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荒诞者共和

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Posts tagged with "Politics"

Contesting Confucius

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Henry Zhao
New Left Review 44
March-April 2007


Henry Zhao on Jean-François Billeter, Contre François Jullien. France’s celebrity popularizer of Chinese philosophy assailed for his political occlusions, amid Confucian crossfire in the PRC itself.

Western scholarship on Chinese philosophy has long remained within its own small specialized ambit: a few scholars teaching a few students, so that the latter in turn may teach a few more students later on. They have constituted a rare species, which respectable universities have chosen to preserve. The subject appeared to have little wider relevance within these institutions, let alone outside. So it comes as quite a surprise to find a debate over traditional philosophy that has been raging in China for nearly a century suddenly blazing out within Western sinological circles, hitherto characterized by library quietness. It is even more astonishing to find the most famous sinologist in France so resoundingly condemned by a more senior fellow-sinologist, and in an eponymously titled pamphlet. If I were François Jullien, I should consider it an honour.

The passionate intensities that arguments over Confucian philosophy have generated in China had seemed unimaginable among those foreign scholars accustomed to watching the conflict with a marveling gaze, but always from a safe distance. Until now. Jean-François Billeter’s pamphlet, Contre François Jullien, burns with the fire of indignation on almost every page. Billeter himself, born in 1939, is a French-Swiss scholar best known for his sociological study of the sixteenth-century rebel thinker, Li Zhi, in the context of the late Ming mandarinate, and for his works on the Daoist classic Zhuangzi. Billeter was responsible for establishing the Sinology Department at the University of Geneva, where he taught until his retirement in 1999. Judging from this blistering text, however, he has not retired from intellectual life. Billeter’s target, François Jullien, has had a more spectacular career. Currently professor of Chinese Philosophy at Paris University vii, Jullien is also a familiar figure in French public intellectual life: interviewed on his work by Le Monde and Le Débat; much in demand by businessmen and investors seeking ‘an understanding’ of China’s multi-millennial culture—without which, they have been assured, it will be harder to turn a profit in the People’s Republic of Confucius, Sunzi and Laozi.

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The Divided China Problem: Conflict Avoidance and Resolution

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Ramon H. Myers
The Hoover Institution

This essay describes the origins of the divided China problem and how it has become the most troublesome factor in Sino-U.S. relations. From interviews and documentary evidence, the authors argue that Taiwan and mainland China achieved a détente in April 1993 and agreed on rules for negotiations to take place. Rather than propose a federation formula for resolving the Taiwan-China sovereignty issue, and to counter the 1979 federation proposal offered by Beijing's leaders, the Lee Teng-hui administration tried to redefine Taiwan's relationship with "China" and win U.S. support for its strategy, thereby undermining Sino-U.S. relations and aggravating Taiwan-mainland China relations. The authors propose how the divided China problem might be peacefully resolved and argue that the U.S. government and Congress should extend military support for the Republic of China regime only on the condition that it negotiate with the People's Republic of China regime under the "one-China" principle to resolve the divided China problem.

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Assessing Social Stability on the Eve of the 17th Party Congress

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Joseph Fewsmith
China Leadership Monitor No. 20
Winter 2007:
Political Reform
Hoover Institution


Recent data on overall public opinion in China make one fairly optimistic about the state of Chinese society. Incomes are up, trust in the central government is high, and many aspects of government are seen as fair. But when one looks more closely at the issues closest to people—health care, social security, and local government—then the potential for social unrest looks significantly greater. This is particularly true when one looks at the effect income has on opinion.

