..out of the dark

First on the list is the victory of Unidad Popular in Chile in 1970, that brought Salvatore Allende to power. In 2003, it was thirty years since the military coup that overthrew his government and brought Pinochet to power, ended in serious political persecution, overturn of social structures, ended fleeting democratic attempts, caused death, torture, the displacement of a fantastic amount of people, and so on. The coup, sponsored by various interests for several different reasons - such as Allende's nationalization of the copper- mines, problematic attitudes towards international conglomerates in general, etc. - the reaction to that came to represent the worst possible kind of misguided western foreign policy and projection of influence. Where the specific reasoning that guided the actual sponsoring of the coup were not exactly overt, while the official and presumably private rhetoric to support it at the time was a mixture of percieved security- political and economical paranoia.

The second item is one Jeane Kirkpatrick, Reagan's trusted foreign policy adviser, and her paper on dictatorships and double standards. The paper is from 1979 and illustrates the environment in which Reagan enters into at the time, where Kirkpatrick at once defends interfering actively in the business of foreign governments, while laying out the case for supporting some of these governments and not others. The standard here is that the old Truman- doctrine was sound enough (in spreading democracy under certain limitations, such as international law and so on), but needed to be forced into accepting that the US cannot go around imagining democracies could be forced on people. Meaning therefore, that the essential choice for the US would be to support "authoritarians", who would keep intact institutions and trade, and excert influence on the state through these - while "totalitarians", who would overthrow the structures of a state and cause stagnation and oppression, should not be supported. Or, said in another way, as long as the torture and political arrests don't interfere with inter- state issues, it should be an opportunity, not a problem.

In this paper, we have a number of interesting presumptions and strange foreshadowing themes, though. The obvious one to legitimize this new course in foreign policy is the Carter- administration's failure in both Iran and Nicaragua, which at once caused instability and great humiliation for the US. Whether this was due to Carter's leadership style in retrospect, or whether these aspects of foreign policy truly were abhorrent failures, was obviously not important in the context of Kirkpatrick's paper. The less overt presumption is the idea that Soviet represented such a danger that any trace of marxism in any government would instantly be associated with a Soviet satelite. Which of course was the justifications used by either Nixon or Kissinger in 1973 and since Allende came to power, for instance. But Kirkpatrick suggests that earlier excesses are now excused and made slightly more acceptable, in the greater scheme of things.

And it is in this context the so- called "freedom fighters" were sponsored around the world, such as the mujaheddin in Afghanistan, the Contras in Nicaragua, etc., in attempts to topple unfriendly governments and forces of different kinds. The fight against evil and the export of freedom nevertheless features prominently. This is the reason the analysis concludes what the viable options are, after all, in that it is not the fundamental idea that's flawed, but the execution of it, that now will achieve different results.

It is nevertheless the same policy that inspires an almost never- ending list of intervention with the military and covert operations, such as the Iran- Iraq war, on both sides, as well as an unprecedented increase in military spending. Depending on your outlook, culiminating in the fall of the Soviet Union and the relative calm during the first Bush- administration.

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More recently, another fascinating tale of inter- state political interference is written, and one cannot help but point out certain common themes. A Democrat with weak and appeasing, comparatively speaking, attitudes towards foreign involvement has just left office. The involvement of the secretive services in certain areas of the world to counter evil is predominant, and the arguments for strong foreign interference is made, this time once again rejecting the earlier administration's presumed attitude and failure to achieve results. But nevertheless the foreign policy continues largely unchanged in terms of practical considerations. We call them pro- democracy groups today, but the essence is the same. Some governments are considered evil enough that the need to overthrow them and isolate them diplomatically as well as economically must be done to counter terrorism and tyranny.

In the same vein, the theories presented by for instance Condoleezza Rice, the now Secretary of State and then security adviser to the Bush- administration, bear the same historical context. The mission is to spread freedom and goodness, and does not defend earlier excesses in direct language, but nevertheless sets the stage for framing the "new" path in terms of how it conforms with the earlier practice. No change, but once again "bold, new" rhetoric, where she explains the march of democracy and power of the US to affect positive change in the region, and in the world.

"The Promise of Democratic Peace
(Why Promoting Freedom Is the Only Realistic Path to Security)"
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/09/AR2005120901711.html

President Bush outlined the vision for it in his second inaugural address: "It is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."

