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荒诞者共和

ABSURDIST REPUBLIC

Posts tagged with "China-US Relation"

"China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?

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MING XIA
College
New York Times


"China's rise" can be seen as a quintessentially political process—through which the ruling Communist Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy after the Cultural Revolution irreversibly changed the nation and caused three crises of ideological belief, faith in the CPC, and confidence in the future. As the Party realized that the performance-based legitimacy was the only hope for prolonging its rule, economic development became the highest politics. Consequentially, the success of economic development would have to cause political implications—the external ones are carefully monitored and evaluated by China's neighbors and the only superpower of the world—the United States.

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"We can be a benevolent superpower", interview with Jimmy Carter

People's Daily
May 14, 2007


His birthday is October 1, a day every Chinese person will celebrate. He cut diplomatic ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic relations with People's Republic of China. His administration didn't fire a single bullet overseas. He was awarded Nobel Peace Prize in 2002 for his contributions to world peace. He is still surprisingly active both physically and spiritually at the age of nearly 83. He enjoys working in his peanut field. He has so far written 21 books. He is The New York Times' best selling author.

His name is Jimmy Carter, the 39th President of the United States. Recently he was interviewed in his office at the Carter Center in Atlanta by Yong Tang, a Washington-based correspondent of People's Daily.

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The Divided China Problem: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution

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Ramon H. Myers
The Hoover Institution

This essay describes the origins of the divided China problem and how it has become the most troublesome factor in Sino-U.S. relations. From interviews and documentary evidence, the authors argue that Taiwan and mainland China achieved a détente in April 1993 and agreed on rules for negotiations to take place. Rather than propose a federation formula for resolving the Taiwan-China sovereignty issue, and to counter the 1979 federation proposal offered by Beijing's leaders, the Lee Teng-hui administration tried to redefine Taiwan's relationship with "China" and win U.S. support for its strategy, thereby undermining Sino-U.S. relations and aggravating Taiwan-mainland China relations. The authors propose how the divided China problem might be peacefully resolved and argue that the U.S. government and Congress should extend military support for the Republic of China regime only on the condition that it negotiate with the People's Republic of China regime under the "one-China" principle to resolve the divided China problem.

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The China Dilemma

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Thomas I. Palley
TomPaine.com
A Project of The Institute for America's Future
June 05, 2007


Thomas Palley runs the Economics for Democratic and Open Societies Project. He is the author of 'Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case for Structural Keynesianism'. His weekly economic policy blog is at www.thomaspalley.com

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, alias Lenin, was the leader of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia. One of his best-known quotes is, “The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.” Today, Lenin must be chuckling in his Moscow mausoleum as he watches U.S. business dealings with China.

Lenin’s sarcastic quip identified how desire for profit can sometimes undermine class interest. In today’s era of globalization a similar logic can hold for the national interest. Thus, with corporations looking to maximize their global profits, what is good for profit can sometimes be bad for country.

U.S.-China relations provide a case study of this “profit vs. country” syndrome. Current U.S.-China economic relations are marked by huge trade deficits and a steady migration of manufacturing to China. This structure was established in the 1990s at the behest of multi-national corporations and big retailers such as Wal-Mart. The former saw China as providing an unequaled low-cost production platform from which to export to the U.S., while the latter saw China as a source of low-cost imports.

Together, these business interests pushed permanent normal trading relations for China, and they also account for the U.S. Treasury’s willingness to accept China’s under-valued exchange rate. That is because an under-valued yuan holds down the cost of goods sourced from China and increases profits on production exported from China.

