My OperaGoldsmiths legal advice
Wednesday, January 27, 2010 10:13:40 PM
I originally wrote this analysis to lay down the gauntlet to those fools that said invasion of Iraq was legal and our PM is not a war criminal 
Some folks truthfully believe that there were loopholes for us to invade - not saying much for morality of government using loopholes to kill people.
I use Goldsmiths own written legal advice to explain, as no country can legally invade another without legal justification to do so.
Even a legal novice should be able to see through Goldsmiths lies and deceptions - in which he aided and abetted Blair (along with Scarlett and others).
We all know that UN resolutions were the only supposed LEGAL excuse they could find to try to justify the removal of Saddam i.e. could not use regime change etc.
One quote: "The Attorney General had concluded that authority for the use of force in Iraq was contained within existing UN resolutions and that another was not needed, Mr Straw said in reply to an emergency question from the Opposition."
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1539816,00.html
Indeed, it did not seem to matter how many Iraqis they killed in doing so - Blair would not give any upper limit when he would admit it was the wrong thing to do.
Keep in mind when reading this, that the UK signed up to UN1441 and are actually legally bound to this agreement.
First and most importantly of all - fact beats even 'expert opinion' - all lawyers know this.
Goldsmith (the Attorney General and Blair’s pal) certainly knows this - yet you will see he uses his opinion to falsify his excuses to overrule facts.
Please note the difference between his use of opinions and the actual FACT.
So – my comments start with G> - everything following numbers 26-31 is from Goldsmiths written legal advice – and anything beginning with 'quote' is from relevant UN Resolution:
26. To sum up, the language of resolution 1441 leaves the position unclear and the statements made on adoption of the resolution suggest that there were differences of view within the Council as to the legal effect of the resolution. Arguments can be made on both sides. A key question is whether there is in truth a need for an assessment of whether Iraq's conduct constitutes a failure to take the final opportunity or has constituted a failure fully to cooperate within the meaning of OP4 such that the basis of the cease-fire is destroyed. If an assessment is needed of that situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.
G> He has failed to explain (either in the detail or summation) what exactly is unclear in UN1441 that would give countries permission for unilateral action - even in an unclear way - that is a FACT.
G> The key question he makes is a sham ("whether there is in truth a need for an assessment") - because it is a FACT - whether it is needed or not - UN1441 actually calls for an assessment.
G> He is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception.
27. In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. I have already advised that I do not believe that such a resolution need be explicit in its terms. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.
G> Not only the safest - but the only legal course using UN resolutions - because it is a FACT that is what UN1441 requires a further resolution - as per item 12.
G> Quote: "12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;"
G> Again he is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception.
28. Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution.
G> False - an outright lie.
G> FACT: UN1441 specifically recalls all prior resolutions - including UN678 - which now requires the UN "convene ... in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance".
G> This gives UN1441 primacy over UN678 - like your latest 'Last Will and Testement' - UN1441 now requires UN to decide.
G> Even if it did not - UN678 applied "all necessary means" only to the demand that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait anyway - "to restore international peace and security in the area Kuwait". As Iraq army are no longer in Kuwait, their argument is rubbish - it is not even a moot point.
G> Quote: "Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,"
G> Yet again he is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception.
29. However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider very carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.
G> False - an outright lie.
G> Nothing in UN1441 gives authorisation to use force under any circumstances - it recalls UN678 and now requires UN decision on next step.
G> FACT: UN1441 specifically requires the UN to make that judgement on what to do next - here it is again as stated in item 12.
G> Quote: "12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;"
G> Yet once more he is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception - starting to see a pattern?
30. In reaching my conclusion, I have taken account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions, including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the action under international law was no more than reasonably arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with the view. I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do requ1re a further Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably maintained. However, it must be recognised that on previous occasions when military action was taken on the basis of a reasonably arguable case, the degree of public and Parliamentary scrutiny of the legal issue was nothing as great as it is today.
G> Opinion is not the same as fact - and especially not a "reasonably arguable" opinion.
G> FACT: Even if a previous war was illegal - illegality cannot be used as the basis of starting new wars.
G> You cannot use an argument that you got away with murder last time - so you can murder with impunity again.
G> Yet again he tries to revive the authorisation in resolution 678 for "all necessary means" - but we know for a FACT that UN1441 stops that and only applies to getting Iraq army out of Kuwait anyway.
G> Goldsmith admits, "a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court [he] would be confident that the court would agree with the view" - because his argument is rubbish.
