My OperaIndian Nuclear Explosions 1998 (1010) Kalki Gaur
Sunday, September 10, 2006 12:48:32 PM
India’s Smiling Nuclear Buddha (1010) Kalki Gaur
http://indiatalking.com/blog/kalkigaur/
Author: Kalki Gaur: American Nuclear Weapon Doctrine © 2006 Copyrights
India is a legitimate world power. In AD 1750 India contributed towards 24.5 percent of global manufactured goods, more than Britain, Russia and United States. Throughout history, India has never used force, swords and guns to promote Indian religions and civilizations, unlike Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The monopoly of four White Christian nations over nuclear weapons threatened the existence of non-Christian and non-white nations and civilizations. White United States used nuclear weapons against Japan, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even when the survival of United States was not at stake. Henry Kissinger threatened the use of nuclear weapons against India, after Pakistan surrendered in 1971 war, had Indian troops invaded western Pakistan. Germany, Netherlands, China and United States transferred nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon capable missiles to Pakistan to threaten the survival of Hindu civilization. The CIA or Chinese secret services were responsible for the crash of the plane carrying Indian nuclear scientist Homi J. Bhabha, to scuttle Indian nuclear program. Indian Prime Minister Lala Bahadur Shastri poisoned in Tashkent, because he had given green signal for the development of Indian Atom Bomb in 1965. These are the arguments the author seeks to develop in this chapter.
Buddha is Smiling
BUDDHA IS SMILING: When India successfully completed its underground nuclear explosion, in 1974, a code message was sent to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, which read “Buddha is smiling.” This code word has religious connotations. Buddha’s smile represents that he is happy as he has attained Enlightenment. With the first underground nuclear test India was happy that it has joined the ranks of nuclear weapon powers and unlocked the secrets of nuclear weapon technology.
SMILING BUDDHA TEST: That India can build nuclear weapons has been an established fact since 8:05 AM, 18 May 1974 (IST), when India exploded a 12 Kt plutonium bomb 107 meters underground in the Rajasthan Desert. This test, code named “Smiling Buddha,” was conducted at the test site located at 27.095 deg N, 71.752 E. The test site is usually identified as being ‘Pokaharan’ (or Pokhran). It is the name of a town that is 24.8 km southeast from the test site. The test site is 1.5 km southwest of the abandoned village of Malka. The crater produced by this detonation of a plutonium implosion device was 47 meters wide with a crater depth of 10 meters.
POKHRAN TEST WAS A BOMB: “The Pokhran Test was a Bomb. I can tell you now. An explosion is an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground. I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful,” said Raj Ramanna, Former Director of India’s nuclear program, on 10 October 1997.
Neutron Bomb or Peaceful Explosion
PEACEFUL DOVE IS A NEUTRON BOMB PROJECT: The US nuclear weapons lab conducted its research on Neutron warhead design under the project code-named ‘Dove.’ The fission-fusion neutron warhead design, is a modified version of the nuclear warhead used for Plowshare project and for large scale landscaping project. Indian nuclear explosion designed to have low level of harmful long-lasting radioactive effects. It is safe to argue that the peaceful nuclear strategy designed to use controlled nuclear explosions to produce neutron bomb warhead.
BHABHA ATOMIC RESEARCH CENTER (BARC): The Smiling Buddha device designed and largely fabricated at BARC, Trombay near Bombay. The plutonium was also produced at BARC by irradiating uranium samples in the Canadian-supplied 40 MW CIR (Canadian-Indian Reactor) heavy water research reactor (also called CIRUS). The reactor began operating in 1960, and can produce 6.6-10.5 kg of plutonium a year, at a capacity factor of 50-80 percent. The reactor is not under IAEA safeguards.
When Did India Decide
DECISION TO DEVELOP A-BOMB: The design for A-Bomb had been developed by 1971, when Indira Gandhi decided to proceed with the manufacture and test of the nuclear device. India probably began its development of a nuclear device shortly after China tested its first nuclear weapon in the mid-60s. It took another two years to separate, purify, and fabricate the plutonium metal, and to manufacture the implosion lens systems and associated electronics. The explosive lenses were made at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The neutron initiator was a Po-210/Be type code-named “Flower,” which took a long time to design and assemble. The 1974 Bomb was almost certainly an experimental test device, not a weapon in deployable form.