For China, the new arrangements have contributed to spectacular economic success. Companies sourcing and exporting from China have also reaped handsome profits. However, for the U.S. economy it has been a different story. Manufacturing has steadily bled jobs as companies have closed factories in the face of low cost Chinese competition, and production and investment have shifted to China. That has tempered wages and investment spending, which helps explain the weak economic recovery and unsatisfactory expansion. It has also eroded the U.S. industrial base while expanding China’s, thereby creating new national security problems

Through its trade surpluses, China has accumulated 1.2 trillion dollars of foreign exchange reserves—mostly held in U.S. treasury bills. Recently, China announced it will invest some of those funds in American equities, signaling the beginning of a new chapter that promises to further entrench existing policy. The new initiative will deepen Wall Street’s support for current policy by offering the prospect of huge fees and capital gains from re-investing China’s reserves. Consequently, Wall Street will now throw its full weight behind existing policy since the Street recognizes China needs continuing trade surpluses if it is to invest its foreign exchange holdings in risky assets such as equities. That augurs badly for the U.S. and Main Street.

Wall Street’s greatest influence is at Treasury, which has been the leader in designing U.S.-China economic policy. The strong dollar policy originated at Treasury in the 1990s, and Treasury has persistently refused to label China a currency manipulator for fear of triggering irresistible public pressure for real action.

On top of this, Treasury Secretary Paulson—a Goldman Sachs alumnus—is actively advocating policies that risk compounding the damage to the U.S. economy. Thus, Treasury has consistently pushed China to open its financial markets and let money exit, and China has been doing just that. This benefits Wall Street since money flows there, but it reduces pressure on China to appreciate its currency. Worse than that, the yuan could even depreciate if enough Chinese wealth holders decide to exit to diversify their portfolios against economic and political risk. That would be disastrous for the U.S. economy, but good news for Wall Street.

The profit vs. country dilemma is compounded by the political power of corporations, which has enabled them to capture policy. In earlier eras such capture promoted domestic monopoly and corruption in government procurement and tax policy. Today, it still does that (look at the Bush administration), but now it also enables corporations to push policies placing their interests ahead of country. That is the lesson of China.

Free market societies need separation between market and government, intermediated by constitutional democracy. In the 20th century many countries suffered from excessive government control over market activities, and they paid a heavy price. In the 21st century America risks paying a heavy price from the reverse problem of allowing excessive corporate influence over government.

This is a huge danger, yet it is off the political radar. One reason is that business funds both Republicans and Democrats, thereby silencing both. A second reason is that much of the public believes businessmen are smart and can run government well—after all, they are rich. Put the two together, and it is easy to see why business executives move seamlessly from Wall Street and corporate boardrooms to top government policy offices on Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues. That suggests the supply of rope will remain plentiful and Lenin may have the last laugh.


China: middle kingdom, world centre

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By Martine Bulard
Le Monde diplomatique
Issue: August 2005


China has announced that the yuan will no longer be pegged to the dollar; greater currency flexibility will permit Beijing to use monetary policy to control its economy. And the entry of its enormous labour force into the global economy will change the world balance of trade. China wants to bypass the Japanese-United States alliance in Asia and at the United Nations, and, through asymmetrical diplomacy, become a different kind of world power.

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UPI/Zogby Poll: 75% say China top U.S. economic rival

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ZOGBY INTERNATIONAL
May 23, 2007


Most view China as an economic threat to the U.S. and are worried about China’s increased consumption of energy resources

Americans overwhelmingly believe China is the chief economic rival of the U.S. and more than half view China as an economic threat, a new UPI/Zogby Interactive poll shows.

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China, U.S.: An Economic Consensus

Strategic Forecasting
May 18, 2007


Summary

China has widened the trading band for the yuan from 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent effective May 21. The increase precedes Vice Premier Wu Yi\'s visit to Washington to meet with U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson for the annual U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue. Beijing\'s move is part of a series of steps to demonstrate progress on currency and trade issues designed to respond to U.S. pressure on Chinese economic policies. The Chinese, the U.S. administration and even the U.S. Congress agree that while change is needed, China should move methodically rather than drastically alter its economic policies.

