Skip navigation

Lost password? | Help

荒诞者共和

ABSURDIST REPUBLIC

Posts tagged with "Cultural Revolution"

Red Guards

, ,

By JUDITH SHAPIRO
New York Times
October 8, 2006


Book Review:
MAO’S LAST REVOLUTION
By Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals.
Illustrated. 693 pp.
The Belknap Press/
Harvard University Press

[There is another review by Christian Science Monitor]

CHINA’S Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which lasted from 1966 to 1976, caused an estimated one million unnatural deaths. It is widely viewed as one of history’s most horrific political cataclysms. Yet there is a peculiar amnesia at play in China, where the regime, whose legitimacy depends on protecting the record of the Communist Party and its founder Mao Zedong, suppresses discussion of the past. Ordinary Chinese, influenced by Confucian traditions that emphasize social harmony, are complicit in the silence, preferring to withhold blame for the violence and to avoid reflecting on personal responsibility. Indeed, in the context of today’s rapidly changing China, the nightmare of denunciations by Red Guards, widespread torture, Mao worship, book burnings and government-orchestrated mass relocations seems a distant memory. Yet until China comes to terms with the root causes of the Cultural Revolution, it is unlikely that a genuinely open polity and legal system will emerge to support the economic freedoms that have dramatically transformed Chinese lives.

Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals’s book, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” the first major history of the elite politics of the period, may generate a wave of Cultural Revolution scholarship within China and encourage healthy debate over state manipulation of historical memory. It is not, however, a book for those lacking some knowledge of recent Chinese history. Its cast of characters includes relatively well-known figures like Mao Zedong, his wife, Jiang Qing, and the other members of the ultraleftist Gang of Four, as well as the top military leader Lin Biao, the beloved Premier Zhou Enlai and the Cultural Revolution’s top-ranking victims, President Liu Shaoqi and General Secretary Deng Xiaoping. But it also features numerous others who are unknown in the West except among specialists. With little hand-holding from the authors, readers are likely to confuse similar-sounding Chinese names, purges and counterpurges, and unfamiliar events whose significance is unclear.

Yet the book is an important first effort to establish the facts. MacFarquhar, a Harvard historian and former British M.P., and Michael Schoenhals, a Swedish scholar legendary in Sinological circles for his mastery of Cultural Revolution rhetoric and arcana, have teamed up to use newly available documents and memoirs in an effort to address some of the great questions of the era. What was Mao’s responsibility for the violence, and what was his relationship with the Gang of Four? Was Zhou Enlai complicit in the revolution’s excesses or was he a moderating figure, as is widely believed? How did party leaders deploy Red Guards, work teams and the military to carry out the revolution? What actually happened when Lin Biao tried to assassinate Mao? How was the arrest of the Gang of Four accomplished after Mao’s death? How did Deng Xiaoping manage to supplant Mao’s anointed successor, Hua Guofeng?

“Mao’s Last Revolution” provides a detailed account of the salvos, currents, countercurrents, conspiracies, waves, cleansings and purges for which the era is known. Included are lengthy descriptions of such familiar episodes as the 1965 campaign against the historian Wu Han and his drama, “Hai Rui Dismissed From Office,” which initiated the revolution; Lin Biao’s 1971 coup attempt, which ended with the deaths of Lin Biao and his family in a plane crash in Mongolia; and the 1976 Tiananmen crackdown on the mourners of Zhou Enlai, beloved for having protected intellectuals and cultural treasures. The book also recounts less-known incidents like the 1973 campaign, “Criticize Lin, Criticize Confucius” (in which Confucius served as a proxy for Zhou Enlai), and the 1975 attack on “empiricism” (the accusation leveled at Deng Xiaoping). A gripping final chapter details the Gang of Four’s planned military coup immediately after Mao’s death in September 1976, which was pre-empted only by their arrests.

Mao comes across as surprisingly reasonable, if often deliberately opaque, in contrast to other recent portrayals that stress his megalomania and cruelty. MacFarquhar and Schoenhals describe him as starting the revolution out of genuine concern that China might follow Khrushchev’s revisionist road (rather than out of political weakness, as many have argued). Mao appears in control of all key decisions concerning the movement’s targets and direction until he is weakened in the revolution’s latter years by Lou Gehrig’s disease and other ailments.

While the authors present a painstakingly detailed account of interactions among the top leaders and their proxies in Beijing, and touch on some of the major events in the provinces, they leave many of the most significant questions for the sociologists, political scientists and the Chinese people themselves. Why was there such enthusiastic participation in the violence? How was it possible for the revolution to move in directions that the elite could not control? Did Chinese political culture support Maoist extremism? At a time when the country’s stability and destiny are unclear, debate on questions like these may help protect China from future cataclysms.

Judith Shapiro is the author of “Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and the Environment in Revolutionary China” and a co-author, with Liang Heng, of “Son of the Revolution.”


Wang Shuo: The Wasteland

, ,

By Wang Shuo
Translated by John Crespi
TIME MAGAZINE
Issue of Nov 11, 2002


[Wang Shuo is a best-selling novelist whose books, including Please Don't Call Me Human and Playing for Thrills, explore the darker side of Chinese society. Know a little bit more about him and his novels in English translation at No Exit Press]

This is an essay from TIME's Special Issue on China, titled "The New Cultural Revolution". In the issue there includes also: Let One Hundred Cultures Bloom, The Middle Kingdom, A Different Party Line, Back-Alley Blues, and many others. Old articles, but worth reading.

Chinese culture sounds like it's vibrant and refined. One problem: it doesn't exist

I think it was rocker Cui Jian who mouthed the phrase Chinese culture to me while talking about his music during a party at some German guy's place in Beijing. Another Chinese friend of mine, his breath reeking of booze, leaned over and asked me, "What's Chinese culture?" Being well stewed myself at the time, I didn't say anything. But if you're going to make me answer, all I can tell you is, "I don't know."

You'll hear foreigners say that Chinese culture is Confucian culture. What is Confucian culture? In the official media it's the Doctrine of the Mean: elders and juniors each in their places; being tolerant and restrained and yielding; doing unto others and all that. All of which just tells you how to avoid getting the short end of the stick in the world's most crowded of crowds: keep your head low and you'll survive. Then there's the philosophy for retirees: Taoism, unity of heaven and man, becoming one with nature. Sounds great, and every Chinese person can rattle off a couple of paragraphs of the stuff. But if you'll excuse me, I have to say that the one line of Confucius you just can't beat is: "I've never seen the man who loves virtue as well as sex." In the end, this philosophy is about telling people to act one way or another. Give someone a chance, and his first instinct is to go straight for the sex. Or the money. That includes me.

I was born under Maoist rule, and the first time I heard the word culture was in "Cultural Revolution." Our only cultural sage, the writer Lu Xun, who had been dead for 10 years by then, taught us "Don't forgive anyone" and "A perfect fly is still just a fly." If only we had listened.

Just look at what passed for culture at the time, and see how little it's changed today. Back then, children sang, "Mommy and daddy can't compare with Chairman Mao, the greatness of heaven and earth can't compare with the great kindness of the Party." The slogan board on the door of the police headquarters read in big red characters, "Resolutely support the righteous anti-imperialist, anticolonial struggles of all the peoples of the world." The slogan on the door of the crematorium read, "Increase production, decrease population." It's been more than 20 years since those days. Now the slogans are new, but they're still a series of orders. "Open a bottle of Hennessy and let the good times roll." "Your choice, Sprite." In the stores and restaurants, you see, "The People's Police advise you to keep an eye on your wallet and other personal articles." In the public toilet the sign reads, "Please urinate in the trough, please flush after defecating." Jiang Zemin says, "Represent advanced culture."

A friend of mine says Chinese people are the smartest. I ask my friend, "But what culture do they possess?" Beyond firecrackers and paper—things the Chinese invented—look around at what we wear, the things we use. Flushing toilets, televisions, cars and toothbrushes. Which did the Chinese invent? All we can talk about is the Great Wall. What greatness comes from China? Architect I.M. Pei. Author Gao Xingjian. Musician Yo-Yo Ma. Movie director Ang Lee. Actor Jackie Chan. None lives in China.

I love my country. I really do. Maybe, like so many people, I love it too much. A guy who once wrote propaganda for the Party, Qu Xiao, returned from a labor reform camp and said, "A son never thinks his mother ugly, and a dog doesn't mind if its owners are poor." He's still loyal! When I heard that, I felt like I had just gulped down a fly. I don't feel loyal to anything.

If by culture you mean a spiritual font or a shared sense of values, then I have to say that this is something I can't see in China—past or present. Here in Beijing I've got to shove others out of the way just to make it across the street. I stare suspiciously at any stranger who gets too close to my briefcase. I don't lend money to friends. I never buy history books written by Chinese because I don't believe them. (I have comforted myself with the thought that mistrust is itself a form of belief.) Looking into the future I often slip into a sense of dread, yet I don't know where to turn for support. I'm like a savage in a benighted age, alone and helpless in a land with no culture.


The Chinese Prison Camp through Contemporary Fiction and Reportage

, ,

Reviewed by Maghiel van Crevel
Leiden University
MCLC Resource Center Publication (Copyright May 2006)
Source: University of Calfornia Pres

The Great Wall of Confinement: The Chinese Prison Camp through Contemporary Fiction and Reportage
By Philip F. Williams and Yenna Wu
Berkeley: University of Calfornia Press, 2004. 260pp


Li Jiulian was a senior high school student in Jiangxi Province. In 1969, her perplexity at high-level political infighting during the Cultural Revolution led to her imprisonment as an "active counterrevolutionary." If the cases of countless other people have gone undocumented, there is sufficient publicly available information on human rights in the People's Republic of China (PRC), and specifically on its prisons and prison camps, to justify the fear that many of Li's fellow inmates would have fared little better than she. In her case, there is a detailed account of the cruel treatment she suffered at the hands of guards, prison cadres and those higher up in the chain of command. Throughout her ordeal, she refused to confess to what she presumably did not think was a crime. Following the downfall of Lin Biao, she was eventually released from the camp in 1972, but her political "tail" as an ex-inmate made her a social outcast. She continued to speak her mind and fought her original sentence up to the national level, to no avail. Her refusal to show contrition landed her back in prison in 1975. She went on one of the longest known prison hunger strikes, even though these were known to elicit violent responses by the authorities. In 1977, Li was executed at a time when government policy stresses the need "to kill proven vicious criminals, to pacify the people's anger." She was quietly exonerated in 1979. Many years later, Hu Ping's perseverance in finding editors who dared publish his research finally publicized her case.

Hu Ping is among a good two dozen authors whose "prison writings" Philip Williams and Yenna Wu review in The Great Wall of Confinement: The Chinese Prison Camp through Contemporary Fiction and Reportage . This book is many things in one. First, it is an analytical, state-of-the-field portrayal of a far-flung, "thriving concentration camp system" (2) maintained by a major world power that is unique in having taken such institutions into the twenty-first century. Second, Williams and Wu adopt a rewarding perspective by mining fiction and reportage for their portrayal of Chinese prison camps, complementing differently mediated research by scholars such as Harry Wu, and James Seymour and Richard Anderson, to name but three well-known authors publishing in English. Third, The Great Wall of Confinement is one of those books whose objectifying, academic approach never detracts from the certainty that they raise fundamental questions of morality.

Williams and Wu drive home the gravity of their subject matter in their first few pages, by validating the notion of concentration camps as applicable to prison camps in the PRC. They proceed to lay out the basics on the PRC system of "remolding through labor" (laodong gaizao, which has made its way into other languages than Chinese as laogai ), and "reeducation through labor" (laodong jiaoyang). While offering international comparisons on concentration camps and conscription societies, they point out that remolding through labor and reeducation through labor bear the imprint of traditional Chinese culture, as well as the Soviet-Stalinist example, with Maoist determination to control inmates' subjective experience of the world as a salient difference with Soviet prison camps. In comparison to Chinese precedents, whether ancient, late-imperial or early-Republican, the notion of "remolding" people becomes notably instrumental in nature in the Mao era. Previously, the verb gaizao 'remold' mostly took inanimates as its direct object. This could mean either that its scope was now extended to animates, which makes sense in the light of a Maoist vision of human beings as malleable material; or, that inmates had the status of inanimates—if it helps us remember, the alphabetic coincidence is worth it—and human beings were dehumanized; or, both.