India Matched Chinese Technology
INDIA NOT BEHIND CHINA IN 1964: India was not far behind China in 1964, when China exploded its first nuclear bomb. Recently declassified documents prove that United States agreed that Indian nuclear weapon technology was not far behind that of China even in 1964. The illegal transfers of classified American technologies helped China explode its first Atom Bomb in 1964. A Chinese Spy stole significant parts of this technology, in 1950s. On the other hand the technology for India’s underground nuclear explosion in 1974 was indigenously developed. India did not become a nuclear weapon power, unlike Russia, China and Pakistan because of the success of its intelligence services. India was ahead of China in nuclear technology in 1964, when China exploded its first Atom Bomb. In response to the first Chinese Atmospheric Atomic bomb test, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, (Chairman of Indian Atomic Energy Commission) had declared that India could also explode its own Atom Bomb in 18 months. Dr. Bhabha estimated the cost of Rs. 18 lack only. Dr. Bhabha suggested that India could test its atom bomb, either underground without releasing radioactivity in the atmosphere. Dr. Bhabha also hinted that India could test its Atom Bomb in a test tube also. This shows that India was far ahead of China in 1964, in nuclear weapons technology. Dr. Bhabha had the capability to develop tactical nuclear weapons of a small yield, and he had the expertise to make simulation tests of the A-bomb in the lab without actually exploding it. Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri apparently had given a green signal to the scientists to exercise the nuclear option after 1965 India-Pakistan war.
Murder of Dr. Homi Bhabha
MURDER OF DR. HOMI J. BHABHA: The conspiracy to murder Prime Minister Shastri was hatched by Communists during the 1965 Tashkent Summit, because Shastri had decided to exercise the nuclear option. Indian Communists organized the Shastri murder conspiracy, as nuclear India could destabilize Chinese preponderance in Asia. It is very likely that Western secret services arranged the murder of Homi J. Bhabha in a plane crash, as United States had realized that India has the necessary technical expertise to develop nuclear arsenal in 1966. It is also suspected that Dr. Bhabha was murdered by Western intelligence murdered Dr. Bhabha by causing the air crash in January 1966. The recently declassified U.S. Department of State documents recognized India’s capability to make and deploy atom Bombs. United States then embarked upon an extensive covert campaign to dissuade India from exercising the nuclear option. It explains that United States would accept India as a nuclear weapon power, and its objections are just part of its global campaign to dissuade new entrants to the nuclear weapon powers club.
Shastri Asked Dr. Homi Bhabha to make Atom Bomb
By early 1965, there was a secret effort by the father of India's nuclear program, Homi Bhabha, to convince Washington to provide him with peaceful nuclear explosive, or the blueprint to make one. Apparently, Dr. Bhabha had been unable to deliver an indigenous Indian nuclear weapon in 18 months, he had predicted. He made these entreaties in February 1965,when he came to Washington and met Under Secretary of state George Ball. According to a memorandum of a conversation bertween Bhabha and Ball, Dr. Bhabha steered the conversation to the dilemma India faced regarding what to do to counteract the noise of Communist China's nuclear explosion. Indian needed to make some dramatic peacerful achievement to offset the prestige gained by Communist China. Dr. Bhabha explained that if India went all out, it could produce a nuclear device in 18 months, with a US blueprint it could do the job in six months. Soviet assistance had played a very important role in quickening Chinese capability. George Perkovich, director, Secure World Program, W. Alton Jones foundation, argued so in his 597-page new book, "India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation."
1950 Xian Xuesen Stole US Secrets
CHINESE NUCLEAR SPY OF 1950: Qian Xuesen played a very important role in the Ballistic missile and space programs of the China. China exploded its First Atom Bomb because of the success of its espionage of U.S. nuclear secrets. Currently deployed Chinese ICBMs targeted on the United States, uses in significant part, on U.S. technologies illegally obtained by China in the 1950s. In the 1950s, Xian Xuesen, an U.S. military officer, and associated member of the design team for a U.S. ICBM program (the Titan missile program) emigrated to China and illegally gave U.S. missile and missile-related technology to China. (Cox Report). Without the stolen U.S. nuclear secrets, China would not have successfully exploded its first Atom Bomb.