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The Myth of China's Soft Power

Bill Powell
The China Blog, Time
July 14, 2007


The economic influence of the world’s rising power grows by the day, its trade surplus climbing month after month-- never, it appears, to be reversed. It carries in its pocket almost $2 trillion in foreign exchange reserves—the cold hard cash that is the very essence of influence in a post cold war world. Meanwhile its direct investment, soft loans, and aid to poorer countries soar; its embassies in key capitals grow in size and influence, often surpassing those of the United States, whose power around the world seems to wane, in inverse proportion to its rising debt and trade deficits. It’s no wonder that diplomats, academics and journalists around the world speculate with increasing frequency about the growing “soft power” of the new kid on the block, and how there seems to be so little the flagging United States can do about it.
And as we all know, Japan went on to become the new super power in the 1990s. American workers now sing the //kimigayo//, Japan’s national anthem, and do calisthenics every day before going to work in Japanese owned companies, while little girls all over the world learn the tea ceremony and wear //geta// and //kimono// as fashion statements.
Ok. I made that second paragraph up. But not the first. No sir. In the late 80s and early 90s, as a bureau chief sitting in Tokyo, I did my bit to help forge what became the conventional wisdom in New York, Washington and wherever else elites gathered to mope about the United State’s grim future. To say that we were wrong about the supposed `soft power’ of Japan became laughably obvious about halfway through the 90s. Journalists then spent the latter half of the 90s writing about Japan’s “lost decade.”
It’s useful to keep that in mind as the trope about `soft power’ again gets tossed about earnestly, only this time with China as the newly ascendant power, linking its own economic miracle to admiration and influence the world over. Let’s first state the obvious: China’s influence, particularly in its own east Asian backyard, //is// growing. And that is, in fact, a result of the country’s torrid economic pace in the last decade, as once suspicious neighbors get increasingly drawn into Beijing’s economic sphere of influence. At the same time, every poll shows admiration for the United States diminishing abroad, thanks mainly to its inept flailing in Iraq. But from there be careful about what conclusions to draw. It’s one thing to say China’s economic clout is rising in its backyard and beyond (mineral rich Africa is the other, often cited case of Beijing’s rising influence), but it’s quite another to say that its “soft power”-- its ability to get other countries to do what it wants without coercing them-- is on the rise. The two aren’t the same, at least to the constituency really in play when it comes to `soft power’s’ influence: people, not governments.
Soft power is not about a government’s inherent attractiveness, but a //society’s//-- of which a government is only a part. The originator of the term, former Clinton administration official and Harvard University professor Joseph Nye, would have no trouble with that distinction. And that’s why much of the talk about China’s soft power is exaggerated. There’s no question that China’s economic success, coupled with its ongoing political repression, is a symbolic and substantive godsend to a lot of governments, particularly despots and dictators throughout the world. It says to them, see, your citizens can be economically satisfitied without you having to worry about this democracy stuff. China ostensibly offers an economic “model” in which state owned companies (unlike in the United States or much of Europe) continue to play a big role. And when there are screw ups— when, in a `you get what you pay for’ economic culture, companies obsessed with cost cutting contaminate a bunch of food exports—you can swiftly execute (as China did this week) the corrupt former head of the country’s Food and Drug Administration. Forget messy hearings and public trials and things like evidence of crimes committed; you can show a mortified populace (both at home and abroad) a bloody head on a pike and get on with things. If you’re a developing world dictator, what’s not to like?
The problem is that soft power’s constituency isn’t solely, or even mainly, other governments. Soft power includes economics, sure, but goes well beyond it; it deals with how a country is perceived, what it stands for. Yes, everyone the world over knows that China’s economy continues to grow rapidly. And an increasing number of people abroad benefit from its economic largesse. But in an interconnected, wired world, an awful lot of people also know that there’s more to China than just 10 per cent GNP growth. They know China’s soon going to be the world’s largest source of Co2 emissions—and that that’s likely to be the case for a long time to come. That 16 of the 20 most polluted cities in the world are in China. That Beijing censors its press and even the internet with withering efficiency. Just this week, to take but one example, the authorities shut down a sober, informative and mostly uncontroversial site called the China Development Brief (dedicated to covering economic development and the advancement of civil society in China) because it conducted “unauthorized surveys” in contravention of a 1993 “Statistics Law.” No question about it, nothing says `soft power’ more than when your Public Security Bureau feels compelled to kneecap a nice if somewhat dull little web site dedicated to covering China’s civic and economic evolution.
The fact is, no matter how much foreign aid it doles out or how big its embassies in southeast Asia are, I’m not even sure China is the real comer in Asia when it comes to soft power. Think of India, and what comes to mind? Poverty—sure. An icy relationship with Pakistan? Check. But how about Bollywood, booming software and high tech industries, and, oh yes, democracy.
Those who exaggerate the rise of China’s soft power—and mourn the US’s loss of it—tend to dismiss democracy. In the US, they’ll often say, it produced George W. Bush, who begat the Iraq mess in democracy’s name. But George W. Bush is gone in a year and a half, and his party has already been tossed out of power in Congress in elections last year. Any bets that if there’s a change in power in the White House in 2008 there will be a sudden decline in the global hand wringing about the US’s loss of `soft power?’ Meanwhile, in allegedly beguiling China, winning friends and influencing people the world over, the Communist Party will still be in power in 2009 and, I’d bet, for quite a long time to come. And 1.3 billion people, whether the economic miracle goes on or not, will have no real say in the matter. That’s a fact-- a hard fact, you might say, nothing soft about it.

