荒诞者共和

For these reasons, official and private sources of financial aid to media development often link their support, rhetorically if not also programmatically, to civil society development. The assumptions behind that linkage are interesting for what they imply about editorial mission and the meaning of editorial "independence." Another such linkage exists as well: the aftereffects of political transition on the media sector mirror those in civil society generally. For the media, the most important effect is a shift in purpose. Media that once existed as sources of political opposition must now contend with the practical challenges of democratic governance, as well as the immediate challenge of running a business. The news product may in turn change substantially. Speaking in Chicago in early 2005, South African journalist Mathatha Tsedu said that since 1994 the news media in his country

have gone for well-off blacks and forgotten the poor. They no longer serve as watchdogs for the weak and the poor. The poor are not a market, but a liability. Nobody covers them. It is the same in the United States, but here the poor are a minority and the middle class is the majority. In South Africa, the poor are the majority. If no one is interested in them, how do we represent them? How are they part of our democracy? It is the dilemma of existence versus the need of the media to survive…. At the same time we have had an exodus of skilled journalists who have left to join government and business. The result is less coverage of our country's democratic story even as it gets more difficult to tell.42

Tsedu was one of South Africa's leading opposition journalists during the apartheid era, a role that is evident today in the physical scars he carries from detentions and beatings. For fourteen months in 2002 and 2003, Tsedu served as editor of the Sunday Times, South Africa's largest paper (with a Sunday circulation of 3.5 million) and not one known for being the voice of the powerless. He was eventually fired by the paper's owner, Johnnic Communications (Johncom), which claimed his performance was unsatisfactory, and specifically that he failed to produce an "independent quality newspaper that sustains our democracy, is trusted by its readers and advertisers, is targeted at those people in Living Standards Measures categories 6-10 in South Africa and Southern Africa, and is profitable."43 But as one South African commentator noted, the question is not why Tsedu was fired, but why he was ever hired:

They knew he came from a deeply embedded tradition of Black Consciousness activism. They knew that Africanisation was important to him. They knew that he had a strong change agenda, including getting rid of the popular and lucrative – but controversial – "extra" editions…. They knew that the slogan he often annunciated was: "Journalism must serve the poor and the powerless." But having selected him, Johncom management must have known that this would mean a disruption in staff, readership, sales, advertising and revenue. Why did they appoint him if they did not want to go down this road?44

What makes Tsedu's firing particularly notable is that Johnnic Communications is itself one of South Africa's most visible democratization projects. Formerly known as Times Media Limited, Johnnic is a publicly traded firm, owned by a coalition of black business groups and trade unions known as the National Empowerment Consortium. Johnnic's executive staff and board of directors are composed predominately of blacks and representatives of other "previously disadvantaged communities." Johnnic owns several publishing and entertainment properties, but the Sunday Times is the money-making machine at the heart of the enterprise. And because the controlling Consortium is itself deeply in debt, it is highly sensitive to changes in share prices and profit levels. According to the commentator quoted above:

Tsedu's dismissal is not about media freedom, for no one is suggesting it was an attempt to stifle his views. It is not about race, much as this provides the cover for those who want simple and crude explanations. It is about the complexities, contradictions, limitations and difficulties of transformation in an empowerment media company. It raises questions about what transformation is intended to achieve. Is the goal to maximize the profitability of empowerment shareholders? Does it mean closing a New York bureau and opening one in Lagos? Does it mean getting rid of the "ethnic" editions, which were conceived in the sin of apartheid but are popular and lucrative? Does it mean hiring political editors who have no experience? How does one weigh the demands for change against shareholders' demands for growth? Which takes priority?

One thing is clear: there is no point to transformation if the end-product is not a healthy and profitable newspaper. There is little value to empowerment if you have been empowered to control a shell. All of this takes place in an increasingly competitive market. The Sunday Times used to be the undisputed king of the English-language weekend, but now it has to fight off the City Press, Sunday World, Sunday Sun and Sunday Independent, some of whom are eating away at the top of the market, others at the bottom.45

The sustainability dilemma is thus important not only for what it suggests about financial viability, but also for providing a perspective for thinking about a more fundamental question: What is media independence and what is it for? Media assistance programs, whatever their purpose, rarely address this question head on. When they do, the answer tends to be understandably short and abstract. The sum of it is usually that journalism is a means to an end: to promote fair elections and universal suffrage; to develop political parties; to guide legal, judicial, and administrative reform; to strengthen civil society; to support public education and social services; and perhaps most often, to promote free-market economies. Media assistance programs focus on the relationship between journalism and civil society mostly because donors believe the two are symbiotically joined. It is not uncommon to hear that free and independent media are a necessary, even sufficient, condition for sustaining civil society, and it is nearly impossible to find literature on media development that does not include (mostly vague) assertions about its importance to civil society development.