ROLE OF QIAN XUESEN IN CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS: Chinese ballistic missile and space programs received substantial assistance during their early development from Qian Xuesen (also known as Tsien Hsue-Shen). Qian Xuesen trained in the United States had worked on classified U.S. missile programs, including the TITAN ICBM program. During the 1950s, allegations arose that Qian was spying for China. After negotiations between the U.S. and China governments, Qian Xuesen allowed to return to China in 1955. Four other Chinese members of the Qian’s Titan design team also returned with him to China. Qian became the chief project manager of China’s CSS-4 ICBM. Today CSS-4 has a range more than 7,400 miles. Starting in 1981 China deployed CSS-4 in silos. The improved version CSS-4 Mod 2, has improved throw-weight that could allow China to deploy multiple warheads on the CSS-4 Mod2, rather than the single warheads that are currently carried on the CSS-4.
India could Make Bomb in 1966
USA RECOGNIZED INDIA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY: The United States Department of State sent a Airgram on March 29, 1966, on the subject Possible Indian Nuclear Weapons Development. The Airgram read as follows: Although there is no evidence that India has decided to develop nuclear weapons, a nuclear device could probably be ready for testing within a year following such a decision. India possesses all the basic facilities necessary to produce plutonium. Its research and nuclear power programs are small-scale but well advanced. It has uranium metal, fuel element fabrication facilities, and a heavy water plant, and the capacity of the recently completed plutonium separation plant (30 tons of fuel annually) apparently exceeds present requirements.
CANADA INDIA REACTOR: In the event of a decision to develop nuclear weapons, construction of a test site would be started well ahead of the anticipated date of the initial year. As a signatory of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), India would presumably test underground. If so, construction of the test site would require tunneling or extensive or extensive drilling operators. The Canada-India reactor is capable of producing enough plutonium for one or two normal-yield weapons annually, although India has agreements with both Canada and the United States to employ the reactor for peaceful purposes only. The fuel, it has been reported to be removed from the reactor after an average burnup of only 450-600 MWD/t, which is significantly lower than the 900MWD/t burnup for which the reactor was designed. While these circumstances alone do not indicate that India has made a decision to develop nuclear weapons. It hints strongly that India is producing the suitable material. It would permit the rapid implementation of such a decision. Electronic neutron generators and high-quality detonator components- likely used in the first Indian nuclear device- are readily available on the open market in Western Europe. The testing of high-explosive shapes, a necessary step toward the development of a nuclear weapon, will be carried out over a period of several months. (Joyce Battle: India and Pakistan-On the Nuclear Threshold, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6). (http:// www. Seas. Gwu.edu/ nsarchive/ NSAEBB/ NSAEBB6 /indes.html).
MINIMUM DETERRENT: Indian suggests that Indian pro-bomb group has good argument that the costs Involved in testing first device ($30-$40 million) well within India’s financial capabilities. Development of a small program is also feasible, (1-2 weapons 20 Kiloton range per year at annual cost $20-30 million). Atomic Energy Commission, Chairman Homi J. Sethna has pointed out, India cannot just detonate one or two devices and stop. A small nuclear bomb program is worse than no program at all, because it would invite preemptive Chinese attack. In terms of Sethna’s own figure, 150 bombs are required (needed) for a credible deterrent. (May 24, 1966 US State Dept. Telegram)
Project Plowshare of 1965
PROJECT PLOWSHARE: As of late 1965, there has been a great deal of speculation, due to remarks made by Dr. Bhabha. India might elect to embark on a Plowshare device development program as a cover and rationalization for a nuclear weapon program. World Bank had shown interest regarding the role nuclear excavation might play in solving some of India’s basic river problems. India was launching the Nuclear Desalting project. Indian authorities suggested that a dual purpose nuclear power plants, for dual purpose power and desalting projects, should be located at the port of Kandla, Madras and Calcutta.