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Simon Gilbert: China – transition to capitalism?

New Left Journal
Issue #3: Spring 2007


New Left Journal is a quarterly journal produced by the Socialist Workers Party, P.O Box 1648,
Dublin 8


In recent years, China has become one of the key players in the world economy. The country is the new workshop of the world, the base for much of the world’s labour-intensive industry. Almost all the clothes and toys we buy, and much else besides, now carries the label: ‘Made in China’. China has also become a significant market for western multinationals. A recent Irish trade delegation to Beijing trumpeted the opportunities for business in China and signed up over a thousand Chinese students to boost income to Higher Education institutions here. Chinese companies are also beginning to penetrate western markets, as the purchase of IBM’s PC business by Lenovo illustrates.
The relentless growth in the Chinese economy and its demand for raw materials, especially oil, has begun to change the pattern of international trade. In November last year, Beijing hosted a summit, which attracted no fewer than 48 of Africa’s 53 heads of state. The reason? China’s trade with the continent is now worth $50 billion a year and includes one third of the country’s oil imports. China has also become an alternative outlet for South American oil, with global political implications. Following the signing of a trade agreement between the two countries, China has supported Venezuela’s bid to join the UN Security Council in the face of American opposition. The Chinese also pledged to build 20,000 homes there and to help with other infrastructure developments.
China can afford to run a trade deficit with other developing countries to secure raw material supplies, because of its huge trade surplus with the US and Europe. Another part of this surplus is lent back to the US government in the form of treasury bonds.
So the US economy holds the Chinese economy up by buying its excess production as imports, and the Chinese economy holds the US economy up by providing its firms and consumers with the cash to maintain their present level of consumption.[1]
This is a remarkable turnaround for a country that just 30 years ago was only beginning to emerge from international isolation and where almost the entire economy was in state hands.
Most writers, whether from the left or the right, see this as a transition from socialism to capitalism. But the enormous economic changes have not been accompanied by significant political changes. The same Chinese Communist Party (CCP) remains in power and the individuals responsible for promoting the reforms were long standing party members, most famously Deng Xiaoping. Deng, a veteran of the 1930’s Long March and leader of the “anti-rightist” campaign against dissident intellectuals in 1957, became the key promoter of market reform and the instigator of China’s neoliberal turn in the 1990s.

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H.D.Thoreau: Resistance to Civil Government

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Henry David Thoreau
Part 1 of 3
Civil Disobedience


(Originally published as "Resistance to Civil Government")

I HEARTILY ACCEPT the motto, — "That government is best which governs least";(1) and I should like to see it acted up to more rapidly and systematically. Carried out, it finally amounts to this, which also I believe, — "That government is best which governs not at all"; and when men are prepared for it, that will be the kind of government which they will have. Government is at best but an expedient; but most governments are usually, and all governments are sometimes, inexpedient. The objections which have been brought against a standing army, and they are many and weighty, and deserve to prevail, may also at last be brought against a standing government. The standing army is only an arm of the standing government. The government itself, which is only the mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war,(2) the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure.