Analysis

The People\'s Bank of China announced May 18 that the daily spot market trading band for the yuan against the dollar will widen from 0.3 percent to 0.5 percent beginning May 21. The change comes ahead of Vice Premier Wu Yi\'s visit to Washington for the latest round of the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue. The widening of the trade band is not entirely unexpected; Premier Wen Jiabao hinted nearly as much back in 2006.
The shift is part of a series of gradual steps by China to alter its economic policies -- a slow process that has the backing and cooperation of the U.S. administration. And even the U.S. Congress, which talks of 27 percent tariffs on Chinese-made goods, in reality has little desire to see a massive and rapid shift in Chinese currency and trade policies, despite the domestic political benefits of keeping the issue front-and-center.
Facing continued pressure from the United States, in 2005 Beijing broke from its fixed yuan peg to the dollar and established a floating peg, with a maximum 0.3 percent daily band. The gradual appreciation of the yuan since then has already moved the yuan past the Hong Kong dollar in relation to the U.S. dollar. (At one time it was thought the yuan would cease its rise when it reached parity with the Hong Kong dollar.) Generally, the increase in the yuan has tracked the rise of other major Asian currencies like the South Korean won and the Singapore dollar over the past two years. The Japanese yen stands in sharp contrast, having lost more than 10 percent of its value compared to the U.S. dollar over the past 24 months, whereas the yuan, won and Singapore dollar have all risen more than 7 percent.
Widening the trading band (which nearly doubles the potential appreciation rate of the yuan) is just one of several steps Beijing is taking ahead of Wu\'s visit to Washington. Chinese officials have announced additional export tariffs on key sectors, including steel; raised reserve requirements for banks (an attempt to slow lending for stock market speculation); and raised interest rates again. Beijing also has launched a number of trade initiatives to increase China\'s imports and refocus investment in China into higher-value-added industries, rather than in low-end manufacturing (which makes up a large portion of China\'s exports).
But even as China makes shifts and adjustments, the government does not want rapid or massive shifts in China\'s economic structure. It appears the U.S. administration agrees. The strategic dialogue, established by then-Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, is now overseen on the U.S. side by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson. It is part of an arrangement between Washington and Beijing gradually to adjust the trade balance, China\'s economic policies and China\'s broader role in international politics. It is an extension of the so-called \"responsible stakeholder\" dialogue floated by Zoellick in 2005, and marks Washington\'s recognition that there is a better chance of managing and shaping Chinese economic and political evolution through cooperation and coercion rather than confrontation.
This also fits with Beijing\'s strategic view of balancing its global relations by focusing first and foremost on its relationship with the United States. China sees the next five years as a crucial time for managing relations with Washington, particularly during the transition from the Bush administration to whatever follows it, whether it be a Republican or Democratic administration. The appointment of former Ambassador to the United States Yang Jiechi as foreign minister reflects this strategic focus in Beijing, as does the creation of the Center for China-U.S. Relations Studies at the Foreign Ministry\'s China Institute of International Studies in December 2006.
The U.S. Congress, however, has been seen as an outlier, as a source of uncontrolled pressure from the United States on China. This has become particularly true with the new Democratic-controlled Congress and its acrimonious relation with the Bush administration. It is from Congress that calls for 27.5 percent tariffs on Chinese goods originate (the bill repeatedly proposed by U.S. Sens. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.) and in Congress where the trade balance and Chinese economic restrictions are raised quite vociferously. But while Congress likes to talk about China and threaten large-scale economic retaliations against real or perceived unequal trade practices, Congress also is rather slow to actually move on these issues.
China-bashing, particularly on the economic front, is a very popular play in U.S. politics, and members of Congress on both sides of the aisle participate with gusto. But even some of the biggest China-bashers have noted that they have little desire actually to pass their extreme punitive trade bills against Beijing, but rather want to use them to shape Beijing\'s perceptions and its ultimate actions. Things like a 27 percent tariff on all Chinese-manufactured goods might hurt China, but they also would hit U.S. businesses that have invested in and moved manufacturing to China to take advantage of the cost savings. These same businesses also are the financial backers of many Congressional campaigns. And even Congress\' constituents are not necessarily best-served by a massive and rapid shift in the U.S.-Chinese trade patterns, as American consumers have grown quite fond of the low-cost imports.
Despite the noise and heated debates, Wu\'s visit thus will be one of quiet cooperation. Though raising a cry about Chinese trade and currency practices is politically expedient for Congress, even Congress is quietly satisfied with gradual, rather than rapid, change -- something easier to manage on both sides of the Pacific.


