wiki); EurAsEC observer (wiki); US FMF recipient ($446,000 in 2005, $495,000 in 2006) (link); 11 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Mongolia (23): Surrounded by SCO (wiki); SCO observer (wiki); US FMF recipient ($992,000 in 2005, $2,970,000 in 2006) (link); 100 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki)
Montenegro (35): Surrounded by NATO (wiki)
Morocco (2,310): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); Diplomatic relations with Israel suspended (link); Free trade agreement with US (link); US FMF recipient ($15,128,000 in 2005, $12,375,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (link)
Mozambique (78): ACOTA participant (link); Portuguese colony prior to 1975
Namibia (150): ACOTA participant (link)
Nepal (105): Surrounded by SCO and SCO observer states (link)
Netherlands (9,408): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 562 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2002,2004,2005,2006); 1,345 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 1,665 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
New Zealand (1,147): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); economically integrated with Australia (ANZCERTA) (link); US suspended its ANZUS (wiki) obligations to NZ due to anti-nuclear policy; purchaser of US weapons (2001,2002,2003); 61 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 122 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Nicaragua (32): CAFTA (wiki); ALBA (wiki); US FMF recipient ($496,000 in 2005, $594,000 in 2006) (link); 230 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Niger (45): Participant of the US Pan Sahel Initiative (link); ACOTA participant (link); Does not recognise Israel (link)
Nigeria (738): ACOTA participant (link); US FMF recipient ($990,000 in 2006) (link); US is the major oil buyer and export partner (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2000)
Norway (4,034): EEA (wiki); NATO (wiki); 80 US military personnel stationed and 3 very small US military facilities (link); purchaser of US weapons (2006); 150 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 500 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Oman (253): Does not recognise Israel (link); 37 US military personnel stationed and 4 small airforce facilities (link); US FMF recipient ($19,840,000 in 2005, $13,860,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2004,2005,2006)


[ANALYSIS PART 1, PART 3]

STICKY POST

SCO v NATO Geopolitical Analysis, part 3

Pakistan (4,260): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); strategic partnership with China (link); SCO observer (link); Does not recognise Israel (link); US military presence related to "Operation Enduring Freedom" (link); US FMF recipient ($298,800,000 in 2005, $297,000,000 in 2006) (link); recieved over $10 billion in overt U.S. assistance FY2001-FY2007 (link); purchaser of US weapons (2004,2005,2006); major purchaser of Chinese weapons (SIPRI); ongoing military tensions with India over Kashmir (wiki)
Panama (150): Free trade agreement with the US (link); US FMF recipient ($992,000 in 2005, $990,000 in 2006) (link); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Papua New Guinea (17):
Paraguay (53): US military presence (link)
Peru (829): 48 US military personnel stationed and 1 very small military facility (link); purchaser of US weapons (2003)
Philippines (805): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); US FMF recipient ($29,760,000 in 2005, $29,700,000 in 2006) (link); 111 US military personnel stationed (link); 51 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Poland (3,500): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); CDC observer (wiki); US FMF recipient ($76,470,000 in 2005, $29,700,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2002,2003,2006); 900 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 1,200 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Portugal (3,498): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 865 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2004); 128 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 150 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Qatar (723): Does not recognise Israel (link); 512 US military personnel stationed (link)
Romania (985): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); CDC (wiki); 100-300 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($13,412,000 in 2005, $12,870,000 in 2006) (link); 397 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 479 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Russia (31,000): SCO (wiki); CSTO (wiki); EurAsEC (wiki); CIS (wiki); CES (link)
Rwanda (50): ACOTA participant (link); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link)
Saudi Arabia (18,000): Does not recognise Israel (link); Purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); 274 US military personnel stationed (link)
Senegal (107): French military presence (link); ACOTA participant (link); US FMF recipient ($496,000 in 2005, $495,000 in 2006) (link)
Serbia (1,200): Surrounded by NATO (wiki); potential EU candidate (link)
Sierra Leone (13):
Singapore (4,470): 116 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); 192 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Slovakia (406): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); US FMF recipient ($4,959,000 in 2005, $3,960,000 in 2006) (link); 2 of initial 110 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 60 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Slovenia (370): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); CDC (wiki); US FMF recipient ($1,486,000 in 2005, $494,000 in 2006) (link); 66 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Somalia (19): Does not recognise Israel (link); US arms embargo (link); EU arms embargo (link)
South Africa (3,172): ACOTA participant (link); Historically US military presence during cold war’; received US economic aid under Clinton; target of Western sanctions during apartheid
Spain (9,907): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 1,308 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2006); 1,300 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 700 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Sri Lanka (515): US FMF recipient ($496,000 in 2005, $990,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2001)
Sudan (587): Does not recognise Israel (link); Major purchaser of Russian weapons (2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); major purchaser of Chinese weapons (link); major oil contracts with China (link); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link); limited EU sanctions and arms embargo (link)
Suriname (8): US FMF recipient ($99,000 in 2005, $99,000 in 2006) (link)
Swaziland (41):
Sweden (5,729): EU (wiki); purchaser of US weapons (2002,2004); 350 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Switzerland (2,548): Surrounded by NATO (wiki); surrounded by EU (wiki); 2 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Syria (858): Defense pact with Iran (link); hostile relations with US (link); Does not recognise Israel (link); “Axis of Evil” (wiki); purchaser of Russian weapons (SIPRI); target of US sanctions (link); US arms embargo (link)
Taiwan (7,574): Protectorate of US as per Taiwan Relations Act 1979 (link); claims "de-facto independence" from China (wiki); Unofficial relations with Israel (link);; US military presence (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004)
Tajikistan (35): SCO (wiki); CSTO (wiki); EurAsEC (wiki); CIS (wiki); Russian military presence (link); US FMF recipient ($496,000 in 2005, $495,000 in 2006) (link)
Tanzania (21): ACOTA participant (link)
Thailand (1,775): Designated as Major non-NATO US ally (wiki); US FMF recipient ($1,488,000 in 2005, $1,485,000 in 2006) (link); 114 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2001,2002,2003,2004,2005); 423 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki)
Togo (36): French military presence (link)
Trinidad and Tobago (67):
Tunisia (356): Suspended diplomatic relations with Israel (link); US FMF recipient ($10,407,000 in 2005, $8,413,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2004,2006)
Turkey (12,155): NATO (wiki); EU candidate (wiki); GUAM observer (wiki); 1,668 US military personnel stationed (link); US FMF recipient ($33,728,000 in 2005, $14,850,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat (link); 1,150 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Turkmenistan (90): CIS associate member (wiki); Kazakhstan/Russia gas pipeline cooperation (link); US FMF recipient ($694,000 in 2005, $297,000 in 2006) (link)
Uganda (170): ACOTA participant (link); US FMF Recipient ($1,984,000 in 2005) (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2003); Ugandan LRA rebels supported by Sudan
Ukraine (618): GUAM (wiki); CDC (wiki); CIS (wiki); CES (link); EurAsEC observer (wiki); disputed Russian military presence (link); US FMF recipient ($2,976,000 in 2005, $10,890,000 in 2006) (link); 1,650 troops deployed but withdrawn from Iraq (wiki); 2 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
United Arab Emirates (1,600): Does not recognise Israel (link); French military presence (link); 87 US military personnel stationed, 1 small airforce and 1 small navy facility (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2003,2004,2005,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (2000)
United Kingdom (42,837): EU (wiki); NATO (wiki); 10,152 US military personnel stationed (link); purchaser of US weapons (2000,2001,2002,2003,2004,2005,2006); purchaser of Russian weapons (2005); 4,500 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 6,700 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
United States (518,100): NATO (wiki); NAFTA (wiki); CAFTA (wiki); GUAM sponsor (wiki); CDC observer (wiki); 154,000 troops stationed in Iraq (wiki); 26,000 troops deployed to Afghanistan (wiki)
Uruguay (258): Diverse weapon suppliers (SIPRI); Purchaser of Russian weapons (2006)
Uzbekistan (200): SCO (wiki); CSTO (rejoined 2006) (wiki); EurAsEC (joined 2006) (wiki); CIS (wiki); in 2005 withdrew from GUAM (wiki); occasional Russian military presence (link); in 2005/2006 evicted US military presence (link); relations with US deteriorated in 2005 due to attempted US-backed governmental coup (link); purchaser of Russian weapons (2001,2002,2005); EU arms embargo and limited sanctions (link); in 2003 issued declarations finding that Iraq was a threat
Venezuela (1,687): ALBA (wiki); ally of Cuba (link); hostile relations with US (wiki); according to President Chavez, George W. Bush is a donkey (video); major purchaser of Russian weapons (link,2006); US arms embargo (link)
Vietnam (650): Purchaser of Russian weapons (2000,2004)
Yemen (886): Does not recognise Israel (link); US FMF recipient ($9,910,000 in 2005, $8,415,000 in 2006) (link); purchaser of US weapons (2006); major purchaser of Russian weapons (link,2000,2002,2004,2005)
Zambia (107): ACOTA participant (link)
Zimbabwe (217): Target of US sanctions (link); EU arms embargo, financial santions and restrictions on admission of Zimbabwean leadership (link)


[ANALYSIS PART 1, PART 2]

Geopolitics of the Silk Road: Beyond Mahan and MacKinder

by R. James Ferguson
International-relations.com

1. Introduction: The Geopolitical Context

When the cartographers of 17th century Lisbon or Paris or London were faced with the task of how to fill in the blank parts of their maps, they relied on one of two principles - the principle of land, or the principle of ocean. If they assumed the world was ocean it was easy enough to leave the blue of the huge encompassing sea as dominant, surrounding the continents as if islands. Alternatively, the principle of land ensured that all the unknown areas must be extensions of the continents, with uncharted coasts which would one day be encountered by hapless mariners.

We can see two important examples of this. Using the principles of land, navigators who first touched the coasts of Western Australia, New Guinea and New Zealand were tempted to assume a huge Great Southern Land, which in reality turned out to be a somewhat smaller Australia. Another crucial example for explorers was whether Siberia and North America were joined by a land bridge or not. Those using the principle of sea assumed that there must be a navigable passage which would separate the two lands, and allow the possibility of a northeast summer passage from Russia down to Japan and China (see Bobrick 1992). This latter hypothesis turned out to be true, but due to the icebound nature of the Arctic Seas, the passage is only partly useable for a short time of the year. The Soviet Union for a time invested considerable effort in trying to develop this naval route and its coastlines, at one stage even envisaging a Arctic Sea coast railway that would help develop the Siberian north (Bobrick 1992). This proved to be impractical, while the development of fleets of icebreakers, including nuclear powered ones, made this north-eastern passage only partly useable for high volume trade. The strategic implications of this limited passage remained serious, in that the Soviet Union and then Russia were still forced to maintain separate fleets (in the Baltic/Atlantic, Black Sea/Mediterranean, Caspian, and Pacific) with little ability to bring them together for strategic operations. It was precisely this limitation which allowed the US and its allies to conceive of a policy of global containment for Soviet forces during the Cold War.

In the 19-20th centuries, with the seas covering more area than the land, sea power (combined with air power in the 20th century) became dominant in generating large empires. Sea power was important in the ancient Greek, Carthaginian and Roman spheres of influence, and indeed the Romans, traditionally a land-power, could only beat the Carthaginians in three major wars by becoming dominant naval powers (Goldsworthy 2001). Sea power became the crucial resource by which the European powers spilled out of Europe to dominate the globe. It was at first a central aspect in the integration of the Mediterranean economies from the 15-17th centuries, then created Atlantic and Pacific empires which were the source of much of the wealth of industrialised Europe. The classic analysis of sea power remains Alfred Mayer Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, originally published from 1890-1893, but a number of other major works have shown the economic and military significance of sea power in several crucial phases of history (Braudel 1984; Hanks 1985; Ross 1990; Staley 1992). In the negative sense, of course, such navies can be used for 'gun-boat' diplomacy, as they were often used by European colonial powers in Africa and Asia, or to control and break up earlier trading networks, as occurred in the Indo-Pacific region with the arrival of Portuguese, Dutch and English fleets.

In both World Wars there were decisive battles for the control of the oceans, the Atlantic being crucial in both conflicts, and with control of the Mediterranean and Pacific being of major significance in the Second World War. In the Cold War, control of the seas, the development of airpower (see Ball 1988; Mason 1987; Quester 1986), and finally control of orbital space (implied through the development of satellites and through research on missile defence technology) became crucial aspects of global dominance. This has now been merged with a 'revolution in military affairs' based on the control of information within a conflict or battlefield. Indeed, the Soviets during the period from the sixties through to the eighties pushed their entire technological base to extreme degrees to be able to challenge the US at sea throughout most of the world's oceans. Even today, with Russia operating a much smaller if modern fleet, the US still wields enormous influence through its ability to send massive carrier groups to any region it wishes to impress with its power; whether off the coast of Libya, Syria, in the Persian Gulf, or in Northeast Asian waters. As late as 1994, a major carrier group off the coast of China, engaging in war-games, found itself in an almost hot confrontation with Chinese naval and air units (Bearman 1995, p165). This was only dress rehearsal for the deployment of two-carrier groups off Taiwan in March 1996 in response to Chinese missile tests and exercises designed to influence Taiwan's foreign policy in the lead up to their presidential elections. In the American case in particular, at least parity at sea has been crucial in maintaining her NATO alliance, in her indirect dominance of Latin and South America, and her ability to 'hold the ring' in influencing all of East and Southeast Asia (Pollack 1993). Air and sea power remain crucial in US policy towards Iraq, and towards the Middle East in general. Air power, likewise, was crucial in the strikes on Afghanistan through late 2001 and early 2002, and indeed tilted the balance of forces towards the Northern Alliance much more effectively than the infiltration by small numbers of U.S., British and Australian special forces troops. Likewise, operations in Iraq have been supported by the coalition ability to retain open waterways through the Persian Gulf (in spite of some Iranian counter-claims), while in North-East Asia the U.S. and Japanese navies have not yet been offset by modernising Chinese forces, now viewed as a 'green-water' navy with sizeable submarine and missile capabilities.

Likewise, in trade terms, oceanic trade has been a crucial basis of economic wealth for Britain, Japan and the United States. Even in Europe, the cost of longer sea-routes is often lower than road, rail or even barge transport costs, e.g. most freight from the Danube basin still passes by sea through the Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean into northern Europe, in spite of the new canal joining the Danube and Rhine River basins. Approximately half the goods sent from Siberia back to European Russia go by extremely long sea routes rather than by over-crowded rail routes. In fact, only highly developed and efficient rail networks can even begin to compare with the bulk handling capacity of naval bulk transport. To date, even with the development of extensive rail networks in Europe, North America, and very long lines in China, Central Asia, and Russia, such networks are far from fully developed. Likewise, extensive canal systems linking the Danube and Rhine River basins, as well as river canals interlinking the Baltic, Arctic, Black Sea and Volga river systems are still unable to provide the volume of through trade to compare with ocean-going transport. Although efforts have been made to modernise trans-continental railways across Eurasia, these have yet to displace longer trips by bulk carriers. This emphasis on sea-going trade has also heightened the strategic of certain parts of the world, especially on 'choke points' along sea-lanes-of-communication (SLOCs), e.g. in the Sea of Japan, in the south China Sea, the Malacca Strait, the Persian Gulf, the rock of Gibraltar at the southern tip of Spain, the entrance to the Black Sea, and the Suez and Panama Canals.

However, this was not always the case. Once one of the main economic and cultural routes passed over thousands of kilometres of mountains, deserts and steppes to connect distant civilisations. For almost four thousand years, though most notably from the 3rd century B.C. onwards, the old Silk Road connected a dozen cultures on the swaying backs of camels carrying silk, incense, gold and rumours between China, Central Asia, the Middle East and the Levant (see Boulnois 2004; Franck & Brownstone 1986). The term 'Silk Road' itself (die Seidenstrassen) was first used by the German geographer, Baron Ferdinand von Richthofen (d. 1905), due to fact that silk was one of the main products that travelled the full length of the route (Christian 2000, p1). Down this road also flowed religious ideas: Gnosticism, Manicheanism, Nestorian Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism and Islam all flowed along this route, influencing major civilisations including Persia, India and China (Franck & Brownstone 1986; Puri 1987; Wallis 1928; Klimkeit 1993).

Power and wealth in Eurasia was often related to an ability to control at least part of the Silk Road, which was important to Persians, Parthians, the Kushans, and to Tang China. The open access to the road depended in part on the stability and policies of key powers along the route: from about 100 B.C. - 100 A.D., during the second and third centuries A.D., during the Tang period and the early Islamic era (7th-8th centuries), and in the Mongol period trade flourished (Christian 2000, p3). For the Mongols control of these routes helped the creation of their empire, and for central Asia it created an oikoumene (a unified cultural world) more extensive than the Mediterranean civilisation of the Romans and Christendom (see MacNeill 1963; MacNeill 1986). Indeed, for a short time the Mongols controlled the heartland of Eurasia, giving them privileged strategic access into East Asia, Eastern Europe and South Asia.



For a time (circa 1300-1405), the Mongols controlled the heartland of Eurasia,

giving them strategic dominance over adjacent regions. (Map courtesy of PCL Map Library)


The traffic on the road was lessened by two trends - the conflict which developed between Islam and Christendom, and then the alternative sea route around Africa which brought ships from Portugal, Spain, then Holland and England around the Cape of Good Hope then into the Indian and Pacific Oceans. By the 18th century the Silk Road had been reduced to secondary importance, with more significance for regional trade rather than the exchange between Europe and Asia. It was this intrusion of European naval powers into Arabic, Indian and Asian waters which destroyed sophisticated existing trade networks and an international system which was relatively stable (Amin 1992; Chaudhuri 1990; Frank 1994).

The dominance of the sea routes, first because of their load carrying capacity, then as a strategic doctrine, means that sea-power came to dominate the world-view of the European conquerors, then of the nation-states of the modern world (Li 1990). With the understanding of the need to control the air over strategic assets and battlefield, which clearly emerged during the course of World War II, the doctrine was reborn as a combined air-sea power strategy. Reaffirmed in the first Gulf War, in NATO operations in the Balkans, and operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, this doctrine remains with us in the 21st century as a rarely challenged dogma. However, as we shall see, there are rather different ways to conceptualise economic and military power. The heartland, world-island and associated rim-land concepts developed by H.J. MacKinder and others reacting to him have posed a wider framework than these air-sea power approaches.

With the 1990s eclipse of the Cold War, with renewed economic growth in East Asia, and a transformed political landscape in Central Asia, the time seems ripe to reconsider these doctrines. This remains true in spite of the breakup of the Soviet 'Empire' (contra the view expressed in Hauner 1992, pp253-254, originally formulated in 1990). The Soviet Union was once held together by centralised authoritarian government, by concerns for a central administration of resources, and secured by military forces guaranteeing internal and external security throughout the region. As a result, the Central Asia region was artificially linked into the Soviet economy, and cut off from eastern and southern trade routes.

Central Asia has re-emerged as a region more integrated into global economic and energy flows, but also a region buffeted by indigenous nationalistic and religious expectations. While the borders with Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and China remained closed, Central Asia could be nothing more than a periphery to Moscow. True economic efficiency remained elusive, as did the development of sympathetic cultural and social resources. Today, this trend is slowly being reversed in spite of the interruption posed by 2001 and by authoritarian governments in most of the Central Asian states. The potential for resource development, more balanced agricultural planning, and industrial development is so high that some commentators have spoken of a new Silk Road (Jones 1995; Ma 1984). The EU, Central Asian states, and China (see Xinhua 2003a) have used this metaphor of a modern 'Silk Road', hoping that resources, manufactured goods, and services to flow along improved east-west infrastructure. However, as we shall see, these routes can also be conduits for transnational threats: organised crime, drug and illegal arms flows, illegal migration, international terrorism as well renewed forms of national competition. Thus from the late 1990s the US recognised via the Silk Road Strategy Act that US interests in the region, including access to energy resources to diversify dependence away from the Persian Gulf, might be compromised if the region became too unstable, or subject to too much control from 'regional hegemonic powers' such as Russia or Iran (Leech 2006, pp55-56).

It must be stressed, however, that this new regional development cannot be entirely based east-west inter-linkages. To date the Russians have found that even with the re-development of the trans-Siberian railway and the recent completion of the BAM linkup, this is too weak a trend to create a unified economic and cultural space. New east-west and north-south connectivities, both in terms of trade and culture, is needed to create a powerful focus of interactions between Central Asia, the Middle East, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and India, as well as to China and the Pacific Ocean. As we have seen, such economic and cultural interactions have already begun, e.g. Turkish trade into Central Asia and Iran and Kazakhstan relations with China, but have yet to be deeply entrenched (see Henze 2001). The rebuilding of Afghanistan from 2002 may also offer opportunities for new north-south linkages through Pakistan and westwards through Iran.