[2] This American government — what is it but a tradition, though a recent one, endeavoring to transmit itself unimpaired to posterity, but each instant losing some of its integrity? It has not the vitality and force of a single living man; for a single man can bend it to his will. It is a sort of wooden gun to the people themselves. But it is not the less necessary for this; for the people must have some complicated machinery or other, and hear its din, to satisfy that idea of government which they have. Governments show thus how successfully men can be imposed on, even impose on themselves, for their own advantage. It is excellent, we must all allow. Yet this government never of itself furthered any enterprise, but by the alacrity with which it got out of its way. It does not keep the country free. It does not settle the West. It does not educate. The character inherent in the American people has done all that has been accomplished; and it would have done somewhat more, if the government had not sometimes got in its way. For government is an expedient by which men would fain succeed in letting one another alone; and, as has been said, when it is most expedient, the governed are most let alone by it. Trade and commerce, if they were not made of India rubber,(3) would never manage to bounce over the obstacles which legislators are continually putting in their way; and, if one were to judge these men wholly by the effects of their actions, and not partly by their intentions, they would deserve to be classed and punished with those mischievous persons who put obstructions on the railroads.
[3] But, to speak practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-government men,(4) I ask for, not at once no government, but at once a better government. Let every man make known what kind of government would command his respect, and that will be one step toward obtaining it.

[4] After all, the practical reason why, when the power is once in the hands of the people, a majority are permitted, and for a long period continue, to rule, is not because they are most likely to be in the right, nor because this seems fairest to the minority, but because they are physically the strongest. But a government in which the majority rule in all cases cannot be based on justice, even as far as men understand it. Can there not be a government in which majorities do not virtually decide right and wrong, but conscience? — in which majorities decide only those questions to which the rule of expediency is applicable? Must the citizen ever for a moment, or in the least degree, resign his conscience to the legislator? Why has every man a conscience, then? I think that we should be men first, and subjects afterward. It is not desirable to cultivate a respect for the law, so much as for the right. The only obligation which I have a right to assume is to do at any time what I think right. It is truly enough said that a corporation has no conscience; but a corporation of conscientious men is a corporation with a conscience. Law never made men a whit more just; and, by means of their respect for it, even the well-disposed are daily made the agents of injustice. A common and natural result of an undue respect for law is, that you may see a file of soldiers, colonel, captain, corporal, privates, powder-monkeys,(5) and all, marching in admirable order over hill and dale to the wars, against their wills, ay, against their common sense and consciences, which makes it very steep marching indeed, and produces a palpitation of the heart. They have no doubt that it is a damnable business in which they are concerned; they are all peaceably inclined. Now, what are they? Men at all? or small movable forts and magazines, at the service of some unscrupulous man in power? Visit the Navy Yard, and behold a marine, such a man as an American government can make, or such as it can make a man with its black arts — a mere shadow and reminiscence of humanity, a man laid out alive and standing, and already, as one may say, buried under arms with funeral accompaniments, though it may be
"Not a drum was heard, not a funeral note,
As his corse to the rampart we hurried;
Not a soldier discharged his farewell shot
O'er the grave where our hero we buried."(6)
[5] The mass of men serve the state thus, not as men mainly, but as machines, with their bodies. They are the standing army, and the militia, jailers, constables, posse comitatus,(7) etc. In most cases there is no free exercise whatever of the judgment or of the moral sense; but they put themselves on a level with wood and earth and stones; and wooden men can perhaps be manufactured that will serve the purpose as well. Such command no more respect than men of straw or a lump of dirt. They have the same sort of worth only as horses and dogs. Yet such as these even are commonly esteemed good citizens. Others, as most legislators, politicians, lawyers, ministers, and office-holders, serve the state chiefly with their heads; and, as they rarely make any moral distinctions, they are as likely to serve the devil, without intending it, as God. A very few, as heroes, patriots, martyrs, reformers in the great sense, and men, serve the state with their consciences also, and so necessarily resist it for the most part; and they are commonly treated as enemies by it. A wise man will only be useful as a man, and will not submit to be "clay," and "stop a hole to keep the wind away,"(8) but leave that office to his dust at least: —
"I am too high-born to be propertied,
To be a secondary at control,
Or useful serving-man and instrument
To any sovereign state throughout the world."(9)

