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Posts tagged with "Book Review"

Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space

EMMANUEL LINCOT
China Perspectives n°67
september-october 2006


Book reviews:
Wu Hung, Remaking Beijing. Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space

Wu Hung has made a major contribution to the understanding of the history and anthropology of contemporary Chinese memory. His works builds on the specificities of the University of Chicago, which combines theoretical thought with studies in the field. An art historian by training, and the author of ten books, Wu Hung is looked on as a pioneer in the field of American sinology for his analyses of Chinese culture from the most ancient to the most recent periods through a systematic comparison of texts and visual signs; the daring of this approach sometimes brings to mind, in contemporary French historiography, Georges Didi-Huberman. To quote Wu Hung: "This book is not written for a particular academic field, but is located in a network of disciplines including art history, the history of architecture, modern Chinese history, urban studies, cultural studies and autobiography. In fact, one of my purposes in writing this book is to forge this interdisciplinary network" (p. 10). In approaching Tiananmen and the metamorphoses of the site through more than a century of the history of Beijing and of China, Wu Hung opens up new epistemological and pragmatic perspectives. Displacing the temporal totality towards the present and towards action, Wu Hung shows, based on a study of this site in its particularity, that the past is not closed, that it is not a dead thing to be mummified in a museum, but on the contrary that it still remains open to new meanings.

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The Chinese Communist Party in Reform

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Wu Guoguang
China Perspectives n°68
November- December 2006


Book reviews:
Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, Zheng Yongnian (éd.), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform

Although China has undergone profound changes since economic reforms and marketisation were introduced in the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still represents a niche surviving from before this period, not only in politics but also in many other dimensions of life in China. This simple fact has for a long time been virtually ignored, intentionally or not, in academic studies on China, as most of the energy in the field is, reasonably, devoted to following the fast-changing reforms that are expected to reduce the importance of the CCP. These expectations are not entirely wrong, as the CCP itself is now reported to be under reform; they are not accurate, however, as the Party carries out reforms simply for the sake of maintaining and even strengthening its unchallenged ruling position, rather than in order to open the political market for the party competition and popular participation that are often assumed to accompany economic marketisation. In this context, how can one assess the CCP today and its efforts to adapt, while keeping its monopoly on ruling post-economic reform China? The volume under review is a timely contribution to answering this question.

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The Sacred Village: Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North China

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Katiana Le Mentec
China Perspectives n°68,
November- December 2006


Book reviews:
Thomas David Dubois, The Sacred Village. Social Change and Religious Life in Rural North China

Examining the varied expressions of religious life in a rural district of North China, the historian Thomas David Dubois, in The Sacred Village, gives us a glimpse of the world of such practices and beliefs at local level, as well as their evolution since the end of the Qing dynasty. This book is the result of archival research enriched with interviews conducted in the district of Cang (in southeastern Hebei province) at the end of the 1990s, with the author seeking to combine the understanding of the anthropologist with a historical perspective on social change.

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In God, Distrust

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By MICHAEL KINSLEY
The New York Times
May 13, 2007


(Michael Kinsley is a columnist for Time magazine)

Observers of the Christopher Hitchens phenomenon have been expecting a book about religion from him around now. But this impressive and enjoyable attack on everything so many people hold dear is not the book we were expecting.

Christoph Niemann
GOD IS NOT GREAT
How Religion Poisons Everything.
By Christopher Hitchens.
307 pp. Twelve/Warner Books. $24.99.