31. The analysis set out above applies whether a second resolution fails to be adopted because of a lack of votes or because it is vetoed. As I have said before, I do not believe that there is any basis in law for arguing that there is an implied condition of reasonableness which can be read into the power of veto conferred on the permanent members of the Security Council by the UN Charter. So there are no grounds for arguing that an "unreasonable veto" would entitle us to proceed on the basis of a presumed Security Council authorisation. In any event, if the majority of world opinion remains opposed to military action, it is likely to be difficult on the facts to categorise a French veto as "unreasonable". The legal analysis may, however, be affected by the course of events over the next week or so, eg the discussions on the draft second resolution. If we fail to achieve the adoption of a second resolution we would need to consider urgently at that stage the strength of our legal case in the light of circumstances at the time."
G> Vetos are valid even if "unreasonable" e.g. the many examples were the American veto could be considered "unreasonable".
G> He even admits that "there are no grounds for arguing that an "unreasonable veto" would entitle" them to invade.
G> He says that if a second resolution fails - they need to *REconsider* "urgently at that stage the strength of our legal case in the light of circumstances at the time" - where is that review?
G> It can be seen by this analysis that Goldsmith does not have a legal case for invasion and I welcome people to show where the scrutiny is wrong.
Links.
UN1441: http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm
Goldsmiths Advice: http://www.channel4.com/news/special-reports/special-reports-storypage.jsp?id=91
UN678: http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/unscr-resolution-678.html
Here is Anthony Lester QC's analysis of it:
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/04/27/Iraq_legal_advice_.pdf
Some folks truthfully believe that there were loopholes for us to invade - not saying much for morality of government using loopholes to kill people.
I use Goldsmiths own written legal advice to explain, as no country can legally invade another without legal justification to do so.
Even a legal novice should be able to see through Goldsmiths lies and deceptions - in which he aided and abetted Blair (along with Scarlett and others).
We all know that UN resolutions were the only supposed LEGAL excuse they could find to try to justify the removal of Saddam i.e. could not use regime change etc.
One quote: "The Attorney General had concluded that authority for the use of force in Iraq was contained within existing UN resolutions and that another was not needed, Mr Straw said in reply to an emergency question from the Opposition."
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2-1539816,00.html
Indeed, it did not seem to matter how many Iraqis they killed in doing so - Blair would not give any upper limit when he would admit it was the wrong thing to do.
Keep in mind when reading this, that the UK signed up to UN1441 and are actually legally bound to this agreement.
First and most importantly of all - fact beats even 'expert opinion' - all lawyers know this.
Goldsmith (the Attorney General and Blair’s pal) certainly knows this - yet you will see he uses his opinion to falsify his excuses to overrule facts.
Please note the difference between his use of opinions and the actual FACT.
So – my comments start with G> - everything following numbers 26-31 is from Goldsmiths written legal advice – and anything beginning with 'quote' is from relevant UN Resolution:
26. To sum up, the language of resolution 1441 leaves the position unclear and the statements made on adoption of the resolution suggest that there were differences of view within the Council as to the legal effect of the resolution. Arguments can be made on both sides. A key question is whether there is in truth a need for an assessment of whether Iraq's conduct constitutes a failure to take the final opportunity or has constituted a failure fully to cooperate within the meaning of OP4 such that the basis of the cease-fire is destroyed. If an assessment is needed of that situation, it would be for the Council to make it. A narrow textual reading of the resolution suggests that sort of assessment is not needed, because the Council has predetermined the issue. Public statements, on the other hand, say otherwise.
G> He has failed to explain (either in the detail or summation) what exactly is unclear in UN1441 that would give countries permission for unilateral action - even in an unclear way - that is a FACT.
G> The key question he makes is a sham ("whether there is in truth a need for an assessment") - because it is a FACT - whether it is needed or not - UN1441 actually calls for an assessment.
G> He is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception.
27. In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. I have already advised that I do not believe that such a resolution need be explicit in its terms. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.
G> Not only the safest - but the only legal course using UN resolutions - because it is a FACT that is what UN1441 requires a further resolution - as per item 12.
G> Quote: "12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;"
G> Again he is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception.
28. Nevertheless, having regard to the information on the negotiating history which I have been given and to the arguments of the US Administration which I heard in Washington, I accept that a reasonable case can be made that resolution 1441 is capable in principle of reviving the authorisation in 678 without a further resolution.
G> False - an outright lie.
G> FACT: UN1441 specifically recalls all prior resolutions - including UN678 - which now requires the UN "convene ... in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance".
G> This gives UN1441 primacy over UN678 - like your latest 'Last Will and Testement' - UN1441 now requires UN to decide.