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Civil Society vs. Political Society: China at a Crossroads

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Edward H. Crane
President, Cato Institute
Cato Policy Report
September/October 1997


(Crane's speech was delivered on June 16, 1997 at Cato Institute's 2nd Conference in Shanghai)

The subject of my talk this morning is civil society vs. political society, which is, I suppose, a bit contentious on the face of it, since China is a society permeated not just with a rich, centuries old culture, but also with politics.

When I was a student at the University of California at Berkeley back in the 1960s, we engaged in often heated debate over ideology. Marxism, fascism, conservatism, neoconservatism, liberalism, libertarianism and more were the ideologies we debated. The overwhelming policy issue of the day was the Vietnam war. Being a libertarian, I found myself in the minority position of supporting laissez-faire capitalism but joining my colleagues on the left in opposing U.S. participation in the war.

I should say that my opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam had nothing to do with any support for Ho Chi Minh or his allies, but rather was based on my conviction that the interests of civil society are best served when nations limit their military activities to actions that directly threaten their national security. Vietnam was not such a case and did not merit the expenditure of billions of dollars of American taxpayers' money, much less the loss of nearly 60,000 American lives.

All nations are well served when they respect the territorial integrity of other nations. I've always believed that the best way to ensure peaceful relations among the nations of the world is free trade. That is why my colleagues and I support MFN status for China.

But to get back to the question of ideology, I eventually concluded that my debates back at Berkeley may have focused too much on the trees so that I wasn't seeing the forest. The truth is, that for all the nuanced and sophisticated analysis of ideology, politics boils down to a pretty simple formula. Politics deals with an individual's relationship to the state.

That relationship determines how a society is ordered. Ultimately, there are two fundamental ways to order society: voluntarily, through the private interaction of individuals, associations, religious organizations, businesses and so on -- what we at the Cato Institute term civil society -- or coercively, through state mandates -- what we term political society.

That we require a certain element of political society seems evident enough. We need protection against crime at home and threats from abroad. But what should also be evident is that a free society, if that is indeed what one desires, should have an expansive civil society or voluntary sector. In fact, I would say that it is axiomatic that the primary goal of public policy should be to enhance the ability of individual human beings to control their own lives, develop their own values and goals, and realize their fullest potential in life.

None of which should be interpreted as a call for atomistic individualism. It is absurd to suggest, as both Hegel and Marx did, that individuals, left to their own devices, will choose not to interact with one another cooperatively in social, commercial, and a myriad of other ways. Human interchange and association will be high on virtually everyone's list of values and priorities. The only question is, will that association be coerced or will it be voluntary.

In civil society, as we define it, you make the choices about your life. In political society, someone else makes those choices. Do you choose the career path that you desire, or does someone else assign that career to you? Do you choose the literature you read, or are your choices limited by someone in authority? Do you spend the money you earn or does someone else spend it for you? The opportunities for political society to intervene in our lives are as great as the infinite choices a free individual faces in civil society.

That is why it is encouraging to learn, as Minxin Pei will tell us in the first session this morning, that the growth of voluntary organizations in China over the past several years has been significant, laying the groundwork for the solid growth of true civil society in China. As my colleague Tom Palmer point out, however, it is important that commercial enterprises be viewed a part of the voluntary sector, as part of civil society.

