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荒诞者共和

ABSURDIST REPUBLIC

Posts tagged with "Globalization"

Will America's Sub Prime Woes Hurt Asia?

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Dr. Enzio von Pfei
Asia Sentinel
07 August 2007


For a long time we have been telling our clients that The Economic Time™ in America is worsening. We thus have been wrong for a long time in telling them to not invest in America, but rather in other places where The Economic Clock™ is signaling good buying opportunities.

Therefore, the recent shakeout in America is of no surprise to us. As an American squawk box commentator magnanimously observed about himself, he has called six of the last two US market crashes. So have I. Let's hope that I am right this time around.

What is different this time is how deeply the sub-prime news has embedded itself into investors’ consciousness. A lemming-like effect is taking place. Sadly, once the lemmings are shaken and turn, and the longer they turn, the more momentum picks up in that direction. Thus, a bear market in America has just begun.

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The US Market’s Pyramid of Lies

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Philip Bowring
Asia Sentinel
10 August 2007


Wall Street's dissembling greed threatens us all.

lies Sack Henry Paulson. Liquidate Goldman Sachs. Call Alan Greenspan to account. End Moody’s rating franchise. Arrest a few dozen salesmen of Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs). Those should be the correct responses to the chaos roiling western financial markets and beginning to have a knock-on effect on an otherwise soundly placed East Asia.

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The global financial crisis: Where we go from here

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Dr. Enzio von Pfeil
Asia Sentinel
20 August 2007


Reality has set in and panic will run for a while. But remember that every asset is being tarred with the same brush. As one wise owl just put it, the fire sale is occurring because fund managers have to raise money in order to finance clients' redemptions.

One asset class that is undergoing the fire sale is commodities. And this, along with various Asian markets, will rebound sharply once value has been created. Subscribers know when we feel - yes, feel, not think! - that this will occur. It is tough to put a time frame on panicky emotions, back to Prof. Kindleberger's marvelous anatomy of a crash.

China has not stopped growing because of sub-prime, CDO, SIV or ABCP strudels in Texas and Frankfurt, Germany. Nor have her Olympics been canceled. Nor has her 17th Party Congress. Nor has growth in India been stopped because of America's Countrywide Financial Corpse. The Economic Time™ in Korea will not worsen because of US and European financial convulsions, either!

This implies that the commodity sell-off is more about fire sales than about growth concerns. All of which implies that this asset class will do particularly well in the rebound.

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The Chinese Road (2)

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RICHARD WALKER & DANIEL BUCK
New Left Review 46
July-August 2007


A government for capital

Last, but certainly not least, is the role of the state, which has never functioned in the way doctrinaire liberals imagine. Laissez-faire Britain had its vast navy, efficient taxation and bureaucracy, central bank and hard-knuckled legal system. In the rest of Europe, the state played an even more intrusive and vanguard role. The liberal regime of the United States also required a strong national constitution to promote economic development; but Americans hit on the distinctive state model of a federal union that has proved an effective way to integrate and manage a vast national territory. The federal umbrella guaranteed the free flows of goods, capital and labour, while geographical representation and the autonomy of local governments has meant close cooperation between state and business in pursuit of regional development. American states have enthusiastically promoted growth via their powers over banking, infrastructure and labour law. Land use and development, in particular, have been almost entirely left to city officials. The result has been a diverse array of competing pro-growth coalitions greasing the wheels of commerce; the political economy of boosterism is an essential part of the American scene.

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The Chinese Road (1)

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RICHARD WALKER & DANIEL BUCK
New Left Review 46
July-August 2007


The PRC’s breakneck transition to capitalism seen through the prism of 19th-century Europe and America, as its cities rehearse the processes analysed by Marx: commodification of land and labour, formation of markets and capitalist elites. What lessons might the West’s past hold for China’s future?

Cities in the Transition to Capitalism

Modern China is undergoing a relentless process of transformation, from the forests of construction cranes in its coastal cities to the gargantuan infrastructure projects in its interior. Its economic trajectory has been equally dramatic: China is now ranked 4th in the world by gdp, rising from 11th in 1990. A range of developments testify to its rapid progress along the path to a capitalist economy: the commodification of land and labour, emergence of private firms, formation of finance capital, among many others. [1] Yet China scholars have been curiously reluctant to apply the classic Marxist idea of a transition to capitalism—and its corollary, primitive accumulation—to the Chinese case. Instead, they quite loosely use terms such as globalization, marketization, post-socialism, reform era and market socialism, seemingly unaware of how closely the transformations under way in China compare with the development of capitalism in Europe and North America—not to mention many other ‘late developers’ in Asia and Latin America.