Shastri Decided to make A-bomb
SHASTRI WANTED TO MAKE ATOM BOMB: Prime Minister Shastri and his supporters needed three things, if they were to have good chance holding their own against pressures for an Indian Bomb, on the eve of China’s second atom bomb test. One is an effective international nonproliferation agreement on which Indians, West and Soviet can agree. Second, Shastri badly needs to be able to demonstrate to his countrymen and Afro-Asians as follows; that India has achieved at least as much in the field of science and technology as Chicoms China. It would offset the increase in prestige, which came to China as result of their nuclear testing program. Third, Shastri needs some kind of security assurance against Chicom China nuclear attack. India’s dilemma is probably caused in part by their realization that public acceptance of any assurance alone would destroy much of basis for non-alignment and affect their relations with Soviets. Do Indian’s believe that a parallel Soviet and US assurance would probably meet the problem? The best US but limited information is that so far India had little success with Soviets. Shastri did however discuss assurance question with Harold Wilson and has publicly mentioned need for protection from nuclear powers several times. India never directly raised the question of nuclear security assurance with USA. (US Embassy in Tel Aviv Telegram. Feb 27,1965)
Plutonium Reactors
PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS: India has developed indigenous plutonium production reactors. On 8 august 1985 the 100 MW Dhruva was commissioned, it is based on the Cirus design and can produce 20-25 kg of plutonium a year. It is now producing 16-26 kg of plutonium annually at a capacity factor of 50-80 percent. The additional possible source of plutonium is a number of unsafe-guarded CANDU power reactors, including Madras Atomic Power Stations (MAPS-I, and MAPS-II), and Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS). Like CIR and Dhruva, the CANDU reactors are heavy-water moderated natural uranium reactors that can effectively produce weapon-grade plutonium. The possible production by MAPS is more than CIR and Dhruva combined, although the fuel burnup produces lower grade plutonium that is less desirable for weapons. Each power station reactor can produce up to 160 kg/yr, at a 60 percent capacity factor. Supergrade plutonium produced at BARC by short irradiation periods when mixed with MAPS plutonium extends the plutonium supply.
PLUTONIUM SEPARATION PLANT: The separated plutonium for the 1974 test was produced at the separation plant in Trombay, capable of processing 50 tons of heavy metal fuel/yr. The construction on the first facility began in the 1950s and it began operating in 1964. The Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) facility, Tarapur, began operating in 1979. It has a nominal annual capacity of 100-150 tons of CANDU fuel. The Kalpakkam reprocessing facility is a much large plant. SIPRI has estimated that India had produced 420-450 kg of weapons-grade plutonium through the end of 1995 (70-100 bombs worth). India used about 100 kg of plutonium for fuelling two plutonium reactors. Estimates are that India has 1000 kg of unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium. China provided the 110 tons of unsafeguarded moderator, Heavy Water, for Dhruva and Madras I and II.
CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANT: India has plans to build an enriched uranium reactor and a domestically fueled nuclear submarine. India has acquired and developed centrifuge technology and built centrifuge plants in Trombay and Mysore in the 1980s.
LIGHT WEIGHT WEAPON DESIGN: BARC acquired in 1980s a vacuum hot pressing machine, suitable for forming large high-quality berryllium forgings, and large amounts of high purity berryllium metal. India manufactured tritium and developed designs for fusion-boosted weapons.
MISSILES PROGRAMS: India developed short-range missile PRITHVI, having a 250-km range, 500-kg payload. AGNI has a 2500-km range and 1000-kg payload. Both are capable of carrying light nuclear weapons. India is developing an ICBM-class missile called Suriya. Agni successfully launched on 22 May 1989 from the Chandipur test facility, about 250 kms southwest of Calcutta at Balasore. The two-stage missile impacted at 1000-km downrange in the Bay of Bengal. Agni is the Hindu god of fire. Agni is 18.4-meter long, 1.3 meter wide, has the launch weight of 16,000 kg. It has two-stage propulsion. The first stage solid propulsion is based on the Indian Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) used in satellite launches since 1979. The Second liquid-fuel motor is the shortened version from the Prithvi.
