..out of the dark

The coordination of assistance programs by the Defense
Department, State Department, United States Agency for International
Development, and other agencies has been ineffective.
There are no clear lines establishing who is in charge of
reconstruction.
As resources decline, the U.S. reconstruction effort is
changing its focus, shifting from infrastructure, education, and
health to smaller-scale ventures that are chosen and to some
degree managed by local communities.

The United States has people embedded in several Iraqi
ministries, but it confronts problems with access and sustainability.
Moqtada al-Sadr objects to the U.S. presence in Iraq,
and therefore the ministries he controls—Health, Agriculture,
and Transportation—will not work with Americans. It is not
clear that Iraqis can or will maintain and operate reconstruction
projects launched by the United States.

Iran has long-standing ties to many Iraqi Shia politicians, many
of whom were exiled to Iran during the Saddam Hussein
regime.

Proposed talks between Iran and the United States about
the situation in Iraq have not taken place. One Iraqi official
told us: “Iran is negotiating with the United States in the streets
of Baghdad.”

Yes, like Ali al- Sistani, who was credited a few pages ago for being the single person calling for calm in the entire Shia- dominated area.

Both Iraqi and international nongovernmental
organizations play an important role in reaching across
sectarian lines to enhance dialogue and understanding, and
several U.S.-based organizations have employed substantial resources
to help Iraqis develop their democracy. However, the
participation of international nongovernmental organizations is
constrained by the lack of security, and their Iraqi counterparts
face a cumbersome and often politicized process of registration
with the government.

Now where did that come from?

Despite a massive effort, stability in Iraq remains elusive
and the situation is deteriorating. The Iraqi government cannot
now govern, sustain, and defend itself without the support of
the United States.

Oh, yes, that's where it came from..

Iraqis have not been convinced that they
must take responsibility for their own future. Iraq’s neighbors
and much of the international community have not been persuaded
to play an active and constructive role in supporting
Iraq. The ability of the United States to shape outcomes is diminishing.
Time is running out.

The costs associated with devolving Iraq into three semiautonomous
regions with loose central control would be too high.(...)
Iraqis, particularly Sunni Arabs, told us that such a division
would confirm wider fears across the Arab world that the
United States invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state.(...)
The United States
should support as much as possible central control by governmental
authorities in Baghdad, particularly on the question of
oil revenues.

Applause, applause. Good thing to set the priorities straight.

Externally, the United States should immediately begin to
employ all elements of American power to construct a regional
mechanism that can support, rather than retard, progress in
Iraq. Internally, the Iraqi government must take the steps required
to achieve national reconciliation, reduce violence, and
improve the daily lives of Iraqis. Efforts to implement these external
and internal strategies must begin now and must be undertaken
in concert with one another.
This responsible transition can allow for a reduction in
the U.S. presence in Iraq over time.

On the new diplomatic track:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The United States, working with
the Iraqi government, should launch the comprehensive New
Diplomatic Offensive to deal with the problems of Iraq and
of the region. This new diplomatic offensive should be
launched before December 31, 2006.
RECOMMENDATION 2: The goals of the diplomatic offensive
as it relates to regional players should be to:
i. Support the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq.
ii. Stop destabilizing interventions and actions by Iraq’s
neighbors.
iii. Secure Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols
with neighboring countries.
iv. Prevent the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond
Iraq’s borders.
v. Promote economic assistance, commerce, trade, political
support, and, if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi
government from non-neighboring Muslim nations.
vi. Energize countries to support national political reconciliation
in Iraq.
vii. Validate Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations,
where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in
Baghdad.
viii. Assist Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key
capitals in the region (for example, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia).
ix. Help Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on
Kirkuk.
x. Assist the Iraqi government in achieving certain security,
political, and economic milestones, including better
performance on issues such as national reconciliation, equitable
distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of
militias.
RECOMMENDATION 3: As a complement to the diplomatic
offensive, and in addition to the Support Group discussed
below, the United States and the Iraqi government should
support the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of
the Organization of the Islamic Conference or the Arab
League both to assist the Iraqi government in promoting national
reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish their diplomatic
presence in Iraq.

I'll say. Someone quite clever came up with those points.

