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荒诞者共和

ABSURDIST REPUBLIC

Posts tagged with "Party Politics"

Let us now praise Hu Jintao

Michael Chang
Asia Times
27 July, 2007


When the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) held its 14th National Congress in 1992, among other things, it duly elected the so-called third-generation leaders to fill the then-seven-member Standing Committee of the Politburo, the real power center that rules China.

As suggested by Deng Xiaoping, the paramount leader of China at the time, Hu Jintao was elected into the Politburo Standing Committee. At the age of 50, Hu became the youngest member elevated to the Standing Committee, with the full understanding that he would eventually succeed Jiang Zemin when the latter retired.

Hu's elevation to national prominence was greeted throughout China with puzzlement. The question, "Who is Hu Jintao?" instantly dominated conversations inside and outside the government apparatus, but few had answers.

For the next 11 years, Hu served in different capacities, each with increasing duties and responsibilities, seemingly going through a tailor-made training program for this future supreme leader. But he largely remained a shadow behind Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Rarely were his pictures or activities conspicuously displayed on Chinese news media, let alone printed and reported outside China. In the eyes of the Chinese people, Hu was a non-entity.

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Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied?—The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin's Faction

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Cheng Li
China Leadership Monitor No. 20
Winter 2007:
The Provinces
Hoover Institution


The fall from power of Chen Liangyu and the persistence in power of most members of the Shanghai Gang suggest that something new is afoot in Chinese elite politics. While this development seems difficult to understand using a traditional factionalism model of zero-sum games in Chinese politics, it is less confusing if interpreted in the context of newly emerging norms of “inner-Party bipartisanship,” a hypothesis that notes that leaders associated with the coastal development strategy pursued by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong are now increasingly being balanced, but not overthrown, by those affiliated with the Chinese Communist Youth League networks headed up by Party secretary-general Hu Jintao. An examination of the fall of Chen suggests some of the new rules that are emerging to guide the country’s top leaders as they seek to manage inner-Party political conflict while maintaining rapid growth, social stability, and one-party rule.

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Assessing Social Stability on the Eve of the 17th Party Congress

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Joseph Fewsmith
China Leadership Monitor No. 20
Winter 2007:
Political Reform
Hoover Institution


Recent data on overall public opinion in China make one fairly optimistic about the state of Chinese society. Incomes are up, trust in the central government is high, and many aspects of government are seen as fair. But when one looks more closely at the issues closest to people—health care, social security, and local government—then the potential for social unrest looks significantly greater. This is particularly true when one looks at the effect income has on opinion.

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Hu Jintao and the PLA Brass

Alice L. Miller
China Leadership Monitor No. 21
Hoover.org


The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) national congress that will meet in the fall of this year is likely to register only limited changes among China’s top military leadership. These changes will only slightly alter the representation of the military on the Party’s top decision-making body, the Politburo, and the make-up of the key military policy body, the Central Military Commission (CMC).

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The Leadership of China’s Four Major Cities: A Study of Municipal Party Standing Committees

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Cheng Li
China Leadership Monitor No. 21
Hoover.org


The leadership of China’s four provincial-level cities—Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing—is arguably the most important sub-national decision-making group in the country. The top leadership positions in these four major cities are high-powered steppingstones for further promotions. For this reason—and also for these cities’ pacesetting role in China’s economic and sociopolitical development—factional politics has been particularly dynamic. Recently, senior leaders of all these cities went through a major reshuffling. This article focuses on the newly reappointed municipal Party standing committees, including their organizational compositions, members’ generational attributes, and factional distribution of power. This analysis previews leadership changes in the upcoming 17th Party Congress.

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The Political Implications of China’s Growing Middle Class

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Joseph Fewsmith
China Leadership Monitor No. 21
Hoover.org


China’s middle class has developed rapidly over the past three decades. If one assumes that there was no one, or at least very few people, who could be considered middle class in 1978, there are now probably around 50 million people who can be considered middle class. Although the emergence of such a group in three decades is impressive, given the size of China’s population, it will be many years until we can speak of China as a middle-class society. In the meantime, despite indications that the middle class is more participatory than their economically less well off neighbors, there is no indication that the middle class—much less the wealthy—desires to challenge the political status quo. The fact that many more people identify themselves as middle class than can be reasonably classified as such by sociological criteria indicates that large swaths of Chinese society identify with middle-class aspirations. Alongside many fissiparous tendencies in China, this is one trend that suggests social cohesion.

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Strengthening the Center, and Premier Wen Jiabao

Barry Naughton
China Leadership Monitor No. 21
Hoover.org


In recent months, several important initiatives to strengthen central government authority have moved ahead under Premier Wen Jiabao’s supervision. Three particularly important efforts were apparent as of mid-2007. First, a long-anticipated decision to have central government state-owned enterprises begin paying dividends to the government was finally made in May 2007. Second, a recent series of industrial policy measures has given the central government a more coherent, but also more intrusive position. Finally, the center has continued to strengthen its monitoring of local land use and planning. These initiatives together make up an important trend in policymaking that complements the general “left” or populist tilt to policymaking in the Hu-Wen administration. These initiatives also have an impact on Wen Jiabao’s political fortunes. Wen has shored up his position and made himself nearly indispensable in the run-up to the 17th Party Congress.

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The Road to the 17th Party Congress

Alice L. Miller
China Leadership Monitor No. 18
Hoover.org


This summer the Chinese leadership will begin active preparations for the 17th national congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), expected to convene in 2007. Party congresses are the most important public event in Chinese leadership politics, and their convocation involves long preparations that inevitably heat up the political atmosphere in Beijing more than a year ahead of time. This article projects the course of preparations ahead and suggests some of the issues that are likely to be debated on the way to the 17th Congress.

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The Chinese Communist Party in Reform

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Wu Guoguang
China Perspectives n°68
November- December 2006


Book reviews:
Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard, Zheng Yongnian (éd.), The Chinese Communist Party in Reform

Although China has undergone profound changes since economic reforms and marketisation were introduced in the late 1970s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) still represents a niche surviving from before this period, not only in politics but also in many other dimensions of life in China. This simple fact has for a long time been virtually ignored, intentionally or not, in academic studies on China, as most of the energy in the field is, reasonably, devoted to following the fast-changing reforms that are expected to reduce the importance of the CCP. These expectations are not entirely wrong, as the CCP itself is now reported to be under reform; they are not accurate, however, as the Party carries out reforms simply for the sake of maintaining and even strengthening its unchallenged ruling position, rather than in order to open the political market for the party competition and popular participation that are often assumed to accompany economic marketisation. In this context, how can one assess the CCP today and its efforts to adapt, while keeping its monopoly on ruling post-economic reform China? The volume under review is a timely contribution to answering this question.

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Hu holds fast to one-party rule in China in major speech

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By Joseph Kahn
International Herald Tribune
2007-06-26


BEIJING: President Hu Jintao of China said that tempts to modernize the country's political system must not jeopardize one-party rule, setting a conservative tone ahead of an important Communist Party conclave in the autumn.

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