The twentieth century, of course, has been a long and bloody experiment in political society. The great nations of the world have, to one degree or another, all experimented with what the great Nobel laureate economist and social philosopher F.A. Hayek called the "fatal conceit" of believing that one or a few very smart people could order societal affairs in ways that were somehow going to yield results superior to those that would spring from the spontaneous order of a free society -- that is, the order that results from the voluntary interaction of millions of individuals in civil society.

Hayek himself described the enormous economic benefits that resulted from the unplanned, spontaneous order of the marketplace. But his thinking about economics and civil society, while in many ways original, reflected the insights of the great thinkers throughout history who have understood the dangers of giving political power to a few to rule a multitude.

Perhaps none of those thinkers was as great as the Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu, whose writings some twenty-six centuries ago are as fresh as tomorrow and provide a solid intellectual basis for civil society. He wrote in the Tao Te Ching, "Therefore the Master says: I let go of the law, and people become honest. I let go of economics, and people become prosperous. I let go of religion, and people become serene. I let go of all desire for the common good, and the good becomes common as grass."

Lao-tzu was speaking great wisdom. He was talking about the superiority of civil society over political society. Jim Dorn's suggestion yesterday that China follow the path of Market Taoism is a good one. More recently, just two and one-half centuries ago, the first American president, George Washington, expressed similar sentiments when he wrote, "Government is not reason; it is not eloquence. It is force. Like fire, it is a dangerous servant and a fearsome master." Government is not reason or eloquence, it is force. In civil society people interact with one another through reason and persuasion -- eloquence in Washington's words -- whereas in political society force, or coercion, is the basis of action.

And because it is in the nature of man to be free, Lao-tzu described how much better off society is -- not just economically, but spiritually -- when politics plays as small a role as possible in societal affairs.

We know from empirical evidence that civil society is preferable to political society in economics by the many failed experiments in central economic planning in this century and by the many success stories of the free market. From Hong Kong to the United States to Chile and New Zealand, where government restraints on economic activity are removed, the economy and the people prosper. Indeed, in the United States the computer industry is both the least regulated and the most dynamic sector of the economy. The beneficial results of freeing the economy are increasingly evident here in Shanghai, as well.

But it is not just empirical observation that leads us to appreciate the importance of getting politicians and bureaucrats out of economic decision-making. The great economists of the 20th century -- Ludwig von Mises, F.A. Hayek, Milton Friedman, George Stiegler and others -- have shown that the market is not a machine, but more like an organism. It does not have rigid input and output relationships, but instead involves a constant discovery process. What is more, the entrepreneurial spirit that drives an economy is based on knowledge that is not centralized, but widely dispersed. Not only is it widely dispersed, but most of it isn't even articulated. It is tacit, local knowledge that is the essence of any economy. Only freedom can allow that knowledge to be coordinated in a manner that will yield dynamic economic growth. The essence of such a free economy is competition and cooperation. The tremendous complexity of a highly integrated free market economy is the greatest example of human cooperation the world has even known, contrary to what its critics may claim.

To give you just one example of how the marketplace is a discovery process and not something that can be efficiently directed by politicians and bureaucrats, consider the trucking industry in the early 1970s in the United States. It was a heavily regulated, cartelized industry with few companies that served regulated routes at regulated rates. At long last the politicians decided to deregulate the industry on the basis of the obvious fact that more competitors would enter the trucking business and rates would therefore go down.

As it turned out, that is exactly what happened. Rates went down and the economy saved money. But what the politicians and experts did not predict was that by far the greater savings to the economy were to come not from lower rates but rather from the radical downsizing of inventories that the now flexible route and pricing system allowed for -- savings on the order of tens of billions of dollars a year.

Government regulation proscribes certain entrepreneurial activities and thereby short-circuits the discovery process of the free market. The opportunity costs to the world economy, which means the people of the world, imposed by governments from France to China to the United States that continue to follow Hayek's fatal conceit of regulation are in the trillions of dollars every year, year in and year out. Future generations will look back at the 20th century's efforts at political control of the economy and shake their heads in bewilderment.