Aborted Test of 1995
ABORTED 1995 NUCLEAR TEST: During the fall of 1995, India changed its position on the CTBT from supporting it to opposing it. India argued that while the five nuclear states possessed weapons, a ban on nuclear tests is discriminatory. On 15 December 1995, the New York Times reported that India might be preparing for a second nuclear test. The US spy satellites recorded activity at the Pokhran test site.
http://indiatalking.com/blog/kalkigaur/
Author: Kalki Gaur: American Nuclear Weapon Doctrine © 2006 Copyrights
http://indiatalking.com/blog/kalkigaur/
Author: Kalki Gaur: American Nuclear Weapon Doctrine © 2006 Copyrights
India is a legitimate world power. In AD 1750 India contributed towards 24.5 percent of global manufactured goods, more than Britain, Russia and United States. Throughout history, India has never used force, swords and guns to promote Indian religions and civilizations, unlike Islam, Christianity and Judaism. The monopoly of four White Christian nations over nuclear weapons threatened the existence of non-Christian and non-white nations and civilizations. White United States used nuclear weapons against Japan, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even when the survival of United States was not at stake. Henry Kissinger threatened the use of nuclear weapons against India, after Pakistan surrendered in 1971 war, had Indian troops invaded western Pakistan. Germany, Netherlands, China and United States transferred nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon capable missiles to Pakistan to threaten the survival of Hindu civilization. The CIA or Chinese secret services were responsible for the crash of the plane carrying Indian nuclear scientist Homi J. Bhabha, to scuttle Indian nuclear program. Indian Prime Minister Lala Bahadur Shastri poisoned in Tashkent, because he had given green signal for the development of Indian Atom Bomb in 1965. These are the arguments the author seeks to develop in this chapter.
Buddha is Smiling
BUDDHA IS SMILING: When India successfully completed its underground nuclear explosion, in 1974, a code message was sent to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, which read “Buddha is smiling.” This code word has religious connotations. Buddha’s smile represents that he is happy as he has attained Enlightenment. With the first underground nuclear test India was happy that it has joined the ranks of nuclear weapon powers and unlocked the secrets of nuclear weapon technology.
SMILING BUDDHA TEST: That India can build nuclear weapons has been an established fact since 8:05 AM, 18 May 1974 (IST), when India exploded a 12 Kt plutonium bomb 107 meters underground in the Rajasthan Desert. This test, code named “Smiling Buddha,” was conducted at the test site located at 27.095 deg N, 71.752 E. The test site is usually identified as being ‘Pokaharan’ (or Pokhran). It is the name of a town that is 24.8 km southeast from the test site. The test site is 1.5 km southwest of the abandoned village of Malka. The crater produced by this detonation of a plutonium implosion device was 47 meters wide with a crater depth of 10 meters.
POKHRAN TEST WAS A BOMB: “The Pokhran Test was a Bomb. I can tell you now. An explosion is an explosion, a gun is a gun, whether you shoot at someone or shoot at the ground. I just want to make clear that the test was not all that peaceful,” said Raj Ramanna, Former Director of India’s nuclear program, on 10 October 1997.
Neutron Bomb or Peaceful Explosion
PEACEFUL DOVE IS A NEUTRON BOMB PROJECT: The US nuclear weapons lab conducted its research on Neutron warhead design under the project code-named ‘Dove.’ The fission-fusion neutron warhead design, is a modified version of the nuclear warhead used for Plowshare project and for large scale landscaping project. Indian nuclear explosion designed to have low level of harmful long-lasting radioactive effects. It is safe to argue that the peaceful nuclear strategy designed to use controlled nuclear explosions to produce neutron bomb warhead.
BHABHA ATOMIC RESEARCH CENTER (BARC): The Smiling Buddha device designed and largely fabricated at BARC, Trombay near Bombay. The plutonium was also produced at BARC by irradiating uranium samples in the Canadian-supplied 40 MW CIR (Canadian-Indian Reactor) heavy water research reactor (also called CIRUS). The reactor began operating in 1960, and can produce 6.6-10.5 kg of plutonium a year, at a capacity factor of 50-80 percent. The reactor is not under IAEA safeguards.
When Did India Decide
DECISION TO DEVELOP A-BOMB: The design for A-Bomb had been developed by 1971, when Indira Gandhi decided to proceed with the manufacture and test of the nuclear device. India probably began its development of a nuclear device shortly after China tested its first nuclear weapon in the mid-60s. It took another two years to separate, purify, and fabricate the plutonium metal, and to manufacture the implosion lens systems and associated electronics. The explosive lenses were made at the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO). The neutron initiator was a Po-210/Be type code-named “Flower,” which took a long time to design and assemble. The 1974 Bomb was almost certainly an experimental test device, not a weapon in deployable form.