We can now turn around the sea and heartland doctrines proposed by Mahan and MacKinder to suggest that the doctrine of land, (continental integration) combined with air-power and communication technologies, can once again play a significant role for the future of Europe and Asia. The issue here is of complementarity. This means that the region of Greater Central Asia will remain crucial for Eurasia as a whole, with a continued strategic significance (in economic, cultural and security terms) for Europe, Russia, the Middle East and China. Indeed, the wider region of Eurasia remains a crucial security complex (see Buzan 1983; Buzan & Waever 2003) that has shaped core global agenda over the last decade. Indeed, only if Central Asia develops adequately (economically, politically and culturally), will Eurasia become a genuine super-region with a high level of positive interaction, as distinct from a loose historical and geographical unit.

In order to clarify this trend it will be helpful to look at the way the modern-nation state has operated amid the parallel trends of regionalism (see Ohmae 1993; Rubenstein & Smolansky 1995) and incomplete or uneven globalisation (Holm 1995). Alongside the newly independent states of the region, the policies of several key international players are very important in stabilising world affairs. The US, Russia, Turkey (a member of NATO and aspirant to the EU), Iran, and China all play an important role in the future of Eurasia as a whole. Furthermore, Central Asia and Siberia are two of the few resource-rich regions that have not yet been fully exploited by the world economy, and represent a reserve which may become even more strategically significant in the twenty-first century. Likewise, the trade potential and cultural resources of Greater Central Asia are only now becoming widely recognised, with particular concern from UNESCO, the EU and China that these resources be protected and developed. UNESCO in particular has sponsored research and public awareness programs designed to enhance and protect the cultural legacies of Greater Central Asia. UNESCO also hopes to promote responsible tourism in the region, and has helped provide guidelines and funding in repairing historic buildings, recognising that tourism in countries such as Uzbekistan has been little developed (Rao 2001).

To understand the full drift towards a re-balanced world system, we will need to examine the interaction between the 'principle of land' and the 'principle of ocean' in more detail. A parallel question is the relationship of sea-power (Mahan) to the theories concerning the heartland and rimland of Eurasia (as developed by MacKinder). It turns out that these theories are not so much in opposition as complementary (as noted by Hauner 1992; see more on this below), and are crucial for the future of Eurasia. What role this Eurasian region will play in reacting with the emerging Pacific-Rim dominant economic structure, and the existing Atlantic cultural-military-economic structure, also needs to be considered. Before proceeding further, however, a brief discussion of the explorers, traders and religions of the old Silk Road will be undertaken.

2. Explorers and Traders

The several linked trade routes that crossed Central Asia, along with related routes across southern Russia and branching lines, can be called the Silk Roads and Steppe Roads. The steppe roads (also called the Sable Road) were slightly more north of the Silk Road, pasting north of the Caspian Sea, and trading expensive furs into Russia, Byzantium and Europe (Christian 2000, p7; Brobrick 1992, p68). These routes predated historical records and probably from as early as 2000 B.C.E. had begun to link the Afro-Eurasian region into one 'world system', in part based on the movements and trade needs of pastoral peoples in the heart of Eurasia (Christian 2000, p1, p4). Aside from silk and other precious trade goods, livestock, human populations, 'disease vectors, languages, technologies, styles, religions and genes' followed this route from pre-historic times (Christian 2000, p1). Technologies that passed along these routes included the compound bow, crossbows, the stirrup, gunpowder, printing and papermaking (Christian 2000, p10).

Early explorers along the Silk Road region included Chinese, Indians, and as late comers, Europeans such as Marco Polo (circa 1254-1324 AD). A recent controversy has raged over whether Marco Polo really did reach China, or simply collected inaccurate hearsay and combined it with earlier Arabic sources. We can test this in one description made by Marco Polo of an important city in China. Marco Polo recorded a vivid impression of the city of 'Su-chau' (Suzhou) in the province of 'Manzi' during the thirteenth century: -

Moving on from here we shall tell you next of a large and splendid city called Su-chau. The people here are idolaters, subject to the Great Khan and using paper money. They live by trade and industry, having silk in great quantity and make much silken cloth for their clothing. There are merchants here of great wealth and consequence. The city is so large that it measures about forty miles in circumference. It has so many inhabitants that no one could reckon their number. I give you my word that the men of the province of Manzi, if they were a war-like nation, would conquer all the rest of the world. But they are not war-like. I can assure you rather that they are capable merchants and skilled practitioners of every craft, and among them are wise philosophers and natural physicians with a great knowledge of nature.

Let me tell that in this city there are fully 6,000 stone bridges, such that one or two galleys could readily pass beneath them. In the adjacent mountains rhubarb and ginger grow in great profusion, so that one Venetian groat would buy forty pounds of ginger, of excellent quality. The city exercises authority over sixteen others, all large and busy centres of trade and industry. (Polo 1972, p212)


This description of the bridges (though their number is exaggerated), the silk industry, and general wealth of Suzhou seem generally accurate. Frances Wood, however, has argued that there are no mountains near Suzhou, that ginger is usually grown further west, and that rhubarb never has been produced there.(Wood 1995, p90) The point concerning rhubarb can be conceded, but the hills near the adjacent Lake Taihu are fertile and today produce a range of agriculture products, including citrus and stone fruits. On this basis, it would be possible for Suzhou to have been a local market for a wide range of agricultural products, perhaps vaguely sketched, though not accurate in all details, by Marco Polo's Description of the World. (Wood 1995, pp140-151) Frances Wood's thesis that Marco Polo did not reach China is rejected by other writers, who argue that Marco Polo was influenced by the fantastic elements found in the travel genre of the time (Hall 1996, pp43-48).

The long route between East and West was in sections extremely difficult: the Gobi and Taklamakan Deserts, the Karakum and Kyzyl Kum (Uzbekistan) Deserts (Rashid 2001, p34), and the mountain heights of the Tien-shan and Pamirs make the route both difficult and dangerous. However, the route itself was not a continuous one, but was established through flows of silk from China to Rome via different groups that controlled sections of the road. The Huns, followed by the Turks and then the Persians controlled key sectors of the trade route, followed by the Mongols and the Mongol-Turkish empire of Timur (Puri 1987, pp11-16). China reasserted strong control of the eastern section of the route between A.D. 630 and A.D. 658 with the defeat of various Turkish tribes and renewed control over the Tarim Basin and Eastern Turkestan (Puri 1987, p48). This, of course, later on in part would become the strategic region of Xinjiang, which today remains a problematic area for Chinese political and economic governance. From the seventh century onwards the Chinese had to face two powerful enemies in this region: the Tibetans from the south and Persians from the west, and for a time in the late 9th century a locally powerful Uighur kingdom (Puri 1987, pp49-50).

Diverse trade goods, ideas and religions flowed down this road in both directions. Artistic and musical influence were also diffused, with Indian, Persian, Chinese, Tibetan and Uighur influences detectable in Central Asian paintings (Puri 1987, p258). However, only high prestige physical goods would be traded at great distances between east and west: -

The most important product was silk from China which was exported through two routes in Central Asia - the northern one passing through Turfan, Karashahr (old Agnidesa) and Kucha, and the southern one through Miran, Niya, Khotan and Yarkand. The terminal points of the two routes at the eastern end were Tunhuang and at the western one Kashgar. Trade provided stimulus and incentive to the merchants of different personalities for participation in it and settling down at various points on the trade routes. (Puri 1987, p226).

Silk, though the most valuable of items, especially when it reached the West (Rome and Constantinople), was in fact one among many items: 'Silk actually composed a relatively small portion of the trade along the Silk Road: eastbound caravans brought gold, precious metals and stones, textiles, ivory and coral, while westbound caravans transported furs, ceramics, cinnamon bark and rhubarb as well as bronze weapons.' (www.pages.com.cn/chinese_culture/silk/caravan.html )

In the long run, of course, the secret of silk production from silk worms could not be kept within China, in spite of severe decrees against the export of worms or cocoons. Sericulture eventually spread, at first in Khotan, according to legend smuggled secretly out of China by a princess (Puri 1987, p246), and then further east into Byzantium at a later date (Ma 1984). However, for many centuries, and even today, Chinese remained among the main suppliers of high quality silk.

The oasis cities of Central Asia flourished when engaged heavily in this local and international trade. One of the centres that flourished from the 16th century onwards was Bukhara: -

From as early as the sixteenth century, Bukharan merchants, who had long experience of trading with Inner Eurasia, played a critical role in the trade routes linking Muscovy, Siberia, and China. Central Asian traders had traded into the lands along the Volga River and west of the Urals from the earliest days of Rus' statehood. And they were active in the region when it was dominated by the Muslim rulers of the Golden Horde and the successor states of Kazan and Astrakhan. After the conquest of these states by Muscovy in 1552 and 1556, respectively, Bukharan traders began to deal more directly with Muscovy. From the late sixteenth century delegations of traders regularly travelled from central Asia to Muscovy and also, though less often, in the opposite direction. Bukharan interest in trade with western Siberia dates from at least the late sixteenth century, when the region was dominated by Tsar Kuchum, but it continued after the occupation of the region by Muscovite forces early in the seventeenth century. By the late seventeenth century Muscovy was trading with China itself, often with the mediation of Bukharan traders who were familiar with all the major routes between Muscovy and China. Some of these routes followed traditional itineraries, leading down the Volga to central Asia and then on to Xinjiang and China. Some rejoined the old Silk Roads in east-central Asia, after passing through western Siberia and down the river Irtysh. Others bypassed the traditional routes entirely, travelling either through Mongolia to Urga, or entirely through Siberia to Nerchinsk, and then through Mongolia. (Christian 2000, p9)

Last, it has been suggested by Andre Frank that what we call 'modernism' was generated out of millennia of interaction among Afro-Eurasian civilisations, interacting along the Silk and Steppe Roads (Christian 2000, p11). If so, then future integration of Eurasia in the 21st century may have a significant impact on the current world system and globalisation processes today (see below).

3. Buddhism on the Silk Road

The Silk Road not only connected East Asia with Central Asia and then to the Western world. It also, via branch roads, opened up communication among China, India and Persia (Puri 1987, p3), and later on via northern routes trade and cultural contacts with Russia. As we have seen, Buddhist culture had a key role to play in unifying Tibet, and in providing a key cultural influence on Mongolia. Buddhism ultimately came from northern India, but 'Central Asia was the earliest and, on the whole, the principal source of Chinese Buddhism' (Puri 1987, p147).

Moreover, it seems likely that Khotan in Central Asia was one of the key transmitters of Buddhism into both Tibet and China (Puri 1987, p13). By the second half of the third century monks and scholars such as Chu-she-hing and Moksala were busy compiling Buddhist texts, translating them into Chinese, and sending them on into China (Puri 1987, p61). Khotan for a time was a centre of Buddhist learning: -

Khotan figures prominently in ancient records and was known to the Chinese writers as Yu-tien, colonised in the time of Asoka with the blind prince Kunala being set up as a ruler of this newly founded kingdom. The Gomati vihara here - the premier Buddhist establishment - was noted for its learned savants who also wrote canonical texts, thus contributing to the development of Buddhist literature. (Puri 1987, p20).

Such centres also became key staging posts in the transmission of ideas from India into China, with the idea of the itinerant monk bring back Buddhist texts becoming one of the standard types in Chinese literature: -

The first Chinese pilgrim to actually reach India and return with a knowledge of Buddhism was Fa Xi'an (337-422), a monk who travelled the southern route in 399, through Dunhuang and Khotan and over the Himalayas to India. He studied Buddhism under various Indian masters in Benares, Gandhara and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and went as far as Sumatra and Java in Indonesia; altogether he visited over 30 countries, returning to China in 414 via the sea route. The Buddhist monk, Xuan Zang (600-664), is perhaps the most well-known of all Chinese travellers on the Silk Road, and one of the four great translators of Buddhist texts. His lasting fame is primarily due to the humorous 16th-century novel, Pilgrimage to the West (also known as Monkey), a fictional account of his pilgrimage that includes and odd assortment of the characters who accompany the monk on his journey, along with their various escapades. (www.pages.com.cn/chinese_culture/silk/religion.html )

The Chinese traveller, Fa-Hien (Fa Xi'an), visited Khotan around A.D. 400. Even by then the small city was worthy of note: -

The Chinese pilgrim found Buddhism in Khotan in a very flourishing condition and describes the glories of its monastic establishments in some detail. The monks numbered several thousands, most of them being students of Mahayana. There were hospitable arrangements in the Sangharamas for the reception of travelling monks, and he notices the custom of erecting small stupas in front of each dwelling family. The Gotami monastery, the residence of the pilgrim and his companions, alone contained 3000 monks of the Mahayana school. He also refers to Buddhist celebrations with the taking out of images in the fourteen great monasteries, more than thirty cubits high. (Puri 1987, p55).

Other cities in Central Asia were also involved in the transmission and adoption of various forms of Buddhism, including centres such as Kashgar, Osh, Kucha, Yarkand, Balkh and Bamiyan (Puri 1987, p85). Other exponents such as Kumarajiva were important in introducing key Buddhist texts into the Tarim Basin, and over fifty of translations became important classical texts in China (Puri 1987, p121). Chinese control of Khotan lapsed around 791, and around 1000 A.D. Muslim rule took over the city (Puri 1987, p57).



Within China itself, the Silk Road itself continued eastward from the three branching paths near Tarim Basin, leading to one of the most important artistic centres for Buddhism in the world. The Grottoes of Dunhuang, which have hundreds of paintings on religious and secular themes, are internationally famous. From here the main trade route continued eastwards to Chang'an (modern Xi'an).

Although Buddhism was largely pushed out of Central Asia by the arrival of Islam, with small pockets surviving in Russia and Siberia, we know of the vigorous spread of Buddhism in the region due to the large number of literary texts, monuments and art works that testify to its saturation of the eastern end of the Silk Road with Buddhist influences. This influences also spread into current-day Afghanistan, after being influenced by patterns of Indian and Greek artistic styles (Gandhara art). One of the major centres for Buddhist statuary and paintings is found in central Afghanistan at Bamiyan: -

The typical example of this culture is represented by Bamiyan, situated in the valley between the Hindukush and the Kohi-Baba ranges. It occupied in its heyday an important position on the trade route from Bactria to Taxila. The two immense statues of Buddha represented as Lokottara, the Lord of the World, cut in the rock at the eastern and western approaches of the town dominate the Buddhist complex in the region. The cliff between them covering about a kilometre in circuit is honeycombed with a conglomeration of caves, chapels, assembly halls and cells for the Buddhist monks. Some of these grottoes are connected by galleries within along the front of the precipice for circumambulation. The fifty-three metre Buddha, like the smaller colossus, has provided access to its summit through a system of stairways . . . (Puri 1987, p298)

In March 2001, the extremist form of Islam as developed under the Taliban led to the intentional destruction of these Buddhist statues and much other representational art in Afghanistan, in spite of world wide protests, including efforts by Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Egypt and the OIC to stop this 'cultural terrorism' (Moore & Constable 2001; Menon 2001). The United Nations General Assembly, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, delegations from Japan, and protests from the Russian Foreign Ministry and Russian Buddhist groups had little effect in stopping this destruction (ITAR/TASS 2001). In fact, this has been part of a much larger problem of neglect, destruction and illegal sales of artefacts out of war-torn Afghanistan for more than two decades (Lewis 2000).

The Silk Road was never fully destroyed but came under specific pressures that displaced its trade and communicative functions. The route around the south of the Tarim Basin was eventually partially lost due to shifting rivers that led to the abandonment of centres such as Miran, Endere, Niya and areas around Khotan (Puri 1987, p259). Likewise, once Islam displaced Buddhism in the region, this would change the geo-political orientation and art of the region. Economic forces would also weaken the long-distance trade along the route as the Ottoman Turks took control of the western end of the route and as Portuguese and then the Spanish began extending ocean trade routes between Europe and Asia. After World War II, of course, the region was largely divided under the fracture lines created by the Cold War, with armed borders restricting trade and influence along both east-west and north-south axes. Today, however, it is possible that new initiatives will begin to re-integrate these regions again. Positive communication and interaction along these 'new Silk-Roads' is crucial for the future of Eurasia.

4. The Eurasian Super-Region

As long ago as the early twentieth century work of the Sir Halford Mackinder (see Mackinder 1904; Mackinder 1962), it was realised that the Eurasian heartland had great significance in world affairs. His ideas were paraphrased by the geo-politician Nicholas Spykman as the idea that whoever controls the Rimland (the peripheral areas of the Eurasian continent) rules Eurasia; who rules Eurasia controls the destinies of the world (Spanier 1971, p3; see Spykman 1944). Somewhat similar ideas were developed by German geopolitical thinkers such as Karl Haushofer, and used by German leadership circles in World War II to justify their push into Russia, and their efforts to encircle the Mediterranean, Black and Caspian Seas. Such connections, of which MacKinder himself knew nothing, have given a negative connotation to the term 'geopolitics' until recently.

Likewise, the academic and US government adviser Owen Lattimore in the 1930s and 40s had an intense interest in Asian frontier nationalism, and argued that strategic and economic geography can become political geography, i.e. transform political realities (see Cotton 1989, p59). This trend remained especially significant while imperial powers fought for extended continental territories. In the 19th century Russian, Chinese and British contests over control of Tibet, Persian and Central Asia became known as the Great Game (Meyer & Brysac 1999). The main British aim was to stop Russian extension of power in the east and especially in the south towards the Persian Gulf - from the perspective of the British Empire, this would have allowed the Russian (heartland) to interfere with their naval empire which effectively controlled a number of zones along the rim of Eurasia. Today, some writers would suggest that a new 'great game' is afoot, with the major players for influence including Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, China and India (Rashid 2001; Malik 1992c, p36). This analogy is riddled with threat perceptions, and according to Roland Dannreuther is a false analogy which does not adequately take into account Russia's determination to remain a major influence, and the fact that the new states have themselves entered the international diplomacy arena with a certain skill (Dannreuther 1994, p5).

However, with the development of extended Atlantic and Indo-Pacific sea lanes and the Suez and Panama Canals, this Eurasian continental zone lost some of its strategic significance except for those states contiguous to Europe or its local sea routes, e.g. powerful regional states such as Russia, Iran, Turkey and China (all of whom have at times placed major military forces along their internal land borders). The significance of this Eurasia has once again increased, if placed in the wider social, economic and cultural aspects of strategic thought. Although a potential area of instability, Central Asia also represents a major economic and cultural opportunity for new positive relations to extend beyond European's border. Once divided by the Cold War and by Soviet-Chinese confrontations, Eurasia now has the potential to become more interconnected in the future as a zone of relative integration for security and economic affairs. Whether it does depends on a number of major factors, including the impact of Russian, Chinese and American policies, as well the way regional and cultural interests are developed. It also dependents on positive outcomes for Iraq and Afghanistan, which is far from assured through 2006-2007.

With the new strategic partnership between China and Russia, along with accords they hold with most of the Central Asian states (leading to the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), it is already clear that these two great powers already hold considerable leverage on Eurasian development. At present, tensions experienced by China and Pakistan with India continue to limit how far the southern zone of Eurasia can become integrated into new trade routes - the old route to the northeast out of India into China remains a militarised area though border trade has increased, while Pakistan-Afghanistan trade routes have not yet really stabilised for access into Central Asia. The question remains open as to whether the U.S. and the EU will sustain a long term interest in Eurasia that goes beyond the reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq. One major sign of western Eurasian integration has been a major transport project to connect Europe, the Caucasus Region, and Asia. Called the Transport Corridor Europe-Causasus-Asia (TRACECA), it has received serious support from the European Union in an effort to rebuild sea, road and railway links. Traffic across this 'new' Silk Road has grown 60% between 1996 and 1998, with up a $1 billion of infrastructure investment and loans eventually being needed, largely to be drawn from the EU and from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Armenian International Magazine 1998).