China’s economic rise destabilises world capitalism (2)

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By John Chan
World Socialist Web Site
20 February 2007


The danger of imperialist war is compounded by the deepening economic crisis of world capitalism. After three decades of globalised production, the advanced capitalist countries, the US in particular, have discovered that the economic crisis that they sought to avoid by diverting manufacturing to cheap labour countries has returned home on a much larger scale.

China’s foreign currency reserves surpassed the $1 trillion mark last year, while the US trade deficit with China reached a new record of $230 billion. The American and Chinese ruling elites have no progressive means for resolving these massive economic imbalances. Beijing needs to keep foreign capital flowing in and exports expanding, in order to create millions of jobs to maintain social stability. The US economy requires the supply of $2 billion a day from the rest of the world, especially from Asian central banks, to finance its massive trade deficits.

If this process continues indefinitely, the financial system must collapse at some point with incalculable consequences for the world economy. The solution offered by the Democrats in the US Congress to “correct” these imbalances is to promote protectionist legislation against China, which will only heighten political tensions and threaten financial stability.

A new book China Shakes the World: The Rise of A Hungry Nation by James Kynge, a veteran China correspondent for the British-based Financial Times, provides some insights into the global impact of China’s enormous economic contradictions. His study found that China resembles, to some extent, the US in the late nineteenth century, in terms of its infrastructure development.

In the 1990s, after discovering that the US interstate highway system had saved American companies $1 trillion over the past four decades, Beijing bureaucratic planners copied the US system across China. When this plan is finished by 2030, China will have 830,000 kilometres of expressways—a little longer than the existing the US system. China is also building railways that duplicate much of the American railroad boom at the turn of twentieth century, including a rail line to Tibet—the “roof of the world”. The scale of China’s electricity power construction is also unprecedented. Every year since 2004, China has been building enough power plants to supply a major European country such as Italy or Spain.

On the other hand, Kynge pointed out, the wages of Chinese workers are far worse when compared to English workers during the Industrial Revolution or an American worker in nineteenth century. Some 200 years ago, a British Weavers Minimum Wage Bill proposed to pay eight shillings a week. After adjusting for time and converting into Chinese currency, Kynge estimated this was double the average wage of a semi-skilled rural migrant worker in China today. A Chicago worker in a lumber yard in the 1850s would have earned between one and half to three times more than a modern Chinese worker doing a similar job today.

The marriage between modern infrastructure and the country’s vast pool of cheap labour is the key to China becoming the new manufacturing centre for global capital. But China is no longer just a cheap labour platform. It is also rapidly developing as a more sophisticated industrial power. According to the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), mainly due to growing international investment, China last year surpassed Japan to become the world’s second largest spender on research and development. China has also overtaken Germany as the fifth most prolific nation in filing patents for new processes and technologies.

Although its overall capacity for technological innovation still lags far behind industrially developed countries, these figures demonstrate that China is rapidly catching up. Coupled with rampant violations by Chinese companies of intellectual property rights—ranging from DVDs to cars—China’s economy is growing not just at the expense of jobs in South East Asia and Latin America, but increasingly replacing skilled labour in the advanced capitalist countries.

China now exports not only shoes and clothes, but also car components and machine tools that still form the manufacturing basis of Western economies. It is not coincidental that after China’s entry into the WTO in 2001, there has been a continuing drop in wages and a loss of jobs in both advanced and developing countries. In the US, some three million manufacturing workers have lost their jobs. In Europe, China’s impact on small and medium-sized firms, which employ the bulk of workforce, contributed to the continent’s 9 percent unemployment rate.