RECOMMENDATION 4: As an instrument of the New Diplomatic Offensive, an Iraq International Support Group should be organized immediately following the launch of the New Diplomatic Offensive. RECOMMENDATION 5: The Support Group should consist of Iraq and all the states bordering Iraq, including Iran and Syria; the key regional states, including Egypt and the Gulf States; the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council; the European Union; and, of course, Iraq itself. Other countries—for instance, Germany, Japan and South Korea—that might be willing to contribute to resolving political, diplomatic, and security problems affecting Iraq could also become members. RECOMMENDATION 6: The New Diplomatic Offensive and the work of the Support Group should be carried out with urgency, and should be conducted by and organized at the level of foreign minister or above. The Secretary of State,
if not the President, should lead the U.S. effort. That effort
should be both bilateral and multilateral, as circumstances
require.

And apparently the VP's little helpers assisted on these points.

RECOMMENDATION 8: The Support Group, as part of the
New Diplomatic Offensive, should develop specific approaches
to neighboring countries that take into account the
interests, perspectives, and potential contributions as suggested
above.

Full marks for actually being able to write something like that, and then get it approved in committee. Sweet pixies on a string, why not just write how you're going to exploit the "diplomatic" process for all it's worth when it comes to economic interests in the region instead?

RECOMMENDATION 22: The President should state that
the United States does not seek permanent military bases in
Iraq. If the Iraqi government were to request a temporary
base or bases, then the U.S. government could consider that
request as it would in the case of any other government.

RECOMMENDATION 23: The President should restate that
the United States does not seek to control Iraq’s oil.

Oh, we're scraping the bottom of the barrel now.

RECOMMENDATION 25: These milestones are a good
start. The United States should consult closely with the Iraqi
government and develop additional milestones in three
areas: national reconciliation, security, and improving government
services affecting the daily lives of Iraqis. As with
the current milestones, these additional milestones should be
tied to calendar dates to the fullest extent possible.

"So now we've invaded you, do you have any idea about how we're going to get out of this? Tell us, will 'ya? Please? ... pretty please with cream tops and sugar on?"

As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq
should have the authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to
promote national reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding
from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is
not demonstrating effective partnership. These are important
tools to improve performance and accountability—as is the
work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

Oh, yeah, sure... Why not ask someone in the Armed Services committee about that one, then?

RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds
with those from international donors and Iraqi participants
on behalf of assistance projects should be provided.

Hah. But that's money from terrorists and greedy french contributors there to fish for oil- contracts!


On oversight:

The public interest is not well served by the government’s
preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war
in Iraq.

First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal
budget request but in requests for emergency supplemental
appropriations. This means that funding requests are drawn
up outside the normal budget process, are not offset by budgetary
reductions elsewhere, and move quickly to the White
House with minimal scrutiny. Bypassing the normal review
erodes budget discipline and accountability.
Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in
a confusing manner, making it difficult for both the general
public and members of Congress to understand the request or
to differentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the
world or operations in Afghanistan. Detailed analyses by budget
experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question:
“How much money is the President requesting for the war
in Iraq?”
Finally, circumvention of the budget process by the executive
branch erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing
committees (including the House and Senate Armed
Services committees) spend the better part of a year reviewing
the President’s annual budget request. When the President
submits an emergency supplemental request, the authorizing
committees are bypassed. The request goes directly to the appropriations
committees, and they are pressured by the need to
act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds.
The result is a spending bill that passes Congress with perfunctory
review. Even worse, the must-pass appropriations bill becomes
loaded with special spending projects that would not
survive the normal review process.
RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should
be included in the President’s annual budget request, starting
in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal
budget process should not be circumvented. Funding requests
for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to
Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out
its constitutional responsibility to review budget requests for
the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.

Let's see how many newspapers are going to quote that from the report.

RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence
should accord the highest possible priority to professional
language proficiency and cultural training, in general and
specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be assigned
to Iraq.

Is there nothing the administration has done well so far? Hm, no, forget I asked.

While the United States has been able to acquire good and
sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our
government still does not understand very well either the insurgency
in Iraq or the role of the militias.

We were told that there are fewer than 10 analysts on the
job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two
years’ experience in analyzing the insurgency.

Let's see.. July 2003, to December 2006.. three and a half years.. No shit.