This Eurasian centre can be contrasted to a formal Atlantic-based maritime sphere based on North America and its interconnections with Western Europe (Fitzpatrick 1992, p18, p27), i.e. NATO 'plus'. This pattern had been modified by the following process during the Cold War: 'The incorporation of key fringe areas of the Eurasian landmass within the American hegemonic sphere produced a new 'bipolar' geopolitical configuration which may broadly be described in terms of an opposition between a Eurasian 'heartland' sphere and an expanded maritime-cum 'rimland' sphere.' (Fitzpatrick 1992, p21). With the fragmentation of the USSR, and the main phase of the Cold War over, a host of newly independent states (NIS) have emerged in the region. These include Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan in Central Asia, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan between the Caspian and Black Seas. All these states are searching for modernisation, for improved standards of living, and improved communications with the outside world. In this context, although the reality of Russian influence remains strong, there has also been a marked increase in Chinese, Turkish, Iranian, Pakistani and Saudi Arabian influence in certain areas. Likewise, the US, European states and to a lesser extent, Japan (Yamamoto 1995) and South Korea, have tried to offer their services in a host of economic and political projects which will change the future of Central Asia and Siberia, a trend accelerated after 2001. It is also possible to argue that the hegemonic Atlantic grouping (North America, plus Western Europe) is now being dissipated by differing economic and political interests as the EU becomes more independent, and as the defensive reasons for coherence in the face of the Soviet Union declines. Both the EU-US and Japan-US relationship have come under a certain level of pressure due to trade frictions and divergences in foreign policy. The US made strenuous efforts during 1996-2006 to ensure that their alliances with Japan and through NATO remain vigorous and effective (e.g. note various concessions to bring France back into NATO, the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, and efforts to deepen military cooperation with Japan).

Furthermore, the region of Central Asia brings together the broader concerns of Eurasia. In a world where regional significances have increased since the end of the Cold War (see Chubin 1989; Cintra 1989), this super-region, often broken in two due to traditional conceptions of 'Asia' and 'Europe', needs to be reconsidered. This super-region has most of the features of a 'security complex' (see Fitzpatrick 1 992, p4; Buzan 1983, pp105-106). In other words, changes and impacts on one side of the super-region have direct effects on not only the centre, but also on the remote border. This was certainly true during the Cold War. For example, the whole doctrine of a US strategic attack on the Siberian coast of the USSR was based on the way this would reduce the willingness of the Soviets to engage in a fast drive through Northern Europe. Likewise, force levels on the Chinese border had a direct impact on modern forces which could be deployed in Central Asia and in the Warsaw Pact region. In the late 1980's, likewise, reduced tensions in Europe allowed the USSR to redeploy and modernise its divisions on its eastern borders, causing a short period of anxiety in both China and the West (Tai Ming Cheung 1992). Even in terms of the PRC's ability to project power against Taiwan and into the South China Sea, a relaxing of tension in China-Russian relations between 1989 and 1996 has been very useful (see Melmet 1998). In fact, today China seeks to build 'strategic partnerships' with Russia and continue trade with the US to ensure her own safety and long-term interests. However, rising competition over energy resources and threaten perceptions driven by PRC's military modernisation may undermine this pattern of practical accommodation.

This Eurasian complex is also being forged at the economic level. The Soviet Union attempted to use primary resources (oil, coal, metal, uranium, diamonds, timber, cotton, fishing resources) as part of an integrated economic scheme which draw these commodities into factories located most often in European Russia. It failed, however, to complete this economic integration. Soviet planners had hoped to balance the higher demographic growth rates of Central Asian communities, by encouraging the emigration of labour to zones which needed more workers, especially in parts of European Russia and even more urgently Siberia and the Far East. In this they largely failed (Hauner 1992; Lewis 1992). The question now, of course, is whether the current world regime, based on capitalism, modernisation and increasing political openness, can complete this transition without severe regional destabilisation, and without turning the region into a zone of exploited resources and cheap labour.

There are, of course, several ways to re-conceptualise world regions. One is to emphasise the new Asia-Pacific super-region, with four subregions of North-East Asia, South-East Asia, the South Pacific and South Asia, with the possible addition of Central Asia 'as a distinct and strategically important fifth subregion' (Malik 1992a, p33). However, this division is problematic. Recent studies of China, for example, suggest a growing economic and social cleavage between coastal provinces and those acting as hinterlands to Special Economic Zones, and truly interior provinces and Autonomous Zones, some of whom who have begun trade with the central Asian republics (see Segal 1994). Looking at prospects for the 21st century, it may be more effective to conceive of a Eurasian core, an Indo-Pacific oceanic grouping which includes the littoral of Asia and western Americas, and an Atlantic-based grouping which integrates with the littoral of western Europe. To what extent nation-states will be able to control and direct economic activity, as well as social and cultural trends, remains to be seen. Regionalism and globalisation may continue to be growing forces while the power of all but the most powerful of states (in relative terms) continues to decline.

5. Beyond the Geopolitics of Mahan and MacKinder

It is hard to over-estimate the influence, direct and indirect, that a writer such as Alfred Mahan has had on American strategic thought and on the way the U.S. has used its economic, military and diplomatic resources in the 20th century. It may be worthwhile to briefly explain his theories in a little more detail. Mahan began his research in the following way: -

In pondering this matter, it occurred to the author - whose acquaintance with naval history was at that time wholly superficial - that the part played by navies, and by maritime power generally, as a factor in the result of history, and as shaping the destinies of nations and of the world, had received little or no particular attention. (Mahan, I, 1892, ppiii-iv)

Mahan thought his views gained especial verification from the outcome of the Napoleonic wars, in which the Continental system set up by Napoleon to try to isolate Britain from European markets, i.e. 'the Continental System' of the early 19th century (Mahan, II, 1892, p54, p897), in fact failed precisely because of British naval power, and in particular, the inability of the French and her allies to control Atlantic coasts and the Mediterranean (Mahan, II, 1892, p59, p69, p366, p372, pp394-5). The ability of the British to close most European ports and seriously inhibit coast trade was demonstrated clearly by 1801 (Mahan, II, 1892, p66). France in particular, with more than a million men under arms, would find this blockade to have serious economic impacts on her ability to effectively wage war (Mahan, II, 1892, pp376-377). Ironically, the British navy would be expanded and her overall dominance of the sea increased by the French challenge, as indeed would her role as a trade entrepot for non-European goods to Europe (Mahan, II, 1892, pp73-74, p374, p380). The possession by the British Isles of a great navy also offered the ability to project power at great distances, and to keep much of the negative affects of war removed from her homeland. This also suggested a policy in relation to 19th century European wars: -

. . .great operations on land, or a conspicuous share in the continental campaigns became, if not absolutely impossible to Great Britain, at least clearly unadvisable. It was economically wiser, for the purposes of the coalitions, that she should be controlling the sea, supporting the commerce of the world, making money and managing the finances, while other states, whose industries were exposed to the blast of war and who had not the same commercial aptitudes, did the fighting on land. (Mahan, II, 1892, p386).

This policy involved the setting up of a world-embracing empire with dominions and colonies, with massive penetration of trade and access to 'third world' resources which were then denied to other powers. This was backed up by a strong merchant marine, a sizeable army and dominant navy, and formed the basis of Britain's power in the 19th century (Mahan, II, 1892, p389). Although Britain would not be able to sustain such a powerful role after World War II, this approach reveals several important correlations of attitudes. These include a correlation between commercial and naval power, and the tendency to link the ability to project power with proxy wars fought by allies.

Several parallels suggest themselves. In World War II, as well, the 'Fortress Europe' conception of the German military command could never be fully maintained while British and American fleets fought and won the 'battle of the Atlantic'. In the Pacific, during World War II the Japanese needed decisive naval victories to ensure the survival of the 'co-prosperity sphere' (see Barnhart 1987) her military planners needed to set up in East and South-East Asia in order to ensure access to strategic resources. It was the lack of total victories at Pearl Harbour and Midway which prevented her from securing needed economic resources and keeping the war away from her vulnerable island homeland. In the Cold War, American also combined dominance in trade and huge naval forces to project power globally and to aid her involvement in a number of proxy hot wars (Korean, Vietnamese, Cambodian conflicts). Although the U.S. has not had colonies as such in this period, she had set up a close network of allies and economic dependencies which gave her some of the same strategic advantage: hence some writers have viewed the Pacific as an 'American Lake' (see Friedman 2001). It was precisely this policy which the Soviets could only partially emulate.

These historical trends have resulted in a huge literature emphasizing the dominance of sea and air power based on carrier groups, or at least strong defensive groupings, e.g. effective submarine and air forces (see Neilson & Errington 1995; Mason 1987; Ball 1988; Hanks 1985; Babbage 1988). In the post-Cold War period, there have also been efforts to re-conceptualise positive roles for these huge forces, including involvement in peace-keeping activities (Staley 1992; Ross 1990). These trends have also been supported by the fact that in the late 20th century considerable portions of the world's trade (18%) flowed across the Pacific and Atlantic (see Miall 1993, p31).

If we now turn to the theories of MacKinder, we can see how his ideas in some ways force a rethinking the dominance of this 'principle of ocean'. MacKinder's startling ideas on the way geography affected political life and world history were publicly announced in a now famous address to the British Royal Geographical Society in 1904, and gained further refinement in an article "The Round World and the Wining of the Peace" (Foreign Affairs, July 1943). They received their most complete treatment by him in his Democratic Ideals and Reality (1962). Although there were slight modifications in his ideas during this time, they focused on several key ideas: -

  • The 'the unequal growth of nations is in large measure the result of the uneven distribution of fertility and strategic opportunity upon the face of the globe' (Pearce 1962, pxviii). Human societies, furthermore, as 'Going Concerns' with institutional momentum are now faced for the first time with a closed global system (Pearce 1962, pxviii) where any expansions impinges on other societies.

  • That societies which used sea power successfully for any length of time did so by enclosing their regions of operation by bases and colonies, turning these regions into virtual 'inland' seas. In other words, sea and land power was required to create lasting political empires. MacKinder supported this idea by looking at the way the Romans in the Punic Wars against Carthage used naval power to invade north Africa and Spain to stop Carthaginian control of the Western Mediterranean, and the way the U.S. build up island bases across the Pacific and into Asia to defeat Japan in World War II

  • The one region which cannot be communicated to by sea and encircled in this way is the heartland of Eurasia, comprising Central Asia and much of the Urals and Siberia. This region has rivers that drain either into inland seas or into the frozen Arctic. The region is protected by frozen seas to the north, and in large measure by mountains and deserts to the south. Thus, in its operations in Afghanistan the U.S. and its allies could not rely on flights from carriers or distant bases, but also relied on bases in Uzbekistan (later closed), Kyrgyzstan, and to a limited degree Pakistan.

  • That this heartland operates as a crucial geographical and strategic pivot which can aid control of the 'World Island' of Eurasia. Combined with its mineral and population resources, control of the heartland would give a major world power, e.g. Germany, Russia or China, a significant global power advantage. It was for this reason that Germany's attempt to control this region (in World War II), and the Soviet Union's control of it down to 1991, made them major challenges to any notion of 'balance of power'.

  • That the ferocity of the Cold War was largely related to the fact that Soviet control of the heartland forced the U.S. (and its allies) to engage in a policy of global containment against this power core, with forces and alliances stationed along the entire land border and in the sea accesses to Soviet territory. Ironically, the strategic 'balance of terror' achieved by nuclear arsenals of the Soviets and the Americans meant that such weapons are locked in a 'non-use stalemate' (deterrence) where the strategic significance of MacKinder's thought has remained valuable. Efforts to achieve strategic advantage have often been played out on the Peninsulas of this 'World Island' (Pearce 1962, pxi), e.g. Korea, Southeast Asia, or in Africa.


Criticisms and adaptions of Mackinder's position include:

  • R.S. Amery has suggested that nations with the greatest industrial and technological base, regardless of location geographically, will tend to dominate world affairs (in Pearce 1962, pxxiii). This would seem to have been true of Britain in the 19th century, and Japan in the economic sense over the last two decades. It must be remembered, however, that Britain needed a large navy and empire to access resources and markets to ensure her power. Likewise, modern Japan's prosperity has been based on access to world resources and markets in a period of relative peace partly enforced by U.S. power in the Pacific and in Asia. Japan has also utilised the concept of 'comprehensive security' to help ensure access to materials and energy resources from a wide range of countries and to develop competitive advantages in world markets (Akaha 1991; Wong 1991; Chapman et al 1983; Comprehensive National Security Study Group 1980), while developing power sea and air-power resources for its Self Defence Forces Thus Through 2003-2004, though in GDP spending was only around 0.99% of GDP, defence spending was sustained at around US$39.5 billion dollars, and lifted to around US45.1 billion in 2004 and 43.9 billion in 2005 and around 41.1 billion in 2006 (Chipman 2007; Chipman 2003; Chipman 2004; Chipman 2005; Hughes 2004). Along with some redefinition of constitutional limits to allow limited peace-support deployments, this means that Japan has one of the most modern and sizeable air-forces and navies in the Asia-Pacific, with an active force of 240,000 persons (Chipman 2007). Japan has also been engaged in research into a Theatre Missile Defence system, directed primarily against the threat of North Korean missiles, but also of some concern to PRC. There have also been hints through 2003-2006 that weaponisation and deployment of nuclear weapons in North Korea might push Japan towards considering the development its own nuclear deterrent, but with improved dialogue from early 2007 this prospect has reduced. In general terms, new destroyers, missile systems, and in-air refuelling has generally strengthened Japan's ability to project power in Northeast Asia, perhaps in response to perceived North Korean threats, though this intent has not been formally expressed at government level (see Hughes 2005, pp79-83).

  • If Eurasia fails to integrate economically, it will in fact remain a net-drain on technological resources and investment, and thereby fail to be the economic basis for a global power. It could remain weak and embattled in its core areas.

  • If political and social insecurity erupt in central Eurasia, the region may well suffer from 'containment' policies from the EU, the U.S., and peripheral powers such as Japan. This policy would definitely limit growth in the world economy, but might be preferred to deep entanglements if regional or ethnic wars expand into larger areas of Central Asia or Russia (to date Tajikistan and Afghanistan show the very negative impacts of such wars on most economic activity). Put another way, Central Asia might remain an 'exporter' of insecurity into adjacent regions.


6. The Inter-Regional Perspective

If one wishes to retain the separate regions of Europe, South Asia, and North-East Asia, then Central Asia becomes a crucial linkage area of interregional contact, which can either result in division and conflict, as in the Cold War and the very hot conflicts in Afghanistan, or in a new series of connections which allow more positive relationships. Here the long, 1,700 kilometre eastern frontier of Kazakhstan with China is a case in point - if viewed in a negative sense, the frontier is wide, porous, and a extremely expensive defence liability. It is also important to note that China's Xinjiang province consists of 60% of ethnic groups who have major connections with cross-border populations, including Uighurs, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks (D'Antoine 1992, p36). In March 1992 there was already one call for an Uighur struggle for independence in China (Dannreuther 1994, p63), causing a tightening of security along borders and in Xinjiang. Through 1995-1998 incidents of riots, calls for independence, terrorism, and a harsh security crack down by China have made Xinjiang province once again an area of instability (see Raczka 1998). Likewise, China has pressured Kyrgyztan to take a stronger line in controlling Uighur minorities within their territory (Rashid 2001).

The region as a whole has not succumbed to the kind of fragmentation and destruction found in Afghanistan. The question is not so much one of direct threats, as of complexity and uncertain prospects. Major issues of concern for the future of Greater Central Asia include: -

  • The ability to restrain ethnic violence and prevent narrow forms of ethnic or religious nationalism, a problem for the region as a whole and the Russian Federation in particular (see Gorenburg 2001).

  • The need to create viable states which have legitimate, democratic governments that can undertake economic reform and avoid corruption and manipulation of power (for problems, see Rashid 2001).

  • The issue of the continued treatment of Russian minorities, who form a powerful but resented group with needed technical skills. This has complicated the politics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan (Rashid 2001).

  • Relationships with an assertive Russia with a strong foreign policy under President Putin.

  • The types of Islam which will penetrate the region. Fortunately, the mystical and individualistic trends of the Sufism common to the region will tend to counterbalance various forms of 'fundamentalism' (Rashid 1994, p246). As the same time, militant Islamic groups such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) have been active in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1999-2001, forcing a stronger security clamp down in the region (Rashid 2001, pp41-43), while through 2005-2007 the Taliban have re-emerged as a major problem for Pakistan and southern Afghanistan..

  • Access to the sea ports and the global economy via improved road, rail and air links.

  • Relationships with China and other regional traders.

  • The problem of illegal drug flows, smuggling (arms and people), and misdirected efforts to control drug production, This probably has only been temporarily interrupted with the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 and remains of major concern to the government of Afghanistan through 2007.


We can sense how importantly this part of the world has been viewed at the level of security issues by the fact that all Central Asian states are members of the OSCE, and all are also members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), indicating NATO and EU concerns over the security of the entire region (International Institute for Strategic Studies 1995c). Yet a genuine Eurasia system has not yet emerged. At best, we can see an ongoing Eurasian process (see Dawisha and Parrott 1994) which is bringing these communities into the world diplomatic and economic systems. There are also dangers in such a process: if NATO expansion and U.S.-China pressures continue, China and Russia could be forced even closer together, and be tempted to control the entire Eurasian heartland as a strategic resource.

Fortunately, there are factors in play during 1997-2007 that suggest these issues are now being seriously addressed, by necessity, by the international community. Whether they will have the staying power to help transform Central Asia into a progressive Eurasian process remain to be seen. Furthermore, a peacefully integrated Eurasia could seriously reduce tension over access to energy and metal resources in the 21st century, and help maintain a multi-polar world system with high levels of cooperation.


Dr. R. James Ferguson is the Director of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, and Assistant Professor of International Relations, FHSS, Bond University, Australia. Member of the International Studies Association (ISA), the International Institute for Strategic Studies (the IISS, London), the International Institute of Development Studies (IIDS) and AIIA.


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The "Great Game": Eurasia and the History of War

by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Global Research

The History of War

History is often self-repeating. Those who are oblivious to the lessons of history are, by virtue of ignorance, doomed to repeat the mistakes of the past.

Samuel P. Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” is an outright camouflage, an ideological instrument used to reach geo-political objectives. This "conflict notion" is part of a broad strategy which has been used throughout history to divide, conquer, and rule.

By Huntington’s definitions, nine diverse civilizations co-inhabit Eurasia; establishing conflict between them is a means towards controlling them and eventually absorbing them in the Spencerian sense of war and the social evolution of nation-states and societies, as defined by British sociologist Herbert Spencer.

Is humanity witness once again to a gradual march towards a large-scale international war like the Second World War, as Vladimir Putin has warned the Russian people? Or is fear being used to push forward otherwise unacceptable global economic policies?

If the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the dual-thrones of Austria and Hungary (the Austro-Hungarian Empire), on June 28, 1914 was the cause of the First World War why then was there talk of a major war throughout Europe in 1905?

It was on the eve of the First World War that radical changes were made to the banking system in the U.S. and on the eve of the Second World War that otherwise unpopular economic reforms were implemented in Britain. War allows otherwise unpopular measures to be accepted by domestic populations or gives them stealthy means for execution.

Mackinder’s Warnings: Divide the Continentals (Eurasians)

Mackinder warned British strategists about preventing Eurasian unification:

“What if the Great Continent, the whole World-Island [Africa and Eurasia] or a large part of it [e.g., Russia, China, Iran, and India] were at some future time to become a single and united base of sea-power? Would not the other insular bases [e.g., Britain, the U.S., and Japan] be outbuilt [sic] as regards [to] ships and outmanned as regards [to] seamen?” [1]

Mackinder also went on to instruct Britain to prevent this unification from ever happening: a policy of balkanization was adopted by London, with a strategic aim of preventing Eurasian unification.

In addition, Mackinder also warned about the large populations of Eurasia. Mackinder argued that lasting empires were based on manpower:

“[The] vast Saracen [Arab] design of a northward and southward Dominion of Camel-men crossed by a westward and eastward Dominion of Shipmen was vitiated by one fatal defect; it lacked in its Arabian base the necessary man-power to make it good. But no student of the realities about which must turn the strategical thought of any government aspiring to world-power can afford to lose sight of the warning thus given by History.” [2]

Mackinder also makes the same observation about the short-lived empires of the peoples’ of the Eurasian steppes, such as the Mongols:

“When the Russian Cossacks first policed the steppes at the close of the Middle Ages, a great revolution was effected, for the Tartars, like the Arabs, had lacked the necessary man-power upon which to found a lasting Empire, but behind the Cossacks were the Russian ploughman, who have to-day [1905] grown to be a people of a hundred millions on the fertile plains of the Black and Baltic Seas.” [3]

Population is clearly an important geo-strategic issue. Under this scheme Russia, China, and India are viewed as threats. This is also why the U.S. will never give up its nuclear weapons. Aside from military superiority and nuclear weapons, how can the generally less populated NATO states keep a balance of power with such heavily populated states? It should also be noted that one of the reasons for European conquests and colonial expansion was also the fact that, at the time, European countries had (in relative terms) large populations.

Dividing, balkanizing, and finlandizing Eurasia, from Eastern Europe and the former U.S.S.R. to the Middle East and India, is consistent with these historical objectives outlined by Britain prior to the First World War. This is one of the reasons why Britain, France, and America gave refuge prior to World War I to various separatist movements from within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and Czarist Russia. Today, the U.S. and Britain are harbouring similar political groups against Iran, Sudan, Turkey, Russia, Serbia, China, and India. Nothing has changed. Only today Zbigniew Brzezinski makes these warnings and not Halford Mackinder.