First in London 30 or more years ago, then in New York and for the last couple of decades in Washington, Hitchens has established himself as a character. This character draws on such familiar sources as the novels of P. G. Wodehouse, Evelyn Waugh and Graham Greene; the leftist politics of the 1960s (British variant); and — of course — the person of George Orwell. (Others might throw in the flower-clutching Bunthorne from Gilbert and Sullivan’s “Patience,” but that is probably not an intentional influence.) Hitchens is the bohemian and the swell, the dashing foreign correspondent, the painstaking literary critic and the intellectual engagé. He charms Washington hostesses but will set off a stink bomb in the salon if the opportunity arises.
His conversation sparkles, not quite effortlessly, and if he is a bit too quick to resort to French in search of le mot juste, his jewels of erudition, though flashy, are real. Or at least they fool me. Hitchens was right to choose Washington over New York and London.
His enemies would like to believe he is a fraud. But he isn’t, as the very existence of his many enemies tends to prove. He is self-styled, to be sure, but no more so than many others in Washington — or even in New York or London — who are not nearly as good at it. He is a principled dissolute, with the courage of his dissolution: he enjoys smoking and drinking, and not just the reputation for smoking and drinking — although he enjoys that too. And through it all he is productive to an extent that seems like cheating: 23 books, pamphlets, collections and collaborations so far; a long and often heavily researched column every month in Vanity Fair; frequent fusillades in Slate and elsewhere; and speeches, debates and other public spectacles whenever offered.
The big strategic challenge for a career like this is to remain interesting, and the easiest tactic for doing that is surprise. If they expect you to say X, you say minus X.
Consistency is foolish, as the man said. (Didn’t he?) Under the unwritten and somewhat eccentric rules of American public discourse, a statement that contradicts everything you have ever said before is considered for that reason to be especially sincere, courageous and dependable. At The New Republic in the 1980s, when I was the editor, we used to joke about changing our name to “Even the Liberal New Republic,” because that was how we were referred to whenever we took a conservative position on something, which was often. Then came the day when we took a liberal position on something and we were referred to as “Even the Conservative New Republic.”
As this example illustrates, among writers about politics, the surprise technique usually means starting left and turning right. Trouble is, you do this once and what’s your next party trick?
Christopher Hitchens had seemed to be solving this problem by turning his conversion into an ideological “Dance of the Seven Veils.” Long ago he came out against abortion. Interesting! Then he discovered and made quite a kosher meal of the fact that his mother, deceased, was Jewish, which under Jewish law meant he himself was Jewish. Interesting!! (He was notorious at the time for his anti-Zionist sympathies.) In the 1990s, Hitchens was virulently, and somewhat inexplicably, hostile to President Bill Clinton. Interesting!!! You would have thought that Clinton’s decadence — the thing that bothered other liberals and leftists the most — would have positively appealed to Hitchens. Finally and recently, he became the most (possibly the only) intellectually serious non-neocon supporter of George W. Bush’s Iraq war. Interesting!!!!
Where was this train heading? Possibly toward an open conversion to mainline conservatism and quick descent into cliché and demagoguery (the path chosen by Paul Johnson, a somewhat similar British character of the previous generation). But surely there was time for a few more intellectual adventures before retiring to an office at the Hoover Institution or some other nursing home of the mind. One obvious possibility stood out: Hitchens, known to be a fervid atheist, would find God and take up religion. The only question was which flavor he would choose. Embrace Islam? Too cute. Complete the half-finished Jewish script? Become a Catholic, following the path well trodden by such British writers as Waugh and Greene? Or — most daring and original — would he embrace the old Church of England (Episcopalianism in America) and spend his declining years writing about the beauty of the hymns, the essential Britishness of village churchyards, the importance of protecting religion from the dangers of excessive faith, and so on?
Well, ladies and gentlemen, Hitchens is either playing the contrarian at a very high level or possibly he is even sincere. But just as he had us expecting minus X, he confounds us by reverting to X. He has written, with tremendous brio and great wit, but also with an underlying genuine anger, an all-out attack on all aspects of religion. Sometimes, instead of the word “religion,” he refers to it as “god-worship,” which, although virtually a tautology (isn’t “object of worship” almost a definition of a god?), makes the practice sound sinister and strange.
Hitchens is an old-fashioned village atheist, standing in the square trying to pick arguments with the good citizens on their way to church. The book is full of logical flourishes and conundrums, many of them entertaining to the nonbeliever. How could Christ have died for our sins, when supposedly he also did not die at all? Did the Jews not know that murder and adultery were wrong before they received the Ten Commandments, and if they did know, why was this such a wonderful gift? On a more somber note, how can the “argument from design” (that only some kind of “intelligence” could have designed anything as perfect as a human being) be reconciled with the religious practice of female genital mutilation, which posits that women, at least, as nature creates them, are not so perfect after all? Whether sallies like these give pause to the believer is a question I can’t answer.
And all the logical sallies don’t exactly add up to a sustained argument, because Hitchens thinks a sustained argument shouldn’t even be necessary and yet wouldn’t be sufficient. To him, it’s blindingly obvious: the great religions all began at a time when we knew a tiny fraction of what we know today about the origins of Earth and human life. It’s understandable that early humans would develop stories about gods or God to salve their ignorance. But people today have no such excuse. If they continue to believe in the unbelievable, or say they do, they are morons or lunatics or liars. “The human wish to credit good things as miraculous and to charge bad things to another account is apparently universal,” he remarks, unsympathetically.
Although Hitchens’s title refers to God, his real energy is in the subtitle: “religion poisons everything.” Disproving the existence of God (at least to his own satisfaction and, frankly, to mine) is just the beginning for Hitchens. In fact, it sometimes seems as if existence is just one of the bones Hitchens wants to pick with God — and not even the most important. If God would just leave the world alone, Hitchens would be glad to let him exist, quietly, in retirement somewhere. Possibly the Hoover Institution.
Hitchens is attracted repeatedly to the principle of Occam’s razor: that simple explanations are more likely to be correct than complicated ones. (E.g., Earth makes a circle around the Sun; the Sun doesn’t do a complex roller coaster ride around Earth.) You might think that Occam’s razor would favor religion; the biblical creation story certainly seems simpler than evolution. But Hitchens argues effectively again and again that attaching the religious myth to what we know from science to be true adds nothing but needless complication.
For Hitchens, it’s personal. He is a great friend of Salman Rushdie, and he reminds us that it wasn’t just some crazed fringe Muslim who threatened Rushdie’s life, killed several others and made him a virtual prisoner for the crime of writing a novel. Religious leaders from all the major faiths, who disagree on some of the most fundamental questions, managed to put aside their differences to agree that Rushdie had it coming. (Elsewhere, Hitchens notes tartly that if any one of the major faiths is true, then the others must be false in important respects — an obvious point often forgotten in the warm haze of ecumenism.)
Hitchens’s erudition is on display — impressively so, and perhaps sometimes pretentiously so. In one paragraph, he brings in Stephen Jay Gould, chaos theory and Saul Bellow; pronounces the movie “It’s a Wonderful Life” “engaging but abysmal” (a typical Hitchens aside: cleverly paradoxical? witlessly oxymoronic? take your pick) in the way it explains to a “middlebrow audience” Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle; and winds down through a discussion of the potential of stem cells. Nevertheless, and in spite of all temptations, he has written an entire book without a single reference to Sir Isaiah Berlin, the fox or the hedgehog.
But speaking of foxes, Hitchens has outfoxed the Hitchens watchers by writing a serious and deeply felt book, totally consistent with his beliefs of a lifetime. And God should be flattered: unlike most of those clamoring for his attention, Hitchens treats him like an adult.


