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During this first trip, which lasted six weeks, I visited several regions of the country, of course I met politicians, and I was received personally, with my wife, by the Chairman Mao Zedong. As for the Prime Minister Zhou En-lai, it was at several times that I had the opportunity to talk with him, sometimes in the presence of various members of the government.

"THE SERPENT AND THE TURTLE"

On my return, I published a book called "The Serpent and the Turtle" in which I suggested that it would be good for France to recognize China. I thought that it was absolutely ludicrous that most of the big countries just ignore this continent. It happens to be that when I was president of the Council of Ministers, I started to study this problem, but I didn't had the time to resolve it. All that I was able to do was to organize a French news agency in Beijing, with reciprocity, so that we had at least one relay. On the other hand, in my book, I mentioned the problem of Formosa (Taiwan) as one of the main problems and I suggested that we solved it by reopening the embassy in Beijing - the Chinese would have reopened their embassy in Paris - but while keeping in Formosa a consular representation, to not break off with the government of Marshal Chiang Kai Chek. I sent this book to General de Gaulle. And the General wrote me back in his own hand, as he usually did, a rather long letter, telling me how he had been interested by this reading and that my idea of a resumption of diplomatic relations with China seemed interesting to him. But he concluded on a quite discouraged tone that was hers at that time, saying that it could not usefully be attempted because, in any event, there was no state, for now, in France.

FACE TO FACE WITH THE REPRESENTATIVE OF FLN

This is probably because of this correspondence and the fact that he remembered my book that General de Gaulle when he was returned to power - but not immediately, I think it was in 1960 ... - asked me one day to come to see him for talking about the Chinese problem (of course I had the opportunity to see him on several occasions but on other subjects). During this conversation, he asked me if I advised him to do something in this area. I said that despite the favorable opinion I had given in my book, I could not advise him to commit, at this time, any process of recognition of China. This was because the situation did not seem favorable to me. I feared in particular the difficulties because of the Algerian case. If we had sent an ambassador to China. it could have been exposed, in this field, to some rebuff, he ran the risk of finding himself one day to be face to face with a representative of the FLN ...

In August 1963, I was struck by the position taken by the General on the issue of Vietnam. Suddenly, just after a Council of Ministers, he had made a very important statement, warning the world against the serious danger that the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia constituted. This was again a demonstration of the extraordinary lucidity of General de Gaulle, and of his clear-sighteness, as this happened in August and it was in October 1963 that occurred in Saigon the great "clash" , ie the elimination and assassination of Diem. So, General de Gaulle, in August 1963, looked all of a sudden at the problems of Asia and assessed very clearly the risks of a worsening situation. And simultaneously, he asked me to come to visit him, to tell me off the cuff : "When I consulted you some time ago on the problem of recognition of China, you told me that there was nothing to do. Are you still of that opinion? " I said:" Since you ask me this means that you have studied the issue by yourself. Well, I think everything is changed. First, you are freed from Algerian obstacle, which means you do not have to fear a setback in the event of a diplomatic opening to Beijing. Secondly, the Chinese themselves are in a difficult situation, because of their friction with the Soviets. And thirdly you have already given such signs of independence towards the Americans that one more or one less will not be so sensitive. " I remember a funny thing, during this interview, I said to General: "You can not scotomise a nation of 600 million inhabitants." And he said: "Oh, what is this word, 'scotomise' I do not know ? -- you know, 'scotomise' that come from 'scotoma', this impairment of vision.

"YES. You will go to China"

It remains that during this conversation, I told the General that, by a curious coincidence, I had told the Chinese that I was proposing to return to Beijing and they just had formally invite me to make the journey. I actually thought it would be helpful if I went to China at this time - to China and to Russia - to consider the core of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The General then told me: "Yes, you will go in China. But you will go as my representative." And he advised me not to make the two trips - China and Russia - at the same time.

We have therefore established a minute project. In particular, it was expected that I first went to Cambodia, both to visit from his hand the Prince Sihanouk, whom he liked very much, but also to create a kind of smoke screen to the real goals of this trip. Similarly, in return, I had to stop in India to see the President Nehru who had also invited me.

The General then gave me a letter to accredit me on his behalf to the Chinese president. And it was quite clever because rather than writing to the Chinese government that he did not know and did not recognized, he was just writing to me, to give me an official mandate.

So I understood in the light of this discussion that the General was willing, as far as possible, to achieve a complete solution to the problem of the resumption of relations. But as in other interviews I had with him at the same time but those times with other ministers or members of his staff, he was less formal, I concluded that there was in all this affair, an confidential aspect that should be preserved. By the way, the french Foreign Affairs at the time were convinced that this issue was raising intractable difficulties, particularly because the problem of Formosa [Taïwan]. In fact, I thought that once we took things in hand seriously, it becomes obviously possible, if not quite easy to find a solution and I had, of course, already think about it.