The process of China moving up the technological ladder, Kynge’s study found, is driven by the necessities of the market. Boeing, the US aircraft manufacturer, for example, initially had to send some production to China and other low-wage countries to maximise the returns to its shareholders. “But in doing so,” Kynge wrote, “it threatened to put out of business many of its small, long-term suppliers [in the US]... The process was self-reinforcing. The more Boeing outsourced, the quicker the machine tool companies that supplied it went bust, providing opportunities for Chinese competitors to buy the technology they needed, better to supply companies like Boeing. Boeing makes money, but ultimately at the expense of the industries and jobs that sustain Middle America.”

Chinese and Indian cheap labour is having an impact on more than just semi-skilled factory jobs or basic call centre services. IT companies now can outsource even the most skilled professional jobs to any geographical location. According to McKinsey Global Institute, some 9.6 million jobs in the US service sector could theoretically be outsourced overseas. If that happened, it would double the US unemployment rate from around 5 percent to more than 11 percent.

Every year, China produces more university graduates than the US and 60 percent of them cannot find a job. National language no longer offers protection to US workers from global competition. There is already a large pool of English-speaking, educated Indian workers. In China, an estimated 200 million people are learning English. The mere existence of these vast reserve armies of labour has created a huge downward pressure on wages and conditions, even for middle-class professionals in Western countries. In the final analysis, the integration of a new labour force of more than two billion low-cost workers in the global capitalist economy is a major factor behind the eruption of social unrest in France and other countries in 2006.

Kynge wrote in his book that the existing European welfare states are incompatible with competition from China. “Intellectually, many in Europe may find it distasteful that the EU runs a subsidy under which cows get more than $2 a day—more than the average daily income of 700 million Chinese...

“China was able in the five years from the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 to lay off more than 25 million workers from its inefficient and heavily subsidised state-owned enterprises. The fruits of that stern therapy are now evident in the competitive shock that is hitting Europe and America. But China is not a democracy... When workers rioted, protested, petitioned or dissented, it answered with well-honed authoritarian tactics. The result has been that state-financed social welfare has in the space of less than a decade ceased to be a millstone for the corporate sector. The housing, schooling, healthcare and pension obligations that over 300,000 state companies used to meet on behalf of their workers have now been eliminated, reduced or privatised. China today is a great deal less socialist than any country in Europe; the 120 million or so migrant workers, for instance, receive no welfare at all.”

The social costs of this anarchic “market reform” in China is huge. More than 110,000 Chinese workers were killed in industrial accidents last year. Most of the country’s rivers and lakes have been severely contaminated by toxic chemicals. Most major Chinese cities are facing water shortages. The lack of public funding in education has produced huge hardships for students and their families. According to official figures late last year, the cost of university education in China has increased 25-fold since 1989, while average real urban incomes have increased only 2.3-fold in the past 18 years. While China’s counterfeiting businesses has created a profitable, multi-billion underground economy, its fake goods, including drugs and foods, have damaged the health of tens of millions of people.

The “rise of China” does not signal a new golden age for capitalism. Long before China becomes a mature capitalist power, it will confront violent struggles with other powers for raw materials and geopolitical influence. The US and Japan have already expressed their open hostility toward a more assertive China. Last year Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Chinese President Hu Jintao that Asia was big enough for the two countries. In fact, the economic dynamism of the two rivals is placing them on a collision course for regional dominance.

China’s socially destructive industrialisation is not based on a historic upward expansion of world capitalism, but is the product of its decay. China’s economic growth will deepen class tensions around the world by intensifying the downward global pressure on wages and working conditions. Within China, harsh social conditions and political repression must inevitably generate a social explosion among the country’s hundreds of millions of workers and rural poor.