G> Even if it did not - UN678 applied "all necessary means" only to the demand that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait anyway - "to restore international peace and security in the area Kuwait". As Iraq army are no longer in Kuwait, their argument is rubbish - it is not even a moot point.
G> Quote: "Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, in particular its resolutions 661 (1990) of 6 August 1990, 678 (1990) of 29 November 1990, 686 (1991) of 2 March 1991, 687 (1991) of 3 April 1991, 688 (1991) of 5 April 1991, 707 (1991) of 15 August 1991, 715 (1991) of 11 October 1991, 986 (1995) of 14 April 1995, and 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999, and all the relevant statements of its President,"
G> Yet again he is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception.
29. However, the argument that resolution 1441 alone has revived the authorisation to use force in resolution 678 will only be sustainable if there are strong factual grounds for concluding that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity. In other words, we would need to be able to demonstrate hard evidence of non-compliance and non-cooperation. Given the structure of the resolution as a whole, the views of UNMOVIC and the IAEA will be highly significant in this respect. In the light of the latest reporting by UNMOVIC, you will need to consider very carefully whether the evidence of non-cooperation and non-compliance by Iraq is sufficiently compelling to justify the conclusion that Iraq has failed to take its final opportunity.
G> False - an outright lie.
G> Nothing in UN1441 gives authorisation to use force under any circumstances - it recalls UN678 and now requires UN decision on next step.
G> FACT: UN1441 specifically requires the UN to make that judgement on what to do next - here it is again as stated in item 12.
G> Quote: "12. Decides to convene immediately upon receipt of a report in accordance with paragraphs 4 or 11 above, in order to consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security;"
G> Yet once more he is clearly conning the reader - it is pure deception - starting to see a pattern?
30. In reaching my conclusion, I have taken account of the fact that on a number of previous occasions, including in relation to Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 and Kosovo in 1999, UK forces have participated in military action on the basis of advice from my predecessors that the legality of the action under international law was no more than reasonably arguable. But a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court I would be confident that the court would agree with the view. I judge that, having regard to the arguments on both sides, and considering the resolution as a whole in the light of the statements made on adoption and subsequently, a court might well conclude that OPs 4 and 12 do requ1re a further Council decision in order to revive the authorisation in resolution 678. But equally I consider that the counter view can be reasonably maintained. However, it must be recognised that on previous occasions when military action was taken on the basis of a reasonably arguable case, the degree of public and Parliamentary scrutiny of the legal issue was nothing as great as it is today.
G> Opinion is not the same as fact - and especially not a "reasonably arguable" opinion.
G> FACT: Even if a previous war was illegal - illegality cannot be used as the basis of starting new wars.
G> You cannot use an argument that you got away with murder last time - so you can murder with impunity again.
G> Yet again he tries to revive the authorisation in resolution 678 for "all necessary means" - but we know for a FACT that UN1441 stops that and only applies to getting Iraq army out of Kuwait anyway.
G> Goldsmith admits, "a "reasonable case" does not mean that if the matter ever came before a court [he] would be confident that the court would agree with the view" - because his argument is rubbish.
31. The analysis set out above applies whether a second resolution fails to be adopted because of a lack of votes or because it is vetoed. As I have said before, I do not believe that there is any basis in law for arguing that there is an implied condition of reasonableness which can be read into the power of veto conferred on the permanent members of the Security Council by the UN Charter. So there are no grounds for arguing that an "unreasonable veto" would entitle us to proceed on the basis of a presumed Security Council authorisation. In any event, if the majority of world opinion remains opposed to military action, it is likely to be difficult on the facts to categorise a French veto as "unreasonable". The legal analysis may, however, be affected by the course of events over the next week or so, eg the discussions on the draft second resolution. If we fail to achieve the adoption of a second resolution we would need to consider urgently at that stage the strength of our legal case in the light of circumstances at the time."
G> Vetos are valid even if "unreasonable" e.g. the many examples were the American veto could be considered "unreasonable".
G> He even admits that "there are no grounds for arguing that an "unreasonable veto" would entitle" them to invade.
G> He says that if a second resolution fails - they need to *REconsider* "urgently at that stage the strength of our legal case in the light of circumstances at the time" - where is that review?
G> It can be seen by this analysis that Goldsmith does not have a legal case for invasion and I welcome people to show where the scrutiny is wrong.
Links.
UN1441: http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm
Goldsmiths Advice: http://www.channel4.com/news/special-reports/special-reports-storypage.jsp?id=91
UN678: http://www.caabu.org/press/documents/unscr-resolution-678.html
Here is Anthony Lester QC's analysis of it:
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Guardian/documents/2005/04/27/Iraq_legal_advice_.pdf