HOSTED BY THE MAYOR

Upon our arrival in China, I realized that there was a notch more to the traditional welcome by the fact that we were received in Canton by the Mayor and not by a Deputy Mayor as it was generally the custom. Moreover, in his welcoming speech, this town councillor alluded to the "economic, cultural and political " relations between our two states. And the word "political" was certainly new. Then I arrived in Beijing where I was the host of an association for international relations. This is an expedient the Chinese had found to maintain relations with states with whom they had not officially relations with. This association was dedicated to caring for people like us, ie heretics in a way. As soon as the day after I met the Prime Minister Zhou En-lai, and I showed him the letter of the General de Gaulle. Besides he asked me to keep it to be able to study and I entrusted the letter to him. That evening, I was the host of the association, but it was noteworthy that the Foreign Minister Chen Yi returned from the provinces especially to attend this dinner.

I stayed two weeks in China. That was my plan. I did not want to stay more, whatever happened. I had said that the mission would succeed or fail but anyway there was no need to linger. These two weeks have been occupied by political conversations, but also by a three-day visit to various sites, in Inner Mongolia, etc. I understand that the Chinese were quite happy to get rid of me for three days to think and discuss among themselves on what I could have offered them. And indeed, during this trip I was accompanied by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which kept wondering about all subjects and every evening was sending a report to Beijing.

On my return in the Chinese capital, we had again three days of discussions. This means that in total we had six or seven days of actual work. Meetings with Chinese last several hours. They repeat at lenght their view. They always express things by explaining the problems from the base, and by saying a lot of generalities. As I knew their method, I did the same. When they spoke for three quater of hour, I spoke for forty-five minutes. We talked extensively of communism, capitalism, contemporary history, etc. And in the meantime we were preparing papers to see what we could do, in practice. Of course, I refused detailed discussions on Formosa [Taiwan]. I adopted the following system: we could not make any commitment on this island, but we would apply the international law. This gave me the opportunity to answer that that law didn't allow us to recognize two governments at the same time as having sovereignty in the same place. So if we were recognizing China, we would not need to break with Formosa since then we were only restoring our embassy where it was before. And besides, we only had at Formosa a chargé d'affaires ad interim. It seemed certain to me that Formosa will break off with us as soon as we would have recognized Beijing. And finally we reached an agreement on a rather curious formula: we are committed to breaking off with Formosa ... if Formosa was first broking off with us. I think I could make that commitment without problem.

I visit Chairman Mao

Finally, at the conclusion of our conversations, I was warned that I would have to come at the end of the second week in Shanghai where I will see the Chairman Mao Zedong and where MM. Zhou En-lai and Chen Yi will join me. They came, and in one evening, we put up a very exhaustive project. The next day I visited Chairman Mao, but it is clear that even if the President was consulted and gave its agreement, everything was settled at the level of Zhou En-lai. We have therefore prepared a document that I signed, but ad referendum, stating that it was ultimately to General de Gaulle to make it official. On the other hand, it was Zhou En-lai who signed.

Then I left China, but so far I did not have the possibility to transmit to Paris to General de Gaulle. Naturally, the journalists - well, the few journalists who were in Beijing - were bustling about a little. To thwart the curiosity of the people who were waiting me in Hong Kong, I returned through Rangoon, in Burma. And it was there where I typed, myself, my report on a typewriter. Then I left for New Delhi and I entrusted the protocol and the report to an embassy secretary who flew to Paris and then gave the documents to the Elysée. For me, I stayed another two weeks in India, and quietly I visited here and there. Many people thus concluded that there was definitely nothing important. But when I arrived in Paris, General de Gaulle had already been able to study the entire file. And the day he received me, he told me that he was intending to follow my conclusions, which tended to the diplomatic recognition of both parties. We had planned with Mr. Zhou En-lai, a protocol for this recognition, which was slightly modified later by the Foreign Office who finally set the execution.

In fact, we now know that this matter was extremely delicate and complex to process and that the Chinese themselves did not know at all if, ultimately, we could achieve to a recognition. We had even considered, them and me, two solutions. The maximal solution, which was the simple recognition, and an intermediary solution who would have been to install cultural and economic levels, with some peculiarities as the use of the flag, the number, etc.. Now that this case is over, I can tell you that it was after much hesitation that I wrote my report in Rangoon, by only referring to the first solution. I feared that the existence of two possibilities made the General to hesitate. And I told to myself: "We'll see. If by chance the first solution does not work, I would take out the second." But it was not necessary.

"This is not for tomorrow"

When General de Gaulle received me at the Elysée to conclude, things are that he was just been informed of the assassination of President Kennedy. And that has probably changed something because I think we had a vague idea that the Americans could take advantage, in one way or another, to our initiative. Especially about Vietnam. I think this could have been the case for the Kennedy administration.

When I left that day, General de Gaulle said that he intended to give a positive result to the case if the conversations he had to have in the United States - at the funeral of Kennedy - did not change his mind. And the positive continuation would happen in January 1964.

Finally, it is the way things happened. I remember that the Americans at the time were quite worried. General had reported that the recognition of China "was not for tomorrow", but wondered whether they should take the word in its literal meaning. Curiously, it was primarily among the "liberals" in the United States that the concerns were most acute. Some people were thinking that such a gesture would promote at the upcoming elections, the most reactionary candidate for the presidency. In any event, today we see how the General was a precursor. It took eight years for the President of the United States to do the same thinking as him. But I believe that although the delay was quite long, our initiative of 1964 was a beginning, a precedent whose existence was able to apply afterwards.