Comparison with historical experience of the rise of capitalism in the West can act as a useful counterbalance to three shortcomings of contemporary China studies. The first common error is to exaggerate China’s uniqueness vis-à-vis the general process of capitalist transition. This does not mean adopting the flat-earth neoliberalism of Thomas Friedman or a unilinear Marxism in which the rest of the world must recapitulate the economic history of Britain or the United States. While capitalism has universal elements, the road to capitalism follows many routes, depending on history, geographic circumstance and politics. Like a virus, capitalism cannot survive without living hosts, whose dna it alters in order to reproduce. Therefore, one can certainly refer to ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’.

A second pitfall for China watchers is an obsession with the socialist past. Certainly, the Maoist era shaped the country’s present course to an important degree, and China shares characteristics with other ex-socialist countries. But it differs profoundly from most post-Soviet and East European countries in that it did not undergo a sudden implosion of state, party and economy. Instead, an autocratic state has maintained a close hold on economic policy and the Communist Party continues to monopolize political life. Nonetheless, China in the twenty-first century can no longer sensibly be called ‘late’ or ‘market’ socialist.

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China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great-Power Politics?

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Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore
The Washington Quarterly
Summer 2004, Volume 27, Number 3


China's strategic choices increasingly seek to use globalization as a way to make China rich and strong, reduce international fears of its rising material power, and transform great-power politics to a more cooperative form of interstate competition that increases prospects for China's peaceful rise.

Download article (PDF, 20 pages, 104 KB)


Shanghaied into modernity

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Antoaneta Bezlova
Asia Times
Jul 3, 2007


SHANGHAI - When one of China's top leaders in charge of the country's architectural landscape recently berated Chinese cities for their breathless rush towards modernity, none deserved the reprimand more than Shanghai.
This most forward-looking city in China is in a quandary. Driven by its overpowering desire to modernize, Shanghai wants to forge a new identity, but is reminded at every step that its uniqueness is entirely defined by its historical legacy. So it has chosen brazenly to assert its new image by steadily obliterating its past - and its character.
Before the communist takeover in 1949, Shanghai was one of Asia's most international cities, home to wealthy merchants, rich compradors, great taipans, White Russian emigrants and Jewish refugees from Nazism.
In 1926, English writer Aldous Huxley summed up Shanghai's charm as: "Life itself ... dense, rank, richly clotted life ... nothing more intensely living can be imagined."
During Shanghai's belle epoque - in the early years of the 20th century, the city rose above every other to become China's brightest star - an economic miracle and a cultural trendsetter. It was a place where the East and West entwined to create a modern economy and a vibrant culture.

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The China Dilemma

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Thomas I. Palley
TomPaine.com
A Project of The Institute for America's Future
June 05, 2007


Thomas Palley runs the Economics for Democratic and Open Societies Project. He is the author of 'Plenty of Nothing: The Downsizing of the American Dream and the Case for Structural Keynesianism'. His weekly economic policy blog is at www.thomaspalley.com

Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, alias Lenin, was the leader of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia. One of his best-known quotes is, “The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them.” Today, Lenin must be chuckling in his Moscow mausoleum as he watches U.S. business dealings with China.

Lenin’s sarcastic quip identified how desire for profit can sometimes undermine class interest. In today’s era of globalization a similar logic can hold for the national interest. Thus, with corporations looking to maximize their global profits, what is good for profit can sometimes be bad for country.

U.S.-China relations provide a case study of this “profit vs. country” syndrome. Current U.S.-China economic relations are marked by huge trade deficits and a steady migration of manufacturing to China. This structure was established in the 1990s at the behest of multi-national corporations and big retailers such as Wal-Mart. The former saw China as providing an unequaled low-cost production platform from which to export to the U.S., while the latter saw China as a source of low-cost imports.

Together, these business interests pushed permanent normal trading relations for China, and they also account for the U.S. Treasury’s willingness to accept China’s under-valued exchange rate. That is because an under-valued yuan holds down the cost of goods sourced from China and increases profits on production exported from China.