The world capitalist system has already produced the objective conditions for revolutionary upheavals across the globe. Our next step is to reach out to the most advanced layers of young people, workers and professionals to equip them with an international socialist perspective. This will be the most decisive factor in the struggles against war, militarism and social inequality.


China’s economic rise destabilises world capitalism (1)

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By John Chan
World Socialist Web Site
19 February 2007


(The following is the first part of a report delivered by World Socialist Web Site correspondent John Chan to a membership meeting of the Socialist Equality Party (Australia) from January 25 to January 27, 2007)

Political events in the past year have confirmed the analysis we made at the meeting of the International Editorial Board of the World Socialist Web Site in January 2006. Instead of moving into a new era of ascendancy, the world capitalist system has entered a period of war and revolution.

The debacles in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that brute force cannot reverse the historic decline of US imperialism. At the same time, the capitalist nation-state system is organically incapable of peacefully resolving the problem of who is going to be the dominant power, either regionally or internationally.

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, no major power, including emerging ones such as China, India and Russia, is capable of establishing a new equilibrium of world capitalism. On the contrary, their emergence, along with the more aggressive military posture of imperialist powers such as Germany and Japan, is a profoundly destabilising factor. Far from accepting a so-called “multi-polar world,” American imperialism is trying to use its residual military might to maintain its hegemonic position as the sole superpower.

The prospect of US militarism driving mankind into a global conflagration is not remote. As the Bush administration intensifies its military escalation in Iraq, it is also threatening a wider regional war against Iran and Syria. To the south, the US has already started a new adventure in the Horn of Africa by backing the Ethiopian army’s invasion of Somalia. In each of these regions, the reckless actions of the US are cutting across the essential material interests of other major powers.

Prior to the US invasion of Iraq, there was a decade of UN sanctions against the regime of Saddam Hussein. The economic impact of a US war against Iran would be significantly different. Earlier this month, as the US was pressuring the Chinese state-owned oil company CNOOC to scrap its $16 billion investment in Iran’s North Pars gas field, another Chinese oil firm CNPC announced a $3.6 billion investment in Iran’s South Pars gas field. In response to Washington’s warnings, Beijing declared that the US should not interfere with normal commercial cooperation.

For China, these deals with Tehran are not only commercial but also strategic. A US military strike on Iran, which could involve nuclear weapons, will seriously undercut the huge energy supplies and other economic interests that the European powers, Japan, China, Russia and India have in that country. The conflict in Somalia also has the potential to threaten China’s newly developed presence in Africa, especially Sudan, which houses some of China’s largest overseas oil projects.

It is worth recalling what happened the last time the US imposed an oil embargo on one of its principal rivals, in 1941. It forced Japan to attack Pearl Harbour and turned the war in Europe into a global conflict. The Second World War ended with nuclear strikes on Japan. A new world war in the twentieth-first century would, in all likelihood, start with nuclear weapons.

American working people overwhelmingly rejected the Iraq war at the November congressional elections. But the US ruling class will not voluntarily retreat from the Middle East. If the US withdrew from Iraq, it would trigger a scramble by its European and Asian rivals for control of the region. China, like the US and European powers, is already engaged in the Middle East.

In December, for instance, Beijing hosted a Middle Eastern “peace” seminar attended by high-level Israeli and Palestinian officials. The largely symbolic meeting was used to proclaim China’s ambition to play a bigger role in the region’s affairs. The joint Israeli-Palestinian statement declared: “We ask China to take practical steps to increase its influence in the region, such as joining the Middle East quartet of the United States, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations, in order to make its interests in stability and peace in the world bear upon the future of our region.” Last year Beijing sent 1,000 troops to Lebanon as part of the international peace-keeping mission—the largest Chinese overseas military contingent since the 1980s.

The US aims to undermine the economic and strategic position of its competitors by dominating the huge reserves of oil and gas in the Middle East and Central Asia. But increasingly the US is facing complex challenges to its plans to control the world’s energy resources, especially in the Eurasian heartland.