Is Democracy Possible Here: a review

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Review by Jonathan Derbyshire
The Philosophers\' Magazine

(Jonathan Derbyshire is reviews editor of The Philosophers\' Magazine)

Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate by Ronald Dworkin (Princeton University Press) £12.95/$19.95 (hb).

Ten years ago, the political philosopher Michael Sandel published a book entitled Democracy’s Discontent. American politics were in a dreadful state. Citizens were anxious and fearful, and felt helpless in the face of the seemingly irresistible unravelling of the “moral fabric of community”.

He wasn’t alone in thinking something was up with American democracy, of course. But there was something distinctive about Sandel’s diagnosis of the crisis. The reasons for the failure of politicians to address popular discontent lay not in the arguments they advanced but rather in the “public philosophy” that underpinned them. Sandel’s contention was that a version of the liberal political theory developed by John Rawls and others had come, in the post-war period, to form the background to political discussion and debate – which was focused principally on questions having to do with welfare reform, rights, and the extent of legitimate government regulation.

Political liberalism of the Rawlsian variety had given shape to what Sandel called the “procedural republic”. In this form of democracy, the procedures for public decision-making are based on values of fairness and openness, and make no reference to more substantive ethical, moral or religious premises. Indeed, the procedural conception requires that in politics people’s most fundamental convictions be bracketed or set aside. Since reasonable people can’t agree on the best way to live, government should be neutral on the question of the good life.

In Sandel’s view, it was this aspiration to neutrality that was the source of democratic discontent, for the strictly procedural values of fairness are too emaciated to sustain genuine civic engagement in public life. The challenge for political philosophy was to figure out how political discourse might “engage rather than avoid the moral and religious convictions people bring to the public realm.”

In the ten years since Sandel wrote his book, a decade that has pitted “red” states against “blue” and the religious right against the secularist left, that challenge has, if anything, become even sharper. But in Is Democracy Possible Here?, Ronald Dworkin, a leading proponent of the kind of liberalism Sandel was criticising, attempts to meet it.