Even assistance organizations that are founded, funded, and run by journalists and journalism organizations tend to shy away from any but the most general statements about the goals of press freedom and independence. American journalists are particularly wary of this discussion. Media assistance, after all, is an undeniably political activity, but because their professional norms frown on anything that might be characterized as advocacy, journalists tend to characterize what they do as training, largely neutral as to matters of content or editorial mission. One common refrain, for instance, holds that Western media trainers show aid beneficiaries "how" to cover the news but never "what" to cover. One commentator calls this an "occupational ideology of professionalism"46 that in itself is assumed to enhance democracy.

Other media assistance providers are more bold stating their objectives. USAID's published materials are notable and praiseworthy in this regard; they are far more explicit about basic questions of journalistic purpose and media system architecture than anything in American press law. Some private sources of media assistance also advocate particular ideas about press freedom and its purposes, which should not be surprising. In most places that receive media assistance, the assistance is intended to help publicize and perhaps remedy gross social inequities and injustices, up to and including the legacies of political torture and mass murder. Professional norms notwithstanding, "neutrality" concerning the violations of fundamental human rights is immoral. In any case, media assistance providers can hardly ignore the reasons for their own existence. To do so makes any discussion about the field incoherent. And where political violence is not a factor, the market will ultimately determine how the media system operates, which media it sustains, and what they produce. For some, that will be enough. Depending on how one defines "independence" (or for that matter "democracy"), perhaps it should be.

Definitions: What Does a "Free" Press Look Like?

Freedom of expression is a critical component of democratic norms. Robert Dahl long ago listed freedom of expression and freedom of information as two of seven criteria most useful for evaluating any state wanting to call itself a democracy.47 In its most tangible form, Dahl said, the two criteria require a "free and responsible" press system.

What does a free and responsible press system look like? Especially since the end of the Cold War, developing and developed nations alike, prodded by changes in communications technology, have considered this question in both normative and legal terms. And countries emerging from various forms of authoritarian rule face the additional question of what news media practices promote democratization. As with the post-World War II period, some media restructuring over the last decade has been the result of international military intervention, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Iraq. Most media restructuring since the mid-1980s, though, has resulted from a significant effort by the democratic West to export ideas about press freedom to Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and to a lesser extent Africa. That effort has generated either bilateral or multilateral financial and material assistance from donor countries, such as the United States, Britain, Germany, and Sweden; IGOs such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU), and the African Union (AU); and international and regional NGOs, dozens of which concern themselves almost exclusively with media and free expression issues.48

Both donors and recipients of media aid use such terms as "independence," "freedom," "responsibility," "professionalism," "diversity," and "sustainability" to mean a great variety of things, depending on their historical experience and social norms and practices. Media scholarship also uses these terms casually, and sometimes nonsensically. One widely used academic text in international journalism studies, for example, defines "independent" journalism as anything that is not government funded.49 This will surely come as a disappointment to the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) even as it confirms the deeply held convictions of FOX News viewers in the United States. In the business of media assistance, donors and recipients alike tend to define independence by what it is not – it is not monopolistic control over the instruments of mass communication. Beyond that, it is not clear what independence means, never mind "free," though presumably both terms somehow relate to the source and predictability of a media organization's revenues and the autonomy from government control of its editorial decisions.

Often these terms are defined by ideological or strategic objectives. In the 1970s, a body set up under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the MacBride Commission, defined media freedom as communication in the service of economic development. The Commission recommended citizen rights of access to the media, the development of locally managed alternative channels of communication, and the participation of non-professionals in media production. Western countries, and the United States in particular, rejected the report as an attack on editorial judgment and thus on free expression. By 1991 UNESCO appeared to have changed its views, explaining in the Declaration of Windhoek:

We mean by an independent press, a press independent from governmental, political or economic control…. By pluralism, we mean the end of monopolies of any kind and the existence of the greatest possible number of newspapers, magazines and periodicals reflecting the widest possible range of opinion within the community.50