This is admittedly a bold course of action, but it is consistent with the proud tradition of American foreign policy, especially such recent presidents as Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan. Most important: Like the ambitious policies of Truman and Reagan, our statecraft will succeed not simply because it is optimistic and idealistic but also because it is premised on sound strategic logic and a proper understanding of the new realities we face.

At the end of the Bush- administration, however, no evil empire will have been vanquished, and no new era will have begun. But there's little doubt there will forever be those who will insist that however unpopular certain actions were today, however misguided certain policies were, they ended up with setting the stage for global change for the better.

And once again, they will have been, in a certain context, correct.

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Of more immediate concerns for the Bush- administration is how to survive their term, though. As previously described with the Iraq Study- group, the question is what they will take from it, and whether they will take the chance to forge some kind of popular comeback (if that's possible), or whether they will try to focus on going back to the same old course officially and hold on for the remaining two years.

And it is in those somewhat nervous considerations the obituaries of Jeane Kirkpatrick, and then soon after Augusto Pinochet is written, casting an unfortunate context on the current administration's actions.

Bush to Announce New Iraq Strategy Next Year

President Bush plans to wait until early next year to announce a new strategy for Iraq, dropping his previous goal of addressing the nation before Christmas to stake out a fresh course based on several studies, the White House said today.

(...)

[Tariq al-]Hashimi[one of two vice presidents in Iraq, and head of the Iraqi Islamic Party, the largest Sunni block] said Bush's invitation to him sends "a really positive message to the Iraqi people" that the administration is "looking for a balanced and fair analysis from diverse leaders in Iraq" as it revises U.S. strategy there.

"There is a great and real chance to get out of this present dilemma," Hashimi said. Iraqis face "a hard time," he said, "but there is a light in the corridor. There is a chance, but we need a good will and a strong determination. . . ."

(edit:
http://glenngreenwald.blogspot.com/2006/12/washington-post-and-authoritarianism_13.html

March 19, 1987 -- HEADLINE: The Chilean Torture Master [in the Washington Post]

CHILE HAS a military dictator who, quite incredibly, may be planning to extend a rule that began in 1973 to nearly the year 2000. . . . But it is easy to see one of the things President Pinochet is doing along the way. He is using violence on detained terrorist and political suspects in newly enlarged and vicious ways.

Torture seems to have been routine in Gen. Pinochet's Chile from the start. But a run of terrorist actions against his regime last fall, including an assassination attempt, produced a surge of horrors by the security police of the CNI.. . .

Oh, well. It's now considered extreme to condemn Pinochet. Who would've thought, hm? When the question on how to "move forward" is reduced to doing the "necessary" thing to win?)

(edit2:

Like any Bush- scandal, it seems, it just keeps on giving:
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/110906.html

Beyond the secret schemes to aid Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, Gates also stands accused of playing a central role in politicizing the CIA intelligence product, tailoring it to fit the interests of his political superiors, a legacy that some Gates critics say contributed to the botched CIA’s analysis of Iraqi WMD in 2002.

Before Gates’s rapid rise through the CIA’s ranks in the 1980s, the CIA’s tradition was to zealously protect the objectivity and scholarship of the intelligence. However, during the Reagan administration, that ethos collapsed.

At Gates’s confirmation hearings in 1991, former CIA analysts, including renowned Kremlinologist Mel Goodman, took the extraordinary step of coming out of the shadows to accuse Gates of politicizing the intelligence while he was chief of the analytical division and then deputy director.

The former intelligence officers said the ambitious Gates pressured the CIA’s analytical division to exaggerate the Soviet menace to fit the ideological perspective of the Reagan administration. Analysts who took a more nuanced view of Soviet power and Moscow’s behavior in the world faced pressure and career reprisals.

Ben-Menashe also placed Gates in a 1986 meeting with Chilean arms manufacturer Cardoen, who allegedly was supplying cluster bombs and chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein’s army. Babayan, an Iranian exile working with Iraq, also connected Gates to the Iraqi supply lines and to Cardoen.

Coincidence? I have to wonder, I guess, considering the exceptional attention given to these issues during Gates' confirmation- hearing.)