Another early point that resurfaces throughout The Great Wall of Confinement is Williams and Wu's interrogation of Michel Foucault's work on the prison. Joining forces with earlier criticasters of Foucault, they take issue with him so thoroughly that it is almost surprising that their title alludes to his notion of the "great confinement." Crudely summarized, they hold that Foucault's "speculative and rhetorical" (53n86) theorizing generates totalizing visions of absolute uniformity in prison regimes, and leaves insufficient room for the complexity and the ambivalences of (Chinese) prison life on the ground. As for the literary-theoretical framework for their analysis of prison writings, Williams and Wu see prison writings not as simplistic reflections or mirrorings of reality, but stress that "both mimetic and symbolic representation remain key functions of most testimony and literature," and that the impossibility of duplicating or replacing reality does not make "prison camp narratives . . . mimetically insignificant, for intersubjective agreement among sources does lead to a degree of objectivity" (15).

The clarity and cogency of the introduction are borne out in the chapters that follow. Chapter 1, "The Cultural Foundations of China's Prison Camp System," notes that China has a history of institutionalized forced labor, by both civilian conscripts and prisoners, in times of war and peace alike. Also, ever since the Han dynasty, Chinese rulers have punished criminals by sending them into (internal) exile, and often limited their mobility to return long beyond the time of their sentence. This has happened to many ex-inmates of PRC prison camps since the 1950s who were forced to accept job placement in the vicinity of the camp (liuchang jiuye), although this particular component of the prison enterprise has been on the decrease in recent decades. Thus, there are "ancient cultural assumptions that forced labor and exile were normal parts of the state's criminal justice system." Moreover, this system has "strictly defined the individual's 'duty to obey authority,' but not the limits of that authority" (28-29). In the final years of the Qing dynasty, the legal code of 1910 outlawed the state's time-honored use of torture to induce confession and signaled a shift away from exile and penal labor. Williams and Wu submit that even if subsequent, Republican-era Guomindang legal practice was seriously flawed, it helped lay the groundwork for the democratic system that would emerge in Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s.

By contrast, chapter 2, "The Development of the Chinese Communist Prison Camp," recounts how starting in the days of the Jiangxi Soviet, Mao Zedong cum suis rejected legal codes with any measure of independence from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). They replaced them with decrees and policy statements whose implementation often hinged on the rhetoric of vilification, specifically the designation as "counterrevolutionary" of political opponents—and often led back to the torture, exile and penal labor that the late-Qing code had attempted to abolish. Legal policies were adjusted to political needs, rather than the other way around. The combined ideological and pragmatic thrust of this strategy is reflected in what the authors identify as the dual mission of Communist prison camps. First, the camps were to guide (alleged) criminals to "make themselves anew," and later to "remold themselves." Second, they were to force them to engage in production, to defray government expenditures on prison maintenance. On the latter point, Williams and Wu hold that both laogai apologists and its outspoken critics have tended to overestimate the economic significance of prison enterprises, citing Jean-Luc Domenach's observation that the PRC prison system was not organized along the lines of economic rationality, but originally "conceived for political objectives and on a military model" (42). In the early 1950s, perhaps 90% of a total number of four to six million inmates were political prisoners, as opposed to common criminals; in the 1990s, the relative numbers were the other way around, and the absolute number of camp inmates, although difficult to verify, was thought to be at two million. Once population growth is factored in, this would roughly mean proportionally four times fewer inmates than half a century earlier, and forty times fewer of them held for reasons to do with, say, sociopolitical ideology. Then again, something to the tune of two hundred thousand political prisoners is still a staggering figure.

Having sketched an overview of the prison camp system, Williams and Wu move on to what one might call the circumstances in the camps and the individual inmate's ordeal, in chapters 3 and 4 respectively. It is also in this part of the book that they start making frequent reference to a variety of prison writings to sustain the narrative. These texts range from more or less straightforward documentation and journalism to reportage and emphatically fictionalized accounts in novels and short stories. Williams and Wu are aware that all the texts they discuss have been "generated by a fallible human consciousness that necessarily filters reality during the processes of thought and representation" (14). They convincingly argue against letting such awareness discredit the referential function of prison writings altogether - and of other literatures of testimony, such as those on the Turkish government's 1915 genocide of the Armenian minority, and Holocaust literature.

Chapter 3, "The PRC Prison Camp (I): From Arrest to Forced Labor," first considers how arrest typically involves a show of force to overwhelm the arrestee—as visible on the book's cover—and subsequent secrecy vis-à-vis their surroundings (e.g., refusal to disclose the nature of the charges, the arrestee's location following removal from their homes and so on). Thus starts a depressing journey through circumstances in the camps, which range from the callous and humiliating to the inhuman and downright unlivable. Williams and Wu dwell on detention centers, where people can be held for renewable terms of up to three years each, without any legal procedure or idea about the foreseen length of their imprisonment. Their situation can be so unbearable that detainees consciously break the rules or commit crimes, in order to expedite their definitive sentencing and transport to a regular labor camp. Detention centers are also the place where the pressure to confess is perhaps the greatest, including intense violence and threats of imminent execution. Other topics in chapter 3 are the often counter-productive effect of protestations of innocence; socialization and forced labor in the prison camp, both leading the authors to lock horns with Foucault again; barracks life and sanitation; and vermin and disease. On the latter topic, Williams and Wu cite reports of camp cadres enlisting the aid of mosquitoes by stripping an inmate naked and leaving him tied to a tree in a marshy area, and intentionally exposing their victims to inmates who suffer from contagious diseases. This is how famous labor activist Han Dongfang contracted tuberculosis. Hunger and sexuality, finally, are two topics in this chapter that are likely better known to scholars and other readers of literature without a special interest in human rights issues or prison camps, since they are central to Zhang Xianliang's 1985 novel Half of Man is Woman (Nanren de yiban shi nüren). Williams and Wu cite Zhang's 1995 laogai memoir My Bodhi Tree (Wode puti shu) as suggesting that food deprivation is the most efficient way for the state to force its citizens into submission to its authority.

Chapter 4, "The PRC Prison Camp (II): From Struggle Sessions to Release or Death," offers an account of the individual inmate's ordeal. It lists a series of horrors, some of which are relatively well known to general audiences outside China, through the work of international human rights organizations and activists. With abundant reference to prison writings, as in the previous chapter, Williams and Wu begin by portraying how inmates' sense of identity and their capacity for independent moral judgment erode, and how they experience a shrinkage of self that leads to crumbling defense mechanisms, feelings of inferiority and worthlessness, and potentially complete dehumanization. The authors also discuss the psychological warfare waged on individuals during tightly orchestrated "study" and "struggle sessions" demanding intense public contrition on the part of the "criminal," and aimed at ideological remolding, especially during the Mao era. In her memoirs, Song Shan recalls that, accused of being a counterrevolutionary and refusing to confess, "all seventy-six times she was subjected to a struggle session in front of thousands of people, the format of the event was exactly the same" (115). Chapter 4 inventories widespread, hair-raising torture methods, some with premodern precursors. It also probes the sinister correlation of the medical needs of high-powered and/or well-paying individuals outside the camps, on the one hand, and luxurious death row diets, medically overseen execution procedures and organ harvesting, on the other.

Two typical Williams and Wu subsections are those on the isolation cell and on prison argot. The authors' meticulous coverage of their primary and secondary material is manifest in the levelheaded observation that to some of the prison writers whose work they have studied, for all the cruelty of the isolation cell and its abuses, the pressures of "normal" interrogation and torture and of overcrowded barracks featuring cadre violence by proxy through "activist" prisoners, have made the isolation cell feel like a place of refuge. As for prison argot, Williams and Wu's discussion highlights their ambition to lay out the various dimensions of prison camp life, including subcultures such as that apparent in lexical items that constitute a distinct prison lingo, ranging from the grim and tired to the ironic and the humorous. Here, again, they question "[Martin King] Whyte's almost Foucauldian claim of PRC prisoners' total dominance by the official prison culture" (118).

If in chapters 3 and 4, Williams and Wu make extensive reference to fiction and reportage, these texts play an ancillary role, as a particular perspective on the PRC prison camps whose cultural foundations and history are reviewed in chapters 1 and 2. This is visible in the subtitle of their project: The Chinese Prison Camp through Contemporary Fiction and Reportage—not, for instance, Contemporary Chinese Fiction and Reportage on Prison Camps. In chapter 5, "Prison Writings," however, the (literary) texts take center stage, with key sections on the categorization of prison writings, on ex-inmates motivations for writing, and on structural features of "prison wall fiction." The great majority of PRC prison camp writings have appeared in the post-Mao period, starting with a 1979 short story by Cong Weixi that counts as a literary-historical milestone. Prior to that time, censorship and well-known sanctions for those who questioned the legitimacy of the CCP's dictatorship ensured that injustice and cruelty as products or indeed endemic traits of prisons and prison camps were off limits in public discourse. While the publication of prison writings is thus a fairly recent phenomenon, many are memoirs that go back to the early decades of the PRC.

Williams and Wu divide prison writings employed in The Great Wall of Confinement into four categories, with fictionality and personal experience of imprisonment as their criteria:
PRISON WRITINGS
non-fictional
fictional


author has personal experience of imprisonment

ONE
e.g. Wei Jingsheng, Wei Jingsheng's Prison Letters (Wei Jingsheng yuzhong shuxin ji)

THREE
e.g. Cong Weixi, "Reddish Magnolia Blossoms beneath the Prison Wall" (Daqiang xia de hong yulan)


author has no such experience, or focuses on the experience of others

TWO
e.g. Wang Anyi and Zong Fuxian, "Six Days on Maple Ridge: A Record of Interviews at the Baimaoling Reeducation-through-Labor Brigades for Women" (Fengshuling liu ri—Baimaoling nü laojiaodui caifang jishi)

FOUR
e.g. Bei Dao, "The Homecoming Stranger" (Guilai de mosheng ren)


Chapter 5 functions as a reference text for the above matrix, in that for each category, it recapitulates which authors have featured in Williams and Wu's research. The authors explain that to them, categories one and three carry special weight:
Some of [the authors] spent as long as two decades in the camps . . . While exceptions exist, the first type, non-fiction, is perhaps the most authentic and authoritative in its firsthand description of prison camp regimens and subcultures. Fiction by former prisoners presents a simulation of prison camp life that encourages readers to imagine how they themselves might react to the quandaries the various protagonists face. Though based to some extent on the authors' personal experiences and other related events in prison camps, their shaping of the subject matter to fit literary conventions and achieve literary effects can dilute the testimonial or historical value of the work. (157)

First, there is no reason why non -fiction by former prisoners could not equally stimulate, or shock, the reader into empathy. One need only think of Harry Wu's Bitter Winds: A Memoir of My Years in China's Gulag (1994, with Carolyn Wakeman), or of Wei Jingsheng's The Courage to Stand Alone (1997, edited and translated by Kristina Torgeson, with essays by Andrew Nathan, Liu Qing, and Sophia Woodman). Second, the historical "reliability" of either fiction or non-fiction—and, in the bigger picture, of memory and representation, especially for texts that are traumatic in one way or another—is more complicated than the above passage suggests. Williams and Wu's awareness of the fallibility of human consciousness and their convincing appeal to intersubjectivity, cited earlier, do not change that. Third, their categorization raises perennial questions about the boundaries of the text. Where do we draw them? Is the author inside them, or outside? What, if anything, do we need, or want, or hate to know about the author's life when we assess their writings? In all, however, within the overall set-up of their book—that is, with (literary) texts in the said ancillary role—the authors' privileging of types one and three is understandable.