India Matched Chinese Technology
INDIA NOT BEHIND CHINA IN 1964: India was not far behind China in 1964, when China exploded its first nuclear bomb. Recently declassified documents prove that United States agreed that Indian nuclear weapon technology was not far behind that of China even in 1964. The illegal transfers of classified American technologies helped China explode its first Atom Bomb in 1964. A Chinese Spy stole significant parts of this technology, in 1950s. On the other hand the technology for India’s underground nuclear explosion in 1974 was indigenously developed. India did not become a nuclear weapon power, unlike Russia, China and Pakistan because of the success of its intelligence services. India was ahead of China in nuclear technology in 1964, when China exploded its first Atom Bomb. In response to the first Chinese Atmospheric Atomic bomb test, Dr. Homi J. Bhabha, (Chairman of Indian Atomic Energy Commission) had declared that India could also explode its own Atom Bomb in 18 months. Dr. Bhabha estimated the cost of Rs. 18 lack only. Dr. Bhabha suggested that India could test its atom bomb, either underground without releasing radioactivity in the atmosphere. Dr. Bhabha also hinted that India could test its Atom Bomb in a test tube also. This shows that India was far ahead of China in 1964, in nuclear weapons technology. Dr. Bhabha had the capability to develop tactical nuclear weapons of a small yield, and he had the expertise to make simulation tests of the A-bomb in the lab without actually exploding it. Indian Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri apparently had given a green signal to the scientists to exercise the nuclear option after 1965 India-Pakistan war.
Murder of Dr. Homi Bhabha
MURDER OF DR. HOMI J. BHABHA: The conspiracy to murder Prime Minister Shastri was hatched by Communists during the 1965 Tashkent Summit, because Shastri had decided to exercise the nuclear option. Indian Communists organized the Shastri murder conspiracy, as nuclear India could destabilize Chinese preponderance in Asia. It is very likely that Western secret services arranged the murder of Homi J. Bhabha in a plane crash, as United States had realized that India has the necessary technical expertise to develop nuclear arsenal in 1966. It is also suspected that Dr. Bhabha was murdered by Western intelligence murdered Dr. Bhabha by causing the air crash in January 1966. The recently declassified U.S. Department of State documents recognized India’s capability to make and deploy atom Bombs. United States then embarked upon an extensive covert campaign to dissuade India from exercising the nuclear option. It explains that United States would accept India as a nuclear weapon power, and its objections are just part of its global campaign to dissuade new entrants to the nuclear weapon powers club.
Shastri Asked Dr. Homi Bhabha to make Atom Bomb
By early 1965, there was a secret effort by the father of India's nuclear program, Homi Bhabha, to convince Washington to provide him with peaceful nuclear explosive, or the blueprint to make one. Apparently, Dr. Bhabha had been unable to deliver an indigenous Indian nuclear weapon in 18 months, he had predicted. He made these entreaties in February 1965,when he came to Washington and met Under Secretary of state George Ball. According to a memorandum of a conversation bertween Bhabha and Ball, Dr. Bhabha steered the conversation to the dilemma India faced regarding what to do to counteract the noise of Communist China's nuclear explosion. Indian needed to make some dramatic peacerful achievement to offset the prestige gained by Communist China. Dr. Bhabha explained that if India went all out, it could produce a nuclear device in 18 months, with a US blueprint it could do the job in six months. Soviet assistance had played a very important role in quickening Chinese capability. George Perkovich, director, Secure World Program, W. Alton Jones foundation, argued so in his 597-page new book, "India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation."
1950 Xian Xuesen Stole US Secrets
CHINESE NUCLEAR SPY OF 1950: Qian Xuesen played a very important role in the Ballistic missile and space programs of the China. China exploded its First Atom Bomb because of the success of its espionage of U.S. nuclear secrets. Currently deployed Chinese ICBMs targeted on the United States, uses in significant part, on U.S. technologies illegally obtained by China in the 1950s. In the 1950s, Xian Xuesen, an U.S. military officer, and associated member of the design team for a U.S. ICBM program (the Titan missile program) emigrated to China and illegally gave U.S. missile and missile-related technology to China. (Cox Report). Without the stolen U.S. nuclear secrets, China would not have successfully exploded its first Atom Bomb.