Learning from History: The Prevention of the German Ostbewegung

In 1848, at St. Paul’s Church in Frankfurt there was an attempt to create a single and large Central-Eastern European, German-dominated nation. This project did not move forward until half a century later, because of the opposition of the Habsburg Dynasty and the rivalry between Prussia and Austria.

Britain feared the German Drang nach Osten, the “drive to the East,” or the Ostbewegung or “eastward movement.”

For the most part this eastward movement, which started in 1200 with the extension of long distance trade, was not part of any German imperial ambitions. [4] The fear in British circles was that some form of unification between the two dominant powers in the Eurasian Heartland, namely Germany and Russia would occur. The fear in the Twenty-First Century is the unification of Russia, China, India, and Iran.

Before the First World War, British strategists believed that Germany was making important inroads towards becoming a global superpower. All that was required to elevate Germany was industrial control over Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which was well underway. Germany was already taking over British markets and threatening the U.S. and Britain economically.

Historically, Eastern Europe has been sandwiched between two great nations, Germany and Russia. After the Napoleonic era and up until the First World War, Eastern Europe was dominated by the Russians and then the Germans. Historically, British strategy was aimed at weakening Czarist Russia until Germany replaced Russia as the dominant power in Eastern Europe. This is one of the reasons why Britain and France supported the Ottoman Turks in their wars against the Russians.

German influence in Eastern Europe was secured under a partnership between the Hungarians (Magyars) and Austrians. German influence had also been growing economically, politically, and industrially under the Ottoman Turks in the Middle East. In Czarist Russia, before the First World War, German influence was politically and economically significant. The Russian capital, St. Petersburg, was in a Germanized area of the Russian Czardom and many Russian aristocrats and nobles were Germanized and German speaking.

German industrial colonies or settlements were also established in the Ukraine and the Caucasus within the territory of Czarist Russia. Similarly German settlements were established in the Levant, within the territory of the Ottoman Turks. The Ostbewegung was more about economics and a united and strong Eurasian industrial base under the control of Germany than it was about the myth of German colonization of all Eurasia.

However, Germany’s means of economic expansion did change about half a century later with the rise of Adolph Hitler in Berlin, who tried to force a German-driven form of globalization in Eurasia by military means. Is this being repeated by those who hold power in Washington, D.C. and London?

A Lesson from History: Playing the Russians and the Germans in War

Economics and industrial competition was the real key behind the tensions that resulted in the First World War. Mackinder also states this. In reality the truth of the matter was that the Germans were from an economic standpoint expanding eastwards. The German demographic push to the East was also over exaggerated. Historically, in many cases Germans were invited as merchants and craftsmen by Eastern European states, such as Bohemia and Hungary, before the unification of Germany under Prince Otto von Bismarck the Prime Minister of Prussia.

Mackinder and others in Britain saw this all as part of a gradual trend that would unify the Eurasian Heartland under a single and powerful player.

The key to stopping the emergence of a single powerful player in the Heartland was to play the Germans against the Russians:

“In East Europe there are also two principle elements, the Teutonic [German] and the Slavonic, but no equilibrium has been established between them as between the Romance [Latin-based speaking] and Teutonic elements of West Europe. The key to the whole situation in East Europe — and it is a fact which cannot be laid to heart at the present moment — is the German claim to dominance over the Slavs. Vienna and Berlin, just beyond the boundary of West Europe, stand already within territory that was Slav in the earlier Middle Ages; they represent the first step of the German out of his native country as a conqueror eastward.” [5]

In the eyes of Britain, playing the Russians and the Germans against one another was vital to keeping the Continentals from uniting.

The Roots of an Anglo-American Compact

The British and the U.S. were clearly trying to weaken both Germany and Czarist Russia. This is evident from British and American support for the Japanese “when it [meaning Britain] kept the [naval] ring round the Russo-Japanese War,” in 1904 to 1905. [6]

By the time of the Russo-Japanese War the Anglo-American alliance had already formed between the U.S. and Britain as Mackinder notes:

“Those events began some twenty years ago [in 1898] with three great victories won by the British fleet without the firing of a gun. The first was at Manila [in the Philippines], in the Pacific Ocean, when a German squadron threatened to intervene to protect a Spanish squadron [in the Spanish-American War], which was defeated by an American squadron, and a British squadron stood by the Americans.”[7]

In Mackinder’s words “So was the first step taken towards the reconciliation of British and American hearts.” [8] This was also the point in history where the U.S. became a major imperialist power.

It should also be noted that the Spanish-American War is believed by some historians to have been started under a false pretext. The U.S. government started the war, blaming the Spanish for the sinking of the U.S.S. Maine in Cuba, from whence comes the quote that was used to build American public support against the Spanish: “Remember the Maine!”

The Second World War: Playing the Soviets against the Germans

The strategy of playing the main players in Eurasia against one another continued into the Second World War. Germany, France, and the Soviet Union were played against one another just as Germany, Czarist Russia, and the Ottoman Empire were before the First World War.

This is evident from the fact that Britain and France only declared war on Germany when both Germany and the U.S.S.R. invaded Poland in 1939. The Locarno Pacts and Hoare-Laval Plan were used by the British government to push the Germans eastward to confront the Soviets by neutralizing France and allowing Germany to militarize, while appeasement under Neville Chamberlain was a calculated move aimed at liquidating any states between Germany and the Soviet Union and establishing a common German-Soviet border. [9]

Both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were aware of Anglo-American policy. Both countries signed a non-aggression pact prior to the Second World War, largely in response to the Anglo-American stance. In the end it was because of Soviet and German distrust for one another that the Soviet-German alliance collapsed. Presently, the U.S. government is using the same strategies in regards to Russia, China, Iran, India, and other Eurasian players.

The Roots of Strategic Balkanization: Preventing the Unification of Eurasia

Mackinder stipulated that the Eurasian Heartland started in Eastern Europe and on the frontiers of Germany. It was from Eastern Europe that a foothold could be established for entrance into the Eurasian interior.

London’s greatest fear, until the division of Austria-Hungary and a creation of a buffer zone between the Germans and the Russians with the emergence of several new states after 1918, was the unification of the Germans and the Slavs as a single Eurasian entity.

British balkanization policy was a synergy of colonial policy, power politics, economics, and historical observation.

Strategic balkanization probably came to maturity when Italy and Germany became unified nation-states and the British realized the dangers that centralized and strong states in Europe could pose. Once again, economics was a driving force. Before this period balkanization was used for colonial means. After the formation, or rather unification, of Germany and Italy balkanization also became a means to neutralize potential British rivals.

František Palacký, the famous Czech historian, is quoted as stating: “If Austria [meaning the Habsburg or Austro-Hungarian Empire] did not exist, it would be necessary to create her, in the interests of humanity itself.”

This is a noteworthy statement because Palacký was a Slav, who defended the Austro-Hungarian Empire due to its multi-ethnic characteristics.

The Habsburg Empire was a regional synthesis between the Germans, the Hungarians (Magyar), and the Slavs. The Austro-Hungarian Empire, like the former Yugoslavia that would spring from its ashes, was also religiously diverse. Christians, Jews, and Muslims lived within its borders and in 1912 Islam became a state religion, alongside the Roman Catholic denomination of Christianity. The British feared that this model under the leadership of German industrial might could be extended to Germany, Austria-Hungary and Czarist Russia, thereby creating a powerful German-Slavic political entity in the Eurasian Heartland. [10] The synthesis was already underway, with the inclusion of the Ottoman Empire, until the First World War stopped it. As already stated this process was part of a historical fusion. Austria-Hungary had to be dismantled in the eyes of London, with a view to obstructing any unification process between the Continentals.

For these reasons separatist nationalist movements were utilized and manipulated. Czechoslovak leaders, such as Milan Rastislav Štefánik, fought for the French and British during the First World War. It should also be noted that in September 1918, the U.S. government recognized Czechoslovakia before it was even created and that the Pittsburgh Agreement, which paved the way for breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Empire and creating Czechoslovakia, was signed in Pennsylvania with the support of the British and U.S. governments. Three “Czecho-Slovak” legions were also formed to fight Germany and the Austro-Hungarians by Britain and France in the First World War.

Redrawing Eastern Europe and the Middle East: The Template for Iraq

Since the First World War instability has been continuously fueled from Kosovo in the Balkans to the province of Xinjiang, which constitutes China's Western frontier. This is an important fact that manifests itself from events such as the division of India to the division of Yugoslavia.

The rationale for establishing new states in Eastern Europe is also explained by Mackinder:

“Securely independent the Polish and Bohemian [the Czech and Slovak] nations cannot be unless as the apex of a broad wedge of independence, extending from the Adriatic and Black Seas to the Baltic; but seven independent States, with a total of more than sixty million people, traversed by railways linking them securely with one another, and having access through the Adriatic, Black, and Baltic Seas with the [Atlantic] Ocean, will together effectively balance the Germans of Prussia [meaning Germany] and Austria, and nothing less will suffice for that purpose.” [11]

Although Bohemia is properly a reference to the Czechs, in this case Mackinder is using it to mean both the Czechs and the Slovaks or Czechoslovakia.

By 1914, the Germans had already secured significant inroads into the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had to be dismantled too. However, in the eyes of British strategists, Russia and Germany were the two main long-term opponents. To undermine the process of unification between the Germans and Russians, a shatter-belt region had to be created in Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia.

After the First World War, Anglo-American planners projected the replacement of Germany by the Soviet Union, the player that emerged from the ashes of Czarist Russia, as the most powerful player in Eurasia. Creating a shatter-belt zone around the western portion of the Soviet Union from the Baltic to the Balkans and the Persian Gulf became a strategic objective for the British. This is one of the reasons why so many new nations were created in Eastern Europe and the Middle East after the First World War and again in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the Cold War.

As Anglo-American strategists started looking at global strategy in a holistic view they adopted the concept of trans-continental encirclement.

The Rimland is the concept of a geographic area adjacent or circling the Eurasian “Heartland.” Western Europe, Central Europe, the Middle East, the Indian sub-continent, Southeast Asia, and the Far East comprise this area from Western Eurasia to Eastern Eurasia. Nicholas Spykman’s Rimland helps give an objective and historical context to the present zones of conflict encircling Russia, China, and Iran that start from the Balkans, the Kurdish areas of the Middle East, Iraq, Caucasia, and go through NATO-garrisoned Afghanistan, Kashmir, Indo-China, and finish in the Korean Peninsula. The geographic locations of these areas say much as to which countries or players are disturbed.

Iraq is being redrawn in a step by step fashion, but firstly though its political landscape and a system of soft federalism. This holistic concept is also getting stronger and the existence of European and Asiatic missile shield projects are connected to this approach as is the brinkmanship to create an American-dominated global military alliance.

The Pirenne Thesis

In his book, Mohammed and Charlemagne, Belgian historian Henri Pirenne, states that Charlemagne and the Frankish Empire would never have existed if it were not for the period of Arab expansion in the Mediterranean region. Henri Pirenne became known for his thesis that the Germanic barbarians, such as the Franks and Goths, that were traditionally credited by historians for the fall of the Western Roman Empire in reality merged themselves with the Western Roman Empire and that the economic and institutional templates of Western Rome continued and stayed intact. Pirenne challenged the traditional historic narrative that the Germanic barbarians were the reason for the decline of Western Rome.

Pirenne seems correct in the basis of his theory. In most cases Western Roman ways were maintained by the Germanic kingdoms. The facts that the Franks, a Germanic people, adopted Latin (which eventually evolved into French over time) as their language or that the Roman Church stayed intact as an important societal institution supports his observations and thesis.

The decline of Rome is more probably based on an end to an economy based on imperial expansion, slavery, over-militarization, and political corruption as its main factors. The decline of the Western European economy was not because the Arabs were unwilling to continue trade with Western Europe, but because of militarism and the de-centralization that went with it, hand-in-hand; the end result being European feudalism. Is this process repeating itself today?

To Pirenne, it was clear that the economic framework of the Roman Empire, Western and Eastern (Byzantine), was fixed around the economy and trade of the Mediterranean Sea. Western Rome only transformed from a politically centralized entity to a network of politically separate kingdoms and states, but with the same economic framework, fixed on the Mediterranean, intact.

Pirenne theorized that the real decline in the Western Roman entity was brought about by the rapid expansion of the Arabs. The Levant, Egypt, various Mediterranean islands, portions of Anatolia (Asia Minor), Spain, Portugal, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, which were all Mediterranean regions, were all incorporated within the vast cosmopolitan realm of the Arabs. According to Pirenne, the reason that this decline was brought about was the cut in ties between the integrated economies of most of the Mediterranean and Western Europe that was brought about by the Arabs. Western Europe effectively degenerated into a marginalized economic hinterland.

Another factor that should be added to Pirenne’s theory about the economic decline of Western Europe after the fall of Rome was that Eastern Rome (Byzantium) also diverted its trade, or reduced its level, from Western Europe due to economic realities brought about by the Arab expansion in the Mediterranean. Also in part the dissolved economic links between Western Europe and the Byzantines was because of the differences and rivalry between the Western Christian Church and the Eastern Christian Church that developed with time. Animosity also existed between the authorities in Constantinople and Western Europe and further effected economic ties. These tensions were also in many cases economic in origin.

The Pirenne Thesis states that Western Europe was transformed into a series of farm-based economies, which slowly gave rise to European feudalism, due to Arab expansion. Raw resources were being exported outwards with little imports to Western Europe, whereas before items and resources such as valuable metals and Egyptian papyrus would enter Western Europe. This was because the economy of Western Europe was cut off from the rest of the globe. The European voyages of discovery that occur later can also be traced to this period as a means to reverse this process.

The Eurasians Strike Back: The New Silk Road

Today, across Eurasia there is a renewed drive at economic and socio-political cooperation and integration. The Silk Road is being revived. Iran, Russia, and China are the most important forces in this project. Kazakhstan is also playing a very important role. Railway networks, transport corridors, electric grids, and various forms of infrastructure are being developed, linked, and built in an effort to integrate Eurasia.

Central Asia is set to become the mid-axis and the heartland of a series of north-south and west-east corridors. A strategic triangle between Russia, Iran, and China will set the border for a Eurasian trade zone that can eventually bring Africa and chunks of Europe into its orbit. Latin America has already anticipated this shift and is preparing to redirect part of its trade from the U.S. and E.U. towards this area.

China is a global centre of labour while Russia, Iran, and Central Asia hold 15% or more of global oil reserves and 50% of the world’s reserves of natural gas. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) also holds half the planet’s estimated population. Together these areas also have vast and important markets.

Eurasia is coming together in a wave of regional integration and cross-border trade. Russia and Kazakhstan have also made proposals for the eventual formation of a Eurasian Union. The customs union established between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan is a step towards this Eurasian Union. Iran has also made proposals for the formation of a so-called Islamic Union between nations with Muslim populations.

This is all effectively a re-introduction of the Pirenne Thesis in a modern context. In this second round of the Pirennian cycle it is the trade-dependent economies of Western Europe and the U.S., the players of the Eurasian periphery and the maritime realms, that are under threat of being marginalized like the former areas of Western Rome were during the Arab expansion in the Mediterranean. The Eurasians are striking back; they realize that it is not them who needs the U.S. or E.U., but the other way around.

A Mediterranean Union and an Islamic Union: The West versus the Eurasian Heartland

Reflecting on the Pirenne Thesis, it is also not historically ironic that the E.U. is pushing for the establishment of a Mediterranean Union, which would economically merge the nations of the Mediterranean and E.U. together with both Israel and Turkey playing key roles. This is a Western answer to the growing strength and cohesion in the Eurasian Heartland between Russia, Iran, and China.

To counter this drive Russia, China, and Iran have been courting the nations of the Mediterranean. In fact after Nicholas Sarkozy’s trip to Algeria, as part of a tour to promote the creation of a Mediterranean Union, an Iranian delegation led by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived with a counter-proposal for the creation of an alternative bloc; this was what the Iranians called an Islamic Union.

The Islamic Union is essentially a rival economic project to the Mediterranean Union in the Mediterranean lands of North Africa and the Middle East, rather than the institutionalization of Islam within any of these states. Undoubtedly, the Iranian proposal must have had some backdoor support from Moscow. It is more than likely that the Islamic Union will be linked in some form to the Eurasian Union proposed by Russia and Kazakhstan. These regional blocs can be overlapping and countries like Iran can hypothetically belong to the Eurasian Union and the Islamic Union, just as how France and Italy could belong to the E.U. and the proposed Mediterranean Union. This is also part of the brinkmanship of turning several regions into supranational entities and ultimately into super-national entities that would merge with like entities.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the so-called Mid-East Peace Process, essentially including the Arab Peace Initiative proposed by Saudi Arabia in 2002, are tied to the joint American-E.U. economic project that is the Mediterranean Union, which will see the integration of the economies of the Arab World with that of Israel in a network of regionalized economic relations that will ultimately merge the economies of Europe, Israel, Turkey, and the Arab World. The Mediterranean Union is a project that was drafted years before the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. The deep ties between Turkey and Israel have been a preparatory step towards eventually establishing this Mediterranean Union with the participation and full involvement of Israel as one of its pillars.

The Bloc Concept and Regionalization: Orwellian Showdown between Oceania and Eurasia?

The players of the Eurasian Heartland realize what is happening. Moreover, France and Germany, like India, are being courted by the players of the Eurasian Heartland to encourage them to de-link themselves from the Anglo-American axis. This is probably why the euro is not being targeted on international currency markets by Iran, Russia, Venezuela, and China in the same way as the U.S. dollar. Or is this because America is the immediate threat to these countries?

The Eurasians are slowly prying the hold of Western financial centres on global transactions. The establishment of a petro-ruble system in Russia and the republics of the former U.S.S.R., as well as the establishment of an international Iranian energy bourse on Kish Island are part of this trend.

However, it seems too late to end the concord between the Franco-German and Anglo-American sides. Franco-German interests appear to have become entrenched with Anglo-American interests. A deal has been reached to eventually merge, with regard to trading systems, the economies of the E.U. and North America that will guarantee the interests of Britain, the U.S., France, and Germany.[12] This deal will also allow the four major powers within the so-called Western World to challenge the Eurasian Heartland as it merges into a single powerful bloc or player.

Whenever a dominate player has started to emerge in the Eurasian Heartland there have historically been wars fought — even the fear of the emergence of one has been the cause of conflict — to prevent the ascendancy of such a power or player. These different stages of regionalism and regionalized mergers mean several things, but what this can mean in Orwellian terms is that Oceania and Eurasia are preparing to challenge one another. [13]


Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is an an independent writer based in Ottawa specializing in Middle Eastern affairs. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

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NOTES

This article is a continuation of The Sino-Russian Alliance: Challenging America’ Ambitions in Eurasia (Nazemroaya, 26.08.2007) and lightly touches on the concept of the Mediterranean Union, which is covered in an article yet to be released.

[1] Halford John Mackinder, Chap. 3 (The Seaman’s Point of View), in Democratic Ideals and Reality (London, U.K.: Constables and Company Ltd., 1919), p.91.

[2] Ibid., Chap. 4 (The Landman’s Point of View), p.121.

Note: This chapter in Democratic Ideals and Reality is based on an essay, Man-power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength, that Mackinder wrote for the National Review (U.K.) in 1905. It should also be noted that Mackinder and various circles in London viewed the large populations of Germany, Austro-Hungary, and the Czardom of Russia as threats that should be addressed. If one reads the full works of Mackinder they will come to realize that he advocated for some form of Social Darwinism amongst nations, and saw democratic idealism as a subject that should be put aside to preserve the British imperial order. Mackinder even states that the commerce that the British enjoyed was due to the use of British guns and force (Chap. 5, pp.187-188).

[3] Ibid., p.142.

[4] Lonnie R. Johnson, Central Europe: Enemies, Neighbors, Friends, 2nd ed. (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 37-42.

[5] Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, Op. cit., Chap. 5 (The Rivalry of Empires), pp.160-161.

[6] Ibid., Chap. 3, p.78.

[7] Ibid., pp.77-78.

[8] Ibid., p.78.

[9] Carroll Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment: From Rhodes to Cliveden (San Pedro, California: GSG & Associates Publishers, 1981), pp. 233-235, 237-248, 253, 264-281, 285-302.

“...from 1920 to 1938 [the aims were] the same: to maintain the balance of power in Europe by building up Germany against France and [the Soviet Union]; to increase Britain’s weight in that balance by aligning with her the Dominions [e.g., Australia and Canada] and the United States; to refuse any commitments (especially any commitments through the League of Nations, and above all any commitments to aid France) beyond those existing in 1919; to keep British freedom of action; to drive Germany eastward against [the Soviet Union] if either or both of these two powers became a threat to the peace [probably meaning economic strength] of Western Europe (p.240).”