The bitterly divisive presidential election of 2004 dramatised some fundamental disagreements over, among other things, the place of religion in politics and the nature of democracy itself. Yet for all the unpleasantness and bitterness of that campaign, Dworkin isn’t convinced that the two contending blocs, the red and the blue, are cultural monoliths hermetically sealed from each other. There is no intrinsic reason, for example, why those who favour a bigger role for religion in public life should also support tax cuts for the rich. That’s an accident of politics and history, not a matter of principle and philosophy.

If “decent” political debate is to be possible, there must be some very basic principles shared by all the parties to discussion, irrespective of “cultural” and other differences. In the absence of such a common ground, politics becomes just a kind of war. Dworkin’s aim is to show that there is common ground in America’s divided political culture and that, consequently, genuine political argument (“democracy”, in other words) is possible.

What’s most interesting about this enterprise is Dworkin’s recognition that, as Sandel argued, purely formal principles of procedural fairness won’t suffice: “We must not try to exclude people’s most profound convictions from political debate.” Rather, Dworkin thinks we ought to engage those convictions while at the same time seeking to stay true to the “attractive hope” which animates Rawls’s political liberalism – that reasonable people with differing ethical, moral and religious beliefs will come to accept the constraints of public reason.

In the model Dworkin proposes, there are fundamental principles held in common by all parties, and these fundamental principles underly political debate. Genuine argument, therefore, will be about the direction in which those fundamental principles ramify. And the principles in question are “deep principles about human value” and human dignity. Dworkin calls them the “principle of intrinsic value” and the “principle of personal responsibility”. The former holds that human lives have a special kind of objective value, and the latter that each person has a responsibility to make her life go better rather than worse.

In both cases, Dworkin needs to show that these principles really do constitute “common ground”. Take the principle of intrinsic value. Dworkin assumes that most of us think there is an objective standard of a good life and that a life can go more or less well. Further, most of us would agree, he says, that the “importance of our leading successful rather than wasted lives does not depend on our wanting to do so.” But what if one’s conception of the importance of leading a good life derives from the conviction that God wants us to live in a certain way? Not all of us think that, however. Dworkin’s response is to point out that “our American religions” –and he is candid that the point might not apply elsewhere in the world – are “religions of humanity” in which all persons are equal in the eyes of God. And if you believe that, he says, then you’re bound to embrace the principle of intrinsic value.

Dworkin also appeals to the distinctive characteristics of “American religion” in expounding the principle of personal responsibility. He considers the charge that this principle, which requires that persons freely choose their own ends, reflects a conception of what Sandel calls the “unencumbered self”, a self constituted prior to and independently of its purposes and ends. Dworkin agrees that the idea of the person as a “self-contained atom” deciding questions of value entirely by himself is absurd. Culture, after all, is inescapable. But there is a difference between being influenced by the values of others and subordinating oneself to their will. And people who equate living well with following the dictates of some religious tradition don’t regard themselves as having been coerced into that opinion.

If that’s right, then the principle of personal responsibility is not incompatible with the acceptance of religious conviction. At least that’s true of “American” religions. Dworkin acknowledges that it clearly wouldn’t be true in places where, for instance, religious officials had the power to punish apostates. There’s another criticism one might make of Dworkin here, however, and it’s that he has failed in his attempt to see things from the point of view of the religious believer: it’s possible that, for the believer, the requirements of religious adherence do not appear as self-imposed but, precisely, as transcendent obligations.

What Dworkin is offering here is not a blueprint for the dissolution of political disagreements, but rather a new way of seeing them – as controversies about the “best interpretation” of values that are shared, rather than clashes between irreconcilable worldviews. This invites a further question to which he gives rather scanter consideration: “do we have the kind of political system that might accommodate a genuine debate?” His answer seems to be: no, but we could have. He envisages a “partnership” model of democracy, in which public reasoning and debate are placed at the centre of political and policy justification. This deliberative conception functions as a sort of utopian ideal, but since Dworkin is doing political philosophy here and not advocacy, his book is none the worse for it.


The most important book of the 21st Century?

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By Gus diZerega
Guerrilla News Network
COA News
Apr 26 2007


Gus DiZerega is a Third-Degree Gardnerian Elder. He spent six years studying with Brazilian shaman Antonio Costa e Silva, and with other teachers in Native American and Afro-Brazilian traditions. With a Ph.D. in Political Science/Theory from the University of California-Berkeley, he has spent the past sixteen years in the academic field, teaching on the faculties of several universities and colleges. His first book, Persuasion, Power and Polity: A Theory of Democratic Self-Organization, was published in 2000 by Hampton Press.