In a speech prior to the NATO summit in Latvia two months ago, Richard Lugar, the former chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, bluntly explained: “In the coming decades, the most likely source of armed conflict in the European theatre and the surrounding regions will be energy scarcity and manipulation.”

Lugar pointed to the underlying concerns. “We all hope that the economics of supply and pricing surrounding energy transactions will be rational and transparent. We hope that nations with abundant oil and natural gas will reliably supply these resources in normal market transactions to those who need them. We hope that pipelines, sea-lanes, and other means of transmission will be safe. We hope that energy cartels will not be formed to limit available supplies and manipulate markets. We hope that energy rich nations will not exclude or confiscate productive foreign energy investments in the name of nationalism...

“Unfortunately,” Lugar continued, “our experiences provide little reason to be confident that market rationality will be the governing force behind energy policy and transactions. The majority of oil and natural gas supplies and reserves in the world are not controlled by efficient, privately owned companies. Geology and politics have created oil and natural gas superpowers that nearly monopolise the world’s oil supply.”

Lugar suggested that NATO should invoke its Article 5 if the energy supply of any of its member states was cutoff, as such an action should be regarded as an armed attack against NATO. He specifically warned of the prospect of Russia attempting to form a natural gas cartel including Algeria, Libya, Qatar, Iran and the Central Asian republics to enhance Moscow’s ability to use energy as a strategic weapon. Lugar also named newly industrialising states such as India and China as competitors for global energy supplies with the economically developed powers.

Although the NATO meeting did not accept Lugar’s advice, Russia’s move on January 8 to shut down one of its major pipelines carrying oil from Siberia to the refineries in Europe via Belarus, demonstrates the potentially explosive character of conflicts over energy. Germany relies on Russia for one-third of its oil imports, mostly through this pipeline, which also provides 96 percent of Poland’s oil imports. Europe as a whole depends on Russia for more than 30 percent of its oil. Last winter Russia threatened to cut off gas supplies to the Ukraine. It was a shock not just to Kiev, but other European capitals. This strategy allows Russia to divide the European Union and counter political pressures on Moscow.

Central Asian challenge

The US ambition to control the huge energy resources of the Middle East and Central Asia would allow Washington to do to its rivals what Moscow is already doing. The US strategy is, however, under challenge, particularly with the American military bogged down in Iraq. China and Russia are forming their own bloc to undermine US influence in Central Asia.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which includes Russia, China and the Central Asian republics, brings together Moscow’s vast reserves of oil and gas and Beijing’s rapidly growing economic clout. Neither China nor Russia wants an open confrontation with the US over Central Asia, but both countries have a shared interest in preventing American dominance in a region that is economically and strategically important.

In the 1990s, Moscow did not take a great deal of interest in the SCO, which it regarded as more of a Chinese initiative. But Russian President Vladimir Putin, facing the pressure of pro-Western “colour revolutions” on Russia’s borders, has discovered shared interests with China. Both countries want the US military out of Central Asia, while Russia is a supplier for China’s huge appetite for oil and gas. In turn, China, which is seeking to rapidly modernise its military, has been the main source of income for Russia’s decaying defence industries.

In 2005, as the US debacle in Iraq became transparent, China and Russia started to work closely to counter the US position in Central Asia. After Washington criticised Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov over his brutal suppression of anti-government protestors in Andijan, Beijing gave Karimov the red carpet treatment. As a result, the Uzbek president opened two dozen oilfields to Chinese companies and eventually shut down the US air base in Uzbekistan.

The SCO cuts directly across US plans for energy transport routes in the Middle East, the Caspian and Central Asia. Putin’s strategy is to use Russia’s state energy monopolies and its political influence in Central Asia and the Caspian region to establish a network of pipelines not only directed to Moscow’s traditional Western clients, but also to the dynamic economies of the Far East. Putin plans that a third of Russian oil and gas exports will go to the Far East by 2020, with China and Japan the biggest beneficiaries.