This is language that most journalists would agree with, but it is not very useful to a discussion of sustainability: a press independent of governmental, political, and economic control does not exist. The press must depend on something for its viability; in this sense, the press can never be wholly free simply because it is locked into a cycle of interdependence. In authoritarian societies the interdependence is easy to understand: governments employ strict censorship to control the flow of information to the general public, and journalists exist as mouthpieces for the government. In democratic societies the interrelationship is much more variable, in part because theory is less important to democracy than how freedom is lived and perpetuated.51 Ideally, the role of the media in a democracy is to ensure the existence of a broadly and equitably informed citizenry, which in turn can hold elites accountable and maintain popular control of government through free and competitive elections. For the press to fill that role, at least two conditions must obtain: citizens have some sort of constitutional or statutory right to political information, and media are protected from the arbitrary exercise of government power. Most democracy scholars also argue for a third condition: legal means, such as restrictions on ownership, that safeguard media pluralism – by which they mean a broad array of media forms and outlets offering a variety of political viewpoints.

These descriptions are to some degree caricatures. Totalitarian regimes never succeed in suppressing all speech, nor is their control over information complete and omniscient. Democratic societies almost all have some measure of government control over, or at least government involvement in, their media systems. At one level, this theoretical dichotomy is a relic of a Cold War framework in which democratic media systems are clearly different from and freer than authoritarian ones. That framework is long overdue for reassessment, and the current emphasis on "sustainability" in media aid – to the extent it concerns itself with other goals conterminous with or dependent on sustainability – can be read as the beginning of such a process. The process has been helped along by growing criticism in developed democracies that the media in general and broadcasting in particular are undermining representative democracy rather than enhancing it.

I understand sustainability to mean financial sustainability joined with a public-service editorial mission. Financial sustainability means the ability of a media firm to be economically viable in a country where the enabling conditions for sustainability – above all the rule of law – are in more or less in place. Unfortunately, transition states often lack enabling conditions. At a 2000 meeting convened by the Ford Foundation and the Aspen Institute, journalists from more than two dozen transition states identified the principal enabling conditions for a healthy media sector as follows:

• Peace, stability, and tolerance
• Pluralistic society
• Basic conditions for survival
• Favorable economic conditions for the media
• Sufficient resources/equipment & infrastructure
• Physical safety of journalists
• Constitutional reform
• Independent judiciary
• Access to information
• Access to media
• Diversity of media outlets
• Independent journalism associations
• Self-regulation / ombudsmen / critical culture in journalism
• Courage

Participants in the meeting also listed the major obstacles to a healthy media sector, obstacles that most knew from personal experience:

• Government repression / archaic laws / emergency regulations
• Religious suppression
• Non-state repression / gangs and paramilitary
• Partisan political corruption of journalists
• Self-censorship
• Lack of journalism training / unprofessionalism
• Imbalance of media in urban and rural areas
• Unsupportive culture / lack of public support
• Unsupportive market / market fragmentation
• Inadequate investment in public and journalism education
• Dangerous work environment / conflict and war
• Media concentration / opacity of corporate ownership
• Privatization of public service media
• Commercialism in media

Journalists themselves thus identify as critical enabling conditions for media development and sustainability many of the factors that scholars and donors identify as important for democratic transition generally: the rule of law, a healthy civil society, and favorable economic conditions.52 With respect to media development, at least, these things are not mutually exclusive. Criminal libel laws, licensing schemes, and value-added taxes, for example, function as both legal and economic restraints on the press. Religious repression, ethnic conflict, paramilitary threats, and rural poverty function as both civil society and economic barriers to media sustainability. Official corruption and organized crime inhibit civil society, economic development, and the rule of law.

Without conditions favorable to press freedom, it makes little or no sense to talk about sustainability in terms of market viability. In Zimbabwe under Robert Mugabe, currently, money alone cannot generate media sustainability. There and elsewhere, sustainability has to be understood in terms appropriate to the functions of media in the particular society. Monroe Price and Bethany Davis Noll have argued that in many states those functions are not so different from what they were a decade or more ago,53 and that the nature of sustainability depends on the goals of assistance. Potential goals include the following:

• Crisis sustainability seeks to keep media financially afloat during periods of violent conflict and post-conflict, or in the aftermath of natural disasters. Here sustainability almost certainly depends on outside donors.
• Incubator sustainability seeks to nourish a variety of new media with the expectation that some will survive and some will not. Most common in post-conflict or transition societies where the enabling environment is still a work in progress, incubator sustainability also pursues supplemental goals, such as promoting professionalism among journalists and developing a legal framework that promotes free and responsible expression.
• Strategic sustainability seeks to further some political and economic goal, much in the way public diplomacy does. In November 2001, for example, the United States created Radio Free Afghanistan to promote democratic values in that country. Such media may not – and are not intended to – outlive their strategic purpose.
• Election sustainability seeks to enable citizens to make an informed choice about candidates, as in the post-conflict elections in Cambodia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and East Timor.