Throughout the book, the notion of "prison wall literature" occurs several times (84-85, 155-156, 173). The original is daqiang wenxue, also rendered by Williams and Wu as "'towering wall literature' set amidst the imposing walls and guard towers of the prison camps" (Jeffrey Kinkley translates daqiang literally, as "big wall ," with reference to the American expression "the big house," in his Chinese Justice, the Fiction: Law and Literature in Modern China [2000]). It is, however, not clear whether—according to domestic convention in the PRC, or to Williams and Wu's interpretation—"prison wall literature" is roughly synonymous with the variegated "prison writings" discussed in their book, or whether it only applies to type three, above. When they explain their categorization (156), Williams and Wu's analogy with "wound literature" (shanghen wenxue, aka "scar literature" and "literature of the wounded," addressing the terror of the Cultural Revolution), suggests that "prison wall literature" should only apply to type three, that is
fiction by former prison inmates. While necessarily imaginative . . . it is often semi-autobiographical or semibiographical in nature, depending on whether the author draws more on personal experience or the recounted recollections of fellow inmates in creating a given literary narrative. (156)

Setting fictionality as a condition for (prison-wall) literary status is a contestable theoretical position, especially in Chinese cultural contexts, both traditional and modern. Note, for instance, the traditional regard for historical authenticity in "high" and hence inherently non-fictional literature—even if this involves notions of history and fictionality that are anything but straightforward—and the modern, non-fictional texts designated as "reportage literature " (baogao wenxue) and "documentary literature " (jishi wenxue). If on top of the fictionality of their writings the author must have had personal experience of imprisonment in order for their work to count as (prison wall) literature, that would seem to be an unnecessary limitation of the term's scope. Then again, a prominent feature of the said Chinese cultural contexts is the emphatic presence of the author's biography, or, more precisely, the widely assumed justification of biographical readings. But before complicating the matter any further, we should note that, later on in chapter 5 (173ff), "prison wall fiction" appears to be a subset of a "prison wall literature" that might encompass all four text types after all—which would be a sensible use of the terminology. In all, this confusion does not substantially affect Williams and Wu's analysis, and the inclusive and exclusive positions are both in themselves defensible. This, however, would have required clarification of the authors' definition of literature.

Williams and Wu cite the following as central among ex-inmates' motivations for writing:

[....their feeling of being] duty-bound to preserve the memory and succor the relatives of those wronged inmates who died or otherwise disappeared in the camps . . . [the wish] to shed light on the shadowy laogai system, [which is] considerably more poorly understood internationally than either the former Soviet gulag or Hitler's concentration camps . . . [the wish] to illustrate how educated and law-abiding citizens could easily become snagged and engulfed in the PRC regime's prison machinery . . . [the wish] to reveal their understanding of what lay below the idealistic veneer of platitudes about remolding and 'study' sessions—especially the arbitrariness, callousness and deception that were built into the camp system. (159)

The discussion of ex-inmates' motivations for writing naturally extends to their thematics: moral issues, sociopolitical and ethical aspects of confinement (rather than the possible religious significance of their suffering), moral issues, the imperative of bearing witness to injustice; the disintegration of families and social networks, physical and mental atrocities experienced in the camps, and so on.

Williams and Wu highlight structural features of prison wall fiction in case studies of Cong Weixi and Zhang Xianliang, the two most prominent authors of texts that belong to type three, above, which also features Liu Binyan, equally famous for his non-fictional writings. They dwell in considerable detail on mechanisms of interweaving and alternation in such fiction of present and past, and of result or current state (present) and cause (past). This begs the question whether this is really a distinguishing feature of Chinese prison wall fiction—or, the other way around, whether this particular set of texts is perhaps fruitfully viewed as part of a larger body of non-linear narratives past and present, from China and elsewhere: testimonial, traumatic, documentary, imaginative or otherwise. Judging by their command of texts of varying cultural and linguistic provenance, and by the way they mobilize them for contextualization, Williams and Wu's reflections on Chinese prison wall fiction must doubtless count as a contribution to an internationally oriented discourse that transcends the scope of either Chineseness or fiction.

In their conclusion, Williams and Wu question a one-sided, domestic discourse of Chinese victimization at the hands of foreign powers, and remind the reader that—as is true for most nations—many of modern China's worst scourges have been largely self-inflicted. It remains complicated, of course, to determine what sort of "self" is the inflictor. At any rate, the authors are less than optimistic about political change—democratization, the rule of law—as an inevitable consequence of economic and social change in recent decades, and observe that while certain aspects of the PRC prison (camp) system may have improved, the current situation is still cause for the gravest concern, hardly allayed by de-ideologization in the Deng-Jiang era. They note "the yawning gap between the high-sounding theory of labor camp manuals for cadres and the actual treatment of PRC prisoners," and rightly claim that their "critical use of prison memoirs and fiction set in labor camps brings a human face back into discussions that have sometimes gotten bogged down in dry statistics and uncritically received bureaucratic formulations" (193). Crucially, while they do not eschew the occasional cultural generalization in the main text of their book, the conclusion steers clear of any cultural essentialism or unilateral West-to-East moralizing. Williams and Wu hold that "a PRC government sincerely bent on preventing future miscarriages of justice would discard the obscurantist myth of 'Asian values' and incorporate a great many of the procedural safeguards and principles of judicial independence that already exist in neighboring powers ranging from New Delhi to Tokyo" (195).

The Great Wall of Confinement is a thoroughly researched, analytically forceful work of clear structure and style. It is suitable for an audience ranging from undergraduate students to senior researchers of various disciplinary orientations, in Chinese Studies and elsewhere (history, political science, sociology, literature). It combines the strengths of regional expertise and multidisciplinary theory, with the depth of local analysis matched by the breadth of global contextualization. In the study of Chinese literature, it has interfaces with scholarship on politics and literature, dissent and literature, violence and literature, reportage and more. A kindred work that immediately comes to mind is Jeffrey Kinkley's aforesaid monograph. Differences with The Great Wall of Confinement include the fascinating fact that Kinkley's subject matter—crime / law / justice and literature, with much attention to post-Mao "legal system literature" (fazhi wenxue) or 'crime fiction'—highlights how the police have been actively involved in the production and promotion of crime fiction in the contemporary PRC. (By analogy, one might wonder whether this also holds for PRC prison authorities, but it appears that they are not involved in the production and promotion of prison writings.) More fundamentally, in the case of law and literature, there is much more of what Kinkley calls "interpenetration" (159) of the twain than for prison camps and writing. Accordingly, Kinkley's book is about law and about literature throughout, and as such more balanced than Williams and Wu's. Indeed, as the authors themselves note in the introduction, chapters 1-4 of The Great Wall of Confinement , on the one hand, and chapter 5, on the other, are very different things. The realization of the book's multi-disciplinary ambitions is thus somewhat unbalanced, but still represents added value.

If literature primarily features in a documentary role, even in the most literary chapter, this does not detract from the significance of The Great Wall of Confinement , to specialists of literature as well as to other readers. A perceived lack of tangible social "relevance" is never something to hold against a literary text deserving of that epithet by virtue of its aesthetics (and, to be sure, relevance and aesthetic achievement are not mutually exclusive). Yet, conversely, the referential function of the subject matter of this book—to a reality that is so painfully relevant as to bear no inverted commas—quite simply adds to its importance. As such, in conjunction with its primary aim of shedding light on the Chinese prison camp system, The Great Wall of Confinement is a vindication of the documentary value of literature, as one of the powers of writing.


Beijing's Red August in 1966

, ,

Beijing’s Bloody August
By Geremie R. Barmé
Copyright © Geremie R. Barmé

This August is the 40th anniversary of the start of Cultural Revolution. Below are two first person accounts beginning of the decade of chaos, translated and with an introduction by Geremie R. Barmé, published here with his permission.PDF version of the text
Recently, I was commissioned to review Mao’s Last Revolution, a co-authored work by Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals (Belknap Press, 2006). It is a weighty tome on the history of the Cultural Revolution, and the opening paragraphs of my review read:

‘On 18 August 1966, Mao Zedong reviewed a mass gathering of zealous young people in Tiananmen Square. At the last moment he donned a PLA uniform and, although it didn’t quite fit his bulky frame, it marked both to his audience of over a million Red Guards, and to his colleagues standing on the rostrum with him, that the old guerilla leader was launching a new campaign. It would become a war of all against all, a civil conflict unlike any other that China had experienced.

‘In Chinese, August 1966 is known as ‘Red August’, hong bayue. For the supporters of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, red symbolized revolution and the revitalization of the ardour for uncompromising and radical change. Their battle cry was “to rebel is justified”. For those who were the victims of the opening salvos of this political movement, however, those harrowing summer weeks of verbal abuse, ransacking and murder were “bloody August”, a prelude to the long years of confusion and devastation that were to follow.’


The review ends with a quotation from a former Red Guard on the subject of the slogan ‘to rebel is justified’ (zaofan you li). I took the quote from an oral history interview conducted by the writer Sang Ye and published in his book 1949, 1989, 1999 (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1999). Much of that book, translated and edited, recently appeared in English under the title China Candid: the people on the People’s Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, , available on Amazon.com)). Unfortunately, due to the length of the manuscript I was obliged to edit the original down, and roughly a third of Sang Ye’s interview material was not included in the published English book.

The following two contrastive interviews with former Red Guards were not included in the English-language version of Sang Ye’s book. Given the fact that it is forty years since the ‘Red August’ of 1966, it would seem timely to make them available to interested readers. The translations and notes are mine, although I would acknowledge the editorial contribution of Miriam Lang.

I

He had been a founding Red Guard at Tsinghua University Middle School. Later he would become an executive working in the Shenzhen office of a multinational company. She (her interjections are marked by parentheses) was a university lecturer in Chinese. —Sang Ye

We were both in our mid teens when the Cultural Revolution was launched. We were extremely idealistic about the future of China and the fate of humanity. Don't forget, we were born the same year that the People's Republic was founded and grew up with the party’s education. It was an education that left an indelible mark on the way we think. We were as young as New China. Just like China after entering the phase of socialist construction, we experienced a period of great idealism too; we too followed a tortuous path, and each twist and turn has left its mark on us.

Take the years after 1957, for example. The party's policies started deviating from the correct course, especially when an emphasis was placed on class contradictions and struggle. Because the party had evolved in an environment of extreme class antagonism there was a great sensitivity to the issue of class. Add to that the fact that there were severe differences of opinion between the established socialist countries like the Soviet Union and the newly-socialist nations like China on how revolution was to continue under the conditions of socialism, and what was to become of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our party placed a particular emphasis on class contradictions and struggle. So the concept of never forgetting class struggle had a profound impact on us.

It was in this kind of environment that after 1964 both the leadership and the students in our school—that is Tsinghua University Middle School—were tirelessly discussing class struggle. When the Cultural Revolution began there was a widespread awareness that we couldn't take anything for granted, despite the fact that the proletariat was ostensibly in political control. There was a general sense of political crisis and now it had reached explosion point.

We wanted our party to be more pure so that it could avoid the pitfalls of the Soviet revisionists. That was the innocent and naïve motivation behind our involvement in the Cultural Revolution. From the very outset we showed ourselves more willing and able than others to respond to Chairman Mao and the party's various appeals. The leadership at all levels saw things differently from us and the older cadres disagreed with the way the masses were being incited to carry out the Cultural Revolution; they felt this mass movement was a betrayal of the party's traditions. They couldn't understand why the masses were being incited to oppose the leadership rather than relying on the democratic mechanisms within the party, that is allowing the party leaders to decide everything and be done with it. We, on the other hand, felt as though a new age was dawning; it was very exciting and the revolutionary situation was excellent. At the start of the Cultural Revolution all the students at my school influenced each other, or rather infected each other, forged connections; and in our enthusiasm we set up the Red Guards.

Honestly, there was nobody else behind it. The idea didn't come from an older cadre or a high-level official; it was entirely our own doing.

(The notion that some high-level cadre told us to set up the movement is just a myth. Like so many things said about those days, it has no basis in fact. Even some so-called Cultural Revolution specialists still claim that the Red Guards were established at the behest of Chairman Mao or Jiang Qing. There's even one school of thought that identifies Wang Renzhong as the central party leader behind it. That just isn't true. Having said this, it is a fact that after the Red Guards were established various people got involved and exploited the movement for their own ends. But that's another story.)

I'd like to say a few words about our school and the kind of environment in which we were living and studying. From this it will be evident why the Red Guard movement appeared there. Our school emphasized the overall development of the individual—moral, intellectual and physical. Added to that was that fact that from 1960 enrollment was opened to students from any school in the city. In other words, only the crème de la crème were chosen. The school was a long way from the city center so everyone boarded there, including first-year students. That meant that people in the same class did everything together, studying, eating and sleeping. They were in constant contact with each other. Tsinghua and Peking Universities were nearby, and so was No. 101 Middle School. So there was a lot of contact between students at all of these schools.

