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荒诞者共和

ABSURDIST REPUBLIC

Posts tagged with "Political Economy"

Willy Lam: Hu’s Economic Policies: Liberalizing the Economy or Promoting Special Interests?

The China Brief Volume 7, Issue 16
Jamestown Foundation
2007-08-08


While widely recognized as holding conservative ideological and political views, the Hu Jintao leadership has been given reasonably high marks for pushing forward economic reforms first initiated by the late patriarch Deng Xiaoping. According to World Trade Organization provisions, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has opened up an unprecedented number of sectors for foreign equity participation. Yet, the authorities have at the same time tightened control over other aspects of the economy. This has resulted in the truncation, if not atrophy, of thousands of private firms. The latter are in danger of being edged out by powerful monopolies and oligopolies that are controlled either by the party-and-state apparatus or by senior cadres and their offspring.

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The Chinese Road (2)

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RICHARD WALKER & DANIEL BUCK
New Left Review 46
July-August 2007


A government for capital

Last, but certainly not least, is the role of the state, which has never functioned in the way doctrinaire liberals imagine. Laissez-faire Britain had its vast navy, efficient taxation and bureaucracy, central bank and hard-knuckled legal system. In the rest of Europe, the state played an even more intrusive and vanguard role. The liberal regime of the United States also required a strong national constitution to promote economic development; but Americans hit on the distinctive state model of a federal union that has proved an effective way to integrate and manage a vast national territory. The federal umbrella guaranteed the free flows of goods, capital and labour, while geographical representation and the autonomy of local governments has meant close cooperation between state and business in pursuit of regional development. American states have enthusiastically promoted growth via their powers over banking, infrastructure and labour law. Land use and development, in particular, have been almost entirely left to city officials. The result has been a diverse array of competing pro-growth coalitions greasing the wheels of commerce; the political economy of boosterism is an essential part of the American scene.

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The Chinese Road (1)

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RICHARD WALKER & DANIEL BUCK
New Left Review 46
July-August 2007


The PRC’s breakneck transition to capitalism seen through the prism of 19th-century Europe and America, as its cities rehearse the processes analysed by Marx: commodification of land and labour, formation of markets and capitalist elites. What lessons might the West’s past hold for China’s future?

Cities in the Transition to Capitalism

Modern China is undergoing a relentless process of transformation, from the forests of construction cranes in its coastal cities to the gargantuan infrastructure projects in its interior. Its economic trajectory has been equally dramatic: China is now ranked 4th in the world by gdp, rising from 11th in 1990. A range of developments testify to its rapid progress along the path to a capitalist economy: the commodification of land and labour, emergence of private firms, formation of finance capital, among many others. [1] Yet China scholars have been curiously reluctant to apply the classic Marxist idea of a transition to capitalism—and its corollary, primitive accumulation—to the Chinese case. Instead, they quite loosely use terms such as globalization, marketization, post-socialism, reform era and market socialism, seemingly unaware of how closely the transformations under way in China compare with the development of capitalism in Europe and North America—not to mention many other ‘late developers’ in Asia and Latin America.

Comparison with historical experience of the rise of capitalism in the West can act as a useful counterbalance to three shortcomings of contemporary China studies. The first common error is to exaggerate China’s uniqueness vis-à-vis the general process of capitalist transition. This does not mean adopting the flat-earth neoliberalism of Thomas Friedman or a unilinear Marxism in which the rest of the world must recapitulate the economic history of Britain or the United States. While capitalism has universal elements, the road to capitalism follows many routes, depending on history, geographic circumstance and politics. Like a virus, capitalism cannot survive without living hosts, whose dna it alters in order to reproduce. Therefore, one can certainly refer to ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’.

A second pitfall for China watchers is an obsession with the socialist past. Certainly, the Maoist era shaped the country’s present course to an important degree, and China shares characteristics with other ex-socialist countries. But it differs profoundly from most post-Soviet and East European countries in that it did not undergo a sudden implosion of state, party and economy. Instead, an autocratic state has maintained a close hold on economic policy and the Communist Party continues to monopolize political life. Nonetheless, China in the twenty-first century can no longer sensibly be called ‘late’ or ‘market’ socialist.