For many of us who are deeply concerned with environmental issues the most frustrating part of our struggle is that while public opinion is largely in our favor, the modern world’s basic institutions are biased against us. They dance to a different, and from an ecological perspective, often malevolent, drummer.

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The Invention of Modernity: Chinese Historians Help Tradition Fight Back!

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Miriam Gross
Chinese History Research, UCSD

The juxtaposition between tradition and modernity has become such a stock character in studies of Chinese history that the unenthusiastic reader can often only sigh at its inevitable onerous inclusion.  At this point authors may only be able to grab the reader’s attention via titles (such as this one) that are better suited for newspaper headlines.  This paper attempts to go beyond this automatic lethargy by exploring the evolving relationship between tradition and modernity.  Further, it suggests that novel ways of delving into the so-called traditional realm are inspiring new questions that in turn allow scholars to understand people’s lived experience in a much more substantive way.
 
After briefly examining how tradition and modernity were addressed in the older literature (Levinson), this paper will assess three current understandings of this relationship: the indigenization of modernity (Morris); modernity and tradition’s mutual re-creation (Wang, Dong); and tradition’s exploitation of modernity (Dong, Yeh, Fong et. al).  These different perceptions of tradition and modernity form a spectrum whose farther reaches are leading the field of modern Chinese history in striking new directions.

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Sociable Darwinism

Review By NATALIE ANGIER
The New York Times
April 8, 2007


Natalie Angier is a science columnist for The Times. Her latest book, “The Canon: A Whirligig Tour Through the Beautiful Basics of Science,” will be published in May.

EVOLUTION FOR EVERYONE
How Darwin’s Theory Can Change the Way We Think About Our Lives.
By David Sloan Wilson.
390 pp. Delacorte Press. $24.

Just as in the classic clashes of nature, where every mutational upgrade in a carnivore’s strength or cunning is soon countered by a speedier or more paranoid model of antelope, so the pitched struggle between evolutionary theory and its deniers has yielded a bristling diversity of ploys and counterploys. The heavyhanded biblical literalism of creationist science evolves into the feints and curlicues of intelligent design, and the casual dismissiveness with which scientists long regarded the anti-evolutionists gives way to a belated awareness that, gee, the public doesn’t seem to realize how fatuous the other side is, and maybe it’s time to combat the creationist phylum head on. And so, over the last few years, scientists have unleashed a blitzkrieg of books in defense of Darwinism, summarizing the Everest of supportive evidence for evolutionary theory, filleting the arguments of the naysayers or reciting, yet again, the story of Charles Darwin, depressive naturalist extraordinaire, whose increasingly pervasive avuncular profile has lofted him to logo status on par with Einstein and the Nike swoosh.

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A Review of Charles Taylor's The Ethics of Authenticity

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An Authentic Modernity
Review by Michael Novak
First Things, May 1993

Michael Novak, a member of the Editorial Board of First Things, holds the George Frederick Jewett Chair in Religion and Public Policy at the American Enterprise Institute

The Ethics of Authenticity
By Charles Taylor
Harvard University Press. 142 pp.


To grow up in Canada is to inherit a privileged position for understanding modernity-sufficently distant from that hurtling spaceship of "the republic to our south," while retaining (perhaps from connections to nature, to the history of France, and to Catholicism) a sharp, intuitive sense of what it once was like to be "premodern." A Canadian can more easily remain detached from capitalism, the spirit of commerce, and the fury of markets, sheltered as he somewhat is by the residual corporatism of medieval Europe and modern socialism. Thus a Canadian tends to associate the negative aspects of modernity with capitalism, its more positive sides to some inarticulate communitarian sense that is not capitalist.

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A Review of Charles Taylor's Sources of the Self

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Review by FRANCES S. ADENEY
New College for Advanced Christian Studies
Berkeley, California
Theology Today, July 1991

Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity
By Charles Taylor
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1989. 608 pp.


Charles Taylor's latest work is undoubtedly one of the most significant works in moral philosophy and the history of ideas to appear in recent decades. In this ambitious and insightful work, he moves the conversation about the relationship between identity and the good ahead in at least four ways. He presents a historical narrative of the development of modern identity in its relation to moral goods and their sources. He articulates a modern ethic of benevolence and universal justice that is gaining increasing acceptance in the West. He describes the increasing separation of that modern ethic from the theistic and Enlightenment sources that spawned it. Finally, Taylor suggests three sources for a metaethic that can undergird our modern moral stance, two of which are uniquely modem and arise from the development of the modern self.

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