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Notes on Logic:

Informal, Deductive, and Inductive

Non Sequitur and Argument Analysis

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As an introductory example of the art of rhetoric, Edward P. J. Corbett quotes at length the famous speech in Book 9 of the Illiad: Odysseus' plea to a sulking Achilles to renew the fight against the Trojans and their allies. Corbett explains the relevance in this passage:

Today we find it almost laughable to read about warriors pausing in the heat of battle, as they do in some of the scenes of the _Illiad_, to hurl long speeches at one another. But the tradition of oratory was already well established---if not yet well formulated---in Homer's time, and this tradition persisted and grew stronger throughout the Golden Age of Athens. So we must take the oratory displayed in this scene as seriously as the participants took it, and we must savor the relish with which they indulged in this battle of words. (Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, _Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student_, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10.)



Of course, the conclusion that the readers (and author Corbett) must take Odysseus' rhetoric just as seriously as those present at the battle does not follow from the assumed statement that oratory was well established in Homer's time. So, we have a non sequitur. Often when an author seems to commit a non sequitur an enthymematic argument is present---i.e., a premise has been left unstated. Some contemporary logicians would identify the fallacy as an ignoratio elenchi, an irrelevant conclusion. This contemporary interpretation is not entirely in keeping with Aristotle's characterization of the fallacy. (See Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, (White Fish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. 11.) Literally, ignoratio elenchi is "ignorance of the nature of how something is refuted," so for the present, let's just keep to the designation of non sequitur.

What premise would be necessary to make the argument valid? We can simplify the argument as follows:

The Greeks took rhetoric seriously at the time of Homer and Athens' Golden Age.
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Therefore, people today should take rhetoric seriously.



With the premise "All arts taken seriously at the time of the Greeks are also taken seriously today,' we could construct a valid argument, assuming rhetoric is one of the arts. Ignoring for the moment the modal "should" for simplicity, would this, then, be the argument implied by Corbett?

All cases of arts taken seriously in ancient Greece are instances of arts taken seriously by people today.
All examples of rhetoric are cases of arts taken seriously in ancient Greece.
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All examples of rhetoric are instances of arts taken seriously today.



Apparently not. There are two problems with this argument. Although the argument is valid, it's clearly unsound. First, some Greek arts are no longer practiced today, and second, the Greeks, of course, would be unaware of contemporary uses of rhetoric.

Corbett undoubtedly would be aware of these objections; in fact, he writes several pages later in reference to an unrelated point:

The dominant values of a society may change with the passage of time---today, for instance, we put more of a premium on actions that contribute to the common welfare than on actions that contribute only to a person's honor---but the basic human passions and motivations are the same today as they were in Homer's day. (Corbett, 14.)



Corbett clearly states in the first part of the quotation the values of the Greeks are different in some respects from the values today. But note how if we interpret the last independent clause of the quotation, the sense of the original argument might be rewritten in such a manner as to avoid the charge of non sequitur:

All basic human passions and motivations in ancient Greece are basic human passions and motivations of people today.
Rhetoric is a basic human passion and motivation in ancient Greece.
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Therefore, rhetoric is a basic human passion and motivation of people today.



We can extend the principle of charity only so far though. In our attempt to save Corbett's enthusiastic support of the importance of rhetoric by our paraphrased substitute, valid, and arguably sound argument, we have strayed far and wide from his original argument.

Specifically, Corbett's conclusion was we must take Odysseus' oration to Achilles just as seriously as did the other Greeks present at the battle. The reason for this odd conclusion is that the rhetorical tradition in Homer's time and Athens' Golden Age was well established. Our rational reconstruction is a quite different argument. We have exceeded the requirement of attempting a sympathetic understanding of an argument before educing criticism.

The charitable conclusion, then, is, in spite of Corbett's use of the conclusion indicator "so," the probable original intent of the passage is emotive rather than logical. Often, it seems to me, apparent non sequiturs are intended to be expressive language use.

In the Corbett example, our conclusion is confirmed ten pages later when Corbett states, "Practices and principles should not be retained simply because they are venerable with age" (Corbett, 24). This statement indicates support would have been necessary anyway for the major premise of our ill-fated final attempt to complete to provide a charitable argument.

Ordinary Language and Immediate Inferences

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A common criticism of university-required courses in logic and mathematics is their lack of practical examples in the traditional course of academic problem-solving. Current logic textbooks used at most universities limit examples to the "All men are mortal" types of examples.