At least three of these forms of sustainability – crisis, strategic, and election – rely on the rule of law. Without it, any discussion of financial sustainability will be highly conditional if not nearly pointless; profits provide little protection against police raids and mobs. By rule of law, I mean that the government abides by its legal obligations under the constitution; that the police and military are accountable to civilian authorities; that the work of both legislative and administrative procedures are transparent and public; and that an independent judiciary provides an effective way for the public to protect its civil rights against encroachment by the government or concentrations of private power. The value of the rule of law, in short, is predictability and fairness. Without it, journalism lives under constant threat of arbitrary state action. At a minimum, the law has to guarantee journalists the freedom to gather and disseminate news without fear of criminal prosecution or violent attack.

Ideally, a host of ancillary rights flows from that basic freedom. Most important, perhaps, is a right of access to public places and proceedings and to government information. The rule of law also requires a regulatory framework that imposes as few burdens on speech as possible, so that media firms can serve their audiences, develop their markets, and ensure their financial independence. Where regulations are necessary – in determining how political candidates may acquire and use broadcast time during elections, for example – they must be clearly written, process-based, and narrowly drawn. And the state should eschew non-media regulations that have the effect of skewing the speech market – tax laws and licensing schemes are notorious in this regard.

Of course no bright line separates "stable" or "mature" legal systems and transition states from backsliders. Thomas Carothers, among others, has argued that a great many so-called transition states are not transitioning to anything, but instead are stuck in a vast "gray area" between authoritarianism and democracy.54 At any given time, it can be difficult to tell where on the continuum one of these gray-area states lies, partly because the judgment can depend on the measures one uses. Democratic progress comprises several independent variables, though none may be susceptible to easy measurement. For official purposes, and sometimes as well for journalistic ones, the most popular indicator of democratic momentum is a successful election (and ideally more than one) that is free and fair, and in which a majority of eligible voters participate. Elections have tangible qualities: they are usually bound by rules and fixed by time, and they can be observed, with votes counted and observations about process compared to electoral outcomes. Elections, in other words, can be evaluated more or less objectively. But of course an election by itself is no guarantee of democracy. Iraq, Ukraine, and Indonesia all held national elections in 2004 and 2005, and the eventual outcomes were generally judged fair, though perhaps in some other way seriously flawed. Each country still suffers from other critical problems, however, ranging from official corruption to criminal violence – in short, inadequate rule of law development.

In sum, then, it is one thing to identify clear threats to the press, and quite another to identify the essential contours of press independence. In 1985, researcher David Weaver and his colleagues argued against trying to apply the same model of press freedom to many countries, especially a model that seeks to compare industrialized countries with developing ones.55 All of the major press freedom and sustainability indices rely on values that are, if not subjective, at least not universal. And the measure most amenable to quantification, financial sustainability, is often subject to constraints that have less to do with economics than with near-ideological faith in the market. The market may well be a better devil to deal with than the government, and when they work properly, markets are at least predictable in their ruthlessness. Moreover, journalists in developing democracies typically have little or no experience of benign government involvement in the media sector, so for them market independence is the only option. But the judgments of the market may be no kinder to high-quality "independent" journalism than was the old authoritarian state.

In Guatemala, El Periodico continues to finds its way, with some success. Last year it developed several editorial products designed to attract not just new readers but new kinds of readers. The goal is to become "essential" reading (the specific objective of Readership Institute recommendations) for a much larger and more diverse audience, and to compete more vigorously with Prense Libre, Guatemala's longstanding paper of record. El Periodico has launched a weekly supplement for kids and, to a great extent, by kids. The supplement, created by investigative editor Sylvia Gereda, has an advisory board made up entirely of teenagers, who drive the editorial content. A second new offering is El Periodico in Five Minutes, a daily news digest distributed as part of the main paper. The four-page digest summarizes the day's major stories and features several of the paper's best photographs. The supplement has proved enormously successful with women, especially housewives – a readership that El Periodico has heretofore been unable to reach. Managing editor Juan Luis Font is now making plans to distribute the supplement as a stand-alone publication on college campuses.