“...the Locarno agreements guaranteed the frontier of Germany with France and Belgium with the powers of these three states plus Britain and Italy. In reality the agreements gave France nothing, while they gave Britain a veto over French fulfillment of her alliances with Poland and the Little Entente. The French accepted these deceptive documents for reason of internal politics (...) This trap [the Locarno agreements] consisted of several interlocking factors. In the first place, the agreements did not guarantee the German frontier and the demilitarized condition of the Rhineland against German actions, but against the actions of either Germany or France. This, at one stroke, gave Britain the right to oppose any French action against Germany in support of her allies to the east of Germany. This meant that if Germany moved east against Czechoslovakia, Poland, and eventually [the Soviet Union], and if France attacked Germany’s western frontier in support of Czechoslovakia or Poland, as her alliances bound her to do, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy might be bound by the Locarno Pacts to come to the aid of Germany (p.264).”

“This event of March 1936, by which Hitler remilitarized the Rhineland, was the most crucial event in the whole history of appeasement. So long as the territory west of the Rhine and a strip fifty kilometers wide on the east bank of the river were demilitarized, as provided in the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Pacts, Hitler would never have dared to move against Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. He would not have dared because, with western Germany unfortified and denuded of German soldiers, France could have easily driven into the Ruhr industrial area and crippled Germany so that it would be impossible to go eastward. And by this date [1936], certain members of the Milner Group and of the British Conservative government had reached the fantastic idea that they could kill two birds with one stone by setting Germany and [the Soviet Union] against one another in Eastern Europe. In this way they felt that two enemies would stalemate one another, or that Germany would become satisfied with the oil of Rumania and the wheat of the Ukraine. It never occurred to anyone in a responsible position that Germany and [the Soviet Union] might make common cause, even temporarily, against the West. Even less did it occur to them that [the Soviet Union] might beat Germany and thus open all Central Europe to Bolshevism (p.265).”

“In order to carry out this plan of allowing Germany to drive eastward against [the Soviet Union], it was necessary to do three things: (1) to liquidate all the countries standing between Germany and Russia; (2) to prevent France from honoring her alliances with these countries [i.e., Czechoslovakia and Poland]; and (3) to hoodwink the [British] people into accepeting this as a necessary, indeed, the only solution to the international problem. The Chamberlain group were so successful in all three of these things that they came within an ace of succeeding, and failed only because of the obstinacy of the Poles, the unseemly haste of Hitler, and the fact that at the eleventh hour the Milner Group realized the [geo-strategic] implications of their policy and tried to reverse it (p.266).”

“Four days later, Hitler announced Germany’s rearmament, and ten days after that, Britain condoned the act by sending Sir John Simon on a state visit to Berlin. When France tried to counterbalance Germany’s rearmament by bringing the Soviet Union into her eastern alliance system in May 1935, the British counteracted this by making the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 18 June 1935. This agreement, concluded by Simon, allowed Germany to build up to 35 percent of the size of the British Navy (and up to 100 percent in submarines). This was a deadly stab in the back of France, for it gave Germany a navy considerably larger than the French in the important categories of ships (capital ships and aircraft carriers), because France was bound by treaty to only 33 percent of Britain’s; and France in addition, had a worldwide empire to protect and the unfriendly Italian Navy off her Mediterranean coast. This agreement put the French Atlantic coast so completely at the mercy of the German Navy that France became completely dependent on the British fleet for protection in this area (pp.269-270).”

“The liquidation of the countries between Germany and [the Soviet Union] could proceed as soon as the Rhineland was fortified, without fear on Germany’s part that France would be able to attack her in the west while she was occupied in the east (p.272).”

“The countries marked for liquidation included Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, but did not include Greece and Turkey, since the [Milner] Group had no intention of allowing Germany to get down onto the Mediterranean ‘lifeline.’ Indeed, the purpose of the Hoare-Laval Plan of 1935, which wrecked the collective-security system by seeking to give most Ethiopia to Italy, was intended to bring an appeased Italy in position alongside [Britain], in order to block any movement of Germany southward rather than eastward [towards the Soviet Union] (p.273).”

[10] Mackinder, Democratic Ideals, Op. cit., Chap. 5, pp.160-168.

[11] Ibid., Chap. 6 (The Freedom of Nations), pp. 214-215.

[12] US and EU agree 'single market,' British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), April 30, 2007.

[13] Critical thinking should be applied to this last statement and the level of cooperation between both sides should be carefully examined.

Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is a frequent contributor to Global Research. Global Research Articles by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya

The Sino-Russian Alliance: Challenging America's Ambitions in Eurasia

by Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya
Global Research

“But if the middle space [Russia and the former Soviet Union] rebuffs the West [the European Union and America], becomes an assertive single entity, and either gains control over the South [Middle East] or forms an alliance with the major Eastern actor [China], then America’s primacy in Eurasia shrinks dramatically. The same would be the case if the two major Eastern players were somehow to unite. Finally, any ejection of America by its Western partners [the Franco-German entente] from its perch on the western periphery [Europe] would automatically spell the end of America’s participation in the game on the Eurasian chessboard, even though that would probably also mean the eventual subordination of the western extremity to a revived player occupying the middle space [e.g. Russia].”

-Zbigniew Brzezinski (The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 1997)


Sir Isaac Newton’s Third Law of Motion states that “for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.” These precepts of physics can also be used in the social sciences, specifically with reference to social relations and geo-politics.

America and Britain, the Anglo-American alliance, have engaged in an ambitious project to control global energy resources. Their actions have resulted in a series of complicated reactions, which have established a Eurasian-based coalition which is preparing to challenge the Anglo-American axis.


Encircling Russia and China: Anglo-American Global Ambitions Backfire

“Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force — military force — in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible. We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way.”

-Vladimir Putin at the Munich Conference on Security Policy in Germany (February 11, 2007)


What American leaders and officials called the “New World Order” is what the Chinese and Russians consider a “Unipolar World.” This is the vision or hallucination, depending on perspective, that has bridged the Sino-Russian divide between Beijing and Moscow.

China and Russia are well aware of the fact that they are targets of the Anglo-American alliance. Their mutual fears of encirclement have brought them together. It is no accident that in the same year that NATO bombarded Yugoslavia, President Jiang Zemin of China and President Boris Yeltsin of Russia made an anticipated joint declaration at a historic summit in December of 1999 that revealed that China and the Russian Federation would join hands to resist the “New World Order.” The seeds for this Sino-Russian declaration were in fact laid in 1996 when both sides declared that they opposed the global imposition of single-state hegemony.

Both Jiang Zemin and Boris Yeltsin stated that all nation-states should be treated equally, enjoy security, respect each other’s sovereignty, and most importantly not interfere in the internal affairs of other nation-states. These statements were directed at the U.S. government and its partners.

The Chinese and Russians also called for the establishment of a more equitable economic and political global order. Both nations also indicated that America was behind separatist movements in their respective countries. They also underscored American-led amibitions to balkanize and finlandize the nation-states of Eurasia. Influential Americans such as Zbigniew Brzezinski had already advocated for de-centralizing and eventually dividing up the Russian Federation.

Both the Chinese and Russians issued a statement warning that the creation of an international missile shield and the contravention of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) would destabilize the international environment and polarize the globe. In 1999, the Chinese and Russians were aware of what was to come and the direction that America was headed towards. In June 2002, less than a year before the onslaught of the “Global War on Terror,” George W. Bush Jr. announced that the U.S. was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty.

On July 24, 2001, less than two months before September 11, 2001, China and Russia signed the Treaty of Good-Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation. The latter is a softly worded mutual defence pact against the U.S., NATO, and the U.S. sponsored Asian military network which was surrounding China. [1]

The military pact of the Shanghai Treaty Organization (SCO) also follows the same softly worded format. It is also worth noting that Article 12 of the 2001 Sino-Russian bilateral treaty stipulates that China and Russia will work together to maintain the global strategic balance, “observation of the basic agreements relevant to the safeguard and maintenance of strategic stability,” and “promote the process of nuclear disarmament.” [2] This seems to be an insinuation about a nuclear threat posed from the United States.


Standing in the Way of America and Britain: A “Chinese-Russian-Iranian Coalition”

As a result of the Anglo-American drive to encircle and ultimately dismantle China and Russia, Moscow and Beijing have joined ranks and the SCO has slowly evolved and emerged in the heart of Eurasia as a powerful international body.

The main objectives of the SCO are defensive in nature. The economic objectives of the SCO are to integrate and unite Eurasian economies against the economic and financial onslaught and manipulation from the “Trilateral” of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, which controls significant portions of the global economy.

The SCO charter was also created, using Western national security jargon, to combat “terrorism, separatism, and extremism.” Terrorist activities, separatist movements, and extremist movements in Russia, China, and Central Asia are all forces traditionally nurtured, funded, armed, and covertly supported by the British and the U.S. governments. Several separatist and extremist groups that have destabilized SCO members even have offices in London.

Iran, India, Pakistan, and Mongolia are all SCO observer members. The observer status of Iran in the SCO is misleading. Iran is a de facto member. The observer status is intended to hide the nature of trilateral cooperation between Iran, Russia, and China so that the SCO cannot be labeled and demonized as an anti-American or anti-Western military grouping.

The stated interests of China and Russia are to ensure the continuity of a “Multi-Polar World.” Zbigniew Brzezinski prefigured in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and the Geostrategic Imperatives and warned against the creation or “emergence of a hostile [Eurasian-based] coalition that could eventually seek to challenge America’s primacy.” [3] He also called this potential Eurasian coalition an “‘antihegemonic’ alliance” that would be formed from a “Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition” with China as its linchpin. [4] This is the SCO and several Eurasian groups that are connected to the SCO.

In 1993, Brzezinski wrote “In assessing China’s future options, one has to consider also the possibility that an economically successful and politically self-confident China — but one which feels excluded from the global system and which decides to become both the advocate and the leader of the deprived states of the world — may decide to pose not only an articulate doctrinal but also a powerful geopolitical challenge to the dominant trilateral world [a reference to the economic front formed by North America, Western Europe, and Japan].” [5]

Brzezinski warns that Beijing’s answer to challenging the global status quo would be the creation of a Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition: “For Chinese strategists, confronting the trilateral coalition of America and Europe and Japan, the most effective geopolitical counter might well be to try and fashion a triple alliance of its own, linking China with Iran in the Persian Gulf/Middle East region and with Russia in the area of the former Soviet Union [and Eastern Europe].” [6] Brzezinski goes on to say that the Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition, which he moreover calls an “antiestablishmentarian [anti-establishmentarian] coalition,” could be a potent magnet for other states [e.g., Venezuela] dissatisfied with the [global] status quo.” [7]

Furthermore, Brzezinski warned in 1997 that “The most immediate task [for the U.S.] is to make certain that no state or combination of states gains the capacity to expel the United States from Eurasia or even to diminish significantly its decisive arbitration role.” [8] It may be that his warnings were forgotten, because the U.S. has been repealed from Central Asia and U.S. forces have been evicted from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan.


“Velvet Revolutions” Backfire in Central Asia

Central Asia was the scene of several British-sponsored and American-sponsored attempts at regime change. The latter were characterised by velvet revolutions similar to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia.

These velvet revolutions financed by the U.S. failed in Central Asia, aside from Kyrgyzstan where there had been partial success with the so-called Tulip Revolution.

As a result the U.S. government has suffered major geo-strategic setbacks in Central Asia. All of Central Asia’s leaders have distanced themselves from America.

Russia and Iran have also secured energy deals in the region. America’s efforts, over several decades, to exert a hegemonic role in Central Asia seem to have been reversed overnight. The U.S. sponsored velvet revolutions have backfired. Relations between Uzbekistan and the U.S. were especially hard hit.

Uzbekistan is under the authoritarian rule of President Islam Karamov. Starting in the second half of the 1990s President Karamov was enticed into bringing Uzbekistan into the fold of the Anglo-American alliance and NATO. When there was an attempt on President Karamov’s life, he suspected the Kremlin because of his independent policy stance. This is what led Uzbekistan to leave CSTO. But Islam Karamov, years later, changed his mind as to who was attempting to get rid of him.

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Uzbekistan represented a major obstacle to any renewed Russian control of Central Asia and was virtually invulnerable to Russian pressure; this is why it was important to secure Uzbekistan as an American protectorate in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan also has the largest military force in Central Asia. In 1998, Uzbekistan held war games with NATO troops in Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan was becoming heavily militarized in the same manner as Georgia was in the Caucasus. The U.S. gave Uzbekistan huge amounts of financial aid to challenge the Kremlin in Central Asia and also provided training to Uzbek forces.

With the launching of the “Global War on Terror,” in 2001, Uzbekistan, an Anglo-American ally, immediately offered bases and military facilities to the U.S. in Karshi-Khanabad.

The leadership of Uzbekistan already knew the direction the “Global War on Terror” would take. To the irritation of the Bush Jr. Administration, the Uzbek President formulated a policy of self-reliance. The honeymoon between Uzbekistan and the Anglo-American alliance ended when Washington, D.C. and London contemplated removing Islam Karamov from power. He was a little too independent for their comfort and taste. Their attempts at removing the Uzbek President failed, leading eventually to a shift in geo-political alliances.

The tragic events of Andijan on May 13, 2005 were the breaking point between Uzbekistan and the Anglo-American alliance. The people of Andijan were incited into confronting the Uzbek authorities, which resulted in a heavy security clampdown on the protesters and a loss of lives.

Armed groups were reported to have been involved. In the U.S., Britain, and the E.U., the media reports focused narrowly on human rights violations without mentioning the covert role of the Anglo-American alliance. Uzbekistan held Britain and the U.S. responsible accusing them of inciting rebellion.

M. K. Bhadrakumar, the former Indian ambassador to Uzbekistan (1995-1998), revealed that the Hezbut Tahrir (HT) was one of the parties blamed for stirring the crowd in Andijan by the Uzbek government. [9] The group was already destabilizing Uzbekistan and using violent tactics. The headquarters of this group happens to be in London and they enjoy the support of the British government. London is a hub for many similar organizations that further Anglo-American interests in various countries, including Iran and Sudan, through destabilization campaigns. Uzbekistan even started clamping down on foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) because of the tragic events of Andijan.

The Anglo-American alliance had played its cards wrong in Central Asia. Uzbekistan officially left the GUUAM Group, a NATO-U.S. sponsored anti-Russian body. GUUAM once again became the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldava) Group on May 24, 2005.

On July 29, 2005 the U.S. military was ordered to leave Uzbekistan within a six-month period. [10] Literally, the Americans were told they were no longer welcome in Uzbekistan and Central Asia.

Russia, China, and the SCO added their voices to the demands. The U.S. cleared its airbase in Uzbekistan by November, 2005.

Uzbekistan rejoined the CSTO alliance on June 26, 2006 and realigned itself, once again, with Moscow. The Uzbek President also became a vocal advocate, along with Iran, for pushing the U.S. totally out of Central Asia. [11] Unlike Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan continued to allow the U.S. to use Manas Air Base, but with restrictions and in an uncertain atmosphere. The Kyrgyz government also would make it clear that no U.S. operations could target Iran from Kyrgyzstan.


Major Geo-Strategic Error

It appears that a strategic rapprochement between Iran and America was in the works from 2001 to 2002. At the outset of the global war on terrorism, Hezbollah and Hamas, two Arab organizations supported by Iran and Syria, were kept off the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. Iran and Syria were also loosely portrayed as potential partners in the “Global War on Terror.”

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran expressed its support for the post-Saddam Hussein Iraqi government. During the invasion of Iraq, the American military even attacked the Iraqi-based Iranian opposition militia, the Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK/MOK/MKO). Iranian jets also attacked the Iraqi bases of the MEK in approximately the same window of time.

Iran, Britain, and the U.S. also worked together against the Taliban in Afghanistan. It is worth mentioning that the Taliban were never allies of Iran. Up until 2000, the Taliban had been supported by the U.S. and Britain, working hand in glove with the Pakistani military and intelligence.

The Taliban were shocked and bewildered at what they saw as an American and British betrayal in 2001 — this is in light of the fact that in October, 2001 they had stated that they would hand over Osama bin Laden to the U.S. upon the presentation of evidence of his alleged involvement in the 9/11 attacks.

Zbigniew Brzezinski warned years before 2001 that “a coalition allying Russia with both China and Iran can develop only if the United States is shortsighted enough to antagonize China and Iran simultaneously.” [12] The arrogance of the Bush Jr. Administration has resulted in this shortsighted policy.

According to The Washington Post, “Just after the lightning takeover of Baghdad by U.S. forces three years ago [in 2003], an unusual two-page document spewed out of a fax machine at the Near East bureau of the State Department. It was a proposal from Iran for a broad dialogue with the United States, and the fax suggested everything was on the table — including full cooperation on nuclear programs, acceptance of Israel and the termination of Iranian support for Palestinian militant groups.” [13]


The White House impressed by what they believe were “grand victories” in Iraq and Afghanistan merely ignored the letter sent through diplomatic channels by the Swiss government on behalf of Tehran.

However, it was not because of what was wrongly perceived as a quick victory in Iraq that the Bush Jr. Administration pushed Iran aside. On January 29, 2002, in a major address, President Bush Jr. confirmed that the U.S. would also target Iran, which had been added to the so-called “Axis of Evil” together with Iraq and North Korea. The U.S. and Britain intended to attack Iran, Syria, and Lebanon after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. In fact immediately following the invasion, in July 2003, the Pentagon formulated an initial war scenario entitled “Theater Iran Near Term (TIRANNT).”

Starting in 2002, the Bush Jr. Administration had deviated from their original geo-strategic script. France and Germany were also excluded from sharing the spoils of war in Iraq.

The intention was to act against Iran and Syria just as America and Britain had used and betrayed their Taliban allies in Afghanistan. The U.S. was also set on targeting Hezbollah and Hamas. In January of 2001, according to Daniel Sobelman, a correspondent for Haaretz, the U.S. government warned Lebanon that the U.S. would go after Hezbollah. These threats directed at Lebanon were made at the start of the presidential term of George W. Bush Jr., eight months before the events of September 11, 2001.

The conflict at the United Nations Security Council between the Anglo-American alliance and the Franco-German entente, supported by Russia and China, was a pictogram of this deviation.

American geo-strategists for years after the Cold War had scheduled the Franco-German entente to be partners in their plans for global primacy. In this regard, Zbigniew Brzezinski had acknowledged that the Franco-German entente would eventually have to be elevated in status and that the spoils of war would have to be divided with Washington’s European allies.

By the end of 2004, the Anglo-American alliance had started to correct its posture towards France and Germany. Washington had returned to its original geo-strategic script with NATO playing an expanded role in the Eastern Mediterranean. In turn, France was granted oil concessions in Iraq.

The 2006 war plans for Lebanon and the Eastern Mediterranean also point to a major shift in direction, a partnership role for the Franco-German entente, with France and Germany playing a major military role in the region.

It is worth noting that a major shift occurred in early 2007 with regard to Iran. Following U.S. setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan (as well as in Lebanon, Palestine, Somalia, and former Soviet Central Asia), the White House entered into secret negotiatiations with Iran and Syria. However, the dye has been cast and it would appear that America will be unable to break an evolving military alliance which includes Russia, Iran, and China as its nucleus.


The Baker-Hamilton Commission: Covert Anglo-American Cooperation with Iran and Syria?

“America should also strongly support Turkish aspirations to have a pipeline from Baku in [the Republic of] Azerbaijan to Ceyhan on the Turkish Mediterranean cost serve as [a] major outlet for the Caspian Sea basin energy sources. In addition, it is not in America’s interest to perpetuate American-Iranian hostility. Any eventual reconciliation should be based on the recognition of a mutual strategic interest in stabilizing what currently is a very volatile regional environment for Iran [e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan]. Admittedly, any such reconciliation must be pursued by both sides and is not a favor granted by one to the other. A strong, even religiously motivated but not fanatically anti-Western Iran is in the U.S. interest, and ultimately even the Iranian political elite may recognize that reality. In the meantime, American long-range interests in Eurasia would be better served by abandoning existing U.S. objections to closer Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation, especially in the construction of new pipelines...”

-Zbigniew Brzezinski (The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, 1997)


The recommendations of the Baker-Hamilton Commission or the Iraq Study Group (ISG) are not a redirection in regards to engaging Iran, but a return to the track that the Bush Jr. Administration had deviated from as a result of the delusions of its hasty victories in Afghanistan and Iraq. In other words, the Baker-Hamilton Commission was about damage control and re-steering America to the geo-strategic path originally intended by military planners that the Bush Jr. Administration seems to have deviated from.