For China, the new arrangements have contributed to spectacular economic success. Companies sourcing and exporting from China have also reaped handsome profits. However, for the U.S. economy it has been a different story. Manufacturing has steadily bled jobs as companies have closed factories in the face of low cost Chinese competition, and production and investment have shifted to China. That has tempered wages and investment spending, which helps explain the weak economic recovery and unsatisfactory expansion. It has also eroded the U.S. industrial base while expanding China’s, thereby creating new national security problems

Through its trade surpluses, China has accumulated 1.2 trillion dollars of foreign exchange reserves—mostly held in U.S. treasury bills. Recently, China announced it will invest some of those funds in American equities, signaling the beginning of a new chapter that promises to further entrench existing policy. The new initiative will deepen Wall Street’s support for current policy by offering the prospect of huge fees and capital gains from re-investing China’s reserves. Consequently, Wall Street will now throw its full weight behind existing policy since the Street recognizes China needs continuing trade surpluses if it is to invest its foreign exchange holdings in risky assets such as equities. That augurs badly for the U.S. and Main Street.

Wall Street’s greatest influence is at Treasury, which has been the leader in designing U.S.-China economic policy. The strong dollar policy originated at Treasury in the 1990s, and Treasury has persistently refused to label China a currency manipulator for fear of triggering irresistible public pressure for real action.

On top of this, Treasury Secretary Paulson—a Goldman Sachs alumnus—is actively advocating policies that risk compounding the damage to the U.S. economy. Thus, Treasury has consistently pushed China to open its financial markets and let money exit, and China has been doing just that. This benefits Wall Street since money flows there, but it reduces pressure on China to appreciate its currency. Worse than that, the yuan could even depreciate if enough Chinese wealth holders decide to exit to diversify their portfolios against economic and political risk. That would be disastrous for the U.S. economy, but good news for Wall Street.

The profit vs. country dilemma is compounded by the political power of corporations, which has enabled them to capture policy. In earlier eras such capture promoted domestic monopoly and corruption in government procurement and tax policy. Today, it still does that (look at the Bush administration), but now it also enables corporations to push policies placing their interests ahead of country. That is the lesson of China.

Free market societies need separation between market and government, intermediated by constitutional democracy. In the 20th century many countries suffered from excessive government control over market activities, and they paid a heavy price. In the 21st century America risks paying a heavy price from the reverse problem of allowing excessive corporate influence over government.

This is a huge danger, yet it is off the political radar. One reason is that business funds both Republicans and Democrats, thereby silencing both. A second reason is that much of the public believes businessmen are smart and can run government well—after all, they are rich. Put the two together, and it is easy to see why business executives move seamlessly from Wall Street and corporate boardrooms to top government policy offices on Pennsylvania and Constitution Avenues. That suggests the supply of rope will remain plentiful and Lenin may have the last laugh.


How Democracies Emerge: The "Sequencing" Fallacy

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By Thomas Carothers
Journal of Democracy
January 2007


In the second half of the 1990s, a counterreaction emerged to the heady enthusiasm about democracy and democracy promotion that flourished during the peak years of democracy’s “third wave” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Believing that the global democratic wave had been oversold, several policy experts and scholars produced a series of influential articles articulating a pessimistic, cautionary view. Fareed Zakaria, alarmed by what he saw as a dangerous rash of newly elected leaders restricting rights and abusing power from Peru and Argentina to the Philippines and Kazakhstan, warned that rapid democratization was producing a plague of “illiberal democracy.”1 Troubled by violent conflicts breaking out in former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argued that democratizing states are in fact more conflict-prone than stable autocracies.2 Disturbed by the specter of ethnic conflict in different parts of Asia, Amy Chua asserted that the simultaneous pursuit of democracy and market reform in countries with “market-dominant minorities” leads to ethnic conflict and antimarket backlashes.3

To read full article click here (PDF)


Thomas Carothers: The Democracy Crusade Myth

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National Interest
July/August 2007


Thomas Carothers is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book is Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies (2006).

AS ATTENTION in Washington begins to turn to the likely or desired shape of a post-Bush foreign policy, calls for a return to realism are increasingly heard. A common theme is that the United States should back away from what is often characterized as a reckless Bush crusade to promote democracy around the world. Although it is certainly true that U.S. foreign policy is due for a serious recalibration, the notion that democracy promotion plays a dominant role in Bush policy is a myth. Certainly, President Bush has built a gleaming rhetorical edifice around democracy promotion through invocations of a universalist freedom agenda. And many people within the administration have given serious attention to how the United States can do more to advance democracy in the world. Overall, however, the traditional imperatives of U.S. economic and security interests that have long constrained U.S. pro-democratic impulses have persisted. The main lines of Bush policy, with the singular exception of the Iraq intervention, have turned out to be largely realist in practice, with democracy and human rights generally relegated to minor corners.

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