..out of the dark

..expect the Armed Services committee to be filled with people well versed in matters relating to maintaining the army in war and peace- time. And in such matters as budget considerations and oversight, the role of the army in a specific war- scenario, as well as the usefulness of the army in certain situations, as well as the preparedness of the army in relation to that. Since this would be directly dependent on what should be spent money on. Similarly, one would expect the army would be seen as a useful tool in the context of this set of solutions it might be considered possible the army would be used to achieve.

However, the questions asked today had little to do with the efficiency of running the army, and did in fact range from things such as "do we have a plan in Iraq", "are we winning in Iraq", and to "what is the impact on our prospects for diplomacy with Iran, if we win or lose in Iraq".

Meaning that the senators are in fact asking the president's appointee about the usefulness of his chief's foreign policy. Is that truly the role the Secretary of Defense is supposed to play? To find solutions to the mess his employer has managed to run the army into, after the executive branch put a failure of a plan into action - presumably after the previous Secretary of Defense convinced this very committee that the army was capable of something it was not?

Similar concerns arise from the fact that the DOD has not had an auditable budget for many, many years. Including the many appropriations that go to maintaining the army with civillian contractors.

Now, as the recently established oversight- bureau for USAID projects in Iraq showed - the budget is unauditable because no auditing happens, meaning that there simply is no way to tell where the money goes. Which is, as any civil servant knows, much worse (so to speak) than simply discovering fraud. Which incidentally did happen in Iraq, on several projects that overlapped between the DOD budget and the USAID budget. The USAID's oversight bureau has since been dissolved and absorbed into the DOD's auditing efforts, at least whereever those overlaps would exist.

Nevertheless - questioning regarding this aspect were largely absent during the confirmation hearing, be it from aspiring opposition high on election- victory, or chairmen on their way out, or republican senators up for reelection in 2008, when predictably the president's "legacy" will be a hot topic.

Then we come to the more immediately alarming concerns. The concern for specific issues on foreign policy is not in the purview of this committe, but were nevertheless very dominant. And the issues were not raised to deftly introduce certain pressing concerns inside their mandate, of course. For instance, the main view in this committee is indeed that Iran is an evil regime. And through a series of non- seqiturs, the senators assert that Iran then has a vested interest in seeing the US fail in Iraq. This serves also as an explanation to excuse failure. Consequently, succeeding in Iraq will then be the one thing that would make "Iran give up their nuclear ambition", and that would make "political pressure" work in that respect.

Now, it is of course beyond consideration that Iran may be seeing the US as a threat since they just invaded two of their immediate neighbors for the purposes of "spreading democracy". Something which, incidentally, all of the members on the committee as well as the president have been agitating for for years.

In other words, succeeding in Iraq - whatever success means - are for these people a practical consideration when it comes to the viability of the President's foreign policy. And also the success of the army, and therefore their puissance in overseeing the army's fitness. Conversely if Iraq is a failure, it will mean the hordes of hell will overrun americas allies, a nuclear Iran, and it will mean difficult questions raised when it comes to who in fact is to blaim for committing the army to an impossible mission.

This is, of course, perfectly on par with the level you'd expect from people who will appropriate billions to the so- called nuclear bunker- busters (which were proven not to work) to destroy secret underground al- Queda bunker- complexes barely fitted inside huge mountains (that didn't exist, although some hope they still exist in Iran, apparently, which is why funding is still appropriated for the program).

Or from the kind of people who will argue openly for easing restrictions on torture for the armed services, since suspected terrorists are not deserving of anything better.

Or who would confirm a military guy to head the CIA.

The question worth asking might therefore be whether the frightfully horrid ignorance on display in this committee when it comes to foreign issues is the biggest problem. Or whether the ignorance about what the mandate of the committee is, is worse.