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"China Threat" or a "Peaceful Rise of China"?

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MING XIA
College
New York Times


"China's rise" can be seen as a quintessentially political process—through which the ruling Communist Party has sought to shore up its legitimacy after the Cultural Revolution irreversibly changed the nation and caused three crises of ideological belief, faith in the CPC, and confidence in the future. As the Party realized that the performance-based legitimacy was the only hope for prolonging its rule, economic development became the highest politics. Consequentially, the success of economic development would have to cause political implications—the external ones are carefully monitored and evaluated by China's neighbors and the only superpower of the world—the United States.

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China's Next Cultural Revolution

By Lisa Margonelli
Wired
Issue 13.04 - April 2005


The People's Republic is on the fast track to become the car capital of the world. And the first alt-fuel superpower.


The Challenge Bibendum is the anti-Nascar, a road rally where dozens of cars, two-wheelers, and buses vroom the straightaways like a pack of DustBusters, cough out water vapor instead of sooty exhaust, and corner at peak speeds of 35 mph. Named for the morbidly obese mascot of Michelin, which sponsors the event, Bibendum is the proving ground for alternative-fuel and low-emissions vehicles.

For the first five years of its existence, the rally was staged in rich cities with bohemian tendencies - San Francisco, Heidelberg, Paris. But last fall Michelin brought the Bibendum to Shanghai. The booming Chinese auto market, which grew by 76 percent in 2003, is an obvious lure. It's a market still under central control - for the moment, anyway - which means that if Beijing wants to go green, it can go in a huge way. And so in Shanghai, Bibendum lost its utopian vibe. The stakes were simply too big: What will 1.3 billion people drive?

The answer, believes professor Huang Miao Hua, is an electric car prototype made by her students at the Wuhan University of Technology. The Aspire (not to be confused with the Ford compact car) is a giddy marriage of tadpole and pickup truck. The $12,000 target price includes a Linux OS, GPS, and an onboard bicycle. A bike? If you get stuck in gridlock, Huang explains, you can park the car and pedal instead. Think of it as a concept car for traffic jams. She pushes up the Aspire's door (it opens vertically, for parking in tight spots) and smiles. "Get in," she says. As it lumbers to a start, engine whining under the strain, my driver shouts, "It's got a few problems, but it feels good, doesn't it?"

In the West, clean cars mostly have been the toys of wealthy worrywarts - too expensive to be economical and too technically challenged to be cool. China's feeling an urgency that slower-growing countries don't face. The demand for oil is skyrocketing, rising even faster than the price. And here's the eye-opening stat: In the absence of new regulations, pollution-related illness will suck up as much as 15 percent of the country's gross domestic product by 2030.

China's central planners are throwing everything at the problems of fuel and pollution - hybrids, electric cars, propane taxis - all while building conventional cars and infrastructure at a furious pace. "There's a controversy about 'Green GDP' and how to grow," says He Dongquan, a transportation expert at the Energy Foundation in Beijing. "China's in a transition where everyone's mind is changing." Amid the hurly-burly, the only thing that's clear is the future, where hydrogen beckons.

China is already taking bold steps toward an alt-fuel future. In late 2003, Beijing mandated some of the world's toughest fuel-efficiency standards. China is even now one of the largest markets for alternative fuel vehicles, with 200,000 in service. In preparation for the 2008 Olympics, Beijing officials plan to convert their entire bus fleet of nearly 120,000 vehicles to run on compressed natural gas (CNG).

All this opens up vast opportunities for automakers. The major car manufacturers (with the exception of Honda) have come to Bibendum to show that they're ready to play China's game, whatever it turns out to be. Toyota will begin producing hybrid Priuses in Changchun by the end of the year. GM, which made 15 times more profit per sale in Asia than at home in 2003, will manufacture hybrid buses for Shanghai. "This will be the biggest market in the world by 2010," says Dongfeng Citroen chief Gilles Debonnet, standing beside a CNG car his company designed for Bibendum. "If we don't bring a [low-emissions] solution to the taxi market, then we can't stay."