This approach assumes that if students can solve problems in traditional logic or symbolic logic involving simple examples, then students ought to be able to solve much more complex linguistic examples by following the same principles. Such a result is rare, though, because translating from everyday language into some kind of standard-form is difficult and time-consuming.

On a recent classroom test on the topic of the square of opposition, in addition to answering correctly the usual examples of problems like ...

State the contradictory and resultant truth-value of the true statement 'No arctic flora are bromeliads'


most students also answered correctly problems involving successive inferences, if the questions were posed using standard-form categorical statements.

But if the questions involved non-standard-form statements, most students were lost, even though they did well in translating textbook-type ordinary language examples into standard-form.

For example, when the following question was posed

Translate the following statements in to standard form: Any strain imposed on the mind will be reflected in the eyes, and similarly [therefore] anything which rests the mind will benefit them.1


all students could provide a translation, but their translations did not allow them to evaluate the inference stated since the subjects and the predicates chosen in the different statements had no obvious logical relation to each other.

The objective sought in asking the question was for the student to recognize in order to evaluate the inference using suitable paraphrases of the subjects and predicates in each of the original statements, the translation should result in either the same classes or classes involving complements of each other. One way to do such a translation would be to use the complementary classes as shown here:

(1) All strains imposed on the mind are non-benefits to the eyes.
(2) All non-strains imposed on the mind are benefits to the eyes.


The conjunctive adverb "similarly" in the original quotation permits the looseness of the rather liberal liberal translation above. Once the translation is accomplished, then it is a simple matter to see that by first contraposing and second converting the first statement in order to obtain the second statement, an undetermined truth-value results. (For those unfamiliar with successive immediate inferences, this process is shown in detail as problem number 2 on this Webpage)



Subsequently, as a take-home problem, I asked the class to show formally, by using the Square of Opposition, that the following argument by Joseph Butler was correct:

[T]here is generally thought to be some peculiar kind of contrariety between self-love and the love of our neighbour, between the pursuit of public and of private good; insomuch that when you are recommending one of these, you are supposed to be speaking against the other; and from hence arises a secret prejudice against, and frequently open scorn of, all talk of public spirit, and real good-will to our fellow-creatures ...

Let us now see whether there be any peculiar contrariety between the respective courses of life which these affections lead to; whether there be any greater competition between the pursuit of private and of public good, than between any other particular pursuits and that of private good. There seems no other reason to suspect that there is any such peculiar contrariety.2


Again, the major difficulty is choosing or inventing a suitable paraphrase in standard form of the specific contrariety Butler is supposing. Statements are contraries if the first statement being true implies that the second statement is false and if the first statement being false does not imply the second statement is true or false.

What seems puzzling about this example is that if the statements are translated into the forms "All S is P" and "No S is P, then they would by definition have to be formal contraries. Even so, I was surprised that no student submitted a paper to show Butler's reasoning is correct.

How is this to be shown with traditional logic? Let's try the following translations:

(1) No pursuits of private good by those who have self-love are quests for public good by those who love their neighbor.
(2) All pursuits of private good by those who have self-love are quests for public good by those who love their neighbor.


We can say if statement (1) above is true, statement (2) must be false and vice-versa. This fact is not, however, what Butler is denying. Instead, Butler is denying that statement (1) is true. In point of fact, he is not overtly asserting either statement (1) or (2).

What Butler is asserting is ...

Some pursuits of private good by self-loving individuals are quests for public good by those who love their neighbor


is true, presumably because he recognizes that some actions done in self-interest also by their very nature help others. So in sum, by asserting that the pursuit of public and private good are not contraries, Butler is specifically asserting that pursuits of private and public good are not mutually exclusive activities.

When explained in this fashion, the students state that that analysis is obvious, but the question asked was how to prove statement are not contraries using the principles of traditional logic? And, of course, they are correct, the analysis doesn't use the logical relation of contrariety for its explantion, it explains why traditional logic is not used in such an example.

Posing clear problems in ordinary language for introductory logic is a difficult undertaking, but if beginning logic is to be useful for other endeavors, then much more attention by texts and instruction need be directed to it.
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1C.S. Price, The Improvement of Sight (Cleveland: Sherwood Press, 1946), vi.
2Joseph Butler, ``Sermon XI---Upon the Love of Our Neighbour,'' in Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel, 2nd. ed. 1729.
November 2009
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