ROLE OF QIAN XUESEN IN CHINESE NUCLEAR PROGRAMS: Chinese ballistic missile and space programs received substantial assistance during their early development from Qian Xuesen (also known as Tsien Hsue-Shen). Qian Xuesen trained in the United States had worked on classified U.S. missile programs, including the TITAN ICBM program. During the 1950s, allegations arose that Qian was spying for China. After negotiations between the U.S. and China governments, Qian Xuesen allowed to return to China in 1955. Four other Chinese members of the Qian’s Titan design team also returned with him to China. Qian became the chief project manager of China’s CSS-4 ICBM. Today CSS-4 has a range more than 7,400 miles. Starting in 1981 China deployed CSS-4 in silos. The improved version CSS-4 Mod 2, has improved throw-weight that could allow China to deploy multiple warheads on the CSS-4 Mod2, rather than the single warheads that are currently carried on the CSS-4.
India could Make Bomb in 1966
USA RECOGNIZED INDIA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY: The United States Department of State sent a Airgram on March 29, 1966, on the subject Possible Indian Nuclear Weapons Development. The Airgram read as follows: Although there is no evidence that India has decided to develop nuclear weapons, a nuclear device could probably be ready for testing within a year following such a decision. India possesses all the basic facilities necessary to produce plutonium. Its research and nuclear power programs are small-scale but well advanced. It has uranium metal, fuel element fabrication facilities, and a heavy water plant, and the capacity of the recently completed plutonium separation plant (30 tons of fuel annually) apparently exceeds present requirements.
CANADA INDIA REACTOR: In the event of a decision to develop nuclear weapons, construction of a test site would be started well ahead of the anticipated date of the initial year. As a signatory of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), India would presumably test underground. If so, construction of the test site would require tunneling or extensive or extensive drilling operators. The Canada-India reactor is capable of producing enough plutonium for one or two normal-yield weapons annually, although India has agreements with both Canada and the United States to employ the reactor for peaceful purposes only. The fuel, it has been reported to be removed from the reactor after an average burnup of only 450-600 MWD/t, which is significantly lower than the 900MWD/t burnup for which the reactor was designed. While these circumstances alone do not indicate that India has made a decision to develop nuclear weapons. It hints strongly that India is producing the suitable material. It would permit the rapid implementation of such a decision. Electronic neutron generators and high-quality detonator components- likely used in the first Indian nuclear device- are readily available on the open market in Western Europe. The testing of high-explosive shapes, a necessary step toward the development of a nuclear weapon, will be carried out over a period of several months. (Joyce Battle: India and Pakistan-On the Nuclear Threshold, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 6). (http:// www. Seas. Gwu.edu/ nsarchive/ NSAEBB/ NSAEBB6 /indes.html).
MINIMUM DETERRENT: Indian suggests that Indian pro-bomb group has good argument that the costs Involved in testing first device ($30-$40 million) well within India’s financial capabilities. Development of a small program is also feasible, (1-2 weapons 20 Kiloton range per year at annual cost $20-30 million). Atomic Energy Commission, Chairman Homi J. Sethna has pointed out, India cannot just detonate one or two devices and stop. A small nuclear bomb program is worse than no program at all, because it would invite preemptive Chinese attack. In terms of Sethna’s own figure, 150 bombs are required (needed) for a credible deterrent. (May 24, 1966 US State Dept. Telegram)
Project Plowshare of 1965
PROJECT PLOWSHARE: As of late 1965, there has been a great deal of speculation, due to remarks made by Dr. Bhabha. India might elect to embark on a Plowshare device development program as a cover and rationalization for a nuclear weapon program. World Bank had shown interest regarding the role nuclear excavation might play in solving some of India’s basic river problems. India was launching the Nuclear Desalting project. Indian authorities suggested that a dual purpose nuclear power plants, for dual purpose power and desalting projects, should be located at the port of Kandla, Madras and Calcutta.