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China Views Globalization: Toward a New Great-Power Politics?

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Yong Deng and Thomas G. Moore
The Washington Quarterly
Summer 2004, Volume 27, Number 3


China's strategic choices increasingly seek to use globalization as a way to make China rich and strong, reduce international fears of its rising material power, and transform great-power politics to a more cooperative form of interstate competition that increases prospects for China's peaceful rise.

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China's going down the drain

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Wu Zhong, China Editor
Asia Times
March 7, 2007


HONG KONG - China has launched an ambitious water-saving plan. But analysts say that if the plan is to be fully implemented, the central government must take effective measures to rein in rampant regional protectionism.

To cope with a worsening water shortage, China has set a goal of reducing water consumption per unit of gross domestic product (GDP) by 20% by 2010.

The goal was set by the Ministry of Water Resources (MWR) in
its five-year plan for 2006-10, according to a report by the state-run Xinhua News Agency. This is similar to an energy-saving plan unveiled by Premier Wen Jiabao during the annual session of the National People's Congress (NPC) in 2006, which set the goal of cutting energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20% between 2006 and 2010.

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The Assertive Center: Beijing Moves Against Local Government Control of Land

Barry Naughton
China Leadership Monitor No. 20
Winter 2007:
Economic Policy
Hoover Institution


Over the past year there have been numerous signs of an increasingly assertive central government in China. Now, Beijing has promulgated a series of measures that aim to change dramatically the way urban land markets work, curtailing local government discretion, and greatly increasing central government oversight. These measures strike directly at the most important single source of power and income for local government officials. Combined with the fall of Shanghai Party secretary Chen Liangyu, these actions indicate a significant shift in the balance of political power in China away from local governments and toward the center.

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Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied?—The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin's Faction

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Cheng Li
China Leadership Monitor No. 20
Winter 2007:
The Provinces
Hoover Institution


The fall from power of Chen Liangyu and the persistence in power of most members of the Shanghai Gang suggest that something new is afoot in Chinese elite politics. While this development seems difficult to understand using a traditional factionalism model of zero-sum games in Chinese politics, it is less confusing if interpreted in the context of newly emerging norms of “inner-Party bipartisanship,” a hypothesis that notes that leaders associated with the coastal development strategy pursued by Jiang Zemin and Zeng Qinghong are now increasingly being balanced, but not overthrown, by those affiliated with the Chinese Communist Youth League networks headed up by Party secretary-general Hu Jintao. An examination of the fall of Chen suggests some of the new rules that are emerging to guide the country’s top leaders as they seek to manage inner-Party political conflict while maintaining rapid growth, social stability, and one-party rule.

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Public Action for Public Goods

Abhijit Banerjee, Lakshmi Iyer and Rohini Somanathan
Harvard Business School Working Knowledge
June 12, 2007


Executive Summary:
In poor rural communities, public goods such as health and education services, clean water, electricity, and transport facilities are remarkably scarce. Within this picture of overall inadequacy there is considerable variation both across countries and inside national boundaries. How can these variations in public goods be explained? This paper surveys theoretical and empirical research on the characteristics of groups and the ability of members to act collectively to promote group interests. There remain many missing pieces in the public goods puzzle and there are important policy implications as a result. Key concepts include:
- Existing models of collective action cannot fully explain the observed variations in access to public goods. The theoretical and empirical literature needs to take into account the interaction of "top-down" processes with "bottom-up" factors.
- While overall access to many basic public goods is likely to improve in the coming years, the focus of research is likely to shift to quality differences.
- Quality is much harder to evaluate than access, and the incentives for government bureaucrats to deliver quality will be different from their incentives for access. This will also have implications for the appropriate level of political and administrative decentralization.

Full Working Paper (PDF, 35k)



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