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Notes on Logic:

Informal, Deductive, and Inductive

Posts tagged with "hasty generalization"

Secundum quid

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I was browsing through an old philosophy vocabulary book and reached the following entry:

Fallacy--Fallacia a Dicto Secundum quid ad Dictum Simpliciter, when a term is used, in one premiss, in a limited, and in the other in an unlimited sense; as, the Ethiopioan is white as to his teeth, therefore he is white.

(Charles P. Krauth, A Vocabulary of the Philosophical Sciences, (New York: Sheddon & Company, 1879), 192.)

Fifty years later, a popular logic book discussed the fallacy in this manner:

A dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid ... arguing from a general rule to a special case, without allowing for the special circumstances... A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. This is the converse of the preceding type of fallacy, and consists in arguing from what holds good in special circumstances to a general rule in which those circumstances are ignored. For example, the fact that certain things (e.g., the destruction of enemy life and property, etc.) are allowed in the special circumstances of warfare, is no ground for allowing them in peace time.

(A. Wolf, Textbook of Logic (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1930), 361-362.)

Amazing! In the first quotation from Krauth, we have an instance of what is usually called the fallacy of Composition, and in the second quotation from Wolf, we have an instance of what is usually called hasty generalization.

Interestingly enough, Charles P. Krauth, in the 1879 volume, decscribes Wolf's A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter as Fallacia Accidentis (Krauth, 191)!

The distinction between hasty generalization and Composition was outlined earlier in this blog under the topic of Generalities and Specificities in Inference. It seems to me I recall one or two current logic textbooks making a similar confusion.

It may well be that the Secundum quid fallacies historically conflated hasty generalization and Composition and conflated the fallacies of Accident and Division, also. Yet, A. Wolf in the second book quoted above lists Accident separately as belonging to the category of "Verbal Fallacies" and the Secundum quid's as "Non-Verbal Fallacies," which seems to me to be entirely correct only if Secundum quid is interpreted with respect to parts and wholes.

I'm also curious about textbooks in the sciences, especially biology, handle these reasoning processes. It seems to me almost every college biology textbook on the market gets the distinction between deduction and induction wrong. I would guess, as well, there might be some confusion between hasty generalization and Composition since both processes are fruitful sources of first hypotheses in the science of discovery.

More on Hasty Generalization

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One of the reasons there is some controversy over informal fallacy identification is simply that the fallacies are not formal--the mistake in reasoning is based on content rather than structure of the purported proof.

Undoubtedly, there will never be consensus on the specific varieties of informal fallacies. Consider this example from Time magazine's Jeff Chu's interview of Shirin Ebadi, human-rights activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner.

Jeff Chu writes:

You have described yourself as stubborn. Does your husband find it exasperating to argue with you?



She replies:

My husband and I rarely argue. I want to tell you something interesting: I believe so strongly in equality that I have even filled my family life with it. My husband and I have two daughters. The elder looks like her mother but has chosen her father's profession--she is an engineer. My younger daughter looks like her father, but her character is like mine. For this reason, she is becoming a lawyer. So you can see we have divided our world equally. There is nothing to fight about.


(Jeff Chu, "10 Questions for Shirin Ebadi," Time 167 No. 20 (May 15, 2006), 6.)

Normally, this fallacy would be cited as an ignoratio elenchi since the resemblance of the individual children to the respective parent is clearly irrelevant, without additional premises, to the lack of parental conflict.

Nevertheless, the main direction of the reasoning seems to be the claim that since she and her husband have nonconflicting interests in their children, it follows that they do not argue about the children. And, since they do not argue about their children, there is nothing "to fight about."

The argument commits the fallacy of hasty generalization primarily because of the presupposition of the truth of the generalization that all there is to fight about for Shirin Ebadi and her husband is their conflicting interests in their children. But, of course, there are many exceptions to this general rule.

Evident also is the reasoning based on the notion of equality. The fallacy here is the opposite of hasty generalization--the fallacy of Accident. Shirin Ebadi's argument runs like this: In world affairs with equality among nations, there is nothing to fight about. Therefore, in married life with equality among husband and wife, there is nothing to fight about.

The fallacy of Accident occurs since there is no reason to suppose a deductive relation between the politics of nations and the politics of family life.
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