Finally, led by publisher José Ruben Zamora, El Periodico has developed a special weekly section on business and economics that focuses on economic policies and trends in Central America and the world, as well as on management issues. The supplement is more esoteric, even academic, than the usual newspaper business section or business magazine, and is intended to provide unique, added value to the economic elites who constitute most of El Periodico's traditional readership. In addition to boosting subscription revenue, all of these supplements provide additional opportunities for advertising revenues.

In the newsroom next door, Nuestro Diario also continues to grow, providing its colorful snippets of sex and sensationalism to its audience of young, poor, and often poorly educated readers. Somewhere in between the editorial missions of these very different business enterprises lies a vision of Guatemala's political future.

Notes

* Craig L. LaMay, an assistant professor at Northwestern University's Medill School of Journalism, is the editor most recently of Journalism and the Debate Over Privacy (Erlbaum, 2003). His book Exporting Press Freedom: Economic and Editorial Dilemmas in International Media Assistance, from which this article is adapted, is forthcoming from Transaction Books. Copyright 2006 by Craig L. LaMay.

1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1992), 263.

2 See Lorne W. Cramer, "Promoting Free and Responsible Media: An Integral Part of America’s Foreign Policy," U.S. Department of State, 2003, at http://uninfo.state.gov/journals/itgic/0203/ijge/gj01.htm (accessed June 15, 2004). Cramer was Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor in the first George W. Bush term. He is currently president of the International Republican Institute.

3 Melinda Quintos de Jesus, executive director, Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, Manila, Philippines, author interview, Denpasar, Indonesia, September 10, 2002.

4 See Denis McQuail, Media Performance: Mass Communication and the Public Interest (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992); see also Daniel Halin and Paolo Mancini, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

5 See, for example, William A. Hatchen and James F. Scotton, The World News Prism: Global Media in an Era of Terrorism , 6 th ed. (Ames, Iowa: Blackwell Publishing, 2002), 168.

6 Thomas Carothers, Critical Mission: Essays in Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 262.

7 Jacques Barzun, “Is Democratic Theory for Export?” Society (March/April 1989): 16-23, 23.

8 Any number of journalism commentators have discussed the idea that Asia and the Muslim world are for cultural reasons poorly suited for democracy. For an academic discussion of the subject, see Huntington, The Third Wave.

9 The problem of productivity lag in inherently inefficient enterprises is known as "Baumol’s cost disease," after William J. Baumol, the economist who first identified it using the analogy of a string quartet and the performance of a musical work. See William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen, Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma – A Study of Problems Common to Theater, Opera, Music and Dance (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1966).

10 See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper Books, 1957).

11 See James T. Hamilton, All the News That’s Fit to Sell: How the Market Transforms Information Into News (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004).

12 See, for example, Herbert J. Gans, "Journalism, Journalism Education, and Democracy," Journalism and Mass Communication Educator (Spring 2004), 10-16; Gilbert Cranberg, Randall Bezanson, and John Soloski, Taking Stock: Journalism and the Publicly Traded Newspaper Company (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 2001); James Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine Democracy (New York: Vintage, 1997); John S. Carroll, "The Wolf in Reporter’s Clothing: The Rise of Pseudo-Journalism in America," Los Angeles Times, May 6, 2004, http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/commentary/la-050604ruhllecture_lat.story

13 Robert Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

14 Readership Institute research and publications are available at http://www.readership.org/

15 Mark Fitzgerald, "Born in the USA," Editor & Publisher (December 2004): 48-51.

16 Ibid.,48,49.

17 Ibid., 49.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid., 50.

20 Ibid., 51.

21 Ibid.

22 See Leo Bogart, Commercial Culture: The Media System and the Public Interest (New York: Oxford, 1995). See also John C. Merrill, "International Media Systems: An Overview," in Global Journalism: Topical Issues and Media Systems, eds. Merrill and Arnold S. de Beer (Boston: Pearson, 2004), 32-33. Merrill identifies the "great" "quality" newspapers of the world as Asahi (Japan), El Pais (Spain), Frankfurter Allgemeine (Germany), The Independent (U.K.), Le Monde (France), Los Angeles Times, Neue Zuercher Zeitung (Switzerland), The New York Times, Sueddeutsche Zeitung (Germany), and The Washington Post. Whatever the merits of the list, one thing can be said of it: all of the papers earn most of their revenues from advertising.