Shastri Decided to make A-bomb
SHASTRI WANTED TO MAKE ATOM BOMB: Prime Minister Shastri and his supporters needed three things, if they were to have good chance holding their own against pressures for an Indian Bomb, on the eve of China’s second atom bomb test. One is an effective international nonproliferation agreement on which Indians, West and Soviet can agree. Second, Shastri badly needs to be able to demonstrate to his countrymen and Afro-Asians as follows; that India has achieved at least as much in the field of science and technology as Chicoms China. It would offset the increase in prestige, which came to China as result of their nuclear testing program. Third, Shastri needs some kind of security assurance against Chicom China nuclear attack. India’s dilemma is probably caused in part by their realization that public acceptance of any assurance alone would destroy much of basis for non-alignment and affect their relations with Soviets. Do Indian’s believe that a parallel Soviet and US assurance would probably meet the problem? The best US but limited information is that so far India had little success with Soviets. Shastri did however discuss assurance question with Harold Wilson and has publicly mentioned need for protection from nuclear powers several times. India never directly raised the question of nuclear security assurance with USA. (US Embassy in Tel Aviv Telegram. Feb 27,1965)
Plutonium Reactors
PLUTONIUM PRODUCTION REACTORS: India has developed indigenous plutonium production reactors. On 8 august 1985 the 100 MW Dhruva was commissioned, it is based on the Cirus design and can produce 20-25 kg of plutonium a year. It is now producing 16-26 kg of plutonium annually at a capacity factor of 50-80 percent. The additional possible source of plutonium is a number of unsafe-guarded CANDU power reactors, including Madras Atomic Power Stations (MAPS-I, and MAPS-II), and Kakrapar Atomic Power Station (KAPS). Like CIR and Dhruva, the CANDU reactors are heavy-water moderated natural uranium reactors that can effectively produce weapon-grade plutonium. The possible production by MAPS is more than CIR and Dhruva combined, although the fuel burnup produces lower grade plutonium that is less desirable for weapons. Each power station reactor can produce up to 160 kg/yr, at a 60 percent capacity factor. Supergrade plutonium produced at BARC by short irradiation periods when mixed with MAPS plutonium extends the plutonium supply.
PLUTONIUM SEPARATION PLANT: The separated plutonium for the 1974 test was produced at the separation plant in Trombay, capable of processing 50 tons of heavy metal fuel/yr. The construction on the first facility began in the 1950s and it began operating in 1964. The Power Reactor Fuel Reprocessing (PREFRE) facility, Tarapur, began operating in 1979. It has a nominal annual capacity of 100-150 tons of CANDU fuel. The Kalpakkam reprocessing facility is a much large plant. SIPRI has estimated that India had produced 420-450 kg of weapons-grade plutonium through the end of 1995 (70-100 bombs worth). India used about 100 kg of plutonium for fuelling two plutonium reactors. Estimates are that India has 1000 kg of unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium. China provided the 110 tons of unsafeguarded moderator, Heavy Water, for Dhruva and Madras I and II.
CENTRIFUGE ENRICHMENT PLANT: India has plans to build an enriched uranium reactor and a domestically fueled nuclear submarine. India has acquired and developed centrifuge technology and built centrifuge plants in Trombay and Mysore in the 1980s.
LIGHT WEIGHT WEAPON DESIGN: BARC acquired in 1980s a vacuum hot pressing machine, suitable for forming large high-quality berryllium forgings, and large amounts of high purity berryllium metal. India manufactured tritium and developed designs for fusion-boosted weapons.
MISSILES PROGRAMS: India developed short-range missile PRITHVI, having a 250-km range, 500-kg payload. AGNI has a 2500-km range and 1000-kg payload. Both are capable of carrying light nuclear weapons. India is developing an ICBM-class missile called Suriya. Agni successfully launched on 22 May 1989 from the Chandipur test facility, about 250 kms southwest of Calcutta at Balasore. The two-stage missile impacted at 1000-km downrange in the Bay of Bengal. Agni is the Hindu god of fire. Agni is 18.4-meter long, 1.3 meter wide, has the launch weight of 16,000 kg. It has two-stage propulsion. The first stage solid propulsion is based on the Indian Satellite Launch Vehicle (SLV-3) used in satellite launches since 1979. The Second liquid-fuel motor is the shortened version from the Prithvi.
Aborted Test of 1995
ABORTED 1995 NUCLEAR TEST: During the fall of 1995, India changed its position on the CTBT from supporting it to opposing it. India argued that while the five nuclear states possessed weapons, a ban on nuclear tests is discriminatory. On 15 December 1995, the New York Times reported that India might be preparing for a second nuclear test. The US spy satellites recorded activity at the Pokhran test site.
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Author: Kalki Gaur: American Nuclear Weapon Doctrine © 2006 Copyrights
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