But civil society is much more than economics. Political society does not just stifle economic growth, it ultimately denies the sense of human fulfillment that can only come from having lived one's life in freedom -- making our own decisions, pursuing our own values, so that in the end our life's achievements -- whether raising a family of many children, inventing a new computer chip, or helping those in need -- are something we can take pride in for having been our achievements, not merely activities others have imposed on us.

Thus, political freedom -- the freedom to make decisions about one's life not just in the economic sphere, but regarding all of life's choices -- is of paramount importance if we are to have true civil society. When the Cato Institute first came to Shanghai in the Fall of 1988, Milton Friedman received an exceptionally warm reception from our Chinese friends who attended that conference. It was at a time of strong political liberalization in China, which I trust will return with even more energy and commitment in the years ahead.

In his great 1962 book Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman wrote about the relationship between economic freedom and political freedom, the two prerequisites for civil society. After discussing the nature of the free market, Friedman writes:

It is this feature of the market that we refer to when we say that the market provides economic freedom. But this characteristic also has implications that go far beyond the narrowly economic. Political freedom means the absence of coercion of a man by his fellow men. The fundamental threat to freedom is power to coerce, be it in the hands of a monarch, a dictator, an oligarchy, or a momentary majority. The preservation of freedom requires the elimination of such concentration of power to the fullest possible extent and the dispersal and distribution of whatever power cannot be eliminated -- a system of checks and balances. By removing the organization of economic activity from the control of political authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power. It enables economic strength to be a check to political power rather than a reinforcement. (Emphasis added.)

Of course, I believe Milton Friedman was right, that economic liberalization has very positive implications for political liberalization. But we should not forget that throughout the world the political class -- those who believe in and benefit from a strong political society -- while sometimes recognizing the obvious benefits of a free market economy, nevertheless persist in trying to control all other aspects of civil society. They can't seem to learn the wisdom of Lao-tzu, who said, "True mastery can be gained by letting things go their own way. It can't be gained by interfering."

In the United States the Cato Institute spends much of its time and resources fighting those politicians and bureaucrats who are constantly trying to undermine civil society, trying to sever the tendrils of community by replacing private, voluntary initiatives in education, charity, and health care, to name a few, with government-run bureaucratic enterprises. We have a Constitution in the United States that says individual human beings have rights to do those things without interference from government and that, indeed, government itself has no right to interfere, as Lao-tzu would say. Without a constitution and the rule of law, government will continue to sever the tendrils of community. As another great American thinker, Thomas Jefferson said, "The natural progress of things is for government to gain ground and for liberty to yield."

Your struggle in China is in part to create a constitution of liberty. Ours in the United States is to once again enforce the constitution of liberty we created over 200 years ago.

Just last week the Vice President of the United States, Al Gore, who visited here not long ago, was quoted as saying the government should be more "like grandparents in the sense that grandparents perform a nurturing role...." Such a patronizing attitude is an anathema to the American heritage of limited government, of a government with no powers not delegated to it by the people in the first place. The people have a right to live free in civil society. The government's role, at least in the United States, is not to "nurture," but to protect our rights life, liberty, and property and to otherwise leave us alone.

China and the United States have much to learn from each other, and I would never presume to fully understand the nature of your complex and rich culture. But I would suggest you should be concerned about last month's announcement of what Reuters described as "a powerful new ideological watchdog body" called The Central Leading Committee for Construction of Spiritual Civilization for the purpose of reviving "communist doctrines of civic responsibility and self-sacrifice." Such a body poses a real threat to the growing infrastructure of civil society in China today.