With Moscow building oil and gas pipelines to the Far East, and Beijing making huge investments in oilfields and pipelines across Central Asia, the prospect of an SCO regional “energy club,” which would act as a counterweight to US influence, has attracted India, Pakistan and Iran as observers.

Beijing and Moscow have also increased military cooperation. After their first large-scale joint military exercise in 2005, the two countries are planning another later this year, to include SCO member states and other former Soviet republics. Although Russia and China are still far from forming a formal military alliance, their close ties pose a potential challenge to US dominance and will provoke a reaction from Washington.

With Russian assistance, China is acquiring advanced military technology. It surprised the US on January 11 by launching a missile to destroy one of its own satellites. Beijing used the test to demonstrate to Washington that China has the capacity to destroy satellites, on which the US military is heavily dependent for navigation, intelligence and weapons guidance.

Despite Chinese President Hu Jintao’s slogan of the country’s “peaceful rise”, Beijing’s economic dynamism has an objective logic of its own. In order to secure the raw materials and energy supplies needed for the country’s booming industry, China is busy building its presence in Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. It was estimated that last year nearly half the world’s heads of state visited Beijing, while top Chinese leaders visited two-thirds of the members of the United Nations.

With more than $1 trillion in foreign currency reserves, China is very much behind the “Hugo Chavez” phenomenon not just in Latin America, but Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Unlike the US and other Western governments that posture about promoting democracy, Beijing sticks to a policy of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other nations. It has offered billions of dollars in loans and aid to various countries, as long as they agree to protect China’s economic and strategic interests.

As a result, China has become a new, alternative source of funds for many developing countries. In October, Beijing hosted a summit for the government heads of the 10 South East Asian nations. In November, China invited the leaders of 48 African nations to a lavish gathering, signalling Beijing’s entry into the new scramble for Africa. These leaders came to China not only for money, but also political support.

China is promoting itself as a new role model for developing countries, in which dictatorship rather than “democracy” is viewed as a crucial component of economic success. This is particularly favoured by various corrupt Third World regimes, which are under pressure from the Western powers, for their own reasons, to carry out limited political reforms.

Beijing’s support for, including in some cases the provision of arms, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Myanmar and Venezuela—i.e., to regimes to which Washington is openly hostile—has provoked opposition from the Bush administration. Over a year ago, former US deputy secretary of state, Robert Zoellick, commented: “China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to consequences and at worst something more ominous.” He warned that if Beijing wanted to “push the US out, they will get a counter-reaction” from Washington.

This “counter-reaction” is already evident in the US push for the strategic encirclement of China. Last year, Bush signed an accord with India on nuclear cooperation and encouraged New Delhi to act as a counterweight to Beijing. Washington has also backed Australia’s escalating intervention in the South Pacific to topple regimes that were inclining towards China and other rivals.

In addition, the Bush administration has actively encouraged Japan to play a more aggressive role in North East Asia, against North Korea and China. The crisis over North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests has been provoked by the Bush administration’s bellicose policy to precipitate a “regime change” in Pyongyang. The long-term consequence of this standoff could well be the re-armament of Japan, including with nuclear weapons.


Opportunity 08: Fostering U.S.-China Relations

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Opportunity 08
Independent Ideas for Our Next President
The Brookings Institution


Opportunity 08 is a project of the Brookings Institution in partnership with ABC News. To help broaden the discussion of America's policy challenges, policy forums and information

China’s growth in power has posed both challenges and opportunities in U.S.-China relations, and for the effect on the global economy. Economically, militarily and politically, China and the U.S. are playing on tumultuous turf. Brookings experts Jeffrey Bader and Richard Bush stress that if we treat China as an enemy, we will acquire an enemy. Brookings experts Lael Brainard and Wing Thye Woo argue that the United States must carefully navigate a sustained, high-level trade strategy with China. Michael Green of the Center for Strategic and International Studies says the key to success is balancing interests throughout Asia.

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