23 Anna Carolina Alpirez, executive editor, El Periodico, author interview, Guatemala City, October 14, 2004.

24 For a brief history of Guatemala’s experience between the U.S.-backed 1954 coup and restoration of civilian rule in December 1995, see Andrew Reding, "Democracy and Human Rights in Guatemala," World Policy Institute, April 1997, http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/rea01/index.html

25 Official, unofficial, and academic sources report the number of dead and disappeared under Rios Montt’s rule between 19,000 to 200,000. The 200,000 figure comes from the U.S. State Department. See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2045.htm

26 An August 30, 2003, report by Guatemala’s Human Rights Ombudsman (Procuraduria de Derechos Humanos, or PHD) determined that public officials had planned and executed the riots.

27 David Brewer, "Guatemala press freedom alarm," BBC News World Edition, June 28, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3028928.stm (accessed June 2, 2004).

28 Ibid.

29 Boorstin coined the term “pseudo-event” to refer to events that were prepared and staged for news coverage. He first developed the idea in a 1960 article, the same year as the first televised presidential debates between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. See Daniel Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (New York: Vintage, 1961).

30 Readership Institute, http://www.readership.org/

31 "Auditing Your Newspaper’s 'Experiences,'" Readership Institute, July 2004, 3, http://www.readership.org/new_readers/data/auditing_experiences.pdf

32 See, for example, "Key Newspaper Experiences," Readership Institute, July 2004, 3, http://www.readership.org/new_readers/data/key_experiences.pdf

33 Richard Longworth, executive director, Global Chicago Center, Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, author interview, Evanston, Illinois, April 16, 2005.

34 Juan Carlos Velazquez, sales manager, El Periodico, author interview, Guatemala City, September 16, 2004.

35 Carlos Gonzales Campo, general manager, El Periodico, author interview, Guatemala City, September 15, 2004.

36 Sheila Coronel, executive director, Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, author interview, Queenstown, Md., May 31, 2000.

37 Thomas A. Bauer, "Two Schools of Thought," deScripto: A Journal of Media in South Eastern Europe, No. 2 (Winter 2005): 4.

38 Jim Hoagland, "Media: Democracy in Jeopardy?" in Freedom and Responsibility Yearbook, 1998/99 (Vienna, Austria: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Representative of the Media, 1999), 109-112.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid.

41 Ibid., at 110.

42 Mathatha Tsedu, remarks at the Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, March 7, 2005.

43 "Media statement by Johnnic Communications Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Connie Molusi," November 10, 2003, http://www.prnewswire.co.uk/cgi/news/release?id=111560

44 Anton Harber, "The hiring and firing of Mathatha Tsedu," Business Day (November 14, 2003)., http://www.journalism.co.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=884 (accessed January 26, 2006).

45 Ibid.

46 James Miller, "Democratization and 'Fact-Based' Journalism: Donor Politics in East Central Europe," paper presented at an International Conference of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication, London, January 5, 2002.

47 Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and its Critics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

48 For excellent overviews of the universe of media assistance, see Monroe E. Price, Bethany Davis Noll, and Daniel De Luce, Mapping Media Assistance (Oxford: The Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, 2002); Ellen Hume, The Media Missionaries: American Support for International Journalism (Miami, Florida: John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, May 2002), http://www.ellenhume.com/articles/missionaries1_contents.html and James Miller, Democratization and Fact-Based Journalism: Donor Politics in East Central Europe (New York: Council for European Studies, 2001), http://www.europanet.org/conference2002/abstracts/j1_miller.htm

49 Hatchen and Scotton, The World News Prism, 32.

50 UNESCO, Declaration of Windhoek, Windhoek, Nambibia, May 3, 1991, http://www.unesco.org/webworld/com_media/communication_democracy/windhoek.htm

51 For a wonderful explanation of democracy and its conflicting theories, see Barzun, "Is Democratic Theory for Export?."

52 See Monroe Price and Peter Krug, The Enabling Environment for a Free and Independent Media. (Washington, D.C.: United States Agency for International Development, 2002), http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/enablingenvironment.pdf

53 Monroe E. Price and Bethany Davis Noll, Media Sustainability: Democracy and Development (Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 2002), http://www.aspeninst.org/c&s/nonpub/20020909/price_noll.pdf

54 Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," Journal of Democracy (January 2002): 5-21.

55 David H. Weaver, J.M. Buddenbaum, and J.E. Fair, "Press Freedom, Media, and Development, 1950-1979: A Study of 134 Nations," Journal of Communication, Vol. 35, No. 2 (1985): 104-117.