(No. 101 was a school that had started out as a Communist Party kindergarten established in Yan'an. From the 1940s it was a ‘horse-back cradle’ for the revolutionary successors of the party. The children of Chairman Mao and many important central party leaders were sent there; some of them were still there right up to the time of the Cultural Revolution.1 The entrance exam standards were also very high.)

That's one aspect of the situation. Another was that the school leadership at that time included people who believed in educational reform, and they wanted their students to excel in every aspect of their activities. They favored a heuristic method of education, 2 and they encouraged students to discuss and debate issues amongst themselves and also to take part in various extramural activities. So the atmosphere was extremely lively; it wasn't just a bunch of people with their heads stuck in books. Frankly, if you got into Tsinghua Middle School that pretty much meant that you were on your way to university.

(Later on, as part of an experiment in educational reform, they set up preparatory classes for college. They wanted to give people a specialized training so they'd be ready for university. Those preparatory classes became a breeding ground for future Red Guard leaders.)

And that brings us to the third characteristic of our school: the class background of the students. Because they got in on the basis of exam results and they had to be good all-rounders; that meant that a lot of people had been student cadres in their old schools. As a result they had already developed their own ideas about things and were confident about expressing them. This made the school environment even livelier. Equally important was the fact that there was also a relatively large percentage of children from intellectual and cadre families. That's because they grew up in a positive social environment and had a strong educational atmosphere at home.

(However, our school was not a school for high-level cadre kids. It was definitely not a Chinese version of the elitist schools they had in Japan that allowed commoners to compete in the entrance exams but would accept all the children of the nobility. At that time in China people were very unhappy about the fact that cadres’ children tended to be concentrated in particular schools—but those had a different system for recruiting students from the one ours did. But since ours wasn't an ordinary high school—we ate and lived there, and we had lots of extramural activities—that meant families had to spend more on their children's education. That was inevitable.)

Given such an environment it was only natural that our students would be particularly idealistic. Generally speaking, we felt obliged to show an interest in the affairs of the nation and politics, and we believed we should be concerned for its future, or rather that we should feel a sense of responsibility for it.

We all got involved in heated discussions from the time of the publication of ‘A Critique of the Newly-written Historical Play The Dismissal of Hai Rui’ in November 1965, 3 right up to the denunciation of the ‘Three-Family Village’ in March-April the following year. 4 The general consensus was that the issues involved were more than just academic, and that this was more than a series of denunciations of bourgeois ideology within the cultural sphere. We were convinced that they were questions of major importance for the political fate of the nation; they touched on issues of crucial significance for the political life of people throughout China.

(At the time this view was diametrically opposite to that of our school leadership and the Beijing Municipal Committee—and even of Party Central itself, that is Liu Shaoqi's headquarters. All of them emphatically claimed that these were academic debates that should not be crudely simplified or turned into a metaphysical discussion. They warned against deviating from the matter at hand and extending the terms of reference of the discussions. To this day I'm still not sure whether or not they realized that this ‘academic debate’ was setting the stage for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. But to be honest, at the time I never thought the movement would become so frenetic, or have such a massive impact on China and the rest of the world—and transform the lives of a whole generation.)

Anyway, given these sentiments some of us felt that the party leadership at school was incapable of keeping up with the unfolding situation. They were too rightwing, too soft. So the students voiced their criticisms and the authorities responded by drawing on the experiences they'd had during the Anti-Rightist Movement of 1957 [when criticisms of the party leadership had led to a wide-ranging purge]. They decided that students would not be permitted to criticize the party leadership at will, and they took the kind of action that had worked in the past. Initially, they cautioned us. ‘What you're doing is very dangerous’, they said. ‘You should be mindful of the lessons of history. During the struggle against the rightists in 1957 many students had expressed their dissatisfaction with the party and its work. As things turned out, however, people who had voiced their criticisms ended up being classified as rightists themselves.’

Their cajoling only served to make the situation more explosive. We were confident that truth was on our side, and nothing could scare us off. We searched through party journals and newspapers, as well as other propaganda materials, for ideas that could support our stance. The general tenor of propaganda at the time just happened to be in line with our position. People's Daily and Red Flag were putting out articles almost every day with big bold headlines that read ‘Never Forget Class Struggle’. You can easily imagine what was in them. Of course, we drew support from them and we believed that our struggle with the school leadership was following the general pattern of contradictions [as outlined by Chairman Mao], and would inevitably end in victory for us. So from the very outset we spontaneously developed links between students in different grades who felt the same, so we could act together.

A significant day in the history of these events was 29 May 1966. On that day a number of key activists in both the senior and junior sections of our high school got together to discuss the situation and our strategy to deal with it. Our school was next to the Yuanming Yuan [the Garden of Perfect Brightness], 5 and we often used to go there after class had finished. We'd wander around there and talk about anything we needed to discuss, or just chat together. We had our meeting there on 29 May, so it came to be known as the Yuanming Yuan Meeting. The date became known as the day on which the Red Guards were founded.

Up until 29 May no big-character posters had appeared in our school. 6 Some students in the junior years had suggested posting attacks on the school authorities, and we had debated the issue but decided against it. At the time I had argued that a poster campaign was not the best strategy at this juncture. On the night of 1 June, in response to an instruction from Chairman Mao, Central People's Radio had broadcast the big-character poster written by people at Peking University who had rebelled against their Party Committee. The broadcast gave full support to the poster, which Chairman Mao praised as ‘the first Marxist-Leninist big-character poster to appear in China.’ 7 This development had an extraordinary impact on me. Now I was convinced that our rebellion was an inevitable expression of the contradictions between the students and the party committee. Things were clearly developing faster and in a more positive direction than any of us could have expected. Our immediate response was to put up our own big-character poster and to adopt formally the name [Chairman Mao's] Red Guards.

Here I must emphasize the fact that, although we decided on the name Red Guards that day, the expression had been around for some time. During the denunciations of the ‘Three-Family Village’ in March and April, we had all put up a series of mini-posters which we signed in a lot of different ways. One of our group, a student by the name of Zhang Chengzhi, put up a mini-poster and signed it ‘A Red Guard’. 8 At the time he explained to us what he meant by this name and I thought it was perfectly suited to our situation. Although there were a lot of other names current among the students—things like ‘Red Descendants’ and ‘Soldiers for the Annihilation of the Bourgeoisie’, and so on and so forth—‘Red Guard’ was the best. So from that time we generally agreed that all like-minded students, that is people who were critical of the school leadership, should use ‘Red Guard’ to sign their mini-posters, followed by their real name. Thus, ‘Red Guard Zhang Chengzhi’, or ‘Red Guard Pu Dahua’. Although we'd all agreed on it we didn't actually use the term all that much, in particular because we were already losing interest in writing mini-posters, and we didn't really have any other opportunities to use the name.

When we put up our own big-character poster on 2 June, it was a perfect opportunity to use it. We signed the poster ‘Red Guards’ and then added our real names. After it went up people who agreed with our views also signed their names on it. Soon the poster had the signatures of over one hundred Red Guards.

As for the contents of the poster, there really wasn't very much to it. Basically, we stated our position and announced that our basic principle was that we would do whatever Chairman Mao and Party Central called upon us to do, and that we would enthusiastically participate in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution.

Our views were well known within the school and had been at the center of controversy for some time. The leadership had even held a special meeting to discuss us. So by this stage it was completely obvious what we really thought and what our intentions were. Naturally, that meant that anyone who signed our poster was critical of the school leadership and of some actions by some party organizations. Those who weren't didn't sign. Some of them were strongly opposed to our point of view—real hardcore opposition—and they put up their own big-character posters attacking us. They were pretty cutting, things like, ‘We are more than aware of what type of people you are and what you are really up to. You have been secretly engaged in underground activities for ages, hatching furtive plots and plans. You Red Guards are wildly ambitious and your real aim is to overthrow the party committee’, and so on and so forth.

(One of the things these people said left a deep impression on me. It was: ‘You have repeatedly claimed that there is an ever-present danger that the bourgeoisie will stage a comeback in China. You're absolutely correct, and you people are the cause of the danger’.)

Of course we tried to explain ourselves and present our own point of view.

(We tried to explain that our sole desire was to protect Chairman Mao with our lives, oppose and prevent revisionism, and persevere with the revolution. We said that we would fight anyone at all who diverged from the proletarian revolutionary line. We were prepared to take on anyone and everyone who was opposed to Chairman Mao. We were determined ‘to overcome all obstacles and stop only when world revolution was victorious.’ We were extremely confident; we felt as though we could somehow determine the fate of the nation. The things we wrote at the time were pretty histrionic.)

As things developed the debates became more heated and we even started doing things like putting crosses through the names of our opponents on the posters. That's when outsiders who supported us, for example, students from Peking University High School and No. 101, decided to come to our campus as a gesture of solidarity. At first the school authorities locked the school gates to prevent them from coming in, but that only served to stir things up even more. Our supporters who had been locked out didn't leave; they stationed themselves outside the school and chanted: ‘We're Red Guards too! We're Red Guards too!’ Who would ever have thought that that was how the term ‘Red Guards’ started to circulate outside our school?

The story of the birth, evolution and eventual demise of the Red Guard movement is long and involved. After the term ‘Red Guard’ began its journey outside the school in June 1966, the leaders in charge of the day-to-day supervision of work in Party Central—in other words, Liu Shaoqi—sent out work teams to occupy the school and suppress the movement. However, Chairman Mao personally wrote to us to express his warm support and to reiterate the principle that ‘revolution is not a crime; rebellion is justified.’ 9 In particular he emphasized that ‘rebelling against reactionaries is justified.’ Before long all kinds of Red Guard groups had been set up throughout China, and Red Guards moved out into the society at large to take part in the movement ‘to obliterate thoroughly and rebuild staunchly’ 10... ... and so on and so forth. That's about all I can really say about the early days of the Red Guard movement.

Everything is a process. As I said earlier, differences of opinion among ourselves eventually led to factional in-fighting. As the Cultural Revolution progressed all kinds of mass organizations called themselves Red Guards, while we, the original Red Guards, fragmented and regrouped. The situation in our school was the same as everywhere else: there was violence and conflict between the two main factions.

(Nowadays some people take the term ‘Red Guard’ to connote something very negative, as though Red Guards were all murderers, some kind of oriental fascists. That's obviously quite unfair. It's tragic both for us personally and for the Red Guard movement as a whole. I will admit that in the organizations that sprung up all over China calling themselves Red Guards there were hooligans, lunatics, ambitious schemers and plotters, and that they did a lot of bad things. I also concede that there were people in the old Red Guards—that is students at our school—who committed errors during the Cultural Revolution. Perhaps one could even call them crimes. I have to live with that fact. However, at the inception of the Cultural Revolution we, and our classmates, were true path-breakers. We were absolutely sincere in our devotion to the Communist Party, the nation and the people. We established the first group of Red Guards in China—in the world, for that matter—in good faith. Over a quarter of a century has passed, and from our present perspective it is irrelevant whether or not the founders of the Red Guards killed people, or smashed and looted and destroyed things. The heavy cross that we bear has been imposed upon us as a matter of political expediency, and we are carrying the weight of other criminals. It will be our burden forever. So, in retrospect what I have to affirm solemnly is that what I did in the spring of 1966 I did in good conscience and faith for the sake of the ideals I once held so dear.)

People like us—especially a person like me who made a bit of name for themselves in the early days of the Cultural Revolution and was later jailed—have weathered many of the vicissitudes of life. That period had a profound and long-lasting impact on us. If you ask me to consider the past and think about the future, then I can claim to speak on behalf of the majority of the old Red Guards when I say that we still care about the fate of our party and our nation, and still care about the grand enterprise of our people.

II

Another Red Guard from more humble origins eventually became the proprietor of a Beijing fashion boutique. —Sang Ye

I was in my third year of junior high school when the Cultural Revolution got going. It was No.27 High School, a real dump. I don't care what other people say about why they got involved; I know I became a Red Guard just for the hell of it, to have a chance to lash out and rebel. Up till then alley-kids like me were always treated like dirt. 11 But, fuck, when the Cultural Revolution came along, I was suddenly one of the five red categories, a child of the workers and peasants who had been oppressed by the revisionist line in education. Under revisionism I'd been forced to learn my lessons off by heart; ten long years and they still wouldn't let me pass. Now that I had the chance I was going to get out there and fuck with them, wasn't I?

