Non Sequitur and Argument Analysis
Monday, 31. August 2009, 16:45:57
Today we find it almost laughable to read about warriors pausing in the heat of battle, as they do in some of the scenes of the _Illiad_, to hurl long speeches at one another. But the tradition of oratory was already well established---if not yet well formulated---in Homer's time, and this tradition persisted and grew stronger throughout the Golden Age of Athens. So we must take the oratory displayed in this scene as seriously as the participants took it, and we must savor the relish with which they indulged in this battle of words. (Edward P. J. Corbett and Robert J. Connors, _Classical Rhetoric for the Modern Student_, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 10.)
Of course, the conclusion that the readers (and author Corbett) must take Odysseus' rhetoric just as seriously as those present at the battle does not follow from the assumed statement that oratory was well established in Homer's time. So, we have a non sequitur. Often when an author seems to commit a non sequitur an enthymematic argument is present---i.e., a premise has been left unstated. Some contemporary logicians would identify the fallacy as an ignoratio elenchi, an irrelevant conclusion. This contemporary interpretation is not entirely in keeping with Aristotle's characterization of the fallacy. (See Aristotle, On Sophistical Refutations, (White Fish, Montana: Kessinger Publishing, 2004. 11.) Literally, ignoratio elenchi is "ignorance of the nature of how something is refuted," so for the present, let's just keep to the designation of non sequitur.
What premise would be necessary to make the argument valid? We can simplify the argument as follows:
The Greeks took rhetoric seriously at the time of Homer and Athens' Golden Age.
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Therefore, people today should take rhetoric seriously.
With the premise "All arts taken seriously at the time of the Greeks are also taken seriously today,' we could construct a valid argument, assuming rhetoric is one of the arts. Ignoring for the moment the modal "should" for simplicity, would this, then, be the argument implied by Corbett?
All cases of arts taken seriously in ancient Greece are instances of arts taken seriously by people today.
All examples of rhetoric are cases of arts taken seriously in ancient Greece.
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All examples of rhetoric are instances of arts taken seriously today.
Apparently not. There are two problems with this argument. Although the argument is valid, it's clearly unsound. First, some Greek arts are no longer practiced today, and second, the Greeks, of course, would be unaware of contemporary uses of rhetoric.
Corbett undoubtedly would be aware of these objections; in fact, he writes several pages later in reference to an unrelated point:
The dominant values of a society may change with the passage of time---today, for instance, we put more of a premium on actions that contribute to the common welfare than on actions that contribute only to a person's honor---but the basic human passions and motivations are the same today as they were in Homer's day. (Corbett, 14.)
Corbett clearly states in the first part of the quotation the values of the Greeks are different in some respects from the values today. But note how if we interpret the last independent clause of the quotation, the sense of the original argument might be rewritten in such a manner as to avoid the charge of non sequitur:
All basic human passions and motivations in ancient Greece are basic human passions and motivations of people today.
Rhetoric is a basic human passion and motivation in ancient Greece.
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Therefore, rhetoric is a basic human passion and motivation of people today.
We can extend the principle of charity only so far though. In our attempt to save Corbett's enthusiastic support of the importance of rhetoric by our paraphrased substitute, valid, and arguably sound argument, we have strayed far and wide from his original argument.
Specifically, Corbett's conclusion was we must take Odysseus' oration to Achilles just as seriously as did the other Greeks present at the battle. The reason for this odd conclusion is that the rhetorical tradition in Homer's time and Athens' Golden Age was well established. Our rational reconstruction is a quite different argument. We have exceeded the requirement of attempting a sympathetic understanding of an argument before educing criticism.
The charitable conclusion, then, is, in spite of Corbett's use of the conclusion indicator "so," the probable original intent of the passage is emotive rather than logical. Often, it seems to me, apparent non sequiturs are intended to be expressive language use.
In the Corbett example, our conclusion is confirmed ten pages later when Corbett states, "Practices and principles should not be retained simply because they are venerable with age" (Corbett, 24). This statement indicates support would have been necessary anyway for the major premise of our ill-fated final attempt to complete to provide a charitable argument.
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