The ISG Report also subtly indicated that adoption of so-called “free market” economic reforms be pressed on Iran (and by extension Syria) instead of regime change. The ISG also favoured the accession of both Syria and Iran to the World Trade Organization (WTO). [14] It should also be noted, in this regard, that Iran has already started a mass privatization program that involves all sectors from banking to energy and agriculture.

The ISG Report also recommends an end to the Arab-Israeli Conflict and the establishment of peace between Israel and Syria. [15]

The joint interests of Iran and the U.S. were also analysed by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. The ISG recommended that the U.S. should not empower the Taliban again in Afghanistan (against Iran). [16] It should also be noted that Imad Moustapha, the Syrian ambassador to the U.S., the Syrian Foreign Minister, and Javad Zarif, the Iranian representative to the United Nations, were all consulted by the Baker-Hamilton Commission. [17] The Iranian Ambassodor to the U.N., Javad Zarif, has also been a middle man between the U.S. and Iranian governments for years.

It is worth mentioning that the Clinton Administration was involved in the track of rapprochement with Iran, while also attempting to keep Iran in check under the “dual-containment” policy directed against Iraq and Iran. This policy was also linked to the 1992 Draft Defence Guidance paper written by people within the Bush Sr. and Bush Jr. Administrations.

It is worth noting that Zbigniew Brzezinski had stated as far back as 1979 and again in 1997 that Iran under its post-revolutionary political system could be co-opted by America. [18] Britain also ensured Syria and Iran in 2002 and 2003 that they would not be targeted and encouraged their cooperation with the White House.

It should be noted that Turkey has recently signed a pipeline deal with Iran that will take gas to Western Europe. This project includes the participation of Turkmenistan. [19] It would appear that this cooperation agreement between Tehran and Ankara points to reconciliation rather than confrontation with Iran and Syria. This is in line with what Brzezinski in 1997 claimed was in America’s interest.

Also, the Anglo-American sponsored Iraqi government has recently signed pipeline deals with Iran.

Once again, America’s interests in this deal should be questioned, as should the high opinions being given about Iran by the puppet leaders of Iraq and Afghanistan.


Something’s Amiss...

The media attention given in North America and Britain to the positive comments made about Tehran by Anglo-American clients in Baghdad and Kabul is sinister.

Although these comments from Baghdad and Kabul about the positive role Iran plays in Iraq and Afghanistan are not new, the media attention is. President George W. Bush Jr. and the White House criticized the Iraqi Prime Minister for saying Iran plays a constructive role in Iraq in early-August of 2007. The White House and the North American or the British press would usually just ignore or refuse to acknowledge these comments. However, this was not the case in August, 2007.

The Afghani President, Hamid Karzai, during a joint press conference with George W. Bush Jr. stated that Iran was a positive force in his country. It is not odd to hear that Iran is a positive force inside Afghanistan because the stability of Afghanistan is in Iran’s best interests. What comes across as odd are “when” and “where” the comments were made. White House press conferences are choreographed and the place and time of the Afghani President’s comments should be questioned. It also so happens that shortly after the Afghani President’s comments, the Iranian President arrived in Kabul in an unprecedented visit that must have been approved by the White House.


Iran’s Political Leverage

In regards to Iran and the U.S., the picture is blurry and the lines between cooperation and rivalry are less clear. Reuters and the Iranian Student’s News Agency (ISNA) have both reported that the Iranian President may visit Baghdad after August 2007. These reports surfaced just before the U.S. government started threatening to label the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a special international terrorist organization. Without insinuating anything, it should also be noted that the Revolutionary Guard and the U.S. military have also had a low-key history of cooperation from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.

The Iranian President has also invited the presidents of the other four Caspian states for a Caspian Sea summit in Tehran. [20] He invited the Turkmen president while in Turkmenistan and later the Russian and Kazakh presidents at the August of 2007 SCO summit in Kyrgyzstan. President Aliyev, the leader of the Republic of Azerbaijan (Azarbaijan) was also personally invited during a trip by the Iranian President to Baku. The anticipated Caspian Sea summit may be similar to the one in Port Turkmenbashi, Turkmenistan between the Kazakh, Russian, and Turkmen presidents where it was announced that Russia would not be cut out of the pipeline deals in Central Asia.

Iranian leverage is clearly getting stronger. Officials in Baku also stated that they will expand energy cooperation with Iran and enter the gas pipeline deal between Iran, Turkey, and Turkmenistan that will supply European markets with gas. [21] This agreement to supply Europe is similar to a Russian energy transport deal signed between Greece, Bulgaria, and the Russian Federation. [22]

In the Levant, Syria is involved in energy-related negotiations with Ankara and Baku and important talks have started between American officials and both Tehran and Damascus. [23]

Iran has also been involved in diplomatic exchanges with Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan. Additionally, starting in August 2007, Syria has agreed to reopen Iraqi oil pipelines to the Eastern Mediterranean, through Syrian territory. [24] The recent official visit of Iraqi Prime Minister Al-Maliki to Syria has also been described as historical by news sources like the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Also, Syria and Iraq have agreed to build a gas pipeline from Iraq into Syria, where Iraqi gas will be treated in Syrian plants. [25] These agreements are being passed as the sources of tensions between Baghdad and the White House, but they are doubtful. [26]

Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are also planning on starting the process for creating an Iranian-GCC free trade zone in the Persian Gulf. In the bazaars of Tehran and amongst the political circle of Rafsanjani there are also discussions about the eventual creation of a single market between Iran, Tajikistan, Armenia, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Syria. The American role in these processes in regards to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the GCC should be explored.

Under President Nicholas Sarkozy, France has indicated that it is willing to engage the Syrians fully if they gave specific guarantees in regards to Lebanon. These guarantees are linked to French economic and geo-strategic interests.

In the same period of time as the French statements about Syria, Gordon Brown indicated that Britain was also willing to engage in diplomatic exchanges with both Syria and Iran. Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, the German Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, has also been involved in talks with Damascus on mutual projects, economic reform, and bringing Syria closer to the European Union. These talks, however tend to be camouflaged by the discussion between Syria and Germany in regards to the mass exodus of Iraqi refugees, resulting from the Anglo-American occupation of their country. The French Foreign Minister is also expected in Tehran to talk about Lebanon, Palestine, and Iraq. Despite the war-mongering by the U.S. and more recently by France, this has all led to speculation of a potential about-turn in regards to Iran and Syria. [27]

Then again, this is part of the two-pronged U.S. approach of preparing for the worst (war), while suing for the diplomatic capitulation of Syria and Iran as client states or partners. When large oil and weapons deals were signed between Libya and Britain, London said that Iran should follow the Libyan example, as has the Baker-Hamilton Commission.


Has the March to War been Interrupted?

Despite talks behind closed doors with Damascus and Tehran, Washington is nonetheless arming its clients in the Middle East. Israel is in an advanced state of military preparedness for a war on Syria.

Unlike France and Germany, Anglo-American ambitions pertaining to Iran and Syria are not one of cooperation. The ultimate objective is political and economic subordination.

Moreover, either as a friend or foe, America cannot tolerate Iran within its present borders. The balkanization of Iran, like that of Iraq and Russia, is a major long-term Anglo-American goal.

What lies ahead is never known. While there is smoke in the horizon, the U.S.-NATO-Israeli military agenda will not necessarily result in the implementation of war as planned.

A “Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition” — which forms the basis of a global counter-alliance — is emerging. America and Britain rather than opting for outright war, may choose to reel in Iran and Syria through macro-economic manipulation and velvet revolutions.

War directed against Iran and Syria, however, cannot be ruled out. There are real war preparations on the ground in the Middle East and Central Asia. A war against Iran and Syria would have far-reaching worldwide implications.


Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya is an independent writer based in Ottawa specialising on the Middle East and Central Asia. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).


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NOTES

[1] Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation Between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation, signed and entered into force July 16, 2001, P.R. of China-Russian Federation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China.
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t15771.htm

The following are treaty articles that are relevant to the mutual defence of China and Russia against American-led encirclement and efforts to dismantle both nations;

ARTICLE 4

The Chinese side supports the Russian side in its policies on the issue of defending the national unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation.

The Russian side supports the Chinese side in its policies on the issue of defending the national unity and territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China.

ARTICLE 5

The Russian side reaffirms that the principled stand on the Taiwan issue as expounded in the political documents signed and adopted by the heads of states of the two countries from 1992 to 2000 remain unchanged. The Russian side acknowledges that there is only one China in the world, that the People’s Republic of China is the sole legal government representing the whole of China and that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The Russian side opposes any form of Taiwan’s independence.

ARTICLE 8

The contracting parties shall not enter into any alliance or be a party to any bloc nor shall they embark on any such action, including the conclusion of such treaty with a third country which compromises the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party. Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow its territory to be used by a third country to jeopardize the national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contracting party.

Neither side of the contracting parties shall allow the setting up of organizations or gangs on its own soil which shall impair the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other contrasting party and their activities should be prohibited.

ARTICLE 9

When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.

ARTILCE 12

The contracting parties shall work together for the maintenance of global strategic balance and stability and make great efforts in promoting the observation of the basic agreements relevant to the safeguard and maintenance of strategic stability.

The contracting parties shall actively promote the process of nuclear disarmament and the reduction of chemical weapons, promote and strengthen the regimes on the prohibition of biological weapons and take measures to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and their related technology.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (NYC, New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1997), p.198.

[4] Ibid., pp. 115-116, 170, 205-206.
Note: Brzezinski also refers to a Chinese-Russian-Iranian coalition as a “counteralliance” (p.116).

[5] Zbigniew Brzezinski, Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the 21st Century (NYC, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons Macmillan Publishing Company, 1993), p.198.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Op. cit., p.198.

[9] M. K. Bhadrakumar, The lessons from Ferghana, Asia Times, May 18, 2005.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/GE18Ag01.html

[10] Nick Paton Walsh, Uzbekistan kicks US out of military base, The Guardian (U.K.), August 1, 2005.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/usa/story/0,12271,1540185,00.html

[11] Vladimir Radyuhin, Uzbekistan rejoins defence pact, The Hindu, June 26, 2006.
http://www.thehindu.com/2006/06/26/stories/2006062604491400.htm

[12] Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Op. cit., p.116.

[13] Glenn Kessler, In 2003, U.S. Spurned Iran’s Offer of Dialogue, The Washington Post, June 18, 2006, p.A16.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/AR2006061700727.html

[14] James A. Baker III et al., The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward — A New Approach Authroized ed. (NYC, New York: Random House Inc., 2006), p.51.

[15] Ibid., pp.51, 54-57.

[16] Ibid., pp.50-53, 58.

[17] Ibid., p.114.

[18] Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, Op. cit., p.204.

[19] Iran, Turkey sign energy cooperation deal, agree to develop Iran’s gas fields, Associated Press, July 14, 2007.
http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/07/14/business/ME-FIN-Iran-Turkey-Energy-deal.php

[20] Tehran to host summit of Caspian nations Oct.18, Russian News and Information Agency (RIA Novosti), August 22, 2007.
http://en.rian.ru/world/20070822/73387774.html

[21] Azerbaijan, Iran reinforce energy deals, United Press International (UPI), August 22, 2007.

[22] Mahdi Darius Nazemroaya, The March to War: Détente in the Middle East or “Calm before the Storm?,” Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG), July 10, 2007.
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=6281

[23] Ibid.
It is worth noting that Iran has been involved in pipeline deals with Turkey and in negotiation between Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, and the Republic of Azerbaijan in the possible creation of an energy corridor in the Eastern Mediterranean. These deals occurred in the same time frame that both Syria and Iran started talks with the U.S. after the Baker-Hamilton Commission’s report.

[24] Syria and Iraq to reopen oil pipeline link, Agence France-Presse (AFP), August 22, 2007.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Roger Hardy, Why the US is unhappy with Maliki, British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), August 22, 2007.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6958440.stm

[27] Hassan Nafaa, About-face on Iran coming?, Al-Ahram (Egypt), no. 859, August 23-29, 2007.
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/859/op22.htm

Imperium Europa, the Eurasian Alternative

by Alexander Dugin
Tradition and Revolution

Geopolitics

Geopolitics actually is an ancient concept. It is a method of political analysis, emphasizing the role played by geography in international relations. Theoretically geopolitics aim at establishing a political grammar of world politics, through a scientific discipline based on the objective reality of geography. Hence, geopolitics is often seen as a "realistic" attempt to establish world policy as an objective science based of some kind of "physico-spacial reference". Geopolitical theorists stress that natural political boundaries and access to important waterways are vital to a nation's survival.
The term geopolitics (Geopolitik in German) was developed by Rudolf Kjéllen, a Swedish political scientist in 1905. As a subbranch of political geography, geopolitics focused on the spatial development and needs of the State. It combined Friedrich Ratzel's theory on the organic nature of the State along with Sir Halford J. Mackinder's Heartland Theory. The term was later borrowed by Karl Haushofer, a German geographer and follower of Friedrich Ratzel.

As a modern concept geopolitics received its classical form in the work of Friedrich Ratzel, Rudolf Kjéllen, Harold J. Mackinder, Alfred T. Mahan and Karl Haushofer. The idea behind geopolitics is based on the assessment that geography is a crucial factor in the system of causes, forming the parameters of politics.
Friedrich Ratzel's influence on modern geography is legendary. Robert E. Dickinson writes about Ratzel: "There is no doubt that Friedrich Ratzel has been the greatest single contributor to the development of the Geography of Man." (Robert E. Dickinson, The Makers of Modern Geography. New York: Friederich A. Praeger, 1969. p.64)

In his analysis from 1890 (Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783. New York: Dover, 1987) Alfred Thayer Mahan argued that the rise of British Power in the 18th and 19th century was attributed to the country's island position, which gave it advances in regard to world trade. Mahan argued that the basis of British world power was its capacity through its navy to control the waterways, which at that time was the main communication structures in the world. Mahan explained Britian's victory in the Napoleon war on the ground control of the main communication network of the world is the main advantage in the great struggle regarding European power hegemony that lied behind the Napoleon wars. Mahan's writing encouraged President Theodore Roosevelt to develop U.S. Naval power in the first decade of the twentieth century.

Sir Halford Mackinder, argued in 1904 that the new trend in the modern industry and particularly the development of the railroad as the main infrastructure and communicative meant a change in the balance between land and sea power and favor the dominance of land powers in the twentieth century. In a famous article titled "the Geographical Pivot of History" (Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History." Geographical Journal, vol.23. 1904. pp.421-444), Mackinder also identified East Europe and Central Russia as the heartland of the world and claimed that the power that controlled Russia would rule the world. This claim however was contested my other scholars and geopolitical theorists.
In the 1920s, the German General and geographer Karl Haushofer developed Geopolitik as a policy for Germany and Europe. Haushofer developed his idea of geopolitics through a study of the emergence of the modern Japanese state. His concept of Lebensraum (living space) was actually developed by Ratzel, who is often called the founder of political geography. In 1924 Gerneral Haushofer founded and edited the journal "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" and then became a professor of geopolitics. The journal, and Haushofer's career, only lasted until 1944. Haushofers ideas were were only of limited influence on the National Socialist regime for it had his own concept of geography and the expansion of the state. Haushofer's son Albrecht was indicted in the July 20, 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler so the elder Haushofer was imprisoned in a concentration camp. Following the war, Haushofer was interrogated by the allies and in 1946, distraught over the death of this son, Haushofer committed suicide. Nevertheless Haushofer is still accused of providing the academic and scientific support for the expansion of the Third Reich.

The concept of geopolitics is of theoretical interest today due to two reasons:

a) The physical, spacial parameters of the world, as an object of social science analysis might still provide us with a special pathway into the scientific study of international policy.

b) Because it is important to identify a pattern of "objective" correlation within the international order, which can save modern social analysis from the pitfall of relativism.


Eurasia

"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; Who rules the World-Island commands the World." Sir Halford Mackinder, the English geographer who wrote "Democratic Ideals and reality" , put this lapidary motto at the basis of his own global geopolitical concept.
Geopolitics – as it is studied in the American and European (and since recently also Russian) military and diplomatic academies and institutes – is based on the fact that between Russia (Eurasia) and the West (atlantism, the US) there is an irremovable contradiction, such as existed between Rome and Carthage, Athenes and Sparta in the ancient times, or between Great Britain and Continental Europe (including Russia) in the modern epoch. Geopolitics states that the kind of a civilization is to a very great extent predetermined by its geography, landscape, climate, structure of space. The insular and coastal peoples, the seafarers' races create commercial societies - dynamical, technologically developed, innovative, but gravitating around plutocracy, egoism and individualism. The peoples dwelling in the depth of continents, in the steppes, forests, plains and wildernesses, on the contrary, are static, conservative, contemplative, yet valiant and inclined to communitarian-counciliary principles. "Leviathan" in the terminology of geopolitical science symbolizes a maritime, "mobile", commercial civilization, e.g. Athenes, Carthago, England, the US, in contraposition to "Behemoth" - symbol of a continental, "static", non-commercial civilization, e.g. Sparta, Rome, the Holy Empire, the Golden Horde, Russia. This polarity of West and East, sea and land, island and continent, atlantism and eurasism predetermines the dynamics of the fundamental lines of world politics. Eurasists and atlantists are opposed to each other defending two different, alternative, mutually excluding images of the world and its future. It is this opposition which defines the historical outline of the XXI century. Not always these lines are evident, and sometimes, in the most complex cases, one has to apply some smart enough methodology to find out where the hidden concerns of eurasism lay, and where those of atlantism. Thus the great opposition of civilizations (maritime and overland) is as old as history. And only the final ruin of one of the poles marks by itself the end of this history – that end which was hurriedly declared by the American liberals (F.Fukuyama) after the demolition of the bipolar world of Yalta.

The US with very clearly acknowledge itself as the contemporary and historically most successful by the issuing of "sea power", apogee of the commercial civilization of liberal ploting. After the second world war it replaced England, queen of the seas, having bought from her the main strategic spots of check over maritime, insular and coastal spaces of the planet. The whole tradition of Anglo-Saxon and American geopolitics (from Mahan and Mackinder to Spykman, Brzeszinski and Wolfowitz) sees foreign policy through the eyes of atlantism, moving step by step towards the final triumph of the "sea power", towards the globalization of their civilization kind.

The Anglo-Saxon World surrounding the Atlantic, including Grat Britain and America, lead by a capitalist elite has been leading a war against Europe since the beginning of the 20th century. According to the classic Geopolitical doctine Eurasia ist the Key to World Power and the Atlantist powers are trying to gain it. With the end of Second World War Europe has become (trans-) atlantic under the hegemony of the US-led Leviathan NATO. With the fall of the Soviet Union, the US has achieved an unprecedented position of global supremacy. To regain its sovereignty Europe has to end its status of a protectorate of the United States by turning away from the Atlantic towards the Russian and Muslim East and to get rid of American supremacy. By creating a global police force operating beneath the auspices of NATO and the United Nations, it is possible to defend and thus facilitate the interests of Americanisation throughout the world. It is only right, therefore, that we emulate their example by both defending and advancing our own interests in a similar manner. Internationalism must be met with an inter-national force of Eurasian solidarity, an explosion of non-sectarian militancy in which dogmatism and reaction will have no place. In other words, opponents of globalisation - regardless of their various political affiliations - must stand shoulder to shoulder in the struggle against Americanisation at all levels of society. Europe must find emancipation from the New American International Law. How right was Carl Schmitt in the past when he wrote: "Behind the facade of general norms of international law lies, in reality , the system of Anglo-Saxon imperialism". More than ever before, in the New World Order, behind the facade of international law lies in reality the system of American imperialism. What Europe needs is a "Monroe Doctrine for Europe" as an answer to the New World Order and American totalitarian ambitions for Weltherrschaft. Or as General de Gaulle once said : "A truly free Europe, is Europe free from American hegemony".

This inevitably leads to the question of the role of Russia for Europe's future. Straddling the Eurasian continent, deprived of nearly all its former superpower glory, economically devastated, politically adrift Russia today poses a unique challenge to geostrategy. Eurasism (in its strict historical meaning) is a philosophical current arisen in the 1920s among the Russian emigrates. Eurasianism is a clear answer to the Atlantic strategy. Against the establishing of the atlantist world order and globalisation stand the supporters of the multi-polar world – the eurasists. The eurasists defend on principle the necessity to preserve the existence of every people on earth, the blossoming variety of cultures and religious traditions, the unquestionable right of the peoples to independently choose their path of historical development. The eurasists greet the generality of cultures and systems of values, the open dialogue among peoples and civilizations, the organic combination between the devotion to traditions and the creative impulse.