I didn't even wait for old man Mao to review the first batch of Red Guards. I joined a Mao Zedong Thought Brigade set up in the Western City. Later on the Red Guards in the high schools fell into two factions. We were in the 4.3 faction. 12 They were all much the same thing; the manifestoes had lots of articles in them and no one could remember what they were. But one line that Chairman Mao had taught us summed it up for everybody: ‘In the final analysis, the innumerable truths of Marxism may be expressed in one sentence: “to rebel is justified”.’

I took part in pretty much all the big events: being reviewed by Grandad Mao in Tiananmen, destroying the four olds, the great link-ups, armed struggle: 13 anything that involved beating people up and smashing things and taking stuff. Man, it was fantastic! Me and my buddies got baseball bats and worked our way up the street from south to north. We must have busted every damn shop sign along Xidan. Just try doing that today! The cops'd be all over you after the first hit. But back then, they didn't dare. We were fuckin' Red Guards; we were destroying the four olds! Rebellion is justified! Breaking into the Nationalities Palace, putting the British Rep Office under siege, man I was there for all of it. How could you miss it? It was full on. Then the British place was torched. They never found the guy who lit the fire. If they could get their hands on him today he'd be finished. Burning up foreigners? Talk about big time! They'd execute the guy three times over. But back then foreigners weren't worth a hair on your dick; they were the object of revolution.

I wasn't all that involved with beating people up; too late to be in on that really. The first time was in August, a good two months later than most. By then beating people to death wasn't really what people were doing any more. I remember it really clearly because it was the first day Chairman Mao reviewed the Red Guards at Tiananmen. 18 August. I was unlucky, though; I didn't get to catch a glimpse of him because I was too well behaved. We were supposed to meet at our school first, so that's where I went. But our school was way over to the west of Tiananmen, and the Red Guard groups were all moving from east to west. They went past Tiananmen, and saw Mao, and then moved on towards Xidan in the west, and then they dispersed. There were marshals all over the place to stop people going back towards Tiananmen. So there's old Grandad Mao over in the square and there's me stuck in Xidan. I could see fuck all. All I could see was everyone really happy because they'd seen him. I was so pissed off. I'm a loser, too obedient, so I've always missed out.

Later I got to see him a few times but he was always so far away he didn't quite seem real. Seeing him in the Mausoleum is better. But at the time I was still incredibly excited. I'd seen the Red Commander-in-Chief and that was the only thing that mattered. No bullshit; how many people got to see Chairman Mao when he was alive? Heaps of people are still lining up to see his body now. I reckon they should set up a company and sell tickets, charge out-of-town people ten yuan a pop to see him. They say his kids don't have it so good nowadays. So maybe the Chairman should help them make a few bucks.

But that was a real bad day. That fucking shit of a class monitor came and put on this big act of reading the big-character posters. I couldn't stand her, so I went over and gave the cunt a few slaps around the face. After all, there she was, presenting herself to me on a platter. You could get away with beating up anyone, like it was for free, as long as they were class enemies. You could beat them to death and no one would care. She didn't have a fucking clue why I'd hit her, and she caved in immediately. ‘I'll confess, I'll confess. I'm guilty, I'm guilty. But it wasn't me who made you repeat a year; it was so and so. He didn't let you pass. It wasn't up to me.’ She was scared shitless, and started selling out other people just like that. Typical fucking intellectual. As soon as I hit her all these other people gathered round. Some of them hated her too, for other reasons, so they got stuck into her as well. We struggled her for a while before we let her go home.

Even now I don't feel bad about it. Big deal. That slut had treated me badly in the past, always punishing me, and making me stand for hours in detention. I still wouldn't apologize. She was over forty then, so I guess she'd be long gone by now. I was only doing my job. If she wants to pay me back she can complain to the manager, Chairman Mao. Anyway, I did my ten-year stint in the countryside after that. About the only thing I didn't experience was death. And, damn it, but those old poor peasants were mean bastards. They really fucked me over. I reckon ten years in the countryside evens the score.

Then came the revolutionary link-ups. What that meant was free travel. If you showed your Red Guard ID you could go on the train for free—anywhere you wanted, within China that is. But you couldn't really call it a free ride. It was standing room only—not even that—people got crushed to death. And nowhere you went was as good as Beijing. All those shit-holes everywhere else. Poor as dirt. It was a real eye-opener, though. I was a bit of an innocent then, and I didn't have much of a clue about anything. The first time I saw a real airplane was at a mass rally at the Capital Airport when they expelled the Soviet diplomats. It was mainly university students who were behind that; I just went along to get a look at the planes.

Society's never fair. Even in the chaos of the Cultural Revolution the Red Guards were divided into different classes. Look at the kids in ‘United Action’. They were from 1 August High School, all privileged kids; they wore real army uniforms; they had black leather shoes, all shining, that's if they weren't wearing snow white sandshoes. They all sped around on brand new ‘Forever’ brand pushbikes, too. When a pack of them went riding past it was like the Praetorian Guard. They really were in your face. They were all from high-level cadre families, or army brats. How could alley-scum like me compete with that? In the Cultural Revolution they were still the ruling class. Our rebellion was a joke; sure it felt good, but we were only the shit-kickers for those people. You've got to face the facts.

Who are ‘the people’ anyway? Morons like me: we're the people. The majority. The Cultural Revolution created chaos among the people; they let us fight it out amongst ourselves. Take that teacher I hit, for example, or a rightist, or some capitalist. In reality, they were all just common people. The peasants screwed me over for ten years, but in the end they're just like me, cannon fodder. Think back to when the Communists and Nationalists were fighting it out with each other. The ones who did all the fighting were the common people. Anyone with money and power never had to get their hands dirty. Sure the Communists eliminated eight million Nationalist bandits. Big fucking deal! Chiang Kai-shek got off scot-free; so did [his son] Chiang Ching-kuo. Who ended up dead? The people, that's who.

So if you ask me I reckon the Cultural Revolution was just a fucking sham. Old Mao was feeling a bit insecure up there in Party Central. He wanted to screw Liu Shaoqi, but Liu was no loser. So Mao got everyone fighting among themselves: students beating up teachers, workers beating up factory heads, party members beating up party secretaries. After that the students, workers and party members turned on each other. In the end, even old grannies and aunties were at each other's throats. The place turned into something out of the Three Kingdoms, with Liu Shaoqi stuck in the middle of it all. 14 Old man Mao was never afraid of chaos; he was a hero born of disorder. The only time he felt at peace was when all under heaven was in a state of chaos, and he was the only one who could stay on top of it all. Forget about Liu Shaoqi; even a dozen US presidents rolled into one couldn't have kept a lid on it. Just take a look at what the Chinese can get up to when they're aroused: no one would want to touch the place with a barge pole.

Of course, I didn't understand all of that at the time. But I reckon I still would have got into it even if I had. Look at me now. I started out with nothing and, fuck, here I am—a small capitalist, you might say. I've got myself a car and everything. And I reckon I'm shit-hot, too. But what about those people from ‘United Action’? Man, they've been driving around in Mercedes Benzes for years, and it has to be the right model and the right year, and they have to have a chauffeur! My hat's off to them, man. The country belongs to them. Their families founded New China—the generals, the government ministers, and now they're claiming their inheritance. I'm telling you, you just have to accept it. But I'm still pissed off as hell because it's so fucking unfair. If things go on like this it'll end up like the Manchu-Qing dynasty, won't it? 15

If you ask me to look back on it from my present perspective, I don't think it was all that different from today. If a time comes when rebellion is justified again, I might be too old to get involved but believe you me I'm going to encourage my son to get out there and fuck them over a bit.

You don't get anything if you don't rebel. You don't get anything if you do rebel either, but you've still got to do it whenever you get the chance. For us ordinary people that is the only truth we believe in.

Footnotes
1: No. 101 was next to the Yuanming Yuan, or Garden of Perfect Brightness, an extensive Manchu-era imperial garden palace that had lain in ruins since the 1860 sacking by Anglo-French forces. See below.
2: qifashi jiaoyu, as opposed to tianyashi jiaoxue, a 'duck-stuffing' or forced-feeding method of teaching.
3: Yao Wenyuan's denunciation of the historian and Beijing party bureaucrat Wu Han's play about the Jiajing emperor's dismissal of the upright late-Ming dynasty minister Hai Rui marked the public escalation of the secretive political maneuverings that would eventually turn into the Cultural Revolution. The play was construed as being a defence of Peng Dehuai, a prominent party leader who was dismissed from his post by Mao Zedong for his criticisms of the Great Leap Forward.
4: The 'Three-Family Village' refers to the three writers Wu Han, Deng Tuo and Liao Mosha and their supposedly anti-Maoist essays. Eventually, these essays, which appeared from late 1961 to mid 1964, were attacked for 'using history, general knowledge and popular topics as a screen, drawing on historical incidents to mock the present and making oblique attacks to launch a vicious and thorough-going attack on the great Communist Party.'
5: The Garden of Perfect Brightness was a Manchu-Qing palace garden used by the imperial family from the early-eighteenth century until its destruction in 1860 following the Arrow War at the hands of an Anglo-French military force. In the twentieth century the destruction of the gardens was regarded as being emblematic of the decline and national humiliation of China at the hands of the imperial powers.
6: The authors of big-character posters or dazibao used Chinese writing brushes and ink to write essays and denunciations on sheets of paper that were then pasted on walls. First popularized during the years 1957-58, big-character posters were an instant form of unofficial mass communication and protest used throughout the Cultural Revolution. They were banned by government order in the early 1980s.
7: The Peking University big-character poster was written by a group of teachers in the university Philosophy Department and it launched an attack on the party leaders led by Liu Shaoqi.
8: Zhang, a Hui-Muslim, would eventually become a noted novelist and essayist who kept faith with his Cultural Revolution-era ideas which became intertwined with various elements of Sino-Islamic thought from the 1980s. See, for example, Geremie R. Barmé, In the Red, on contemporary Chinese culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp.304-309.
9: geming wu zui,. zaofan you li, a quotation from Mao Zedong's letter to the Red Guards. The second part of the quote comes from Mao's ‘Speech at the Meeting Sponsored by All Circles in Yan'an to Celebrate the 60th Birthday of Stalin,’ in which he said, ‘In the final analysis, the innumerable truths of Marxism may be expressed in one sentence: “to rebel is justified”.’ Although broadcast on national radio and printed in the press, Mao’s ‘letter’ was never received by the Red Guards at Tsinghua Attached Middle School.
10: da po da li, that is to obliterate the old totally and to establish the new firmly.
11: In this context, alley-kids hutong chuanzi indicates young people who grew up in the older and poorer parts of Beijing and were regarded as being ill bred, uneducated and unemployable.
12: The '4.3 Faction' appeared in April 1967, named after a meeting on 3 April (literally the 4th month 3rd day, and thus 4.3), encouraged by the radical central party leaders as a force to counteract the 'old Red Guards.'
13: po sijiu, da chuanlian, wudou, the hallmarks of the Red Guard movement (1966-68).
14: A reference to the conflict between the kingdoms of Wei, Shu and Wu in the third century CE, and the machinations and betrayals that the contestation involved.
15: The corrupt and bureaucratically top-heavy Manchu-Qing dynasty collapsed in 1911 ushering in an era of revolution.


From Red Guard to Blue Chip: The Making of a Merchant Banker

,

Ying Fang's Career Spans Revolution to Evolution
by Terry Macalister and Luc Torres
The Guardian
September 6, 2006

A young girl who saw her Beijing family home ransacked by Red Guards and her father flung in jail during the Cultural Revolution might be expected to harbour bitter feelings about the 1960s.

But Ying Fang, who now heads a London investment bank, holds mixed views because she was also a Red Guard, fired up by the prospect of transforming society. "China had a very old, stiff class culture into which I was born, where you had to be tight-lipped always," she says. "Chairman Mao smashed that completely, destroying the hierarchy and making everything feel possible."

Whether the Great Helmsman would have been full of praise, or horrified, by the career trajectory of the energetic woman who is now the founder and chief executive of Evolution Securities China can only be guessed at.

