..out of the dark

For instance, ever since Bashar Assad in Syria came to power, they have chosen the role of a regional and therefore international player. Iran on their part suffer from the same malaise, the belief in being a regional power and that their political influence is to be reckoned with. Saudi- arabia, of course, walk an even more difficult path, in that the royal family only justify their existence in the region by being a supporter of the US, or a force of stability. Locally, there is increasing pressure to transform the society into a more modern vision - and the move to approach a more assertive role in the region has two positives for them: at once to gain favour with the US as well as legitimize their role as a power, and thereby stem certain brewing misgivings about absolute rule that go broader and wider than simply sunni and shia.

Syria, in a similar way, has neglected it's people, in favour of their assertion of importance in the region for stability and peace. (As the competitor to the now crushed Iraqi Baathists, that choice certainly seems to have had something to it). And the justification for the presence in Lebanon also rested on that principle.

But now we have two powers in the region that are dependent on playing the role as regional broker in order to not largely dissolve, ironically, as they use their percieved clout to help the US save face in Iraq.

But, as pointed out, Iran, as the defacto ally of the shiite majority, has no possibility to truly assert themselves in the region. Nevertheless, with a measure of democratic reform as well as a very young population, they will always be politically unpredictable. The prevailing views in Washington on their views on zionism also make them dangerous, as does the alleged wish for a nuclear weapon.

Not to get into a long rant on that subject, but it's more than enough to point out noone of the surrounding countries want a nuclear Iran. And the Iranians are savvy enough to know that asserting themselves as a regional power in that way would break their backs. And indeed, that is the reason why the "moderates" in Iran do not want to produce a nuclear weapon (as established by highest decree).

In other words, the recent visit by the US Vice- president to Saudi- arabia, the recent pushes towards Syrian diplomacy, all describe on what level this crisis is unfolding.

Of course, at the same time the crisis in Iraq is grave. But as so succinctly stated about the ISG report, in the article quoted the other day:

It is a report to solve American problems, and not to solve Iraq's problems

And it is a misunderstanding of dimensions to believe that simply dealing with the regional powers in this way is going to automatically solve anything. Indeed, if Iran was turned to glass tomorrow, there would still be an arab sunni- shiite divide in Iraq.

But now the donkey is pushed up to the top of the minaret, and I think it will not get down again without there being a lot of messy bits around. The question simply is what kind of mess we will get.

And considering the options, I believe we have the following.

Possibility 1:
Syria and Saudi- arabia will gain influence in the region, compete with Iran and make politics unbearable in Iraq, as it moves towards low- level proxy warfare, with the US acting only in the periphery. Result: limited cleansing of those assisting the americans in Iraq, and a possibility for a light federal option. The principle of slight balance will be the one sought in the short term.

Possibility 2:
Syria and Saudi- arabia will gain influence to assist the US option in Iraq, making it paramount to force a sunni rule in Iraq through the most important ministeries, and get the infrastructure built to justify the continued assistance. Result: Strong- hand sunni rule, Iran quickly becomes the enemy as quickly as sabotage continues, disaster, horror, riots, etc.

Possibility 3:
Pending the new course to be set past the new year in Washington, Iraq remains an isolated specific case, involvement with the region comes through a balanced and brokered government, while local distribution and reconstruction eventually is conducted by separate local governments. That structure would be an Iraqi invention, kept together not with force as in Pakistan, Syria or Saudi- arabia, but through an uneasy mutual distrust. There would be clear steps that could be taken for that purpose - solving the oil- distribution matter, the Iraqi constitution, and crafting ministeries that have deliberated mandates to operate in the region. Result: the regional game would be immaterial, a kind of unity not predicted by the US and not seen before in the region would eventually work to stabilize the country without continuing military presence. The US role would be small and conditional upon Iraqi support.


Unfortunately, we will have the second one. As the brits discovered at the beginning of the last century - when you introduce the imperial option, you replace any kind of local struggles with your own, and these will emerge in full fury when that grip becomes lighter. While, of course, any solution to these issues will not be found as long as the heavy foreign presence is there.