More on the theory of winning in Iraq.
Saturday, January 13, 2007 2:38:53 PM
Still, as previously mentioned - there's not much either Iran or Syria really can do when it comes to launching troops to destabilize Iraq. So this is merely an excuse for the failure. Because what Bush really is grasping for is a political solution between the factions in Iraq - something which Syria, Iran or Saudi- arabia cannot provide. In fact, they are being actively opposed in their attempts for good or bad, with Iraq or the US, as supporting any multilateral talks would amount to "giving in to terrorists", as they say. And on the ground, any other attempts by the Maliki government (or it's branches) to conduct official or semi- official talks with Iran and Syria are also sabotaged. In so doing, any alternative is therefore preempted.
This, quite frankly, is most important here, and the most alarming thing - american foreign policy could rest on these back- door talks, while the official policy would contradict it. But the lack of these talks show just how far the delusions have managed to go. Meaning, all the way into the implementation of new strategies.
Similarly, the "surge" is absolutely not the new strategy - it's the old strategy. The only "new" option available to the Bush- admninistration is what has been rejected utterly earlier on (and which is what al- Maliki would oppose, and it would probably cost him his position as prime minister, one way or another), namely killing off "that cleric", Muqtada al- Sadr, cordon off Sadr city, and declare the militia illegal throughout the country (yes, largely the same thing as suddenly "happened" for no apparent reason with Abbas and Hamas). As well as conducting more stings on militia- infested areas.
This is of course as impossible now as it was earlier on, and it would include civillian losses of genocidal proportions. Nevertheless, as Bush and his cohorts sees "success" in Iraq as paramount, this will be the natural way to go in the short term. As with the Iraq invasion, etc - they believe a show of force will work. They truly think it's going to make a fundamental difference to do a politically suicidal move, simply because the move is politically suicidal. Because this gives whatever it is they're insisting on doing the impression of being selfless, sacrificing. At the same time it's an ultimatum to the Iraqi government - get moving, or we will do unspeakable things in our infinite, self- imposed stupidity.
Why go for something like this, though? It's worth remembering that the previous establishment, as defined by Bush sr. and people such as James Baker of the ISG group, has always advocated the "status quo" in the middle east as far as the Bush- administration is concerned. And choosing Maliki as prime minister instead of a sunni strongman, etc, no doubt sustains the Bush- administrations delusions about how much greater their approach is, and how it may still succeed.
At the same time, there is some talk of "plan B", at the point when the already implemented "plan A" is predictably failing. What would "plan B" be? What could they possibly believe they have to fall back on? Do they really believe there's anything else that could be done if only the "surge" will be allowed to go ahead?
Hardly - Most likely the front here is designed simply to lend the US the political cover to stay in Iraq for quite possibly "the time it's needed to get the job done". I do not believe it's much more complicated than that. But it's also an excuse to avoid actually reassessing the possibility that "hanging on" is going to yield any results, as that would mean the same as defeat.
In other words, the recent threats against Iran and Syria has no immediate military implications. They are merely cover for the idea that the current approach in Iraq might work. Whatever else the US may do later, though - when the line between rhetoric and policy- making is blurred enough - that is a good question.