Governments of all stripes, left, right and center have through the centuries employed the concept of "self-sacrifice," of subjugating the dignity of the individual to the alleged greater good of society, as a means of enhancing the power of political society over civil society. One of the most articulate critics of that idea was the Russian-born American author Ayn Rand. She wrote of such a system,

[It] is a moral system which holds that man has no right to exist for his own sake, that service to others is the sole justification of his existence, and that self- sacrifice is his highest moral duty, value and virtue. This is the moral base of collectivism, of all dictatorships. In order to seek freedom and capitalism, men need a ... rational code of ethics -- a morality which holds that man is not a sacrificial animal, that he has the right to exist for his own sake, neither sacrificing himself to others, nor others to himself.

The alternative moral code is one that denies that dignity of the individual and says the goals and values of those with the "fatal conceit," those with the power of political society shall determine the destiny of everyone else. But those who advocate such state control over the lives of individual human beings are not just wrong, they are on the wrong side of history. As world trade develops, as the peoples of the globe get to know one another, to appreciate the traditions of other cultures, to form communities through the internet and other means that transcend mere political boundaries, they will develop a growing distrust of and disinterest in the pronouncements of the political class.

Political control of the economy today is not only a bad idea, but increasingly infeasible. Control over how human beings communicate with each other around the globe -- efforts at censorship are increasingly futile. And that is good news.

Those who cling to a past of political society would do well to consider once again the words of Lao-tzu: "When taxes are to high, people go hungry. When the government is too intrusive, people lose their spirit. Act for the people's benefit. Trust them; leave them alone." Perhaps we should call that the wisdom of Market Taoism. Thank you very much.


China: middle kingdom, world centre

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By Martine Bulard
Le Monde diplomatique
Issue: August 2005


China has announced that the yuan will no longer be pegged to the dollar; greater currency flexibility will permit Beijing to use monetary policy to control its economy. And the entry of its enormous labour force into the global economy will change the world balance of trade. China wants to bypass the Japanese-United States alliance in Asia and at the United Nations, and, through asymmetrical diplomacy, become a different kind of world power.

Read more...


How Democracies Emerge: The "Sequencing" Fallacy

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By Thomas Carothers
Journal of Democracy
January 2007


In the second half of the 1990s, a counterreaction emerged to the heady enthusiasm about democracy and democracy promotion that flourished during the peak years of democracy’s “third wave” in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Believing that the global democratic wave had been oversold, several policy experts and scholars produced a series of influential articles articulating a pessimistic, cautionary view. Fareed Zakaria, alarmed by what he saw as a dangerous rash of newly elected leaders restricting rights and abusing power from Peru and Argentina to the Philippines and Kazakhstan, warned that rapid democratization was producing a plague of “illiberal democracy.”1 Troubled by violent conflicts breaking out in former Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and elsewhere, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argued that democratizing states are in fact more conflict-prone than stable autocracies.2 Disturbed by the specter of ethnic conflict in different parts of Asia, Amy Chua asserted that the simultaneous pursuit of democracy and market reform in countries with “market-dominant minorities” leads to ethnic conflict and antimarket backlashes.3

To read full article click here (PDF)


Thomas Carothers: The Democracy Crusade Myth

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National Interest
July/August 2007


Thomas Carothers is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His latest book is Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies (2006).

AS ATTENTION in Washington begins to turn to the likely or desired shape of a post-Bush foreign policy, calls for a return to realism are increasingly heard. A common theme is that the United States should back away from what is often characterized as a reckless Bush crusade to promote democracy around the world. Although it is certainly true that U.S. foreign policy is due for a serious recalibration, the notion that democracy promotion plays a dominant role in Bush policy is a myth. Certainly, President Bush has built a gleaming rhetorical edifice around democracy promotion through invocations of a universalist freedom agenda. And many people within the administration have given serious attention to how the United States can do more to advance democracy in the world. Overall, however, the traditional imperatives of U.S. economic and security interests that have long constrained U.S. pro-democratic impulses have persisted. The main lines of Bush policy, with the singular exception of the Iraq intervention, have turned out to be largely realist in practice, with democracy and human rights generally relegated to minor corners.

Read more...


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