Ms Fang herself is not particularly interested in exploring how one moves from 11-year-old firebrand to 52-year-old merchant banker, claiming she never delves into the past. "I have chosen not to look back. It's better to look forward," she says baldly, but later comments that she looks to the future rather than "collecting the tears" of a bygone era.

Pauper

China has dramatically moved forward, from agrarian pauper to industrial powerhouse, over those decades. But how many former Red Guards end up in offices overlooking the Bank of England and send their children to posh English public schools?

Ms Fang's innovative, if not revolutionary, duties now involve trying to help Chinese companies raise money in the west while carving out a good living for herself and her backers. "There are many banks such as Goldman Sachs and others present in China but very few of them are making money. It's easy to build a strategic presence but not to turn it into profit as we have done."

She has already helped bring four firms to the London stock market, has three more lined up to float this year and has double that number ready on the launch pad for next year.

The role of Evolution Securities China - 35% owned by Ms Fang and her colleagues and 65% by the Evolution brokerage - is to pick reliable and successful far east candidates and match them with the right investors. "There are huge cultural differences. Western due diligence doesn't work in China because the economics are very different. Many Chinese companies have traditionally judged their success only by whether they are making enough money to keep their staff employed.

"Things have changed over the last 10 years but still things like who gets government support and who pays taxes are vital to know," she says.

Ms Fang believes she is perfectly placed to do this, given her cross-cultural background coupled with in-depth knowledge of the Chinese business community and solid experience of western banking practices.

During the Cultural Revolution, Ms Fang was sent from the middle-class comforts of Beijing to the Communist Labour University in far-flung Jiangxi province, where she was confronted by rural poverty. That experience had the right impact, she believes, making her aware of how the other half lived. She returned with zeal to the capital where she worked for a government policy unit.

But her life began to change with the return to power of Deng Xiaoping, whose pragmatic approach involved encouraging the Communist Party elite to travel abroad for international experience. Ms Fang seized the chance to study economics at the State University of New York followed by a summer internship at the World Bank.

There she met the man who was to become her husband, Giles Chase, another financier, and transferred to the London School of Economics. This triggered a move to Britain. Charles Goodhart, her professor at the LSE, gave her a reference that helped win her a job as an economist at Barclays Bank.

She had several jobs with different institutions studying China but this was not a fashionable area in those days. "It is hard to remember that China was of little interest to the western business community. If you mentioned China, they thought you were talking about porcelain," she laughs.

Now that situation has changed dramatically, with almost every conversation on economics or commerce turning at some stage to China. Most of the interest has been around western firms selling raw materials to the world's most populous nation and buying cheap manufactured goods in return. Increasingly, Chinese firms want to expand and they want London money to help them do it.

Evolution Securities China was set up three years ago to bridge the funding gap and Ms Fang has brought a host of very different businesses to the City: from a citrus fruit grower, to a cement manufacturer and a bio-diesel maker.

In the pipeline are Chinese businesses involved in healthcare, education and security - all to be helped by the woman who has gone from revolutionary Red Guard to corporate white knight.

Leadership

Ms Fang believes there are business lessons to be learned from the way Mao built his cult leadership "brand", which is almost as omnipresent in China's present mixed economy as it was under doctrinaire communism. "What is phenomenal is that he united a whole nation - they all thought like he did. It was amazing the way he ensured that all messages went from the bottom to the top and vice-versa. A lot of management skills went into that," she argues.

Clearly, Ms Fang can square the circle. But what of her father, who had started work as a journalist on the only English-language paper in Shanghai before moving to Beijing? Happily he was released from jail and is now a professor of media at several top universities.

And what did her parents really think of her joining the Red Guards at 11? She won't really say: "Well, they had their own lives to worry about."


The May-16 Circular (516通知)

Circular of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution

May 16, 1966

[This circular was seen by mainstream chinese historians as the official document which triggered off the beginning of the ten-year turmoil]

To all regional bureaus of the Central Committee, all provincial, municipal and autonomous regional party committees, ail departments and commissions under the Central Committee, all leading party members' groups and party committees in government departments and people's organizations, and the General Political Department of the PLA:

The Central Committee has decided to revoke the 'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' which was approved for distribution on 12 February 1966, to dissolve the 'Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution' and its offices, and to set up a new Cultural Revolution group directly under the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. The outline report by the so-called 'Group of Five' is fundamentally wrong. It runs counter to the line of the socialist cultural revolution set forth by the Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung to the guiding principles formulated at the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the party in 1962 on the question of classes and class struggle in socialist society. While feigning compliance, the outline actually opposes and stubbornly resists the great Cultural Revolution initiated and led personally by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, as well as the instructions, regarding the criticism of Wu Han, which he gave at the work conference of the Central Committee held in September and October 1965 (that is, at the session of the Standing Committee attended also by the leading comrades of all the regional bureaux of the Central Committee).

The outline report by the so-called 'Group of Five' is actually an outline report by P'eng Chen alone. He concocted it according to his own ideas behind the backs of Comrade K'ang Sheng, a member of the 'Group of Five', and other comrades. In handling such a document regarding important questions which affect the overall situation in the socialist revolution, P'eng Chen had no discussion or exchange of views at all within the 'Group of Five'. He did not ask any local party committee for its opinion; nor, when submitting the outline report, did he make it clear that it was being sent to the Central Committee for examination as its official document, and still less did he get the approval of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee. Employing the most improper methods, he acted arbitrarily, abused his powers, and, usurping the name of the Central Committee, hurriedly issued the outline report to the whole party.

The main errors of the outline report are as follows:

1. Proceeding from a bourgeois stand and the bourgeois world outlook in its appraisal of the situation and the nature of the current academic criticism, the outline completely reverses the relation between the enemy and ourselves, putting the one into the position of the other. Our country is now in an upsurge of the great proletarian Cultural Revolution which is pounding at all the decadent ideological and cultural positions still held by the bourgeoisie and the remnants of feudalism. Instead of encouraging the entire party boldly to arouse the broad masses of workers, peasants, and soldiers, and the fighters for proletarian culture so that they can continue to charge ahead, the outline does its best to turn the movement to the right. Using muddled, self-contradictory, and hypocritical language, it obscures the sharp class struggle that is taking place on the cultural and ideological front. In particular, it obscures the aim of this great struggle, which is to criticize and repudiate Wu Han and the considerable number of other anti-party and anti-socialist representatives of the bourgeoisie (there are a number of these in the Central Committee and in the party, government, and other departments at the central as well as at the provincial, municipal, and autonomous region level). By avoiding any mention of the fact repeatedly pointed out by Chairman Mao, namely, that the key point in Wu Han's drama Hai Jui Dismissed from Office is the question of dismissal from office, the outline covers up the serious political nature of the struggle.

2. The outline violates the basic Marxist thesis that all class struggles are political struggles. When the press began to touch on the political issues involved in Wu Han's Hai Jui Dismissed from Office, the authors of the outline went so far as to say: "The discussion in the press should not be confined to political questions, but should go fully into the various academic and theoretical questions involved". Regarding the criticism of Wu Han, they declared on various occasions that it was impermissible to deal with the heart of the matter, namely, the dismissal of the right opportunists at the Lushan plenum in 1959 and the opposition of Wu Han and others to the party and socialism. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has often told us that the ideological struggle against the bourgeoisie is a protracted class struggle which cannot be resolved by drawing hasty political conclusions. However, P'eng Chen deliberately spread rumours, telling many people that Chairman Mao believed political conclusions on the criticism of Wu Han could be drawn after two months. P'eng Chen also said that the political issues could be discussed two months later. His purpose was to channel the political struggle in the cultural sphere into the so-called pure academic discussion so frequently advocated by the bourgeois politics and opposing giving prominence to proletarian politics.

3. The outline lays special emphasis on what it calls 'opening wide'. But playing a sly trick it grossly distorts the policy of 'opening wide' expounded by Comrade Mao Tse-tung at the party's National Conference on Propaganda Work in March 1957 and negates the class content of 'opening wide'. It was in dealing with this question that Comrade Mao Tse-tung pointed out: 'We still have to wage a protracted struggle against bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideology. It is wrong not to understand this and to give up ideological struggle. All erroneous ideas, all poisonous weeds, all ghosts and monsters, must be subjected to criticism; in no circumstance should they be allowed to spread unchecked.' Comrade Mao Tse-tung also said, 'To "open wide" means to let all people express their opinions freely, so that they dare to speak, dare to criticize, and dare to debate.' This outline, however, poses 'opening wide' against exposure by the proletariat of the bourgeoisie's reactionary stand. What it means by 'opening wide' is bourgeois liberalization, which would allow only the bourgeoisie to 'open wide', but would not allow the proletariat to 'open wide' and hit back; in other words, it is a shield for such reactionary bourgeois representatives as Wu Han. The 'opening wide' in this outline is against Mao Tse-tung's thought and caters for the needs of the bourgeoisie.

4. Just when we began the counter-offensive against the wild attacks of the bourgeoisie, the authors of the outline raised the slogan: 'everyone is equal before the truth'. This is a bourgeois slogan. Completely negating the class nature of truth, they use this slogan to protect the bourgeoisie and oppose the proletariat, oppose Marxism-Leninism, and oppose Mao Tse-tung's thought. In the struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, between the truth of Marxism and the fallacies of the bourgeoisie and all other exploiting classes, either the East wind prevails over the West wind or the West wind prevails over the East wind, and there is absolutely no such thing as equality. Can any equality be permitted on such basic questions as the struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the dictatorship of the proletariat in the superstructure, including all the various spheres of culture, and the continued efforts of the proletariat to weed out those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the communist party and who wave 'red flags' to oppose the red flag? For decades the old-line Social Democrats, and for over ten years the modern revisionists, have never allowed the proletariat equality with the bourgeoisie. They completely deny that the several thousand years of human history is a history of class struggle. They completely deny the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolution against the bourgeoisie, and the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, they are faithful lackeys of the bourgeoisie and imperialism. Together with the bourgeoisie and imperialism, they cling to the bourgeois ideology of oppression and exploitation of the proletariat and to the capitalist system, and they oppose Marxist-Leninist ideology and the socialist system. They are a bunch of counter-revolutionaries opposing the communist party and the people. Their struggle against us is one of life and death, and there is no question of equality. Therefore, our struggle against them, too, can be nothing but a life-and-death struggle, and our relation with them can in no way be one of equality. On the contrary, it is a relation of one class oppressing another, that is, the dictatorship of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie. There can be no other type of relation, such as a so called relation of equality, or of peaceful coexistence between exploiting and exploited classes, or of kindness or magnanimity.

5. The outline states: 'It is necessary not only to beat the other side politically, but also, by academic and professional standards, truly surpass and beat it by a wide margin.' This concept which makes no class distinction on academic matters is also very wrong. The truth on academic questions, the truth of Marxism-Leninism, of Mao Tse-tung's thought — which the proletariat has grasped — has already far surpassed and beaten the bourgeoisie. The formulation in the outline shows that its authors laud the so-called academic authorities of the bourgeoisie and try to boost their prestige, and that they hate and repress the militant newborn forces representative of the proletariat in academic circles.

6. Chairman Mao often says that there is no construction without destruction. Destruction means criticism and repudiation; it means revolution. It involves reasoning things out, which is construction. Put destruction first, and in the process you have construction. Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, was founded and has constantly developed in the course of the struggle to destroy bourgeois ideology. This outline, however, emphasizes that 'without construction, there can be no real and thorough destruction'. This amounts to prohibiting the destruction of bourgeois ideology and prohibiting the construction of proletarian ideology. It is diametrically opposed to Chairman Mao's thought. It runs counter to the revolutionary struggle we have been waging on the cultural front for the vigorous destruction of bourgeois ideology. And it amounts to prohibiting the proletariat from making any revolution.