"At a planetary level Eurasianism means active and universal opposition to globalisation, and is equal to the 'anti-globalist movement'. Eurasianism defends the blossoming complexity of peoples, religions and nations. All anti-globalist tendencies are intrinsically ‘Eurasianist’. We are consequent supporters of ‘Eurasianist federalism’. This means a combination of strategic unity and ethno-cultural autonomies."



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President Vladimir Putin's historic speech at the Munich Conference

Speaker: Putin, Wladimir W.
Function: President, Russian Federation
Nation/
Organization: Russian Federation

Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy

(The speech was held in Russian. Find the English translation below.)

Thank you very much dear Madam Federal Chancellor, Mr Teltschik, ladies and gentlemen!

I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.

This conference’s structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference’s format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.

Therefore. It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.

This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that “security for one is security for all”. As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: “When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”

These words remain topical today. Incidentally, the theme of our conference – global crises, global responsibility – exemplifies this.

Only two decades ago the world was ideologically and economically divided and it was the huge strategic potential of two superpowers that ensured global security.

This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the margins of the international community’s and the world’s agenda. And, just like any war, the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn’t happened in world history?

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.

It is world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.

Incidentally, Russia – we – are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today’s – and precisely in today’s – world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.

Along with this, what is happening in today’s world – and we just started to discuss this – is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.

And with which results?

Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no less people perish in these conflicts – even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state’s legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.

And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this – no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.

The force’s dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats – though they were also well-known before – have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character.

I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.

And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly – changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions.

Madam Federal Chancellor already mentioned this. The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future.

There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.

In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.

However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other, dangerous criminals are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people – hundreds and thousands of civilians!

But at the same time the question arises of whether we should be indifferent and aloof to various internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? As a matter of fact, this was also at the centre of the question that our dear colleague Mr Lieberman asked the Federal Chancellor. If I correctly understood your question (addressing Mr Lieberman), then of course it is a serious one! Can we be indifferent observers in view of what is happening? I will try to answer your question as well: of course not.

But do we have the means to counter these threats? Certainly we do. It is sufficient to look at recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime – a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?

I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn’t hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law have a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.

And one must not forget that democratic political actions necessarily go along with discussion and a laborious decision-making process.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

The potential danger of the destabilisation of international relations is connected with obvious stagnation in the disarmament issue.

Russia supports the renewal of dialogue on this important question.

It is important to conserve the international legal framework relating to weapons destruction and therefore ensure continuity in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1700-2000 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.

Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies. The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones.

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.

At the same time, it is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons. Needless to say it refers to measures to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer space. Star wars is no longer a fantasy – it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American partners were already able to intercept their own satellite.

In Russia’s opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. And we have come forward more than once with initiatives designed to prevent the use of weapons in outer space.

Today I would like to tell you that we have prepared a project for an agreement on the prevention of deploying weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let’s work on this together.

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.

And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation.

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removed its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times. We constantly discuss this issue with Mr Solana and he knows our position. We are ready to further work in this direction.

But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: “the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee”. Where are these guarantees?

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice – one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia – a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.

And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us – these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of politicians, to dissemble and dismantle these new walls?

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons.

This creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year Russia put forward the initiative to establish international centres for the enrichment of uranium. We are open to the possibility that such centres not only be created in Russia, but also in other countries where there is a legitimate basis for using civil nuclear energy. Countries that want to develop their nuclear energy could guarantee that they will receive fuel through direct participation in these centres. And the centres would, of course, operate under strict IAEA supervision.

The latest initiatives put forward by American President George W. Bush are in conformity with the Russian proposals. I consider that Russia and the USA are objectively and equally interested in strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment. It is precisely our countries, with leading nuclear and missile capabilities, that must act as leaders in developing new, stricter non-proliferation measures. Russia is ready for such work. We are engaged in consultations with our American friends.

In general, we should talk about establishing a whole system of political incentives and economic stimuli whereby it would not be in states’ interests to establish their own capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle but they would still have the opportunity to develop nuclear energy and strengthen their energy capabilities.

In connection with this I shall talk about international energy cooperation in more detail. Madam Federal Chancellor also spoke about this briefly – she mentioned, touched on this theme. In the energy sector Russia intends to create uniform market principles and transparent conditions for all. It is obvious that energy prices must be determined by the market instead of being the subject of political speculation, economic pressure or blackmail.

We are open to cooperation. Foreign companies participate in all our major energy projects. According to different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia – and please think about this figure – up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign capital. Try, try to find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist! There are no such examples.

I would also recall the parity of foreign investments in Russia and those Russia makes abroad. The parity is about fifteen to one. And here you have an obvious example of the openness and stability of the Russian economy.

Economic security is the sector in which all must adhere to uniform principles. We are ready to compete fairly.

For that reason more and more opportunities are appearing in the Russian economy. Experts and our western partners are objectively evaluating these changes. As such, Russia’s OECD sovereign credit rating improved and Russia passed from the fourth to the third group. And today in Munich I would like to use this occasion to thank our German colleagues for their help in the above decision.

Furthermore. As you know, the process of Russia joining the WTO has reached its final stages. I would point out that during long, difficult talks we heard words about freedom of speech, free trade, and equal possibilities more than once but, for some reason, exclusively in reference to the Russian market.

And there is still one more important theme that directly affects global security. Today many talk about the struggle against poverty. What is actually happening in this sphere? On the one hand, financial resources are allocated for programmes to help the world’s poorest countries – and at times substantial financial resources. But to be honest -- and many here also know this – linked with the development of that same donor country’s companies. And on the other hand, developed countries simultaneously keep their agricultural subsidies and limit some countries’ access to high-tech products.

And let’s say things as they are – one hand distributes charitable help and the other hand not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts. And if all this happens in, shall we say, a region such as the Middle East where there is increasingly the sense that the world at large is unfair, then there is the risk of global destabilisation.

It is obvious that the world’s leading countries should see this threat. And that they should therefore build a more democratic, fairer system of global economic relations, a system that would give everyone the chance and the possibility to develop.

Dear ladies and gentlemen, speaking at the Conference on Security Policy, it is impossible not to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all – I shall emphasise this – all aspects of security: military, political, economic, humanitarian and, especially, the relations between these spheres.

What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE’s bureaucratic apparatus which is absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way. Decision-making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental organisations are tailored for this task. These organisations are formally independent but they are purposefully financed and therefore under control.

According to the founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE is designed to assist country members in observing international human rights norms at their request. This is an important task. We support this. But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should live and develop.

It is obvious that such interference does not promote the development of democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes them dependent and, as a consequence, politically and economically unstable.

We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks and build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency.

Dear ladies and gentlemen!

In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often – and personally, I very often – hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs.

In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.

We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.

Thank you for your attention.


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Russia – India: Geopolitical Project (by General Leonid Ivashov)

Strategic Culture Foundation

The visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India, the agreements reached and documents signed there surely represent a pivotal moment in development – or, to be more precise, in restoration of relations between the two great powers.

The overwhelming majority of analysts, journalists – and official persons, too – are focusing on economic and, in the first place, military-technical aspects of the visit. The importance of these aspects can hardly be overestimated. India is the second biggest buyer of Russian weapons after China. And in terms of the qualitative substance of military-technical cooperation, Delhi is a unique and still unparalleled partner of Moscow.

My opinion is based on my personal experience of contacts with Indian military experts. The Indian military have never signed a contract for acquisition of large quantities of weapons (or a major weapon system) without first having our designers make serious engineering changes that would improve combat effectiveness of the supplied products. Secondly, the Indians have always accompanied their consent to acquisition with requests for licensed production and joint development.

In other words, our Indian partners have always been willing to buy the most modern weapons and simultaneously engage in their development and production. This corresponds to the strategic goal of the Indian government – making their country a highly industrialized and high-technology world power.

The Indian side’s approach to military-technical cooperation played an exceedingly important role for the Russian defense industrial complex, which has been in a state of collapse since the 1990s. India has helped the Russian defense industrial complex to survive, find funds and consolidate efforts on fulfilling Indian orders – not simply turning out Soviet samples but also modernizing them (sometimes pretty thoroughly), developing innovative technologies. The then arms dealers, in the first place «Rosvooruzheniye», were not too happy about this – they would have preferred to quickly push off what they had in the inventory and what disintegrating enterprises were still able to turn out. Instead of showing a systemic approach to development of India’s defense potential, Russian arms dealers were trying to push off obsolete weapon samples to the Indian market.

This is why they did not like my good friend, the current Indian President Abdul Kalam. At the time, Dr Kalam was in charge of Indian scientific research, who annoyed his Russian partners with proposals of joint research in the field of military, space and missile technologies. As a Russian saying has it, constant dripping wears away a stone. Today, it may be stated that India’s orders not only helped to preserve entire sectors of the Russian defense industrial complex, but also provided an impetus for qualitative development of weaponry. And if Russia in the 1990s had had a more or less distinct international posture and nationally oriented leaders, we would not now fear competition of Germany, France, Israel or the US on the Indian weapons market.

There are few of those who are aware of the following scandalous fact. At the turn of the 21st century, the Indian Air Force negotiated a purchase of four Russian radar surveillance aircraft A-50. The agreement was reached by Defense Ministers and approved by the Indian Prime Minister and Russian President. However, Ilya Klebanov, Russian Vice Premier and Secretary of the Commission on Military-Technical Cooperation, blocked the deal, suggesting a «tin-can» option that favored Israel instead of Russia. Under this option, Russia supplied the aircraft («tin-can»), with Israel providing the contents – a radioelectronic system. And, despite President Vladimir Putin’s endorsement of the fully Russian option (the one put forward by the Defense Ministry), despite NPO Vega’s readiness to install the radioelectronic system Shmel-2 in the aircraft, Russia’s Israeli lobby won. The Russian radioelectronic systems were not sold to India.

Similar things happened in tank and fighter jet deals. All of this inflicted serious harm to both bilateral cooperation and the defense industrial complex.

In the mid-1990s, India was declared Russia’s strategic partner. This was a proper decision. Our countries really have many coinciding strategic interests. Delhi supports the multi-polar world concept, equality of nations and peoples, enforcement of the UN Charter principles. Besides, India actually is the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement. All of this serves Russia’s interests – in the same way that Russia’s interests would be served by India’s becoming a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

In terms of the world’s economy, India is a dynamic power, a large goods and services market, an innovational and intellectual center of the 21st century. For Russia, it is also a reliable partner in development of space technologies, nuclear power engineering, world ocean research, development of hydrocarbon resources, etc. However, the inborn disposition of the Russian elite of the ‘90s to look towards the West hampered timely realization of the potential of Russian-Indian cooperation. Besides, there was a lot that Washington did not allow Russia to do during Yeltsin’s rule. This is not surprising, for the military strategic potential of Russian-Indian cooperation is truly enormous.

In the first place, increased Indian military presence in the Asian and Pacific region does not contradict Russia’s interests but much rather serves them, as Russia’s current weakness made it abandon its formerly active role in maintaining the balance of forces in the region. As a result, we are facing the absolute domination of the US, which is increasing its military presence in the Asian and Pacific region.

Secondly, the stronger Indian military potential produces a restraining effect on China, drawing off a considerable part of Peking’s growing military might. This is also important for Russia.

Thirdly, India represents a «showcase» of Russian politics, strategy and modern weapon technologies. This country is a kind of image-maker for Russia’s defense potential.

India accounts for more than 30% of Russian weapon exports. Today, practically all services of the Indian armed forces take part in Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation. The Indian army is learning to use T-90C tanks supplied from Russia in quantities which make our own army envious – in 2006, it got only 31 tanks, whereas the Indians ordered 374 tanks with an option for almost the same number.

The Indian navy operates the former Russian (Soviet) aircraft carrier «Admiral Gorshkov», undergoing modernization with the help of our experts and enterprises, Russian-built submarines, and Russian-built frigates armed with modern cruise missiles «BrahMos». The Russian aircraft building corporation «MiG», which did not make a single deck-based aircraft during the years of Yeltsin’s «reforms», was for the first time commissioned to supply shipboard fighters MiG-29k to India.

The Indian Air Force has bought and started licensed production of the modern Sukhoi-30MKI, is looking into the possibility of joint development and manufacture of the fifth-generation fighter MiG-35, medium military transport aircraft, unmanned aircraft.

Achievements and failures, grandiose plans and doubts related to further progress of Russian-Indian military-technical cooperation found their confirmation in the course of Vladimir Putin’s visit to India in January 2007. It got an extensive press coverage, but I believe that the essence of the visit still remains off screen.

This essence is the inter-civilization geopolitical project, which reveals itself in the logic of development of Soviet- and, later, Russian-Indian contacts. Russia and India are civilization states. Their behavior in global politics and mutual relations is predictable. The two countries have coinciding geopolitical interests and positions on major international issues.

In the second half of the 19th century, N.Ya.Danilevsky, a classical representative of Russian geopolitical thought, wrote that the main players on the scene of global history are «cultural-historical types» - civilizations, rather than states or ethnoses. And the modern world, in terms of geopolitics, represents a new type of bipolarity, arbitrarily divided into two super-civilizations – one of these focuses on material consumer values, professing hedonism, whereas the other continues placing priority on moral and spiritual values. The geopolitical code of the former is profit, benefit; that of the latter, conscience and justice.

The former is directly associated with the West, the political strategy of its advance guard – the Anglo-Saxons and Israel, who have launched a power struggle for control over the planet’s resources, for the growing consumption of these resources by the «golden billion». And now we are witnessing another, increasingly more distinct tendency, which is bringing this struggle over to the plane of inter-civilization confrontation. It was most clearly demonstrated by the 14th Conference of Non-Aligned Movement held in 2006 in Havana. 114 states, represented by their leaders, declared that the Anglo-Saxon world order based on Judeo-Protestant ideology is unacceptable.

It is lamentable that Moscow does not yet heed the call of time – Russia did not participate in the conference. It still has strong illusions originating from the desire to become part of the «golden billion». Nevertheless, the sober attitude is gradually gaining ground. It is the West itself that contributes to this process, regarding Russia as its raw materials base. To prevent our country from even daring to pretend to a more important role, it is being surrounded with US and NATO military bases, covered with an anti-ballistic missile defense system, encircled by Western satellites, as though it were a wolf within a string of red flags. As for the new «global elite», they only intend to include a few hundreds or even dozens of the wealthiest people of Russia, as well as those who have unreservedly served the interests of world oligarchy throughout the «reform» years.

It is time for the rest of Russia to determine their allies.

Development of our relations with India is a step in the proper direction. It is a geopolitical choice of Russia that is capable to change the whole world for the better. But it may only happen if Russia finally perceives itself as the center of Orthodox Slavic civilization, rather than a part or appendage of the West.

Located on the geographic axis of Eurasia, Russia has as its objective historical task the structuring of a triple-vector system of relationships within the Old World, with India representing the first vector, the Moslem world (especially Iran) acting as a second vector, and China, a third one.

By proposing in the late ‘90s to set up the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, we actually proposed to create an inter-civilization union, with Russia, India, China and Iran serving as the nucleus. This is a long-term objective. Yet rapprochement with India may become a present-day reality – if, in the new stage of Russian-Indian relations, military-technical cooperation is supplemented with cooperation in the fields of politics, culture, science, high technologies, education, etc.

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Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov is the president of the Academy on Geopolitical Affairs. He was the chief of the department for General Affairs in the Soviet Union’s Ministry of Defense, secretary of the Council of Defense Ministers of the Community of Independant States (CIS), Chief of the Military Cooperation Department at the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense and Joint Chief of Staff of the Russian armies.


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Mackinder's World

by Francis P. Sempa
American Diplomacy



Halford Mackinder’s ideas, which began to appear in print almost a century ago, have assumed classic status in the world of political geography. Policy makers and scholars remember them now mainly for the seemingly simple formula that control of Eastern Europe would bring command of the “Heartland,” thus control of the “World-Island” (Eurasia), and ultimately the world. His ideas in their entirety, including his own later reconsiderations, form a complex, powerful body of work. The author, who is deputy attorney general for the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, revisits Mackinder’s professional career.

The study of international relations is impossible without a firm grasp of geography. The geographic factor in world history is the most fundamental because it is the most constant. Populations increase and decrease, natural resources are discovered and expended, political systems frequently change, empires and states rise and fall, technologies decline and advance, but the location of continents, islands, seas and oceans has not changed significantly throughout recorded history. That is why great nations neglect the study of geography at their peril.

No one understood better the important relationship between geography and world history than the great British geographer, Halford John Mackinder. Born in Gainsborough, England, in 1861, Mackinder attended Gainsborough Grammar School and Epsom College before entering Oxford in 1880. As a boy, according to W. H. Parker, Mackinder had “a strong curiosity about natural phenomena, … a love of the history of travel and exploration, an interest in international affairs, and a passion for making maps.”

At Oxford, Mackinder fell under the influence of Michael Sadler and Henry Nottidge Mosely, key figures in the effort to establish geography as an independent field of study in England. Mackinder was appointed a lecturer in natural science and economic history in 1886 and that same year joined the Royal Geographical Society. According to Brian W. Blouet, one of Mackinder’s biographers, the membership of the Royal Geographical Society “consisted of men with a general interest in the world and its affairs, officers from the army and navy, businessmen, academics, schoolteachers, diplomats, and colonial administrators.” The next year (1887), Mackinder wrote his first major paper, “On the Scope and Methods of Geography,” which has been called “a classic document in the history of the development of British geography.” In that paper, Mackinder argued that “rational” political geography was “built upon and subsequent to physical geography.” “Everywhere,” he wrote, “political questions will depend on the results of the physical inquiry.” Political geography’s function was “to trace the interaction between man and his environment.” That environment, Mackinder explained, included the “configuration of the earth’s surface,” climate and weather conditions, and the presence or absence of natural resources.

Four of the ideas mentioned in “On the Scope and Methods of Geography” are key to understanding Mackinder’s subsequent geopolitical writings.
First, Mackinder expressed his view that the goal of a geographer was to “look at the past [so] that he may interpret the present.”

Second, he noted that man’s great geographical discoveries were nearing an end; there were very few “blanks remaining on our maps.”

Third, Mackinder described the two kinds of political conquerors as “land-wolves and sea-wolves.”

And, fourth, he recognized that technological improvements made possible “the great size of modern states.”

Upon the foundation of those four ideas Mackinder later constructed his famous global theory.

In June 1887, Mackinder was appointed Reader in Geography at Oxford, and he began to lecture on the influence of geography on European history. He visited the United States in 1892, lecturing at the University of Pennsylvania, Swarthmore, Drexel, Harvard, Princeton and Johns Hopkins. The same year, he was appointed Principal of Reading College at Oxford, a position he held for eleven years. In 1893-1894, Mackinder gave a series of ten lectures on the relations of geography to history in Europe and Asia. Five years later, he helped found the School of Geography at Oxford, and participated in an expedition that climbed Mount Kenya, Africa’s second-highest peak.

In 1902, Mackinder wrote his first major book, Britain and the British Seas. Although primarily concerned, in Mackinder’s words, “to present a picture of the physical features and conditions” of Britain, the book’s chapters on “The Position of Britain,” “Strategic Geography,” and “Imperial Britain” contain insights on global affairs that foreshadowed Mackinder’s subsequent geopolitical works. In the book, he described Britain as being “of Europe, yet not in Europe,” and as lying “off the shores of the great continent.” British predominance in the world rested on its “command of the sea,” wrote Mackinder, because “[t]he unity of the ocean is the simple physical fact underlying the dominant value of sea-power in the modern globe-wide world.” “A new balance of power is being evolved,” Mackinder opined, and it included “five great world states, Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and America.” Mackinder suggested, however, that Britain’s position as the preeminent world power was endangered due to “permanent facts of physical geography” in the form of “the presence of vast Powers, broad-based on the resources of half continents” (i.e., Russia and the United States).

The threat to British preeminence and to the liberty of the world was the subject of Mackinder’s bold, provocative essay, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” which he delivered to the Royal Geographical Society on January 25, 1904. He began this seminal work by noting that the last stage of “geographical exploration” (which he called the “Columbian epoch”) was nearing its end. “In 400 years,” he wrote, “the outline of the map of the world has been completed with approximate accuracy.” Moreover, since conquerors, missionaries, miners, farmers and engineers “followed so closely in the travelers’ footsteps,” the world was for the first time a “closed political system.” This meant, wrote Mackinder, that “every explosion of social forces, instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organism of the world will be shattered in consequence.” Nations, in other words, could no longer safely ignore major events that occurred in far away places of the globe.

Mackinder’s avowed purposes in writing the “pivot” paper were to establish “a correlation between the larger geographical and the larger historical generalizations,” to provide “a formula which shall express certain aspects… of geographical causation in universal history,” and to set “into perspective some of the competing forces in current international politics.”