7. The outline states that 'we must not behave like scholar-tyrants who are always acting arbitrarily and trying to overwhelm people with their power' and that 'we should guard against any tendency for academic workers of the left to take the road of bourgeois experts and scholar-tyrants'. What is really meant by 'scholar-tyrants'? Who are the 'scholar-tyrants'? Should the proletariat not exercise dictatorship and overwhelm the bourgeoisie? Should the academic work of the proletariat not overwhelm and eradicate that of the bourgeoisie? And if proletarian academic work overwhelms and eradicates bourgeois academic work, can this be regarded as an act of 'scholar-tyrants'? The outline directs its spearhead against the proletarian left. Obviously, its aim is to label the Marxist-Leninists 'scholar-tyrants' and thus to support the real, bourgeois scholar-tyrants and prop up their tottering monopoly position in academic circles. As a matter of fact, those party people in authority taking the capitalist road who support the bourgeois scholar-tyrants, and those bourgeois representatives who have sneaked into the party and protect the bourgeois scholar-tyrants, are indeed big party tyrants who have usurped the name of the party, have no contact with the masses, have no learning at all, and rely solely on 'acting arbitrarily and trying to overwhelm people with their power'.

8. For their own ulterior purposes, the authors of the outline demand a 'rectification campaign' against the staunch left in a deliberate effort to create confusion, blur class alignments and divert people from the target of struggle. Their main purpose in dishing up the outline in such a hurry was to attack the proletarian left. They have gone out of their way to build up dossiers about the left, tried to find all sorts of pretexts for attacking them, and intended to launch further attacks on them by means of a 'rectification campaign,' in the vain hope of disintegrating their ranks. They openly resist the policy explicitly put forward by Chairman Mao of protecting and supporting the left and giving serious attention to building up and expanding their ranks. On the other hand, they have conferred on those bourgeois representatives, revisionists, and renegades who have sneaked into the party the title of 'staunch left', and are shielding them. In these ways, they are trying to inflate the arrogance of the bourgeois rightists and to dampen the spirits of the proletarian left. They are filled with hatred for the proletariat and love for the bourgeoisie. Such is the bourgeois concept of brotherhood held by the authors of the outline.

9. At a time when the new and fierce struggle of the proletariat against the representatives of the bourgeoisie on the ideological front has only just began, and in many spheres and places has not even started — or, if it has started, most party committees concerned have a very poor understanding of the task of leadership in this great struggle and their leadership is far from conscientious and effective — the outline stresses again and again that the struggle must be conducted 'under direction', 'with prudence', 'with caution', and 'with the approval of the leading bodies concerned'. All this serves to place restrictions on the proletarian left, to impose taboos and commandments in order to tie their hands, and to place all sorts of obstacles in the way of the proletarian cultural revolution. In a word, the authors of the outline are rushing to apply the brakes and launch a counter-attack in revenge. As for the articles written by the proletarian left refuting the reactionary bourgeois 'authorities', they nurse bitter hatred against those already published and are suppressing those not yet published. But on the other hand, they give free rein to all the various ghosts and monsters who for many years have abounded in our press, radio, magazines, books, text-book, platforms, works of literature, cinema, drama, ballads and stories, the fine arts, music, the dance, etc., and in doing so they never advocate proletarian leadership or stress any need for approval. The contrast here shows where the authors of the outline really stand.

10. The present struggle centres on the issue of implementation of, or resistance to, Comrade Mao Tse-tung's line on the Cultural Revolution. Yet the outline states: 'Through this struggle, and under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, we shall open up the way for the solution of this problem (that is, "the thorough liquidation of bourgeois ideas in the realm of academic work").' Comrade Mao Tse-tung opened up the way for the proletariat on the cultural and ideological front long ago, in his On New Democracy, Talks at the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art, Letter to the Yenan Peking Opera Theatre after Seeing the Performance of 'Driven to Joint the Liangshan Rebels', On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, and Speech at the Chinese Communist Party's National Conference on Propaganda Work. Yet the outline maintains that Mao Tse-tung's thought has not yet opened up the way for us and that the way has to be opened up anew. Using the banner of 'under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought' as cover, the outline actually attempts to open up a way opposed to Mao Tse-tung's thought, that is the way of modern revisionism, the way for the restoration of capitalism.

In short, the outline opposes carrying the socialist revolution through to the end, opposes the line on the Cultural Revolution pursued by the Central Committee of the party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, attacks the proletarian left and shields the bourgeois right, thereby preparing public opinion for the restoration of capitalism. It is a reflection of bourgeois ideology in the party, it is out-and-out revisionism. Far from being a minor issue, the struggle against this revisionist line is an issue of prime importance having a vital bearing on the destiny and future of our party and date, on the future complexion of our party and date, and on the world revolution.

Party committees at all levels must immediately stop carrying out the 'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion made by the Group of Five in Charge of the Cultural Revolution'. The whole party must follow Comrade Mao Tse-tung's instructions, hold high the great banner of the proletarian Cultural Revolution, thoroughly expose the reactionary bourgeois stand of those so-called 'academic authorities' who oppose the party and socialism, thoroughly criticize and repudiate the reactionary bourgeois ideas in the sphere of academic work, education, journalism, literature and art, and publishing, and seize the leadership in these cultural spheres. To achieve this, it is necessary at the same time to criticize and repudiate those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army, and all spheres of culture, to clear them out or transfer some of them to other positions. Above all, we must not entrust these people with the work of leading the Cultural Revolution. In fact many of them have done and are still doing such work, and this is extremely dangerous.

Those representatives of the bourgeoisie who have sneaked into the party, the government, the army, and various cultural circles are a bunch of counter-revolutionary revisionists. Once conditions are ripe, they will seize political power and turn the dictatorship of the proletariat into a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Some of them we have already seen thorough, others we have not. Some are still trusted by us and are being trained as our successors, persons like Khrushchev, for example, who are still nestling beside us. Party committees at all levels must pay full attention to this matter.

This circular is to be sent, together with the erroneous document issued by the Central Committee on 12 February 1960, down to the level of county party committees, party committees in the cultural organizations, and party committees at regimental level in the army. These committees are asked to discuss which of the two documents is wrong and which is correct, their understanding of these documents, and their achievements and mistake.


Mao's Last Revolution

,

Book Review:
MAO'S LAST REVOLUTION
Roderick Macfarquhar and Michael Schoenhals
Belknap Press

The cultural revolution and how it shaped China

A new history of the tumultuous last decade of Mao's life and the impact it left on his country


By Ben Arnoldy
Christian Science Monitor
August 29, 2006

Many trends in today's China have their roots in the late 1970s - the period after the nation had its slate wiped clean by the Cultural Revolution. Those cataclysmic years (1966-1976) offer insight into what pushed China's pendulum toward capitalism and why democracy hasn't followed.

Or as the preface to a new history of that period, Mao's Last Revolution by China scholars Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals states: "To understand the 'why' of modern-day China, one must understand the 'what' of the Cultural Revolution."

The 462-page narrative (with nearly 200 pages of supplemental material) excels at detailing the how of the Cultural Revolution - how Chinese leader Mao Zedong purged opponents, upended the lives of millions, and established a cult of personality (while yet remaining vague about what it all meant).

Ostensibly, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to restore the communist revolutionary spirit within China - after watching Russia's post-Stalin leaders make "revisionist" steps. The revolution began with a series of carefully orchestrated purges of leaders accused of taking the capitalist road. With the help of his wife, loyal propagandists, and cowering colleagues, Mao encouraged students to find and drive out "capitalist roaders."

Emboldened by slogans such as "To rebel is justified" and "Bombard the headquarters," Chinese students attacked teachers and officials as ideologically unsound. As the revolution progressed, workers and even soldiers were also nudged to rebel. Accusations flowed forth, often motivated by petty grievances or opportunism, sweeping up millions of Chinese over the course of 10 years.

Punishments ranged from public humiliation to manual labor to death by mob violence. "A middle school teacher ... was sentenced ... to nine years in prison for having, among other crimes, written in his private diary that a certain Mao-quote gave him 'boundless energy,' then changed that to 'very much energy,' " MacFarquhar and Schoenhals write.

However, the book does not tell the stories of ordinary citizens. Its focus is on top-level machinations, particularly those of the Chairman. The aging leader is portrayed as fearful of either being sidelined during life or consigned after death to the dustbin of history. Mao's "last revolution" was a crafty effort to stave off both threats.

"Only Mao himself could 'detect' revisionists, or, more accurately, decide who they were." But Mao kept his cards close to his chest, leaving his supporters "to intuit what he wanted and to fulfill what they believed to be his aims." If Mao decided to change direction, he would quietly wait for his acolytes to overstep - and then pounce.

What emerges from the exhaustive research in this book is an understanding of the Cultural Revolution less as a coherent ideological movement and more as divide-and-rule political tactics. "Recent Chinese histories attempt to impose a nonexistent coherent 'anti-leftist' pattern" on attacks that took place in 1967 when students targeted "just about every power-holder there was, save for Mao himself." But if there was any pattern, it was summed up best by the son of fallen leader Lin Baio: "Today [Mao] uses this force to attack that force; tomorrow he uses that force to attack this force."

As time wore on, the inconsistencies of the revolving purges and the absurdity of radicals denouncing each other for being "bourgeois reactionaries" took its psychological toll on the party faithful. In material terms, as well, the country suffered. The value of industrial production dropped by 13.8 percent in 1967, and another 5 percent in 1968. Striking workers and gang warfare hurt industry, as did ministries purged of experienced officials. Perversely, some officials feared they would be labeled "bourgeois" if their industries appeared profitable.

Faced with a mess and few left to fix it, Mao rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping, who had been discredited early in the Cultural Revolution. Deng proved enormously capable at restoring order and putting economic progress ahead of partisan fighting. Deng would lead China after Mao's death in 1976 and inaugurate the market reforms that have made China an economic power.

"Mao's Last Revolution" is a fascinating study of Mao's colossal, yet cunning, misadventure. But it may leave some readers fatigued, with too many faceless names and a narrative that is at times chronologically disjointed. The introduction and conclusion, however, offer context and much food for thought.

The book's final pages place the revolution within a century-long Chinese quest for modernization that does not compromise cultural integrity. "The chaos, killing, and, at the end, the stagnation of the Cultural Revolution ... led Deng to abandon this vain search. China had to jump on the bandwagon of successful Western-style modernization."

But the chaos of that era also taught Deng to prefer political stability and gradualism - a lesson he applied in crushing the Tiananmen Square democracy movement.

(Ben Arnoldy is the Monitor's Asia editor)


Remembering China's Revolution

,

by John Roderick
Published 13 August 2006
THE ASSOCIATED PRESS


[AP Special Correspondent John Roderick reported for the AP for 39 years, mainly in Asia]

Forty years ago, Chinese communist chairman Mao Zedong launched the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. It's an unpleasant anniversary that official Beijing will not celebrate and most Chinese would rather forget.

Mao's objective: to purge the party of its moderate, pragmatic faction, which he said was leading China away from Marxism and toward capitalism and to make himself unassailable leader.

The bloody, chaotic decade between 1966 and 1976 which ensued was among the most violent, divisive and shameful in China's long, illustrious history.

It erupted in the summer of 1966 when Mao called on the youth to mount a new revolution. Before it ended with his death in September 1976, untold thousands died and millions were tortured, imprisoned or humiliated, mostly by those young shock-troops, the Red Guards.

China was at its most isolated. The fewer than a dozen Western correspondents in Beijing were hobbled by fear of expulsion if they displeased their communist hosts. Americans were excluded due to Cold War enmity.

The daily reporting of these events by a small band of American "China watchers" in Tokyo and in the British colony of Hong Kong was a product of resourcefulness, imagination and hard work. I was one of them.

We were assisted in separating fact from fiction throughout the continuing turmoil by an unlikely source: the U.S. government.

At the same time that the U.S. was feeding American correspondents truths, half-truths and lies at the daily "five o'clock follies," the Vietnam war briefings in Saigon, it made available to China watchers a vast store of information on the turbulent state of Chinese affairs.

It arrived sporadically by mail. Inside the packets were page after page of reports culled from radio broadcasts, newspapers and secret agents operating inside the mainland. They were translated by scores of interpreters in the enlarged U.S. consulate in Hong Kong.

American reporters were "China watchers" from a distance because Beijing, angry at U.S. refusal to recognize the People's Republic in 1949, said we were no longer welcome. When Zhou Enlai invited Western reporters to return to Beijing in 1956 Washington refused to let us go.

With Europeans, Canadians and Australians in Beijing when the cultural purge broke, Americans were the odd man out.

Being excluded turned out surprisingly to be a plus. Unlike our Western colleagues in Beijing, we were free to write what we pleased without worrying about official displeasure and had ready access to the valuable consulate files and other information, which they did not.