Mackinder pictured Europe and Asia as one great continent: “Euro-Asia.” He described Euro-Asia as: “a continuous land, ice-girt in the north, water-girt elsewhere, measuring twenty-one million square miles….” The center and north of Euro-Asia, he pointed out, measure “some nine million square miles, … have no available waterways to the ocean, but, on the other hand, … are generally favorable to the mobility of horsemen…. ” To the “east and south of this heart-land,” he further explained, “are marginal regions, ranged in a vast crescent, accessible to shipmen.”

Mackinder noted that between the fifth and sixteenth centuries, a “succession of … nomadic peoples” (Huns, Avars, Bulgarians, Magyars, Khazars, Patzinaks, Cumans, Mongols and Kalmuks) emerged from Central Asia to conquer or threaten the states and peoples located in the “marginal crescent” (Europe, the Middle East, southwest Asia, China, southeast Asia, Korea and Japan). Beginning in the late fifteenth century, however, the “great mariners of the Columbian generation” used seapower to envelop Central Asia. “The broad political effect” of the rise of sea powers, explained Mackinder, “was to reverse the relations of Europe and Asia….” “[W]hereas in the Middle Ages Europe was caged between an impassable desert to south, an unknown ocean to west, and icy or forested wastes to north and north-east, and in the east and south-east was constantly threatened by the superior mobility of the horsemen,” Mackinder further explained, “she now emerged upon the world, multiplying more than thirty-fold the sea surface and coastal lands to which she had access, and wrapping her influence around the Euro-Asiatic land-power which had hitherto threatened her very existence.”

Often unappreciated, however, Mackinder believed, was the fact that while Europe expanded overseas, the Russian state based in Eastern Europe and Central Asia expanded to the south and east, organizing a vast space of great human and natural resources. That vast space would soon be “covered with a network of railways,” thereby greatly enhancing the mobility and strategic reach of land power.

With that geo-historical background, Mackinder identified the northern-central core of Euro-Asia as the “pivot region” or “pivot state” of world politics. He placed Germany, Austria, Turkey, India and China, lands immediately adjacent to the pivot region, in an “inner crescent,” and the insular nations of Britain, South Africa, Australia, the United States, Canada and Japan in an “outer crescent.” He then warned that, “[t]he oversetting of the balance of power in favour of the pivot state, resulting in its expansion over the marginal lands of Euro-Asia, would permit the use of vast continental resources for fleet-building, and the empire of the world would then be in sight.” Mackinder suggested that either a Russo-German alliance or a Sino-Japanese empire (which conquered Russian territory) could contend for world hegemony. In either case, “oceanic frontage” would be added to “the resources of the great continent,” thereby creating the geopolitical conditions necessary for producing a great power that was supreme both on land and at sea.

“I have spoken as a geographer,” Mackinder acknowledged toward the end of the paper. But he carefully avoided geographical determinism in assessing the world situation: “The actual balance of political power at any given time is… the product, on the one hand, of geographical conditions, both economic and strategic, and, on the other hand, of the relative number, virility, equipment and organization of the competing peoples.”

Mackinder’s “pivot” paper caused one member of the Royal Geographical Society to “look with regret on some of the space which is unoccupied here.” Unfortunately, as W. H. Parker has pointed out, “in the English-speaking world Mackinder’s paper lay forgotten . . . for thirty-five years.” It was only during and after the Second World War that Englishmen and Americans began to appreciate the wisdom and prescience of Mackinder’s “pivot” paper and his 1919 masterpiece, Democratic Ideals and Reality.

A few months before he delivered the “pivot” paper to the Royal Geographical Society, Mackinder was appointed the director of the London School of Economics, a post that he held until 1908. In 1910 he was elected to the House of Commons, where he served until 1922. In 1919, as civil war raged in Russia, Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, chose Mackinder to be British High Commissioner for South Russia. In that post, Mackinder promoted the idea of a British-supported anti-Bolshevik alliance because he feared that if the Bolsheviks consolidated their control of Russia “there is… great risk that such a weapon may be forged as may become a danger to the world.” “[T]here is to-day,” he warned, “a growing threat from Moscow of a state of affairs which will render this world a very unsafe place for democracies. . . .” Among British policy makers of the time, only Winston Churchill voiced strong support for Mackinder’s anti-Bolshevik strategy.

During his directorship of the London School of Economics and his stay in Parliament, Mackinder continued to think and write on geography and world affairs. His articles and books included: “Man-Power as a Measure of National and Imperial Strength” (1905), Our Own Islands: An Elementary Study in Geography (1906), “On Thinking Imperially” (1907), “The Geographical Environment of Great Britain” (1908), The Rhine: Its Valley and History (1908), “Geographical Conditions Affecting the British Empire” (1909), “The Geographical Conditions of the Defence of the United Kingdom” (1909), “The New Map” (1915), “Some Geographical Aspects of International Reconstruction” (1917), “This Unprecedented War” (1917), and “The New Map of Europe” (1918).

Shortly after the end of the First World War, Mackinder wrote Democratic Ideals and Reality, arguably the most important work on international politics ever written by a geographer. Here Mackinder greatly expanded on his 1904 “pivot” paper, drawing on recent lessons learned from the Great War. In the book’s preface, referring to the continuing relevance of the ideas expressed in the “pivot” paper, Mackinder opined that “the war has established, and not shaken, my former points of view.” In the two hundred or so pages that followed, Mackinder presented a masterful synthesis of historical and geographical analyses that has withstood the test of time.

Early in the book, Mackinder emphasized the paramount importance of geography to the study of history and global politics. “The great wars of history,” he wrote, “are the outcome, direct or indirect, of the unequal growth of nations, and that unequal growth… in large measure … is the result of the uneven distribution of fertility and strategical opportunity upon the face of the globe.” The “facts of geography” indicated to Mackinder that “the grouping of lands and seas, and of fertility and natural pathways, is such as to lend itself to the growth of empires, and in the end of a single world empire.” In order to prevent future world conflicts, he advised, “we must recognize these geographical realities and take steps to counter their influence.” He proposed to reveal those “geographical realities” by measuring “the relative significance of the great features of our globe as tested by the events of history….”

Mackinder pointed out that although the “physical facts of geography have remained substantially the same during … recorded human history,” it was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that the globe became, in political terms, a “closed system.” “Every shock, every disaster or superfluity,“ he wrote, ”is now felt even to the antipodes…. Every deed of humanity will henceforth be echoed and re-echoed in like manner round the world.”

In geographical terms, Mackinder’s world as sketched in Democratic Ideals and Reality consisted of the following: (1) one ocean covering nine-twelfths of the globe; (2) one great continent encompassing Europe, Asia and Africa; and (3) several smaller islands including Britain, Japan, North America, South America and Australia. The one great continent, which Mackinder called “the World-Island”, he further subdivided into six regions: the European coastland (Western and Central Europe), the Monsoon or Asian coastland (India, China, Southeast Asia, Korea and eastern Siberia), Arabia (the Arabian peninsula), the Sahara (North Africa), the Southern Heartland (Africa south of the Sahara), and, most important, the Heartland (the northern-central core of Eurasia which he had called the “pivot region” in his 1904 paper).

Mackinder showed the significance of the position of the Eurasian-African “World-Island” on the globe by geo-historical analogy. The "World-Island” was to North America, he explained, what Greece under the Dorians had been to Crete, and what the Roman Empire had been to Britain, i.e., an unchallenged peninsular land power versus an insular sea power. In both of those instances of history, strongly-based unchallenged land power defeated the less strongly-based sea power. But it was not simply a case of land power being superior to seapower. The victorious land power had to be unchallenged by land, and had to possess sufficient resources to enable it to construct a fleet powerful enough to defeat the insular sea power. Absent those two conditions, a strongly-based insular power would prevail, as evidenced by the British defeat of Napoleon’s France, the latter of which, while possessing tremendous resources, faced a significant land power challenge to the east (Russia) which prevented it from harnessing those resources to overwhelm British seapower.

Indeed, in Mackinder’s view, the optimum geographical position combined insularity with greater resources, and that was precisely the position of the “World-Island.” Strategists, he explained, “must no longer think of Europe apart from Asia and Africa. The Old World has become insular, or in other words a unit, incomparably the largest geographical unit on our globe.” In the First World War, had Germany conquered Russia and France, “she would have established her sea-power on a wider base than any in history, and in fact on the widest possible base.” Although Germany lost the war, Mackinder cautioned, “must we not still reckon with the possibility that a large part of the Great Continent might some day be united under a single sway, and that an invincible sea-power might be based upon it?” “[T]hat,” Mackinder wrote, “is the great ultimate threat to the world’s liberty.”

The most strategically significant geographic feature of the “World-Island” was the Heartland, which Mackinder described as “a great continuous patch in the north and center of the continent… from the icy, flat shore of Siberia to the torrid, steep coasts of Baluchistan and Persia.” This region’s great rivers (Lena, Yenisei, Obi, Volga and Ural) emptied either into the frozen Arctic Ocean or inland seas (the Caspian and Aral), thereby rendering the Heartland “inaccessible to navigation from the ocean.” The Heartland also included a great “lowland” plain that formed “a broad gateway from Siberia into Europe,” which is suitable to highly mobile land power.

As in his 1904 “pivot” paper, Mackinder in Democratic Ideals and Reality, used history to illustrate the strategic significance of geography. He noted that beginning with the Huns in the fifth century, successive waves of mobile hordes emerged from the Heartland to conquer or threaten the coastlands of Europe and Asia. Those hordes, however, lacked sufficient manpower and organization to conquer the whole World-Island, or a large part of it (although the Mongols came close to doing so). Two modern developments—increased population and advanced means of overland transportation (railroads, motorcars)—threatened to upset the balance between land power and seapower, and constituted, in Mackinder’s words, “a revolution in the relations of man to the larger geographical realities of the world.”

Mackinder described how during the nineteenth century following the defeat of Napoleon and until the rise of the German empire, British sea-power sought to contain Russian land-power, a geopolitical struggle that has since been called the “great game.” Germany’s rise to world power after 1871 shifted the geopolitical focus of British statesmen and set the stage for the First World War. For Mackinder, the most important aspect of that war, for the purposes of strategy, was Germany’s near successful conquest of Eastern Europe and the Heartland. Had Germany discarded the Schlieffen Plan, remained nominally at peace with France and Britain, and directed all her efforts and resources eastward, the world would be “overshadowed by a German East Europe in command of the Heartland.” “The British and American insular peoples,” warned Mackinder, “would not have realized the strategical danger until too late.”

Mackinder perceived a consistent geographical basis for British policy during the “great game” and the First World War. “We were opposed to the… Russian Czardom,” explained Mackinder, “because Russia was the dominating, threatening force both in East Europe and the Heartland for a half century.” “We were opposed to the… German Kaiserdom, because Germany took the lead from the Czardom, and would have crushed the revolting Slavs, and dominated East Europe and the Heartland.” This strategic insight formed the basis of Mackinder’s memorable advice to the Western statesmen at Versailles: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island: Who rules the World-Island commands the World.”

The postwar settlement and reconstruction was the focus of the final part of Democratic Ideals and Reality. Mackinder worried that failure by the statesmen at Versailles to construct an effective security system for Eastern Europe would mean that after the terrible sufferings of the First World War, the Western democracies “shall merely have gained a respite, and our descendants will find themselves under the necessity of marshaling their power afresh for the siege of the Heartland.” To those who argued that Germany’s defeat would alter the German desire for conquest and power, Mackinder sagely replied: “He would be a sanguine man…who would trust the future peace of the world to a change in the mentality of any nation.” To those who argued that peace would be secured by the new League of Nations and its professed ideals, Mackinder prophetically remonstrated: “No mere scraps of paper, even though they be the written constitution of a League of Nations, are, under the conditions of to-day, a sufficient guarantee that the Heartland will not again become the center of a world war.”

Mackinder’s proposed solution to the problem of Eastern Europe, which he derived from “a consideration of the realities presented by the geography of our globe,” was the formation of a “tier of independent states between Germany and Russia,” which would form “a broad wedge of independence, extending from the Adriatic and Black Seas to the Baltic….” This “territorial buffer between Germany and Russia,” wrote Mackinder, must have access to the ocean, and must be supported by the “outer nations” (i.e., Britain and the United States). Otherwise, the East European power vacuum would again serve as the spark to ignite yet another struggle for Eurasian hegemony.

During the 1920s and 1930s, unfortunately, Mackinder’s ideas had little influence in Britain or the United States. That was not the case, however, in Germany where Mackinder’s global view attracted the attention and praise of Karl Haushofer and his associates at Munich’s Institute of Geopolitics. The German geopoliticians, influenced by the writings of Oswald Spengler, Friedrich Ratzel and Rudolf Kjellen, adapted Mackinder’s theories and concepts to promote German expansion. Haushofer in the 1920s and 1930s was close to Rudolf Hess, a close adviser to Hitler. But it is unclear to what extent the German geopoliticians influenced the Führer’s global strategy. Haushofer considered Mackinder the author of “the greatest of all geographical world views.” “Never,” exclaimed Haushofer referring to “The Geographical Pivot of History,” “have I seen anything greater than these few pages of a geopolitical masterwork.” The German geopoliticians divided the world into “Pan Regions” each of which was dominated by a great power. Haushofer advocated the formation of a “Eurasiatic great continental bloc”; in essence, an alliance between Germany, Japan and Russia that would eventually overwhelm the British Empire.

During the inter-war period, Mackinder was knighted (1920), lost his seat in Parliament (1922), chaired the Imperial Shipping Committee (1920-1939), sat on the Imperial Economic Committee (1925-1931), was made a Privy Councilor (1926), and continued to write and lecture on geography and related topics. His inter-war writings included: “Geography as a Pivotal Subject in Education” (1921); “The Sub-Continent of India”(1922); The Nations of the Modern World: An Elementary Study in Geography and History After 1914 (1924); and “The Human Habitat”(1931).

The Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939, the beginning of the Second World War and Germany’s subsequent invasion of the Soviet Union drew attention in the United States to Mackinder’s works. In 1941 and 1942, Newsweek, Reader’s Digest and Life published articles which prominently mentioned Mackinder and his writings. Democratic Ideals and Reality was reprinted in 1942. That same year, Hamilton Fish Armstrong, the editor of Foreign Affairs, asked Mackinder to write an article to update his Heartland theory. That article, entitled “The Round World and the Winning of the Peace,” appeared in July 1943, and was Mackinder’s last significant statement of his global views.

"[M]y concept of the Heartland,” wrote Mackinder, “… is more valid and useful today than it was either twenty or forty years ago.” He described the Heartland in geographical terms as “the northern part and the interior of Euro-Asia,” extending “from the Arctic coast down to the central deserts,” flowing westward to “the broad isthmus between the Baltic and Black Seas.” The Heartland concept, he explained, is based on “three separate aspects of physical geography.”
First, “the widest lowland plain on the face of the globe.”

Second, “great navigable rivers [that] flow across that plain [but have] no access to the ocean.”

And third, “a grassland zone which… presented ideal conditions for the development of high mobility” by land transportation.

The Heartland, in essence, wrote Mackinder, was equivalent to the territory of the Soviet Union, minus the land east of the Yenisei River.

If the Soviet Union defeated Germany in the war, opined Mackinder, “she must rank as the greatest land Power on the globe.” “The Heartland is the greatest natural fortress on earth,” he explained, and “[f]or the first time in history it is manned by a garrison sufficient both in number and quality.”

A second geographical feature which Mackinder estimated to be “of almost equal significance” to the Heartland was the “Midland Ocean,” consisting of the eastern half of Canada and the United States, the North Atlantic basin and its “four subsidiaries (Mediterranean, Baltic, Arctic and Caribbean Seas),” Britain and France (a remarkable description of the NATO alliance that was formed six years after Mackinder wrote his article).

Completing his updated global sketch, Mackinder identified three additional geographic features. The first was “a girdle of deserts and wildernesses” extending from the Sahara Desert eastward to Arabia, Tibet, and Mongolia to eastern Siberia, Alaska, part of Canada, and the western United States. The second consisted of South America, the South Atlantic Ocean, and Africa. And the third encompassed the “Monsoon lands” of China and India. He expressed the hope that those lands would prosper and, thereby, balance the other regions of the globe. “A balanced globe of human beings,” he wrote, “[a]nd happy, because balanced and thus free.”

Mackinder expressed the hope that Heartland Russia would cooperate with the Midland Ocean powers in the postwar world and, thereby, prevent future German aggression. But his theories and concepts proved readily adaptable to the emerging Cold War struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union. American strategists during and after the Second World War borrowed aspects of Mackinder’s world view in formulating and implementing the policy of “containment” of Soviet Russia. Anthony J. Pierce, in his introduction to the 1962 edition of Democratic Ideals and Reality, could confidently assert that “in America and in England, since 1942, most studies of global strategy or political geography have been based, in whole or in part, upon [Mackinder’s] theories. “Mackinder, of course, had his share of critics, but as Colin Gray has pointed out, “Mackinder’s interpretations of historically shifting power relationships in their geographical setting have stood the test of time much better than have the slings and arrows of his legion of critics.”

More recent and current political observers and strategists attest to the continuing influence of Mackinder’s ideas. In 1974, R. E. Walters wrote that “the Heartland theory stands as the first premise in Western military thought.” In 1975, Saul B. Cohen noted that “most Western strategists continue to view the world as initially described by Mackinder.” Zbigniew Brzezinski’s Game Plan (1986) and The Grand Chessboard (1997) present global views almost wholly based on Mackinder’s concepts. In 1980, Robert Nisbet claimed that “[e]very geopolitical apprehension that Sir Halford Mackinder expressed some six decades ago in his Democratic Ideals and Reality has been fulfilled.” The influential journals, Strategic Review and The National Interest, published several articles in the 1980s and 1990s wherein the authors applied Mackinder’s theories and concepts to contemporary global issues. In 1988, the respected strategist Colin Gray asserted that “the geopolitical ideas of the British geographer Sir Halford Mackinder … provide an intellectual architecture, far superior to rival conceptions, for understanding the principal international security issues.” In 1992, Eugene Rostow remarked that “Mackinder’s map remains an indispensable tool of analysis” of global politics. In 1994, the former State Department Geographer, George J. Demko, wrote that “the geographic ideas of … Mackinder, still provide important insights into international political processes.” Henry Kissinger in his book, Diplomacy (1994), concludes with a warning that “Russia, regardless of who governs it, sits astride territory Halford Mackinder called the geopolitical heartland….” Paul Kennedy, Robert Chase, and Emily Hill invoked Mackinder’s theories in a 1996 Foreign Affairs article on post-Cold War “pivot states.” Finally, in 1996 the National Defense University issued a reprint of Democratic Ideals and Reality.

Twentieth century global politics were shaped, in part, by Mackinder’s geopolitical vision. Following his concepts, the continuing struggle for Eurasian mastery was the geopolitical essence of the First World War, the Second World War, and the Cold War. First Great Britain, then the United States, organized great coalitions to oppose successive bids for Eurasian hegemony launched by Wilhelmine Germany, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. The Great Power struggles of the twenty-first century will likely repeat this pattern.

The People’s Republic of China, situated at the gates of Mackinder’s “pivot region” or Heartland, and with access to the sea, possesses sufficient human and natural resources to make a bid for Eurasian mastery sometime in this new century. Russia, though currently undergoing a new time of troubles, still occupies the Heartland and possesses vast human and natural resources, as well as thousands of nuclear weapons. The nations of Western, Central and Eastern Europe are moving toward economic unity and, perhaps, political unity, with Germany playing a leading role. Whatever specific power constellation emerges, however, U.S. foreign policy will continue to be shaped by Mackinder’s geopolitical vision of a Eurasian-based world hegemon.

In 1944, the American Geographical Society awarded Mackinder the Charles P. Daley Medal, which was presented to him at the American Embassy in London on March 31, 1944. Ambassador John Winant remarked that Mackinder was the first scholar who fully enlisted geography as an aid to statecraft and strategy. A year later, the Royal Geographical Society awarded Mackinder the Patron’s Medal, and its president noted that ”[a]s a political geographer his reputation is … world wide.”29 Mackinder died on March 6, 1947, at the age of eighty-six. More than fifty years later, as we enter a new century, statesmen and strategists still operate in Mackinder’s world.


Francis P. Sempa, is a senior deputy attorney general for Pennsylvania, earned degrees from the University of Scranton and the Dickinson School of Law. He has written extensively on national security questions, publishing articles in Strategic Review, The National Interest, National Review, and Presidential Studies Quarterly. Mr. Sempa has filled the position of adjunct professor of political science at the University of Scranton and at Wilkes University.



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