It was a heady experience. We would write stories about purges of senior politicians and other unreported events three months old in China but new to the rest of the world and see them lead page one of American newspapers the next day.

The raw news was often readily available. Each side in the chaotic struggle published pamphlets, put up wall posters or went on the stump in the war to win the minds of the masses. If one side suppressed the news, the opposition dug it up and broadcast it.

Interpreting it was the challenge. Aside from U.S. government translations, we interviewed returning travelers, commissioned others to write stories for us and carefully monitored the Chinese and English versions of the communist New China News Agency.

Reading the wooden, official prose of the New China News Agency was a test of endurance. One had to remain alert throughout the exercise because buried deep in the text sometimes lay guarded clues to an important development-the promotion, demotion or death of a high-ranking official.

The tragedies of the Cultural Revolution touched me personally. Allowed back into Beijing in 1971 with the U.S. pingpong team, I found the delightful capital that I had known in the 1940s reduced to a gray, grim city wracked by fear and uncertainty.

I was dismayed to learn some of my Chinese friends had been punished for knowing me, now a hated American.

Even from afar, when I learned that leaders such as President Liu Shaoqi, former defense minister Peng Dehuai and the colorful general He Long were tortured and killed, my heart sank.

I had gotten to know many of them in the 1940s, during seven months reporting for AP in Yanan, their revolutionary capital next to the Gobi desert. I saw them not as communists but as humans driven by a desire to end poverty, plagues, famines and inequality in China - goals which had turned to ashes under Mao's imperial, intolerant and vindictive rule.

Those objectives have nearly come true as a result of the two-and-a-half decades of free-market reforms enacted by those pragmatists in the party who survived Mao's purges.

Enjoying an economic boom unparalleled in history and anticipating the international acclaim it expects from the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it is no wonder that China wants to forget the sordidness and pain of the Cultural Revolution.

The Communist Party has a more pressing reason to ignore it. Recalling its terrors and inhumanity would call into question the integrity of Mao himself, still regarded as the father of communist China.

The author Ji-li Jiang, whom I met recently, had been a teenager in Shanghai when Mao launched his radical movement. She and her family suffered because of their landlord origins, but still she kept her faith in Mao, until after his death.

"We finally learned that the whole cultural revolution had been part of a power struggle at the highest levels of the Party," she wrote in her 1997 memoir "Red Scarf Girl." "Our leader had taken advantage of our trust and loyalty to manipulate the whole country. This is the most frightening lesson of the Cultural Revolution."


Dai Sijie (戴思杰): Mr. Muo's Travelling Couch

, , ,

BOOK REVIEW: Le Complexe de Di
(Mr. Muo's Travelling Couch)
by James Roy
China Economic Review
August 2006


Cultural Revolution-era sent-down youth literature had a good ride, but it's probably about time it hung up its paper shoes. It has been a subject of great fascination for Westerners, who find the circumstances of the time simply unfathomable, and for a generation of Chinese writers, who experienced the events up close as bourgeois intellectuals.

There was a time when a Cannes jury could sit through - and lavish prizes on - movies about city kids planting crops in Yunnan or teaching children in Shaanxi until the water buffalo came home.
But while the sub-genre has reached a saturation point, its most representative writers may have trouble moving forward and writing about China's present. Most of them haven't lived in the country for at least a decade.
Dai Sijie (戴思杰), who was sent to live in rural Sichuan in the early 1970s and has been living and writing in France since the early 1980s, is a likely example.
His quasi-autobiographical first novel, Balzac and the Little Chinese Seamstress (which he later adapted into a film), was a delightfully light-hearted story of two lads who make the most of their time as manure porters by trying to use their knowledge of Western literature to woo the prettiest girl in their countryside village.
In his second novel, Mr Muo's Travelling Couch, first published in French in 2003 and in English two years later, Dai has stepped up and taken a stab at the more contemporary setting of China in 2000 - even if that pre-Olympic, pre-WTO year already seems more distant than it probably should. The book's 264 pages are a brisk and thoroughly entertaining read.Dai's protagonist and alter ego is Muo, a forty-something intellectual who claims to be "China's first psychoanalyst".
Muo returns to the motherland after a decade in Paris reading Freud and Lacan to rescue his college sweetheart, who is stuck in a Chengdu prison after (what else?) selling sensitive photos to the foreign press. Of course, the person in charge of her case is the venal, vitiated Judge Di. Sick of monetary bribes, Di's condition for letting the girl go is that Muo provide him with a virgin to deflower.
Determined to win his love's freedom (and apparently untroubled by the prospect of serving up an innocent girl to a repulsive official), Muo sets off on a quixotic quest around China to find the right girl, interpreting the dreams of people he meets as a way of investigating their personal lives. Ever the psychiatrist, Muo cannot get his mind off the carnal. A running joke in this section of the book is that Muo, so versed in the academic literature and symbolism of sex from his studies, is himself chaste while there doesn't seem to be a single virginal girl left in his home country.
Dai sends Muo careering into one Chinese political hot potato after another. Aside from the corrupt judge and the imprisoned photographer (she was taking pictures of the police torturing a suspect), Muo stumbles across an execution ground; a lonely woman whose gay husband was driven to suicide; Han-hating minorities; and a library full of banned literature where he picks up Dr Li Zhisui's biography of Mao and flips straight to a page detailing some of the Chairman's own deviant proclivities.
These might seem cheap shots from a writer who, critics would point out, has not been able to see some of the progress made in China over the last 20 years. Is Dai saying he, like some high and mighty head-shrinker, knows China better than it knows itself? Not really.
The insinuated complaints are only half-serious and usually remain in service of the plot, which is a corker. Quite unlike the placid Balzac, the new Mr Muo is full of twists and absurdist moments. Dai includes plenty of tasty Freudian subtext for readers to chew on and, like his other work, it goes down easy.

EXCERPT
Psychoanalytic stand-up comedy
Despite my modest fee, I took my psychoanalytic endeavors very seriously. Whenever my memory permitted, I paid tribute to my masters by quoting a passage from Freud, Lagan or Jung. It must be conceded that the language of psychoanalysis, with its specific terminology and phrasing, does not lend itself to translation. When I recited such passages, not in Mandarin but in the melodious dialect of Sichuan, the cabbalistic vocabulary took on a comic edge which provoked such uproarious laughter among the women crowding round to listen that you would have sworn I was engaging in stand-up comedy - a genre I normally despise.
My first client, a woman of fifty, had permed her hair and wore a fancy ring on her finger. She had dreamt of catching a fish. I asked her if the fish was large or small, but she could not recall. To convince her of the significance of this detail, I attempted to translate what Freud has to say on the subject: small fish stand for human sperm and big fish for children. As for the fishing rod in her dream, it obviously stood for the phallus. An indescribable pandemonium ensued, with all the women shouting and cheering at the tops of their voices. My client blushed and hid her face in her hands, while the crowd broke out in deafening applause. From one moment to the next the fear of unemployment vanished from their faces. I have the feeling they have adopted me and that Great Leap Forward Street has accepted me as a public entertainer.

Wikipedia - Dai Sijie


The Revolution Will Not Be Memorialized

,

Chinese Title: 革命不该被纪念
by Ma Jian (马建)
(Ma Jian is the author of the acclaimed memoir 'Red Dust' (红尘) and of the novel 'The Noodlemaker' (面条师傅), among other books. After many years in exile, he recently returned to China.)

Published: May 2006
Project Syndicate Commentary
[Project Syndicate is a not-for-profit international association of quality newspapers devoted to:
1. bringing distinguished voices from across the world to local audiences everywhere;
2. strengthening the independence of printed media in transition and developing countries;
3. upgrading their journalistic, editorial, and business capacities.]

Forty years ago Mao Zedong launched the Cultural Revolution. The Propaganda Department of China’s ruling Communists have now issued an order banning any kind of reviews or commemoration of this disaster as part of the Party’s bid to make the Chinese forget about that lost decade.

But in condemning the Japanese for neglect of the Nanjing massacre during the Second World War, Chinese officials proclaim that forgetting the past betrays the people. But. for the Chinese, the Cultural Revolution was itself a betrayal, one that continues to this day. All the terrible events since then – the Tiananmen Square massacre, persecution of Falun Gong, and repression of civic activists – are the evil fruit of that un-cleansed original sin.

The Cultural Revolution marked the climax of class extermination practiced by the Party during the 1960’s. The survivors of all the previous political movements, now enthralled by Mao’s personality cult, were free of all constraint, able to kill and seek revenge with impunity. As Mao summed up this psychological state: “Now is a time of upheaval, and I’m just happy about the chaos.” In his instruction called “Regarding Biting Incidents,” Mao asserted: “So what? Good people get to know each other by biting each other and it serves bad people right if they are bitten by good ones…”

Friends of my generation invariably comment when I mention that I was born on August 18: “Hey, that was the anniversary of Chairman Mao first receiving the Red Guards.” But the following months and years have been selectively forgotten, particularly by the Red Guards themselves. These are people who, like the Hitler Youth, turned over their bloody page of history and never looked back.

According to Wang Youqin (王友琴), author of Victims of the Cultural Revolution (文革受难者), after Mao received the Red Guards and instructed them in the “militant fight,” more than 1,700 people were beaten, drowned, or scalded to death. Another 100,000 were driven from their homes.

Within months, an all-out movement, under the banner of “revolutionize Chinese culture” and dedicated to the aim of “breaking away from old culture, old traditions, old thoughts, and old customs,” was raging throughout the country. Those who had been born “landlords, rich farmers, reactionaries, bad elements, and rightists” were among the first to be victimized. Desperate to save their lives, families voluntarily smashed their properties and pulped their ancient paintings and calligraphy.

Episodes of “burning books and burying intellectuals alive” had occurred before, but none was more radical than the destructive force unleashed by Mao. Soon, ancient sites would be ruined. Corpses of historic figures, such as Zhang Zhidong, a high-ranking official in the Qing Dynasty, were exhumed, with the decaying bodies left hanging in trees.

Eventually, anybody – from the President to average citizens – could be criticized, labeled an “ox-demon and snake-spirit,” persecuted, and listed for death. People killed others to safeguard Mao, and those who were executed shouted “Long Live Chairman Mao” on their way to death.

In Guangxi province, where some of the worst violence occurred, nearly 100,000 people were killed during July and August 1968. In the official “Memorabilia of the Cultural Revolution in Guangxi” (广西文革大事记), many infants appear on the death list. The author Zheng Yi (郑义) reported that in Wuxuan County alone, more than 100 people were eaten, because devouring enemies was the only way to prove one’s love for Mao. Livers, eyes, or brains were removed while victims were still alive.

Mao set off yet another wave of persecutions in 1968. In countless “suicides,” many people were simply bitten to death, or took their own lives when the suffering became too much to bear. In Beijing, deaths occurred mostly in areas wuth trees and lakes. Wang Youqin reports that on November 4, four bodies were found floating in the lake of the Summer Palace. A total of 63 people were killed at the prestigious Beijing University.

Mao died aspiring to exterminate Chinese culture. His Cultural Revolution alone killed as many as two million people, shattered traditions, uprooted spiritual and ethical values, and tore apart family ties and communal loyalties. People who experienced it seal off the memory, for the pain, worse than a bullet to the heart, overwhelms souls.

Worst of all, Mao’s crimes against civilization, unlike those of, say, Hitler, are ongoing. The Communist Party still uses his brainwashing methods, and his legacy continues to be officially revered. His portrait and body remain on display in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square, and his face appears on banknotes in the wallet of every Chinese, many of whom saw parents, children, and other loved ones die under his knife.

The Chinese people, unsurprisingly, regard politics with a mixture of caution and dread. Public figures spend a lot of time and effort to avoid offending the Party, openly endorsing indifference as the foremost tool of survival. Last month, I watched a TV show featuring Han Meilin (韩美林), a famous painter. In his closing remarks, he announced his words of wisdom to viewers: “Long live those who don’t care!”

Han Meilin was badly persecuted during the Cultural Revolution. His declaration was greeted by a roar of applause from the studio audience.

Original Chinese Article


December 2009
M T W T F S S
November 2009January 2010
1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9 10 11 12 13
14 15 16 17 18 19 20
21 22 23 24 25 26 27
28 29 30 31